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SUMMARY
In the period between the First and Second World Wars evacuation carne to be seen as a
military necessity in the event of future hostilities. In anticipation of immediate and
devastating bombardment of London and other British centres of economic and
strategic importance, the organised removal of 'non-essential' groups of civilians from
vulnerable areas was regarded as vital in order to save lives, preserve public morale and
prevent universal panic. This thesis studies the effects of official evacuation schemes
which were operated during the Second World War. Firstly, the background to
planning is outlined, with particular attention to organisation for evacuation from
Sheffield. Secondly, preparations for departure, the operation of the 'Pied Piper'
programme, and resistance to evacuation, particularly with regard to Sheffield, are
covered, together with reactions in reception areas and methods employed in the
selection of billets. Thirdly, difficulties encountered in the reception areas, complaints
about evacuees, the premature drift homeward of evacuees and problems of education,
both nationally and locally, are discussed. Later evacuation plans, leading to the
'Trickle' scheme and its accompanying problems, as well as overseas evacuation, the
effects of the Sheffield blitz. and further government planning are described. Finally
Operation 'Rivulet' (the 'flying bomb' evacuation) and the implications of the change
for the city of Sheffield from an evacuation zone to a reception area for victims of
rocket attacks in 1944 is examined, concluding with the final stages of the evacuation
scheme. Evacuation was an event of major social importance: massive upheaval
followed, conflicting cultures of urban and rural life were exposed and the gaping
chasm between classes was laid bare. The British public did not flee in unruly disorder:
on the contrary, countless thousands resisted evacuation - none more so than the people
of Sheffield. The reasons for this, and the broader significance of evacuation in the
'people's war', are also suggested.
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1INTRODUCTION
"The most part of them did convey their aged fathers and
mothers, their wives and little children, into the city of Troezen,
where the Troezenians received them very lovingly and gently.
For they gave order that they should be entertained of the
common charge, [... ] and suffered the young children to gather
fruit wheresoever they found it, and furthermore, did hire
schoolmasters at the charge of the commonwealth, to bring them
up at school."
The above is Plutarch's description of the official evacuation of the civilian population
of Athens as a military necessity during the Persian invasion in 480 BC.1 Nearly two
and a half thousand years later, another official evacuation of a civilian population as a
military necessity took place when invasion threatened western Europe.
During the first three days of September 1939, at the outbreak of the Second World
War, nearly 1,500,000 British people left their homes under the government's
evacuation scheme.' Many thousands of town- and city-dwellers, who may never in
their lives have ventured more than a few miles from home, found themselves
transported at very short notice to places they had not even heard of before. At the
same time, countless others made their own arrangements and removed themselves
independently from areas of danger to places of safety. It was a huge exodus, hitherto
unknown in Britain. Further movements of the civilian population took place under
official schemes in ensuing years, notably in 1940 as the threat of invasion loomed and
1 Vita Themistoclis, 10, S (North's translation), cited in R M Titmuss: Essays on 'The Welfare State', p.77
2 R M Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy, History of the Second World War, p.33 [all further reference
to this author will concern this publication]
2with the onset of the Blitzkrieg on major industrial areas; throughout 1941 when
bombing raids were intermittently increased, and again in 1944 when Germany
unleashed its unmanned rocket attacks on London and the south of England.
Experiences of the Home Front in the First World War had brought home to the British
government the fact that in any future hostilities the country would no longer be safe
from invasion. Britain's island status, which had afforded protection over many
centuries, had been breached by German zeppelin and aeroplane attacks. In the light of
this, and in the expectation that technology would continue to make rapid advances and
extend the range of aircraft, the government anticipated that in the event of war aerial
bombardment greater than anything ever known before would put the civilian
population in the front line and devastate industrial centres throughout the country.
Faced with this formidable prospect, Britain clearly had to be prepared to defend itself;
but it was difficult to judge accurately the threat posed by this new method of warfare.
In 1922 the possibility of a daily onslaught for an indefinite period upon London of
seventy-five tons of high explosives was anticipated. Thereafter estimates were
continually revised, reaching a peak in March 1939when the Air Ministry warned of a
possible seven hundred tons each day for the first two weeks. with an unknown quantity
thenceforth." Working on the basis of air-raid casualties suffered in 1917-18, the
Ministry assumed in 1924 that there would be fifty casualties per ton of bombs dropped:
3 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.4-,6
3by 1938 the Air Raid Precautions Department had increased the figure to seventy-two
per ton,"
In hindsight it is clear that these estimates were vastly over-stated: the reality was that
when war was finally declared. no bombs fell at all during the first months. and the total
weight of those dropped by piloted aircraft in the whole of the war never reached the
amount predicted in 1939 for the first fourteen days. Bell held that part of the difficulty
in forecasting was that intelligence reports of Germany's strength were often wide of
the mark. S However. it may be argued that the authorities faced an almost impossible
task in attempting to assess a situation which was unprecedented in history.
It was in the light of popular reaction to German air attacks in the First World War that.
in the inter-war years. the British government conceived its evacuation scheme. In 1917
Londoners were said to have panicked and caused rail and road chaos in their efforts to
flee from danger." Fearing a breakdown in law and order in the event of even greater
and more devastating aerial bombardment. the government considered evacuation of
certain groups of civilians from target areas in any future hostilities to be a military
necessity. The chief priority for the authorities would necessarily be the prosecution of
war. but an important consideration would also be the extent to which the civilian
population might impede the war effort.
4 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.13, 14
sp MHBeU: The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, p.180
6 Titmuss: op. cit., p.18
4The main objectives of the evacuation scheme were to preserve lives and to facilitate
civil defence by removing non-essential members of the country's urban population
from target areas, dispersing them into areas of safety. The priority groups were
defined in 1938 as: (a) school children to be removed as school units in the charge of
their teachers; (b) younger children accompanied by their mothers or some other
responsible person; (c) expectant mothers; (d) adult blind persons and cripples whose
removal was feasible.' In the interests of military necessity and public morale it was
vital that any evacuation from the cities should be carried out in an efficient and orderly
manner, under official direction."
The government evacuation scheme was conceived to cover the whole of Britain, but
there were regional variations in its operation. Wales was not to be involved in
evacuating its population, but was much concerned in reception. In Scotland, children
did not go out in school parties but were evacuated with their mothers," In England, in
addition to large numbers of mothers with their young children evacuating under the
official scheme in the first days of September 1939, this first movement alone included
nearly 827,000 school children travelling in school parties with their teachers and other
voluntary helpers but without their parents."
The mass of complicated arrangements required in planning the evacuation scheme
called for a vast amount of administrative work. This involved dividing up the country
7 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.33,34
8 PRO. ED. 138149
9 Titmuss, op. cit., p.551, n.l
10 ibid., p.I03
5into evacuation, neutral and reception areas; liaising between countless numbers of
local authorities; surveying receiving districts for billets; recruiting officials, escorts and
foster parents. The co-ordination of transport to take the refugees by bus, coach, train
and even by boat away from areas of perceived danger was a massive task. Financing
the operation was necessarily a vitally important factor.
But despite all the forward planning, this thesis will argue, the architects of the scheme
had little inkling of what it all meant to the people actually involved. Planners saw the
exercise in terms of numbers rather than of people: in consequence, human feelings
were neglected because there was little or no consultation with those who were to be
most affected. Parents were expected to send their children away at very short notice to
unknown destinations to live with strangers for an indefinite period of time. not
knowing when they would see them again. Those responsible for drawing up the plans
simply did not understand that this was an unbearable and incomprehensible concept
for close-knit, mainly working-class families of the inner cities.
The first operation necessarily received the most attention for, because it was a
movement of unprecedented scale, it is the most documented. But evacuation in Britain
involved a constant migration of its inhabitants, with an estimated 4,000,000 people
dealt with officially under the various government schemes which developed according
to need throughout the war. II There is no way of accurately calculating the numbers of
those who made their own private arrangements, for no records were kept of individuals
who did not call upon official agencies for help.
11 H L Smith (ed): War and Social Change, p.7
6Although the first government programme, code-narned 'Operation Pied Piper', was
initially seen as a blue-print for further official schemes, it quickly becarne apparent
that it could not be adhered to slavishly. Even at the outset substantial changes were
made to the programme. When it was seen that the number of travellers was so much
smaller than expected the original four-day plan was suddenly compressed into three
days, resulting in chaos in many evacuation and reception areas. In such a massive
undertaking as this, it is perhaps extraordinary that there was not a single reported
casualty or serious accident. 12 Yet it was surely inevitable that, at both local and
national level, mistakes were made in carrying out the first official Evacuation Plan.
How could it be otherwise? Aerial warfare on the scale expected had never previously
been encountered: neither had any government or local authority been called upon
before to implement such a huge movement of its people within such a short time. The
first imperative was to get large groups of non-essential citizens away from danger:
what happened in the reception areas was necessarily regarded as of secondary
importance.
As German troops swept through Western Europe invasion becarne a very real threat to
Britain. Southern and eastern coastal towns, earlier designated reception or neutral
areas, were rapidly re-classified as danger zones, and some evacuees experienced their
second move as they (and their hosts) were hastily transferred inland. When the long-
dreaded bombing materialised, the 'Trickle' programme dealt with further movements
of refugees from air-raids on industrial centres: some parents, hitherto apathetic or
unwilling to evacuate their children, were frightened into action and sent them away.
12 Titmuss, op. cit., p.101
7Further evacuation took place throughout 1940 and 1941, largely dictated by the
frequency and ferocity of enemy action on civilian targets. Attacks by unmanned
aircraft in 1944 brought the last evacuations of the war, in Operation 'Rivulet'. Many
of the early mistakes and grievances were rectified as time went on, but others
continued to the end of the migrations.
Evacuation proved to be an exercise of major social importance. Massive upheaval
ensued. Not only was a significant degree of dislocation of the urban population
produced as thousands of families were broken up; in rural districts domestic privacy
was invaded, and the education system became a shambles in both evacuation and
reception areas. Conflicting cultures of urban and rural life were exposed: class
divisions, though to some extent initially over-ridden in the interests of efficiency,
revealed yawning chasms which led to problems in many reception areas. It may be an
over-simplification to state that those in the upper and middle classes were the most
likely to make their own private evacuation arrangements, independent of the
government scheme. But, because it was mainly the inner areas of Britain's major
industrial centres which were the most likely targets, the fact was that the great majority
of' official' evacuees were from the working class and many of them were poor.
There is no doubt that the country at large suffered a profound shock when Operation
'Pied Piper' exposed the social conditions of large towns and cities in Britain. On the
one hand, ordinary people in villages and country towns struggled to cope with the
physical problems encountered as they were compelled to share their homes with
strangers who often arrived ill-clad and ill-equipped for life in a completely alien
environment, who seemed to adhere to entirely different standards of behaviour. On the
8the other, the middle and upper classes throughout the land were rocked by the
revelations of poverty and deprivation endured by the masses who inhabited the inner
cities - problems which had hitherto been overlooked or denied. Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain, an erstwhile 'progressive' Health Minister in Baldwin's government,
wrote at this time to his sister:
"She [Dorothy] tells us of how one hostess said to her I never
knew that such conditions existed, and I feel ashamed of having
been so ignorant of my neighbours. ,,13
This statement has been mistakenly attributed to Chamberlain himself 14 Nevertheless,
the sentiments expressed may well have reflected the Premier's feelings and those of
many of his class.
It has often been claimed that an important outcome of the evacuation which took place
in the Second World War was the breaking down of class barriers: but the reality, it may
be argued, was somewhat different. Certainly it had early been foreseen that in the
event of wartime emergency it would not be possible to cater for individual needs, and
official schemes for evacuation were therefore intended to be carried out irrespective of
class, race or creed. What had not been anticipated was the shock received by middle-
class householders as children from poor inner-city areas were delivered to their
doorsteps. However, it may be argued that even if it had been possible to match
evacuees with foster families of similar social status and religion, the strain on urban
13Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain (Dorothy was Chamberlain's daughter): Neville Chamberlain
Papers, University ofBirmingbam Library, ref NC.181111121 (courtesy ofR Mee)
14 The source of the error appears to be P Addison: The Road to 1945, p.72. Among those who have
followed Addison are J MacnicoL "The effect of the evacuation of schoolchildren on official attitudes to
State intervention" in H L Smith (ed): War and Social Change: British Society in the Second World
War, p.8, and A Davies WhereDid the Forties Go?, p.28
9and rural peoples forced to live together for an indefinite period of time would have
been too great in any case and the experience was always destined to end unhappily.
Some of the hostility shown by householders towards their 'guests' was inevitable and
often understandable. Although the government strongly urged parents to send their
children out of the cities, it stopped short at compulsion - sensing that such a course
would be doomed to failure. But rural people felt aggrieved, for while evacuation itself
was voluntary, the billeting of evacuees was not: the Civil Defence Act of 1939
empowered the government to compel local authorities to receive evacuees and obliged
householders to take them in.IS Moreover, complaints were soon heard that wealthy
owners of 'big houses' in rural areas were allowed to shirk their responsibilities while
advantage was taken of poorer villagers. When the newcomers arrived, hosts were
outraged at the condition and behaviour of some: there was a furious outcry as the press
took up and publicised critical accounts coming in from reception areas across Britain:
in consequence, evacuees were universally condemned and stigmatised.
Despite the best intentions of officialdom, class differences could not be avoided.
While evacuation was a human problem which transcended class, its operation was
dictated by human factors. Upper- and middle-class parents in danger zones could
avoid many of the problems of official programmes by evacuating themselves and their
children privately. Some international companies set up their own schemes offering
safe havens abroad for the families of their employees. In addition, there were groups
of American intellectuals who offered sanctuary to the children of their British
15 T' . 88rtmuss: op. CIt., p.
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counterparts.l" The gulf between the classes was surely typified by Harold Nicolson
who, while poor and working-class parents in city tenements were struggling to send
their children away with the bare minimum of a change of clothing, wrote to his wife,
Vita Sackville-West:
"You will have to get the Buick in a fit state to start with a full
petrol-tank. You should put inside it some food for 24 hours,
and pack in the back your jewels and my diaries. You will want
clothes and anything else very precious, but the rest will have to
be left behind.r'"
Millions of civilians were deeply affected by evacuation, especially at the outbreak of
war but also in 1940 after the onset of air-raids, and again in the rocket attacks of 1944
and 1945. Moreover, it was not only evacuees whose lives were changed, sometimes
for ever. Parents and grandparents, brothers and sisters, teachers who left their own
families to move with the children were also affected, as well as the many volunteers
who helped to organise the scheme or acted as escorts on long journeys - and that was
only in the evacuation areas. In the reception areas evacuation also took its toll: it
dominated the lives of foster parents and their families, billeting officers, voluntary
workers, teachers and indigenous school children who had to share their facilities with
the incomers. Even those living in neutral areas did not escape its impact, as some
families from the other zones moved house rather than give up their children or open
their homes to strangers. Considering this, it is perhaps curious that so little has been
written about this migration: indeed, it seems to the writer that there has been a dearth
16 A Spokes Symonds (eel): Havens Across the Sea, p.l
17N Nicolson (eel): Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters 1939-1945, p.88
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of research on evacuation in its entirety and little attempt to place it within the context
of the history of the war.
In researching the subject it has largely been necessary to refer to relevant parts of more
general works on the Second World War. By far the most outstanding work is the
volume by R M Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy, which forms part of the series The
Official History of the Second World War and includes within it perhaps the most
comprehensive and detailed information on British evacuation available anywhere.
Despite the passage of fifty years since the end of hostilities, Titmuss' s factual
information remains unchallenged, though his belief that class differences became less
defined as a result of evacuation is more open to question. Because it is the only work
of its kind, this volume has of necessity been extensively consulted for statistical
details, not only in this thesis but also by all of the authors of books on evacuation since
its publication in 1950.
There appear to have been few attempts to examine the subject as closely since then,
although recent exceptions are Bob Holman: TheEvacuation: A VeryBritish Revolution
and Richard Samways: We Think You Ought to Go: An Account of the Evacuation of
Children from London during the Second World War, both published in 1995, and
Martin Parsons: "I '/I Take That One ": Dispelling the Myths of Civilian Evacuation
1939-45, published in December 1998. In the 1980s the wealth of wartime documents
made available by the Public Record Office attracted mainly American authors to
publish detailed accounts, namely Carlton Jackson: Who Will Take Our Children?
(chiefly concerned with overseas evacuation), Travis L Crosby: The Impact of Civilian
Evacuation in the Second World War, and Ruth Inglis: The Children's War: Evacuation
12
1939-1945. There have also been some recent efforts to treat the subject historically,
mainly for school pupils by, for instance, Derek Johnson: Exodus of Children, Fiona
Reynoldson: TheHome Front: Evacuation and Martin Parsons: Evacuation.
Various useful surveys were made on behalf of particular agencies during the actual
course of the war, especially in the early years. Among these, perhaps the most notable
researchers in 1940 were Richard Padley and Margaret Cole, who produced their
Evacuation Survey for the Fabian Society, and Susan Isaacs, whose Cambridge
Evacuation Survey was funded by the Mental Health Emergency Committee and carried
out by a committee of social workers, sociologists, psychologists, teachers and
psychotherapists, concentrating on the reception of a relatively small number of
children. In the same year Women's Institutes in villages throughout the country
reported members' experiences in Town Children Through Country Eyes: A Survey of
Evacuation. The Hygiene Committee of the Women's Group on Public Welfare
produced an important report, Our Towns: A Close-Up, in 1943. The problem is that,
because these surveys were undertaken during the course of the war and not afterwards,
their findings, however scholarly, were surely necessarily limited.
While professionals and voluntary bodies collected and published on evacuation mostly
as seen from the reception areas, evacuees' views have been largely overlooked by
historians and sociologists. True, there exist a few excellent anecdotal collections,
notably by Bryan Johnson: The Evacuees and Ben Wicks: No Time to Wave Goodbye,
and The Day They Took the Children, as well as some personal accounts of evacuees'
own experiences, such as Bryan Breed: I Know a Rotten Place: An Evacuee's Story
Forty Years On and head teacher Judith Grunfeld's account: Shefford: The Story of a
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Jewish School Community in Evacuation, 1939-1945. One reason for this lack of
research on evacuees may be that the majority came from the poor, urban working class
who were less articulate and certainly carried less political clout than their hosts and
hostesses.
In the light of the country's first devastating experiences of evacuation, which were
revealed within days and so widely publicised, several articles were contributed by
educational psychologists, teachers and educationists to publications such as The British
Journal of Educational Psychology and Education, the official organ of the Association
of Education Committees, in the early years of the war. However, after the first flush of
enthusiasm and concern, interest in the subject appears to have dwindled until in 1944
and 1945 only one or two journal articles can be found. Some sociologists also
responded to the problems thrown up in the first two or three years of the war by
publishing articles in, for example, Social Work. Again, it appears that their interest
waned as the war progressed. There seems to have been a mild revival in the local
effect of evacuation in the past few years, as evidenced by a few articles in History of
Education (1989) and History of Education Society Bulletin (1992).
Through evacuation the eyes of the country as a whole, and of the establishment in
particular, were opened to facts of urban poverty and squalid living conditions which
had previously been hidden or ignored. Some historians, notably Titmuss," hold that
these revelations were a major factor in the development of social reforms in the years
18 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.507-11
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immediately following the war. In the 1980s Jackson agreed," but Macnicol took issue
with this theory, pointing to the fact that many measures had already been mooted
before 1939.20 More recently Holman asserts that evacuation was the catalyst which
pushed the government into making the plans a reality;21and Parsons concurs with this
view.22 Crosby, on the other hand, holds that the main impact was political - that
evacuation revealed to the urban poor the realities of class and privilege" and voting
patterns were changed, leading to the Labour landslide victory of 1945. The view that
class attitudes became more egalitarian was strongly defended by many, including
Titmuss," and just as energetically opposed by others such as Macnicol." These
arguments, however, will not form a part of this thesis, for its purpose is not to evaluate
any perceived change in class attitudes or provision of social services which mayor
may not have been brought about by evacuation, but to trace its effect upon the people
of Sheffield, and upon school children in particular.
It has been necessary to try to gain an insight into the problems encountered in both the
evacuation and the reception areas. Questions are addressed about reasons for the
reluctance of parents (and in particular the marked unwillingness of Sheffield people) to
respond to official demands to send children away from areas of perceived danger, and
for the early return of so many of those who did initially obey the government's call.
19 C Jackson: Who Will Take Our Children?, p.187
20 Macnicol: op. cit., p.22
21 B Holman: Evacuation: A Ve", British Experience, p.129
22 M L Parsons: "/'11 Take That One ", p.211
23 T L Crosby: The Impact ojCivilian Evacuation in the Second World War, p.146
24 Titmuss: op. cit., p.S08
2S Macnicol: op. cit., p.21
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Why did some children remain in the reception areas, despite the fact that so many of
their peers had gone home? What part did social class play, not only in the
arrangements made by parents for their children, but in the operation of the scheme in
the rural areas of Britain? How were the children received by foster parents, many of
whom were forced to take them against their will in the first place? What happened
about education? Did later schemes receive a better response - or was it a case of 'once
bitten, twice shy' on both sides?
A detailed study has been undertaken of evacuation as it affected the citizens of
Sheffield, and in particular its school children. This city was chosen because it is seen
as particularly interesting. As a major industrial centre many of its inner-city districts
were designated 'evacuation zones' and extensive plans were drawn up for a massive
programme to move school children with their teachers, as well as mothers with young
children and other priority groups, away from these perceived danger areas at the
beginning of the war. Other districts in and surrounding the city were deemed to be
neutral, and no mass movement of people was undertaken officially, although many
people evacuated themselves privately from these areas. No areas of the city itself were
designated reception areas at the outset, but in 1944 Sheffield did become a receiving
area for upwards of 10,000 evacuees, both official and unofficial, fleeing from German
VI and V2 rocket attacks on London and southern England. The city can, therefore,
claim to have witnessed all sides of the evacuation experience and may be said to be
worthy of investigation for this reason alone.
But there is another, arguably more pressing, reason for inquiring into the effect of
evacuation on Sheffield. Despite all the detailed planning, fewer than nine thousand
16
people left the city under the first programme." The percentage of eligible children
evacuated fell lamentably below that of every other county borough in England, with
the sole exception of its close neighbour, Rotherham, which was not designated a
danger zone until late in the day. The comparison between Sheffield's 15% and, for
instance, Salford's 76% or Manchester's 69%27 is patently worthy of study.
Furthermore, by 5 December 1939 more than half of the few who had been evacuated
from Sheffield had returned.P and by the following month less than one tenth of the
city's eligible children remained in the reception areas - again, among the lowest in the
land." Even the serious blitz on the city in December 1940 did not persuade the
majority of parents to send their children away.
What was the reason for this abysmal response? Little enlightenment has been
forthcoming from local publications on the history of Sheffield: even those concerning
the city during the Second World War either ignore the subject altogether or merely
make passing reference to evacuation. A member of Sheffield Local Studies Library
staff reflected the popular misconception of the city's role to the author of this thesis:
"There is very little in the library on Sheffield evacuation in 1939 - they were all back
within a month, weren't they?" Many people who were of school age or older and who
lived in danger zones during the war years believe that no evacuation took place from
the city at all. Local newspapers appear to support in some measure Ritchie Calder's
contention, that Sheffield had prepared early for evacuating children to selected and
26 Sheffield Education Committee: Survey April 1939 -March 1947, p.4
27 Titmuss: op cit., p.SSO,1
2& ibid., p.544
29 ibid., p.173
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familiar areas of Derbyshire," and it was the government's intervention which caused a
backlash from parents, resulting in the failure of the programme locally. But it will be
asserted that many leading councillors, too, played a part in the city's poor showing.
In an effort to seek answers, a thorough investigation of available primary sources has
been undertaken. An extensive search of Sheffield Archives has been made: it is clear
that much weeding of records has taken place, but draft minutes of some committees
dealing with civil defence were unearthed, which are listed in the Bibliography to this
thesis and which gave a few invaluable insights into the planning and execution of
evacuation programmes as they affected the city. The printed minutes of meetings of
Sheffield City Council and of its Education Committee for the years 1937-1947 have
been consulted but do not yield very much detail: enlightenment regarding bald
statements of 'Reports received' has often been forthcoming only by consulting
provincial newspapers of the period.
A list of all the schools scheduled for evacuation was obtained from Sheffield
Education Department Library and it was hoped to make an extensive survey of the log-
books of at least the majority of these in an effort to shed some light on
communications between school officials and parents, as well as on preparations for
and operation of the various evacuation programmes, not only in 1939 but after the blitz
on the city in December 1940. It was anticipated that an interesting picture would
emerge of experiences of staff and pupils in the reception areas and of how teachers
coped with educating the children in their charge in new environments.
30 R Calder, "The School Child" inR Padley &M Cole (eds): Evacuation Survey, p.14S
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Unfortunately, of the seventy-five schools listed, log-books were available in the
Sheffield Archives for only sixteen. Some schools had been bombed during the war,
many had closed during the intervening fifty years, and a few head teachers have
retained their log-books. Twenty-nine log-books covering the various departments of
the sixteen schools had been deposited at the Archives and these, together with some
other log books of schools in neutral areas, were scrutinised - with, however, a
somewhat disappointing result. Many head teachers made scant mention of either
planning or the event itself, recording only the barest details of this momentous event in
their school's history, and some ignored it altogether. Of the few who made more than
a passing reference to the subject only one or two gave detailed information regarding
the exodus from Sheffield and arrival in the reception area. School admissions
registers, which may have proved useful indicators of the extent of wartime migration,
were not accessible in these Archives, being subject to closure for seventy-fiveyears.
As in the case of Sheffield Archives, with the passage of time many files held in both
the Leicestershire Record Office and in Nottinghamshire Archives have been subject to
considerable weeding, and many records have no doubt been lost in this way.
Leicestershire's Attendance Registers of Evacuated School Parties were useful in
highlighting the ebb and flow of Sheffield's evacuee school children in that county, but
unfortunately no similar records exist for Nottinghamshire. Nevertheless, extensive
searches were made in both of these departments and some log-books and admissions
registers were traced. These were inspected, with more favourable results: life in small
country schools in the reception areas was significantly affected by the influx of
numbers of town children and this may account for more detailed record-keeping.
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The Local Studies Departments of Central Libraries in the cities of Leicester,
Nottingham and Sheffield were visited, as well as several local libraries in the reception
areas. Minutes of meetings of the relevant County Councils and Education Committees
were combed, as well as Reports of School Medical Officers for the appropriate period.
The former yielded only limited information, with greater detail being provided by local
newspaper reports of the meetings; but the latter proved more productive. Some local
libraries were found to hold published and unpublished works recording wartime
reminiscences of local people, but with one exception (J Perry et at (eds): Shepshed:
Wartime Memories) these contained little more than passing reference to evacuation.
While strenuous efforts were made to discover how Sheffield and its receiving areas
coped with the problem of evacuation in the early years of hostilities, the question of
migration into the city, when the tables were turned in 1944 and former evacuation and
neutral zones became reception areas, has not been overlooked. Little written reference
to this subject was found in school log-books or in Sheffield City Council and
Education Committee Minutes although some details were discovered in draft Minutes
of the city's Emergency Committee for Civil Defence. It was necessary, therefore, to
consult newspaper reports which were prolific at first but few and far between after the
arrival of several parties of evacuees, and to conduct oral interviews. The conclusion
reached was that, although there was sympathy with the victims of rocket attacks, this
evacuation was an event of comparatively little significance in the life of the city, at a
time when the interest of ordinary people in the war was waning and it was generally
accepted that victory would be achieved.
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The voices of evacuees themselves have largely gone unheard and ignored by historians
despite the fact that this vast migration created a huge impact both on a personal level,
upon the individuals concerned, and on a wider level, upon British wartime society as a
whole. It has been impossible, of course, to collect an account of the full effect of
evacuation upon those who were involved; but some oral interviews have been
undertaken with former evacuees who travelled under official government schemes and
with others whose parents made arrangements privately, as well as with teachers who
accompanied school parties and householders who opened their homes to refugees.
Due to the passage of time and increasing age of the subjects, it was easier to find
former evacuees than it was to locate representatives of other categories.
Interviews have provided fascinating, and often moving, reminiscences and have
yielded much interesting information, not only in regard to the mechanics of evacuation
as it affected those involved, but more importantly in gaining an insight into the
children's feelings about leaving home and their experiences of reception, in particular
of billets and foster parents. In this way it has been possible to obtain some (necessarily
limited) overall view of the subject, particularly as it affected Sheffield people.
Nevertheless, it must be accepted that memories may be somewhat unreliable after
more than half a century has passed: they can be unconsciously selective and they may
not always be accurate, however genuinely interviewees believe them to be. Interviews
cannot, therefore, be considered as conclusive evidence: they can, however, be useful in
illustrating points made by historians, and it is in this context that those conducted in
the course of this research have been used.
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With regard to other primary sources, Mass-Observation Archives provided a body of
data expressing the views of ordinary people about life in Britain during the war and
revealing illuminating insights into opinions of the 'man or woman in the street' (or
village) on evacuees and evacuation. The Imperial War Museum contains many diaries
and personal accounts, some of which were consulted; none, however, referred
specifically to the situation regarding Sheffield. Likewise, although the Public Record
Office merited thorough investigation and yielded much interesting information, little
was discovered which expressly related to evacuation out of and, in the latter part of the
war, into this particular area. Hansard was consulted for reports of Parliamentary
debates on the subject.
Contemporary newspapers, which were the chief form of communication at the time
and helped to form public opinion of both national and local issues, have been combed.
The Times was largely relied upon for the national perspective, while Sheffield,
Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire publications gave local information in both the
evacuating and receiving areas under special scrutiny. In Sheffield, coverage after the
first exodus was often meagre and relegated to inside pages, the front pages being given
over to the progress of war. The 'Letters' columns and editorials have provided
disappointingly little indication of local opinion of evacuation in either Sheffield or its
many reception areas, both in reference to the planning stages of the programme and its
operation. Whether this was due to apathy of readers and contributors, to an editorial
policy opposed to 'rocking the boat', or in accordance with official government policy
can only be surmised - but, seen from a present-day viewpoint, such reticence on the
part of those most closely involved seems remarkable.
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The officials who conceived the government scheme could have no comprehension of
the enormous impact that their plans would make on the lives of vast numbers of the
population of Britain. How, it may be asked, could these upper- and middle-class,
mainly male and military architects of evacuation, who traditionally sent their own
young children away from their comfortable homes at an early age to boarding schools
apparently without a qualm, understand the enormity of their demands upon the close-
knit families of the poor? The answer would seem to lie in the fact that they could not
comprehend, because it was outside the realm of their experience.
This thesis begins by studying the background to the government evacuation scheme.
Various plans devised by the British government in its efforts, firstly, to safeguard law
and order and, secondly, to protect the civilian population are outlined, with particular
attention to organisation for evacuation from Sheffield. Preparations for departure,
including problems which arose at stations and on journeys are described, and responses
to evacuation are discussed. Thirdly, the arrival of evacuees and muddles at detraining
points, methods of selection and the shortfall in numbers arriving are covered. The
fourth and fifth chapters are concerned with difficulties encountered in the reception
areas, including complaints against evacuees, parental visits and billeting anomalies,
problems of private evacuation, the drift homeward of evacuees and education. Chapter
Six describes the 'Trickle' evacuation and its accompanying problems, as well as
overseas evacuation, the effects of the Sheffield blitz, and further government planning.
Before concluding, the last chapter examines the 'flying bomb' evacuation and its
implications for the people of Sheffield and the fmal stages of the evacuation scheme.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE BACKGROUND TO PLANNING
The government evacuation scheme had its roots in the air raids of the First World War,
when enemy bombing had demonstrated that Britain, hitherto protected for centuries by
the sea, would henceforth be vulnerable to devastating attack from the air. It was clear
that any future warfare could bring the danger of even more sophisticated and accurate
aerial bombardment than had ever previously been experienced, and that measures must
be taken to prevent the weakening of public morale. One important step, as has been
seen, would be to move non-essential groups of the population away from areas of
perceived danger. What was not so clear at this time, and indeed for many years, was
the enormity of the impact of such a move, in terms of social dislocation, on the morale
of the British people.
It has been argued that the government evacuation scheme was designed "simply and
solely as a military expedient, a counter-move to the enemy's objective of attacking and
demoralising the civilian population."! Only four years after the end of the First World
War, Lord Balfour had warned of the possibility in any future conflict of "a torrent of
high explosives" and "unremitting bombardment of a kind which no city [... ] has ever
had to endure".' When the Committee ofImperial Defence was charged to review civil
defence policy in 1924, a major anxiety of the authorities was not merely the protection
1 R M Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy: History of the Second World War, p.23
2 PRO CAB.3/3 C.I.D.I08-A. 29.5.22, cited in Titmuss: op. cit., p.5
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of the civilian population in the event of war but, at least as important (and arguably
even more so) the prevention of a possible breakdown of law and order. Fears were
based on reports of public reaction to German air attacks in 1917 and 1918, when
thousands of Londoners were said to have fled from the bombing in terror. Some had
sought shelter in underground railway stations, while others were alleged to have
caused rail and road congestion in their efforts to escape from the city, many deserting
posts essential for the maintenance of public services.' This nervous reaction to the air
raids was alleged to have been out of all proportion to their material effect, but in
consequence a preoccupation with panic in the population formed a significant factor in
government planning in ensuing years.
Three hundred tons of bombs had been dropped on the British Isles during the whole of
the First World War. By 1924 the Air Raid Precautions Sub-Committee of the Imperial
Defence Committee was forecasting that in any future hostilities London could be
bombarded with one hundred tons of high explosives and incendiaries in a single day,
which, it was said, would undoubtedly cause hysteria in the population." Continual
upward revision of bombing estimates throughout the following fifteen years did
nothing to lessen official concern about public reaction: on the contrary, the question of
civilian behaviour was a key topic of discussion at successive meetings of the Imperial
Defence Committee in the run-up to war.
It was anxiety about public morale that led the Evacuation Sub-Committee of the
Imperial Defence Committee, appointed in 1931, to consider as a priority, not so much
3 Titmuss: op. cit., p.IS
4 ibid., p.S
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the problem of removing people from danger, but that of preventing panic and <a
disorderly general flight'. An early solution suggested by this Sub-Committee was that
the police force should be expanded so that a cordon could be thrown around the
metropolis.' The authorities' mistrust of the masses was further demonstrated by
Winston Churchill's statement in the House of Commons in November 1934:
"We must expect that under the pressure of continuous air
attack upon London at least 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 people
would be driven out into the open country around the
Metropolis. This vast mass of human beings [... ] would
confront the government of the day with an administrative
problem of the first magnitude.?"
It is evident that this was a general reflection of the attitude of the establishment to the
urban public, for similar fears continued to be expressed throughout the ensuing years -
for instance, the Home Secretary stated in November 1937: "We must have on the
ground a system of air raid precautions that will ensure the country against panic."?
Discussions between the War Office, the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police
from 1937 concluded that extra police, and perhaps even troops, would be needed to
control London's population in the event of a future war involving RIitzkrieg bombing.'
The Ministry of Health was charged to consider arrangements to deal with what it
perceived to be an 'inevitable' increase in cases of neuroses: some estimates held that
these would outnumber physical injuries by three to one." In 1938 the Munich crisis
appeared to bear out government concern about panic in the population, as 150,000
s Titmuss: op. cit., p.18, n.l
6 HoC Deb. 28.11.34, Vol. 295, Col. 859
7 HoC Deb. 15.11.37, Vol. 329, Col. 41
8 Titmuss: op. cit., p.19
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people were reported to have quickly removed themselves from London to Wales and
the West Country, temporarily overloading the railways system. to However, it could be
argued that government action immediately following Munich did not help to calm
fears or strengthen public confidence, as people were informed by wireless and
newspapers that throughout the country the distribution of 38,000,000 gas masks
(already manufactured and in store) was to begin immediately and over two hundred
miles of trenches were to be dug in London and other industrial areas. II At this time
inhabitants of Sheffield, for example, learned that a start had already been made in that
city for 120,000 of its inhabitants had already been fitted with gas masks and work was
in hand to dig several trenches in public parks to accommodate 15,000 people."
Despite the early start, however, some Sheffield people had still not received their gas
masks by May the following year.13
Early attention had been given by the Evacuation Sub-Committee to the subject of
evacuating "les bouches tmailes'' - mainly women, children and invalids - from the
metropolis and vulnerable provincial towns and cities in the event of war. 14 It was clear
that wholesale evacuation of the civilian population was out of the question. The
normal activities of the capital city had to carry on or risk severe damage to public
morale. On the other hand, the expected aerial bombing of London would require the
10 T H O'Brien: Civil Defence: History of the Second World War, p.l64
I I G A N Lowndes: The Social Revolution, p.l99
12 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 26.9.1938, p.4; 27.9.1938, p.3; also The Sheffield Star:
28.9.1938, p.7
13 The Sheffield Star: 22.5.1939, p.7
14 O'Brien: op. cit., p.23
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large-scale movement of 'non-essential' people away from danger, and an orderly
dispersal was necessary to avoid casualties and minimise panic.
The Sub-Committee's report, presented in June 1934, persuaded the government of the
need for detailed plans for such an evacuation from London. These plans were
subsequently drawn up, covering the co-ordination of railway timetables, estimates of
the probable cost to the Government (approximately £920,000 per week at the outset)
and of the extent of available accommodation within a fifty-mile radius of London. At
this early stage it was expected that three-quarters of the capital's total population
would need to be evacuated, on a voluntary basis, and the intention at this time was that
complete families should move together wherever possible."
Yet despite the fact that the subject of evacuation was receiving considerable attention
in official quarters, the public at large were unaware of it, for the activities of the
various committees received little publicity until the mid-1930s. It was not until July
1934 that the Prime Minister stated in a House of Commons debate on civil defence:
"Our plans have been carried as far as is possible without wider
publicity than has hitherto been deemed to be in the public
interest. [ ... ] before long steps will be taken to communicate
the necessary instructions to the public generally. "16
The government's reticence may be partly explained by the perceived political need to
avoid naming Germany as a potential enemy and encouraging war. But one
consequence was that much more attention was focused on public order than on other
important factors: Macnicol has argued, for instance, that essential discussions between
I'T' . 24itmuss: op. CIt., p.
16HoC Deb. 30.7.1934, Vol. 292, Cols. 2335-6
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local authorities and with central administration were inhibited, with neither knowing
quite what the other was doing.17 The matter which was to cause so many problems
throughout the war - accommodation for displaced urban populations - appears to have
received little consideration in comparison with the meticulous attention given to the
problem of dispersal, in the early stages of the planning process at least.
Even when the ARP Department of the Home Office was formed, in April 1935, the
local authorities were not taken into the Government's confidence and education of the
public on civil defence did not include the possibility of evacuation. After six months
of deliberations there was still no official mention of it: the Department's first circular
sent to regional bodies concentrated on such measures as gas attacks and air raid
precautions. Although the subject of mass movement of the population was raised in
sub-committees of the Committee of Imperial Defence, it was not until November 1936
that the existence of evacuation plans was tacitly admitted, when a report from Sir
William Beveridge to the Committee of Imperial Defence stated:
"The evacuation of London needs to be thought out in terms, not
of transport only but of reception, housing (by compulsory
billeting if necessary) and feeding. [... ] No doubt those who
are concerned with evacuation are making plans about food as
well.?"
The potential danger of air attack was constantly scrutinised and regularly reviewed
after Hitler's rise and consolidation of power in Nazi Germany. Then, in January 1937,
the Air Ministry radically and suddenly increased its estimates of German military
17 JMacnicol, "The effect of the evacuation of schoolchildren on official attitudes to State intervention" in
H L Smith (ed): War and Social Change: British Society in the Second World War, p.ll
18 PRO CAB.4/25 C.I.D.1276-B, 11.11.36, cited in Titmuss: op. cit., p.25
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expansion and capacity. In the event of war it was now predicted that there would be an
expected death toll of 600,000, with twice that number injured over a period of sixty
days. There was a general expectation that the enemy would initially try to deliver a
'knock-out blow' with London as prime target, and ports and provincial industrial cities
and towns as secondary goals."
Clearly, air attacks would cause serious disorganisation and disruption of public
services, and it was seen by the authorities as inevitable that huge numbers of people
would seek to flee the cities to escape danger: evacuation now had to be tackled in a
more comprehensive way in order to prevent widespread panic. By this time the
Evacuation Sub-Committee's report of 1934, with its timetables and figures, was out of
date. All its particulars had to be re-thought and broadened to encompass not just
London but many other vulnerable areas beyond the capital.
Inexplicably, the Air Raid Precautions Bill in November 1937 contained no reference to
evacuation when first presented to the house of Commons: indeed, the Home Secretary
initially resisted demands for an amendment to include it. It was not until the
committee stage of the Bill, a month later, and after continual pressure from Members
of Parliament, that the omission was rectified by a clause requiring local authorities to
draw up schemes and provide information to assist the government in evacuation
plans." Some politicians were not reassured, however. The Times reported the concern
of Captain A Graham, Unionist Member for Wirral:
19 Titmuss: op. cit., p.13
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"In most of the principal countries of Europe plans for
evacuation have been entirely worked out. We, as so often, are
deplorably behind the times."
Others expressed different concerns: for example, Sir Richard Glyn, Unionist Member
for Abingdon, criticised the wholesale evacuation of people and exhorted Members not
to encourage panic by making speeches which would encourage people to think there
would be evacuation of large numbers because, he stated, he considered it simply was
not possible."
It has been seen that, up to the end of 1937, the general public had not been informed of
the government's intentions. Indeed, it may be argued that the government itself was
not sure of its way forward, for the evacuation scheme was still in the early stages of
development and subject to alteration throughout the early months of 1938. In January
the Board of Education had issued Circular No. 1461 advising local authorities in
vulnerable areas to consider evacuation since it was the Board's intention to close all
schools for the duration of any future war.22 Then, in March, the same authorities were
told not to take any action until the Home Office issued them with specific directions.
The following month witnessed Sir Samuel Hoare, Home Secretary, assuring the House
of Commons that the whole subject was being pursued thoroughly but the question of
shelter provision needed to be settled before clear directives on evacuation could be
given to local authorities." In view of this prevarication, it seems hardly surprising that
21 The Times: 8.12.37, p.7
22 Titmuss: op. cit., p.26, n.5
23 ibid., p.27, n.I
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many Members of Parliament and regional bodies throughout Britain were becoming
fidgety.
Sheffield was a case in point. When the ARP Sub-Committee of the City Council met
in February 1938,Circular 1461was examined. Council members regarded it as "being
too nebulous" and referred it back to the Board of Education with a request for
guidance in the form of a model plan. On being informed that no such plan had been
prepared, the Sub-Committee then requested the Board to "urge upon the Home Office
the necessity for preparing a model plan immediately", requiring at the same time that
their views should be passed on to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for the
Home Department, the President of the Board of Education and all the local Members
of Parliament.24
The reaction of local authorities demonstrated that independent regional schemes would
cause confusion: it was clear that national organisation was needed both to define which
areas were at risk and to assess facilities available in areas deemed to be relatively safe.
The government's own plans for evacuation were apparently getting nowhere, and
might even be said to be hindering local initiatives. At the beginning of May 1938,
London County Council approved the principle of evacuating school children, but the
Home Office refused to instigate a survey of potential accommodation. When Duncan
Sandys asked Sir Samuel Hoare if it would not expedite the whole preparation for air
raid precautions to allow a survey, the reply was: "I am inclined to think that it would
not.,,25 In fact, a national billeting survey was not undertaken until the following
24 Sheffield Education Committee: Report 1938/39, pp.38-9
2' HoC Deb. 12.5.38, Vol. 335, Col. 1703
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January. Part of the problem was financial: local authorities were reluctant to take on
the costs involved, and the government did not provide them with adequate finance to
cover the full extent of civil defence. Indeed, wrangling over finances was to dog
successive evacuation programmes throughout the early years of the war.
A realistic national strategy was not begun until the end of May 1938, when the
Anderson Committee on Evacuation was appointed with its stated remit:
"to review the various aspects of the problem of transferring
persons from areas which would be likely, in time of war, to be
exposed to aerial bombardment. "26
The question of evacuation occupied politicians at both national and local level in the
ensuing months. By July the Sheffield branch of the Communist Party had prepared its
own comprehensive plan for removing the population to safety. A pamphlet was
published (Appendix 1), warning that the city would be one of the main targets of an
enemy power and proclaiming "Sheffield must never be a second Barcelona!". The
plan was radical, proposing the compulsory evacuation of all the city's school children
up to the age of fifteen (the Party estimated a number of 55,000) accompanied by
sufficient school teachers to look after them; together with all blind persons; all bed-
ridden persons and wholly dependent invalids. The evacuees would be sent to the
Derbyshire villages of Calver, Peak Forest, Edale and Flouch, where settlements would
be established with paid staff in charge. Compensation would be paid to owners of
such properties which were requisitioned, and parents or those responsible for
evacuated dependants would be required to contribute towards their maintenance.f
26 Titmuss: op. cit., p.27, n.S
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The Communist project also proposed the temporary evacuation of all 'non-essential'
civilians from inner-city areas from the time of receipt of any air raid warning until
after the 'all-clear'. These short-term evacuees should carry enough food for four meals
and the city council would provide transport by corporation and private buses which
would follow pre-arranged routes to shelters in various Derbyshire villages - Calver,
Stoney Middleton, Tideswell, Langsett, Broomhead and Bradfield, Hathersage,
Grindleford, Derwent, Bamford, Hope Valley and Castleton. Planners also envisaged
air raid shelter protection for the whole of the city.28 At the end of July the Communist
Party plan was submitted to Geoffrey Lloyd, Minister responsible for Air Raid
Precautions, by William Gallacher, Communist Member for West Fife, with a request
that it would be put before the Committee "without political prejudice"." No further
reference to this project has been discovered during research.
The Anderson Committee worked quickly and presented its findings to Parliament on
26 July 1938, on the eve of the summer recess. The Report laid down certain principles
which became the basis of the government's evacuation scheme. It asserted its view:
"The whole issue in any future war may well turn on the manner
in which the problem of evacuation from densely populated
industrial areas is handled.'?"
It was recommended that arrangements should be made for substantial numbers of non-
essential persons to be removed from designated densely populated industrial towns and
cities - possibly a third of the population of these areas. Schemes should be based on
21 ARP: A Complete Plan/or the Sajetyo/the People o/Sheffield, pp.7,8
29 HoC Deb. 28.7.38, Vol. 338, Col. 3283
30 O'Brien: op. cit., p.IS3
34
voluntary evacuation m all but exceptional circumstances; however, compulsory
billeting powers should be taken to provide accommodation for refugees in private
houses. Plans should be drawn up to evacuate school children in school groups, with
their teachers, at government expense. The government should bear the initial cost of
evacuation, with adult refugees or parents of child evacuees expected to contribute to
their own maintenance wherever possible: no detailed proposals were made for
payments to billeters at this stage. The committee stressed the need for urgent attention
to be given to dispersal from vulnerable areas and for a survey to be made of
accommodation available in the reception areas. Moreover, it was considered that a
scheme covering the whole country could be organised within a few months. The
importance of educating the public about the scheme was also emphasised, thus
abandoning the secrecy which had earlier characterised evacuation planning.31
But although the Anderson Committee had acted swiftly to present the result of its
considerations, its Report was not published immediately: in fact it was delayed for
several months, until more than a month after the Munich crisis. Continuing official
preoccupation with maintaining public morale was evident when Sir Percy Harris, MP.
a member of the committee, explained the procrastination ina letter to The Times:
"The Home Secretary first withheld its publication because of
the August Bank Holiday and then, I understand, because he
thought that in view of the crisis some of its recommendations
might alarm the public."32
31 O'Brien: op. cit., p.IS3
32 The Times: 1.11.38. p.IS
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Worse, the Home Office did not even start to implement the principles of the Report
until the beginning of September. While civil servants then tried to set plans in motion,
the first government official plan (Plan One) was still at an early state of development
when the Munich crisis of September 1938 erupted.
Feverish activity ensued: on 22 September the Lee, which had already been working on
its own contingency arrangements, was warned by the Home Office to prepare to
evacuate children at short notice. Six days later some 4,300 children from special and
nursery schools were removed to rural residential schools with parental consent.
Although they were brought back within a matter of days when tension relaxed, the
experience gained was invaluable in dealing with later movements of the population.Y
In the meantime, the need for speedy finalisation of a definite national design was clear,
for confusion between regions reigned as some other local authorities, too, were hastily
designing their own schemes. For example, at the same time as Essex authorities were
planning to move their children away from the county border, the Lee were arranging
to move East London children into that very area."
As yet, ordinary people had still not received any official information or instructions on
evacuation, apart from a cursory suggestion contained in The Householder's Handbook
(issued to townspeople in connection with air raid precautions) to consider sending
children and the elderly to places of safety." During the acute phase of the Munich
crisis national and provincial newspaper editors rushed to calm their anxious readers.
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Over the course of a few days, a flurry of rather vague and confusing reports were
published of arrangements for evacuation of civilians in the event of an emergency.
On 26 September 1938 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent revealed that secret
plans were being made for several provincial centres, but as yet there were no concrete
scheme for the evacuation of Sheffield people." Only two days later, however, citizens
learned that plans were indeed being made for their removal. Under the banner
headline "Big Evacuation of Sheffield in Event of War", they were informed that, in
such an event, the government intended to evacuate from Sheffield and other congested
areas as many persons as possible who wished to leave and could be spared, and to
accommodate them in areas deemed to be safer from air attack:
"Evacuation will not be compulsory. Facilities will be afforded
for those who wish to leave. [... ] This advance intimation will
enable the people of Sheffield to consider the matter and come
to a decision as to whether they desire to be evacuated. "37
Next day the newspaper carried a warning to Sheffield people that evacuation
arrangements would proceed very rapidly in any future emergency. Refugees travelling
under this official government scheme would not be able to choose their own
destinations or billets but every effort would be made to keep families together."
Eventually, on 29 September, as war seemed inevitable, the government published two
plans, drawn up by the Anderson Committee, for voluntary assisted evacuation: the civil
servants had achieved some kind of initial success. But the confusion continued, not
least in Sheffield. Both national and local press carried the Home Office announcement
36 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 26.9.38, p.4
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of the plans, the first being a general scheme for implementation in the event of
emergency. The second scheme was limited to school children travelling in groups
with their teachers. The Times stated that the arrangements would include some
cities." However, The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent must have confused its
readers, for although it trumpeted "Evacuation Plans for Large Towns" the report
referred only to London, and no mention was made of any arrangements for the
provinces.'?
The general scheme incorporated some of Anderson's basic principles. Anybody
(adults and children alike) wishing to be evacuated would go to named railway stations
wearing their warmest clothing and carrying only a small amount of hand luggage. At
the stations they would be supplied with rations for the first forty-eight hours and a free
railway ticket to an allocated destination within fifty miles of London, where they
would be billeted. The government would pay billeting costs in the first instance, but
those who could afford to would have to contribute later.
The scheme for school groups was more detailed. School children in congested areas of
London whose parents consented to their removal would be transported from their
schools in the care of their teachers. Parents were assured that the children would be
domiciled in private homes where the householder taking them in would be expected to
give them board and lodging and to look after them. They would become "members of
the family". The government would pay the householder ten shillings and sixpence a
week for one child and eight shillings and sixpence per child if more than one child
39 The Times: 30.9.3&. p.9
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38
were taken. The scheme would be entirely voluntary and no parents need send their
children away if they did not wish to do so. Although parents would not be told in
advance where their children were going, they would quickly be informed by notices
posted outside their schools."
The move to publicise these rudimentary plans had clearly been intended to reassure the
public and maintain morale at a critical period. However, while the government
expressed its confidence in the proposed measures, the ad hoc nature of the general
scheme in particular may have caused great embarrassment if huge numbers had put it
to the test. As it turned out, Chamberlain returned from Germany proclaiming "peace
for our time" at the eleventh hour and neither scheme was put into operation at that
point. The LCC had gone ahead with its own arrangements and did operate the small-
scale provision for certain children outlined earlier. But O'Brien asserts that, while
some local authorities had begun to make their own preparations, arrangements for
reception and billeting were only in an embryonic stage everywhere.Y
Investigation of files in Sheffield Archives has disclosed that the Home Office
instructed the City Council on 25 September 1938 to make arrangements for the
evacuation of "those people (including children)" wishing to leave the city in a national
emergency." A report presented to the Emergency ARP Committee a month later
showed that such a plan was drawn up, under which evacuees would travel by train
from the two Sheffield main stations to railheads in South Yorkshire and Lincolnshire
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and the programme would be completed in two days. The general manager of the
Transport Department had worked out a scheme of transport, but nothing further had
been done as the emergency ended, and no further instructions were received from the
Home Office. The committee was informed that there had been no proposal for the
evacuation of school children by groups as in London, probably because there would
have been too little time to carry out the scheme."
In the crucial phase of the Munich crisis an exodus of considerable scale had taken
place and many families fearfully left home and made their own way privately to
country areas, as has been seen above. But the problem was not so much with those
who could take care of themselves but with that large sector of city populations who
would be unable to move without official help and who were clearly disturbed at the
government's failure to make clear its intentions. These were the people with whom
the authorities were concerned, and The Times echoed the continuing official anxiety
about the morale of the masses when its editorial stressed the need for an orderly
departure of those who would be "the poorer section of the people"."
In Parliament the government came under increasing attack for dragging its heels, for
few believed the Munich Pact would secure more than a temporary respite. Until the
crisis, the Home Office had been in control of central planning of the whole subject of
civil defence, of which evacuation had been only one strand. However, it belatedly
became clear that evacuation was not just a question of the orderly dispersal of city
populations: education, housing, health and welfare were also key considerations.
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Accordingly, in November 1938 power was transferred to a new Evacuation Division
established at the Ministry of Health and constituted jointly from its own officials and
those nominated from the Board of Education. The new Evacuation Division's first
action was to set up an Advisory Committee composed of representatives of local
authorities, several branches of the teaching profession, and local education
departments. This body would have to deal with a multitude of human problems
including transportation of evacuees, accommodation for pregnant mothers, provision
of food, bedding and blankets, to name but a few (see Appendix 2).46
As the political situation eased temporarily, the Anderson principles were eventually
translated into action and finally brought to the attention of the general public.
Government officials may well have hoped that publication of the Report, eventually
achieved on 27 October 1938, would have a settling effect on the people. And indeed,
this may have been so in the case of city dwellers: at least, if they entertained any fears,
few appear to have been voiced publicly. The "Letters" columns of Sheffield
newspapers were largely silent on the subject: whether this was due to editorial policy
or because there were simply no complaints from a largely urban readership is not clear.
On the other hand, criticism from country areas scheduled to receive evacuees poured
in. No doubt the architects of the government scheme were disappointed to note the
spate of letters from the public to the national and local press alike reflecting the depth
of feeling in rural areas and expressing alarm at the prospect of compulsory billeting of
evacuees on private householders. The Home Secretary divulged that he had received
46 Titmuss: op. cit., p.32
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"quite a number" of letters from householders complaining that it would be "an outrage
to have dirty little children from the London schools billeted upon our house.?"
Various alternative suggestions for accommodation were put forward, several of which
advocated building communal camps for families and school groups, thus avoiding the
danger of the incoming townspeople, as one writer put it, "upsetting the lives of the rest
of the community'v''' But opposition was not all for selfish reasons: some writers put
the view that both sanitary and cooking arrangements in country homes were
insufficient to cope with additional numbers." The executive council of the Rural
District Councils Association also criticised arrangements for billeting and reception as
"unworkable" and demanded that the proposals should be completely revised. 50
The Sheffield Telegraph was mainly concerned with the lack of communication with the
public during the autumn crisis and rebuked the Home Office on publication of the
Anderson Report:
"Arrangements had to be made for the evacuation of thousands
of Sheffield people to Lincolnshire villages and other districts
comparatively 'safe'. But the people concerned knew nothing
of what was being proposed, nor did many of the wives whose
homes they were going to invade. The whole question bristles
with difficulty. If there is one thing likely to promote panic it is
the idea among thousands of people, mostly strangers to each
other, that they are being packed off together at a moment's
notice to an unknown destination to live for an indefinite period
among other strangers who might not welcome them. "51
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This newspaper, which had kept its readership informed of air raid precautions plans
throughout and beyond the crisis, discussed the recommendations on evacuation at
length for two days and then, seemingly, forgot about the subject.
Apart from concerns over billeting and reception, it was clear that not everyone agreed
with the mass movement of people from industrial areas. There were those who had
opposed any official evacuation scheme on the grounds that large numbers of city
people would in any case move to safety of their own accord (and were proved partially
right). Others worried that a government-funded scheme of the size envisaged would
divert finances away from munitions and aircraft production, and also satisfy the
enemy's intention of causing dislocation and weakening public morale. 52 An extreme
view was expressed by Austin Hopkinson, Member for Mossley, Lancashire, when he
told the House of Commons:
"It is the business of the people living in the London area to be
the bait drawing the enemy into the trap provided by our fighter
squadrons, while balloon barrages and anti-aircraft guns drive
him into the zone of battle. "53
Other public figures were quoted too: Professor J B S Haldane criticised the concept of
evacuation and proposed the construction of a thousand miles of deep shelters sixty feet
below London which, he averred, would protect the whole of the city's population. 54
Further, he asserted that some of the proposed reception areas were often more
dangerous than evacuees' own homes, and declared that no children should be sent to
east coast towns. Although these latter assertions were later justified, it could be argued
52 O'Brien: op. cit., p.285
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that such dissenting voices added to public confusion and hardened attitudes against
evacuation at the outbreak of war a year later.
Once the evacuation scheme, now designated Plan Two, did receive widespread
publicity there was an urgency to update and complete preparations in case of a sudden
deterioration in the international situation. A priority under Plan Two was to divide the
country into 'evacuation', 'neutral' and 'reception' areas, according to the estimated
degree of risk, comprising populations of approximately thirteen, fourteen and eighteen
millions respectively. The task was begun in the autumn of 1938 and provisionally
completed in the following January, although the second plan was later augmented by
Plan Three as it took account of changes made in area designations in response to some
local demands. Appendix 3lists evacuation zones agreed by September 1939.
As Titmuss observed, while several local authorities asked for their status to be re-
defined, with 200 demanding to be deemed neutral (thus being excluded from
participation), not one authority zoned as an evacuation area disputed that decision;
neither did one single authority request reception status. ss This was echoed by a
number of local associations of the National Union of Teachers who communicated to
their Executive "that they regard their areas either as suitable for evacuation or
unsuitable for reception"." This was arguably a significant early warning of billeting
problems to come. Chester-Ie-Street, for example, flatly refused to accept its
designation as a reception area, and when local officials were instructed that they must
" Titmuss: op. cit., p.32
56 The Hallamshire Teacher: No. 47, Nov 1938, p.S
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accept the position, they did so with "extreme reluctance"." The Ministry of Health,
now in overall control of the government schemes, was forced to recognise and
emphasise that children should go to homes where they would be welcome and sought
to reassure parents on this score.58
Like most other industrial towns and cities, Sheffield was divided, with its inner city
designated an evacuation area and its suburbs neutral. The nearby town of Rotherham
and its surrounding rural districts were deemed to be wholly neutral.59 Sheffield
community leaders broadly accepted, in principle, the need to remove much of its
population, though press reports indicated that ordinary people were divided over the
issue. But no-one, it seemed, was happy about the government's choice of reception
areas for the city. At a meeting of the ARP Committee of Sheffield City Council on 19
October 1938 (before official publication of the Anderson Report) it had been
recommended that representation should be made to the Home Office to ensure that the
North Derbyshire area should be allocated for the reception of Sheffield evacuees/"
The government's negative response to this and a later request, and City Council
members' fury at what was seen as official intransigence, may have been significant
contributory factors in the miserably low turn-out for evacuation when plans were
eventually turned into reality.
North Derbyshire was seen as the natural destination for Sheffield's evacuees: not only
was the area familiar territory, but it was near enough for refugees to maintain contact
57 PRO. HLG.1n3
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with their homes in the city. Home Office proposals to remove them to Lincolnshire,
therefore, were greeted with some alarm. Those who would be most affected by the
move could hardly have been reassured to learn the comments of Councillor William
Asbury, Chairman of the City Council's ARP Committee:
"It seems to me - and to other members of the ARP Committee -
a very dangerous procedure to send civilians in large numbers to
the east which would be in the direct line of sight of attacking
aircraft. Boston and Spalding were among the areas proposed to
accommodate refugees from Sheffield. They need only
mentioning for anyone to appreciate how unsafe that would
be.?"
For many months hopes were still high that Derbyshire would receive Sheffield
evacuees, even as additional reception areas emerged: "parts of Lancashire",62 the North
and East Ridings of Yorkshire," and even the Lincolnshire coast" (the subject of
Haldane's warning) were all named as possible locations at this time. Alderman E G
Rowlinson, Chairman of Sheffield Education Committee, joined the debate when he
revealed that a provisional scheme had been approved even before Munich to send
Sheffield children to the Peak District of Derbyshire. He went on to express doubts
about whether parents would approve the scheme to send their children a hundred miles
nearer the line of enemy artack."
Moreover, it could be held that the City Fathers were hardly inspiring their citizens to
respond positively to government plans for civil defence in general and evacuation in
61 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 29.10.38, p.12
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particular. After months of debate their interest was apparently waning: one member of
the city's ARP Committee was stung into complaining of apathy as he described one
meeting: "Some read novels, some interested themselves in other ways, and some went
out early.,,66
It was little wonder, it may be argued, that Sheffield parents did not rush to register
their children for evacuation to these relatively distant and unfamiliar areas when they
were called upon to do so only a short time afterwards. The local editor who had
opined that parents would be willing to let their children go away under the government
scheme in the knowledge that they would be safe and in good hands had clearly been
over-optimistic, to say the least."
Nationally, the situation facing the architects of the government's evacuation scheme
was daunting. They decided to restrict the scheme to four groups: school children,
moving with their school units; young children under school age accompanied by their
mothers; pregnant women; and those adult blind or disabled people who could be
moved without difficulty. The essential stipulation was the evacuation should be
voluntary unless military reasons dictated otherwise. This non-compulsory element of
the scheme severely complicated matters, for it meant that firm and complex
arrangements had to be made on a basis of many unknown and variable condiuona/"
Estimates of numbers likely to need evacuation were initially based on public reaction
to the Munich crisis, as well as on figures gathered in surveys carried out in London at
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67 ibid., 25.11.38, p.ll
68 Titmuss: op. cit., p.34
47
that time, when the LCC reported a possible 83% of its school population had been
ready to register. This had resulted in a projection that 4,000,000 people in the priority
classes in vulnerable areas throughout the country would need transport and
accommodation." Although the public were made aware that those employed on
essential work would be expected to remain in the cities and continue to contribute to
the national effort, it was realised that there were other groups of 'non-essential' adults
in the civilian population who would also want to leave the danger zones. However, the
sheer size of the official scheme for priority classes forced the government to leave
these less vulnerable groups to make their own private arrangements. It was an
unavoidable decision which was, however, to exacerbate an already difficult situation
regarding accommodation when war began.
If the voluntary factor of evacuation caused some problems in the 'danger' zones, it was
as nothing compared with the trouble in store in the reception areas. The compulsory
nature of billeting evacuees in private houses was always going to be a thorny problem,
but the planners were convinced that this was the only way to overcome major problems
of accommodation with reasonable standards of comfort.
In the nation-wide survey of reception areas called for by the government and carried
out in January 1939 by local housing authorities conducting a house-to-house
investigation, the standard adopted for estimating accommodation was for one person
per habitable room in most of England and in Wales. Exceptions were made in the
cases of already overcrowded parts of the north of England and Scotland, where the
69 T' . 34rtmuss: op. cu.; p.
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standard was one person over fourteen years of age or two children under fourteen to
each habitable room. Itwas clear that not all the available billets would be suitable for
all categories of evacuees - for example elderly people, invalids or single people at
work all day would not be required to take unaccompanied school children."
The January investigation revealed 4,800,000 'suitable' places available nationally, but
by the following month this figure was reduced by one sixth as householders claimed
reservations for friends and relatives." Government planners had foreseen that, if an
emergency arose, the results of the survey would be nullified by private 'early birds'
who would seize at least some of the accommodation set aside for official evacuees,
especially in attractive areas. The authorities were concerned about this development,
but accepted that local authorities would have difficulty in evicting private refugees and
nothing could be done to prevent this beyond appeals to the public on moral grounds.72
In the localities, also, some cynicism was expressed about claims by householders of
needy relatives, as evidenced by the comment of an ARP organiser for Bakewell and
Ashboume in Derbyshire - one of the areas sought by Sheffield authorities to receive its
evacuees: "The genuineness of the reservations in favour of relations might be doubted
in some cases. ,,73
The concern was that, especially in the Home Counties and the south-west of England,
accommodation was being reserved not just for family members but for others who
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could afford to pay for themselves." Independent migration was not discouraged by the
authorities, for it would save lives and reduce the proportions of the problem of
civilians in vulnerable areas - and it would be less expensive for the government.
However, private evacuation would later present a serious stumbling block to the
government scheme, for householders would find paying guests preferable and more
profitable than unknown and unwanted school children, young families or expectant
mothers installed by officialdom.
As the accommodation survey progressed, attempts were made to reassure city dwellers
that there would be enough places for them, and especially for their children, in the
country. Sheffield people were optimistically informed that the machinery was
prepared so that it would "simply be a case of pressing a button" and children would be
removed to safety." And with the machinery already in motion to close all schools in
the evacuation areas for the duration of any hostilities, it was anticipated, by the
authorities at least, that billeting in private homes would be a long-term project.
It was doubtless to be expected that such a thorough billeting survey would cause
consternation in those areas scheduled to receive refugees. Its object had been two-
fold: firstly, to ascertain the amount of surplus housing available, and secondly, to
discover the number of householders who would offer hospitality to children and
mothers willingly rather than under duress. Walter Elliot, Minister of Health. appealed
to them:
"Small towns and villages can be of vital and human service.
Moreover, [... ] these towns will not lose out by giving
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hospitality, for there will be a good deal of extra trade brought
by the refugees."76
It was apparent from press reports, however, that he did not altogether succeed in his
efforts to reassure country people.
In districts destined to receive Sheffield evacuees, opposition came not only from
householders but also from some unexpected quarters. A Gainsborough councillor
stipulated that evacuee children must be "decent", and declared that no refugees from
the slums were wanted in the town." In an even more surprising assault the
Archdeacon of Lindsey denounced the plan for evacuation: endorsing the call for
underground shelters for townspeople as an alternative to the government scheme, he
protested:
"It is outrageous and unfair that all these people should be thrust
upon us without knowing anything about their morals or their
cleanliness. [... ] The authorities would have them dumped
down here, no matter how much inconvenience or distress may
[be] caused."78
His attack brought a swift rejoinder from the Chairman of the ARP Committee of
Sheffield City Council. Jumping to the defence of citizens of his city, Councillor
Asbury declared:
"Very many townspeople [may] retort that they and their
children may be distributed in homes about whose morals and
cleanliness they know nothing. [... ] Iagree that it is absurd to
think of the area as being suitable to evacuate Sheffield's adults
or children. We regard Lincolnshire as entirely unsuitable for
the purpose.'?"
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The later decision to re-allocate Sheffield evacuees to Kesteven'" fortunately avoided
further conflict with the Archdeacon. Eventually Lincolnshire was abandoned as an
official reception area for Sheffield.
In contrast to the lack of local response in the period following the Munich crisis and
before the publication of the Anderson Report, the Sheffield press carried several letters
from members of the public when the billeting survey was in progress in January 1939.
Those in areas expected to receive evacuees seemed to be divided in their views: some
shared the concerns voiced above, while others dissociated themselves from the
remarks and expressed willingness to accept "these poor little children". Likewise, city
parents appeared split on the issue, some objecting to the proposals for evacuating
children to places unknown to them, and others supporting the scheme." It is
interesting to note that after this short flush of public response, correspondence on the
subject apparently dried up altogether, with no letters to the two main Sheffield
newspapers on the subject published for many months - in fact until after rehearsals
began in late August. Whether this was simply because no letters were received about
evacuation, or was a policy dictated by the government or by editorial staff is not clear.
At this stage, early in 1939, plans were in fact being laid for the evacuation of those in
vulnerable parts of Sheffield. This was made clear in February by the Town Clerk
when he reported to the City Council the government decision that the official scheme,
so far as it related to the city, was now in course of preparation.82 But the local press
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further stirred the anxieties and frustrations of inner-city parents who were still kept in
the dark about decisions affecting their offspring. Working on what turned out to be a
vastly inflated estimate of the number of children who would need to be evacuated, one
report was hardly reassuring:
"We cannot take 70,000 children out of Sheffield and dump
them down anywhere in the country, leaving them to fend for
themselves. We must know where they are going and that there
is a space ready for each one of them. "83
School meetings provided a platform for parents to ask questions or to express for
themselves their objections to the evacuation scheme. Some favoured the alternative of
underground shelters which they considered would render the scheme unnecessary and
avoid the separation of families." The tunnel solution was resurrected from time to
time throughout the pre-war period, the Lord Mayor of Sheffield joining proponents in
suggesting such a system under the city could serve the dual purpose of easing traffic in
peacetime and providing public shelters in the event of war.85
What seems to have been lacking was any positive encouragement by either press or
community leaders to Sheffield parents to register their children for evacuation: indeed,
it could be argued that those parents desiring to do so were being discouraged by press
reporting. The reservations of the Chairman of the Education Committee were
recorded more than once, and the city's newspapers were quick to publish his comment
that he doubted whether many parents would approve of their children being taken from
them."
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Partly, this reluctance to push for evacuation may have been based on the City
Council's continued opposition to the government's selection of Lincolnshire as the
reception area for Sheffield, which one councillor had earlier described as "farcical".87
Representations which had been made to the Home Office finally paid off in February
1939, as members of the city's ARP Committee were informed that a revised list of
reception areas had been received, "which areas are more acceptable than those
previously suggested. ,,88 But a month later it was clear that the matter was still
unsettled, when Alderman Rowlinson appeared to reject the new areas (extending
eastwards to the Lincolnshire coast and southwards to Market Harborough in
Leicestershire), stating that the Education Committee was urging reconsideration of its
Derbyshire scheme." This lack of leadership was reflected in the fact that only one
third of eligible parents had registered their willingness to send their children away with
their schools by the end of March. 90
In the meantime, the head teachers of some of the city's secondary schools, which were
not included as school units in the Government Scheme, were making their own
arrangements for evacuation: two secured accommodation for their children to the area
of North Derbyshire officially denied to Sheffield. At a meeting of parents, teachers
and governors of Notre Dame High School it was decided to explore the possibility of
transferring the whole school to a country area. Within months the school had taken
over Derwent Hall in Derbyshire, where many children remained until the summer of
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1941.91 Sheffield High School made similar arrangements to move to Cliff College,
Calver." Although these were private arrangements which circumvented the official
scheme to evacuate to other areas, the children were eligible for government billeting
allowances. School fees continued to be the responsibility of parents except for pupils
who held 'special places' who continued to be supported by the local authority."
There were, however, other reasons for concern about dispersing large numbers of
people into the countryside. Anxiety had already been expressed about water supplies,
and indeed many rural areas were to experience problems in trying to cope with a
sudden influx of town dwellers used to higher standards of sanitation. Questions asked
in the House of Commons regarding a government grant towards "providing proper
water supplies for the many Lincolnshire parishes which lack them" can hardly have
reassured parents of prospective Sheffield evacuees, particularly when the Minister of
Health was unsympathetic to the request. 94
The government billeting survey was completed in early February 1939. But although
the information gained confirmed sufficient places available for estimated needs, it was
clear that many householders had shown themselves unwilling to act as hosts to
evacuees and some had refused to co-operate in the enquiry at all. They were rebuked
by the Minister of Health for their failure to embrace the children he described as "not
scrofulous and verminous" but "the bud of the nation".9s Praising volunteers who had
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come forward to perform what he maintained was one of the most valuable forms of
national service, Walter Elliot announced that such householders would be provided
with a card bearing a "National Service" badge to display in the window of their homes,
showing that they were actively supporting the evacuation scheme." This was clearly
offered as an incentive, but the move may have also been intended to exert neighbourly
pressure on the reluctant. Whatever the motive, resistance continued throughout the
period.
Yet despite the understandable reluctance of many country people to have their homes
filled with strangers, volunteers did come forward and provisional places were secured
for some 2,250,000 unaccompanied school children in England and Wales. That these
offers were made in the knowledge of the less-than-generous billeting allowances
demonstrated a widespread caring concern of many rural folk for their urban
neighbours. The payments already announced (IOs.6d. a week for one unaccompanied
child, and 8s.6d. a week for each child where more than one was taken, irrespective of
age) were confirmed." But these sums would later be found inadequate and would add
to the long list of problems to emerge the following September. Difficulties arising
from billeting payments will be discussed in a later chapter.
The question of allocating reception districts to specific evacuating areas was one
which greatly exercised officials, as has been seen. Apart from the priority classes, the
organisers also had to take into consideration accommodation requirements of other
sectors of the population whose needs might have to take precedence. Of particular
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importance were some government departments and civil servants: indeed, O'Brien
contends that secret plans had been made to move the entire Government machine out
of the capital in case of dire emergency." The problem was further exacerbated by the
fact that more than half of the available accommodation was in Wales and the sector of
England south of a line drawn from the Wash to Bristol. This meant that many school
children and mothers with young children, not only from London but other vulnerable
cities further north, would have to be billeted a very long way from their homes, for
example in Somerset or Devon." The fear that this would make parental visits difficult
and could also result in feelings of alienation due to differences in dialects and culture
would later be borne out and add to the government's problems.
As has been seen, it was of paramount importance to effect an orderly exodus from
perceived danger areas in order to avoid panic. And in the early months of 1939
officials were mainly concerned with the dispersal from London, for that was where
sudden air attacks were expected to begin. However, work was also proceeding on the
mechanics of evacuation from industrial towns and cities in other parts of England and
Scotland. To a large extent, the position of existing rail networks influenced the
decision to allocate evacuating zones to particular receiving areas. The work involved
was daunting, for not only were there complicated railway timetables to be worked out
but also transport arrangements for parties to travel by road from assembly points to
entraining stations and from detraining centres to outlying towns and villages in the
reception areas to be organised. A comprehensive system of control was called for, and
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divisional dispersal officers were put in charge of all transport arrangements for the
evacuees countrywide, for it was clear that remarkable skill was needed in directing the
work of 41,000 official and voluntary workers. lOO
In the reception areas the debate continued about accommodation. Disabled adults and
children were, in the main, to be taken care of by institutions and boarding schools, and
maternity homes were to cater for expectant mothers in the late stages of pregnancy.
The demand was primarily for billets for other pregnant women, school children and
their teachers, and mothers with young children under five years old. It was already
accepted policy that children were to go to private homes. But, while empty houses
may have seemed the best solution for the mothers with children, and these were
reserved wherever possible, there were simply not enough available. Of those buildings
that were suitable, many had already been reserved by business companies making
provisional arrangements to evacuate their staffs.'?' It was clear that the vast majority
of families and expectant mothers would also have to be billeted upon householders.
This was where the sticky problem arose which was to haunt officials at national and
local level throughout successive government evacuation schemes. For it was one
thing, it seemed, to ask householders to take in a child or two: it was, however, quite
another to expect them to share the intimacy of their homes (and especially their
kitchens) with women and toddlers previously unknown to them.
Many in the reception areas continued to pursue the idea of camps and hostels which
they saw as the best answer to the quest for billets for evacuees of all categories. Strong
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pressure was exerted for a comprehensive programme to adapt existing holiday camps
for families and also to provide new purpose-built camps for children. These would
have the advantage of keeping family or school units together without encroaching too
much into village life. There was much public discussion of the subject and some
surprising views were put forward. One observer of the problem wrote:
"Why not use good barns? [... ] They are warm and draught
proof and with the addition of a staircase, sanitation and a
kitchen, could accommodate anything up to fifty or sixty
children. "102
When the Sheffield Soroptimists' Society debated the issue of camps versus private
homes for children, an eminent local head mistress volunteered her opinion that camps
would present a more likely target for bombers. The majority at the meeting voted in
support of camps, however - and this in an evacuating area.103
But the government resisted the pressure, and not only for financial reasons. Holiday
camps had already been tested when they were used to house Jewish refugees from
Germany and other European countries, but had proved unsuitable in winter
conditions.l'" In any case, the Anderson Committee's policy was clearly stated and
followed: the vast majority of evacuees should be lodged with families. However,
among a number of government circulars released at this time, two did give
consideration to the provision of hostels for special categories of unaccompanied school
children, notably 'difficult' children (those who were maladjusted or otherwise
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unsuitable for ordinary billeting) and secondary school children whose education might
be adversely affected at a critical stage.105
In February 1939 the government made another, albeit small, concession when it agreed
to the construction of fifty camps, each to accommodate 300 refugees. However,
funding was not forthcoming until the Camps Act was enacted in May, providing for
schools to use such buildings for holidays in peace time and for accommodating
children in the special categories in the event ofwar.106 As it turned out, only thirty-one
camps were eventually built by the summer of 1940, the majority of which were
destined to be occupied by secondary or senior schools.l'"
But even then, empty houses, hostels and camps did not appreciably help the situation.
Hotels and holiday guest-houses were reserved for reception purposes, but the brunt of
billeting would still have to be borne by private householders and the government
pinned their faith to their hospitality. Housewives' organisations and church bodies
besieged local authorities and Members of Parliament with complaints.
The prospect of war was suddenly transformed from possibility to probability with the
Czech crisis in the spring of 1939. The time factor dominated planning. In the haste to
complete the programme, the problems of emptying the city of the priority classes at all
speed obscured the equally important issues of reception and billeting, to say nothing of
welfare and education.l'" The most important thing was that "les bouches inuules" had
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to be dispersed from London before the devastating air attack which was expected
immediately following any declaration of hostilities, or risk public disruption.
Walter Elliot, speaking for the Evacuation Division of the Ministry of Health, assured
the House of Commons that plans were well advanced for evacuation to be achieved
within three days immediately prior to any announcement of war. Timetables were
ready and each local authority had now been informed of the number of persons allotted
to its area. However, while asserting "This is an orderly evacuation", the Minister went
on to warn that once air raids did begin, the chaos would be terrific.109
At the same time, members of the public continued to receive confusing messages. On
the one hand, government was urging parents in danger zones to register their children
for evacuation and pressing householders in safe areas to offer hospitality. On the
other, the provincial press reported that local officials, school teachers and other public
figures were continuing to express their own concerns about the policy. At a national
meeting of school attendance officers held in Sheffield only days after the Minister's
announcement, there was a lively debate. One delegate, worried that his own child
would not have the same care as at home, doubtless summed up the situation for many
others throughout the country when he told the conference: "My wife said: 'Where you
stay I stay, and where I stay the child stays' and that settled it for US."110 And while
some agreed with the suggestion that a child might become a stranger to its parents if
109 HoC Deb. 5.4.39 Vol. 345, Cols. 2870-5
110 The Sheffield Star: 10.4.39, p.S
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separated for any length of time, others responded that the same child might be killed if
it stayed at home. II I
Although the scheme was directed centrally by the Evacuation Division, in the
evacuation zones the town and district councils were responsible for drawing up
detailed local plans and operating programmes for dispersal. With regard to London, in
order to simplify a very complex task the LCC was made responsible for co-ordinating
schemes for the whole of the Metropolitan area and for twenty boroughs and district
councils in the Home Counties. In the rest of the country, where a zone extended into
the territory of more than one authority, one officer was appointed to take charge of
arrangements to prevent confusion. Sending and receiving authorities were put in touch
with each other to settle details of housing - a mammoth task, for in England and Wales
there were more than 1,100 reception districts and over eighty evacuation areas. 112
The densely populated central, northern and eastern areas of Sheffield, with the
exception of housing estates therein, were declared evacuation zones, while the rest of
the city, together with all the housing estates, was classified as neutral and these areas
would neither evacuate nor receive refugees. In the surrounding area the mining
villages of South Yorkshire were also defined as neutral. 113 The City Council at first
accepted this mixed designation of Sheffield. However, the Education Committee later
asked that the whole city should be classed as a vulnerable area, but the request was
turned down. This was conveyed to the committee:
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"[ ... ] the Ministry of Health have only agreed to less than half of
the city coming under such a category which contains about
sixty thousand persons under the heading of 'priority classes',
all of whom are being given the opportunity to state in writing
whether or not they desire to be transferred to the Sheffield
Reception Areas."!"
Other decisions seemed clearly inequitable too: nearby Rotherham Borough, initially
declared neutral despite the town's heavy industrial base, fought for evacuation status
like its neighbouring city and eventually won. lIS Rotherham Rural Council, on the
other hand, was not successful in changing the classification of the town's outlying
areas from partly 'neutral' and partly 'reception' to an entirely neutral area.!"
It will be seen that at this stage of the proceedings the problem of reception was largely
perceived as one of housing, with less regard to other considerations which were to play
such an important part when evacuation came into force a few months later. But it was,
perhaps, inevitable that such a gigantic and complicated scheme, drawn up to cover the
national situation, could not cater for the multitude of problems which were later
brought to light in the localities.
As speed became the imperative for evacuation planners after Czechoslovakia, a host of
details needed to be finalised, but there was little firm information on numbers to be
catered for. There were questions, for instance, of how many trains would be required,
where they were destined, provision of food for the journeys, postcards for children to
let parents know of their arrival. By May 1939 the government decided to publicise the
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evacuation scheme more widely and in greater detail, and local authorities were asked
to ascertain how many in the priority groups wished to take part in the official scheme.
Voluntary registration of mothers and children was dealt with by appointed officers in
the sending areas throughout the country. In many cities schools were used for this
purpose, with teachers acting as voluntary registrars.l'" A recruitment programme went
ahead to find extra helpers, mostly women, who would be willing to assist officials in
supervising and travelling with the children if the scheme was put into action. The
Dowager Marchioness o~ Reading, Chief Organiser for the Women's Voluntary
Service, visited Sheffield on a tour to boost the flagging recruitment drive for civil
defence and appealed particularly for women escorts. The press report, headlined
"Wives Told Their Job is to Fight Panic", reiterated official concern over public morale
and quoted LadyReading:
"The care of the children if war should come would be the only
assurance for the future of the life for which Englishmen have
fought for centuries."!"
The Chief Education Officer of Sheffield, H E Newton, was named as Evacuation
Officer and he appointed a Liaison Committee to work with him to draw up an
evacuation plan for the city using the directives issued by central government.
Membership of this committee was drawn from many agencies - head teachers,
administrative staff of the Education and Transport Departments in the city, as well as
local representatives of the ARP Department, the Blind Welfare Department and the
Sheffield Crippled Aid Association.l"
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In March 1939 a Home Office circular informed local authorities in evacuation areas
that immediate meetings were to be convened for head teachers and helpers in schools
which would be using the same departure points, so that all the necessary arrangements
could be made with local police and railway authorities for an orderly departure.
Similar meetings should be arranged in reception areas to avoid confusion on arrival of
evacuees.!"
Available school log books give disappointingly little information about the momentous
events affecting the city's children. One or two referred to the Munich crisis and civil
defence in cryptic terms: for example the Headmaster of Carbrook Council Boys'
School wrote: "After a week of suspense war has been averted. Much activity in gas
mask fitting. "121 Beyond this, only two log books have been discovered which even
mention that meetings were called in early March 1939 to inform parents of provisional
evacuation plans and to distribute forms to be completed by those wishing their children
to be registered for the proposed scheme.122
By early May, though, concerns about education were being aired publicly in
educational journals and at council meetings. Questions about seniority and authority
were raised. Teachers intending to evacuate with the children were worried about their
position in the schools which they would be required to share, for the government
would deem them to be under the administrative direction of the receiving area.123 The
120 Sheffield Archives File CA.41129, Circular No. 59/1939
121 Log Book: Carbrook Council Boys' School: entry 3.10.38
122 Log Books: St Stephen's Mixed School: entry 3.10.38; St Barnabas (Cecil Road) Mixed School: entry
7.3.39
123 Education: No. 1895, 5.5.39, p.3
65
matter was raised at a meeting of Sheffield Education Committee in May 1939, when a
councillor asked if Sheffield children and their teachers could remain as identifiable
entities in shared premises or would be under the jurisdiction of staff of the host school.
The Chairman replied that it was expected that schools would operate in split shifts,
with Sheffield children attending for half a day and the 'home' children the other half
The question of relative status of teachers, therefore, should not arise.124 Although this
method operated successfully in some areas when put to the test, it was to prove
unworkable in others. In the event it became unnecessary, in the main, for the small
number of children who moved from Sheffield.
Other problems surfaced, too: there was, for instance, the question of what to do about
children in the same family who were attending different schools, for some who lived in
evacuable areas were pupils at institutions in neutral areas and vice versa, while others
could be split up from their siblings if their separate schools were not scheduled for the
same reception area. These were perplexing questions which clearly needed to be
addressed without delay.
The Evacuation Officer and his Liaison Committee co-operated in producing a booklet
which was distributed to seventy-five schools in the evacuable parts of the city inMay.
Entitled State of Emergency, it presented a comprehensive survey of arrangements for
the evacuation of those in the priority classes. Covering every detail, it seemed, from
the relatively small matter of postages incurred by head teachers or the provision of
124 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 23.5.39. p.3
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armlets for marshals, to the huge matter of transport arrangements, it sought to stress
the serious nature of the undertaking:
"The success of the Scheme outlined in this Booklet will depend
upon the extent to which it is understood by those who have to
take a part in the same if it is ever necessary to put the Scheme
into operation. "12S
The booklet also revealed that the knotty problem of the destination of evacuees from
Sheffield had finally been settled: it was not Lincolnshire, Lancashire or even the
hoped-for Derbyshire. Instead, the reception areas were named as Leicestershire and
Nottinghamshire. Ten districts within these two counties were named: Barrow-upon-
Soar, Castle Donington, Loughborough, Melton Mowbray, Melton and Belvoir, and
Shepshed in Leicestershire; and Basford, Bingham, Newark and Southwell in
Nottinghamshire. An estimated 60,300 billets were available, which was twice the
number for whom the Evacuation Committee had catered and three times the number of
places requested.!" In the event, only one tenth of the billets were taken up at the
outbreak of war.
The emergency instructions advised that every school party would be placed under the
complete control of a named leader who would be responsible for all communications.
Each leader should arrange to meet the entire teaching staff, caretakers and voluntary
helpers under their jurisdiction to ensure that the scheme was fully understood.
Teachers and other volunteers for evacuation duties must remain on call at week-ends
and should leave their holiday addresses with the leader, who would also hold lists of
12.5 City ofSheftield: State of Emergency, 11.5.39, p.l
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names and addresses of all the adults and children who had registered to travel under
the scheme.
Head teachers were asked to inform parents of a list of clothing required in the event of
evacuation, and to ask them to prepare and label the items with the child's name as
soon as possible. Heads were also instructed to make further efforts to encourage more
parents to register their children for the scheme.127
The document clarified the situation of many children when it was explained that
evacuation would be extended beyond those attending the seventy-five named schools
to cover children attending Special, Intermediate, Senior or Non-maintained schools as
well as those at Higher Educational Institutions outside the evacuable areas if they lived
in evacuable areas and their parents wished them to go. If children in the same family
were attending different schools, they should all report to the establishment attended by
the youngest child, from where they would be evacuated.!"
In the event of evacuation plans becoming a reality, the government would make a
public announcement over the wireless and give detailed instructions on the procedure
to be followed. Were the situation to arise during a school holiday (as in fact it did),
teachers should return to Sheffield immediately. If it happened during a normal school
day, the school would be closed immediately and remain so until further notice.
Children would be sent home to collect their luggage and report to their assembly
points. Older pupils would act as messengers to relay information to those (pupils and
127 State of Emergency, op. cit., p.l
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teachers) intending to participate in the scheme but who were attending non-evacuable
establishments. !29
The children to be evacuated should assemble at the named schools wearing their
thickest and warmest clothing and footwear, and be able to carry their luggage by
themselves on their backs, preferably in a rucksack or similar container. One day's
food should be taken, but drinks were only permitted if taken in a thermos flask. No
child was to travel if suffering from, or in contact with, an infectious complaint, or with
scabies or ringworm of the scalp or if the leader considered the child unfit to travel. A
doctor or nurse would accompany each train and motor bus to the reception area.130
Leaders of parties should see that work was begun immediately on preparing identity
cards for adults and labels for children showing the bearer's name, home address, the
name and evacuation number of the Sheffield school to which the person was attached,
and the reception area assigned (although the exact location within that area would not
be known). The children should also be supplied with a distinctive coloured emblem
which would easily identify them at the railway station. All those involved in helping
would wear white armbands with the letters "S.E. C." in different colours to signify their
separate duties as teachers, volunteer helpers or medical staff. The armlets would serve
as passes and entitle the wearers to free travel on the day of evacuation. Staff of the
Education Committee, also wearing identifying white armbands, would work with
station officials to marshal the school parties on the platforms.!"
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All the arrangements for travelling had been worked out with scrupulous attention to
detail. Police protection would ensure that the school parties received priority. Travel
vouchers were expected to be supplied to the schools in advance. Leaders would
complete forms giving exact numbers and categories of parties for travel by train and by
bus. Timetables had been meticulously worked out for everyone registered and
particulars for each school listed entraining station, train number, departure time and
detraining station. The majority of school parties would travel on foot or by bus or tram
to the four Sheffield stations (Victoria, Midland, Darnall and Heeley) where they would
complete their journeys by train. Those children and adults with physical handicaps
would be taken all the way from assembly points to reception areas by motor bus.
Although it was hoped to complete the programme in one day, similar provisional
arrangements were made for a second day of evacuation, with extra leaders and escorts
appointed.v"
Instructions also covered arrival in the reception areas, where teachers and other escorts
with the Sheffield parties would be under the direction of the government billeting staff:
they were firmly advised that finding billets was not their responsibility. It was the
leader's task, immediately accommodation for the party had been secured, to find a Post
Office suitable to receive correspondence and to send telegrams to the Sheffield Chief
Education Officer and to the caretaker of the evacuated school with that information,
which would then be displayed on the school notice board for parents to see. Each
child would be provided with a pre-paid postcard to send home at the first opportunity
after this, telling their parents of their exact whereabouts so that they could then
132 State of Emergency: op. cit., p.7
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communicate with each other.133 All other expenses incurred by head teachers in
connection with evacuation business would be reimbursed by the Sheffield Education
Committee.l'"
The billeting fees payable by the government to householders were unchanged from
those indicated a year earlier: lOs.6d for a single unaccompanied school child's board
and lodging, or 8s.6d. for each child if more than one child was taken in. Those
householders offering lodging only to mothers with children under five years of age
would receive 5s.0d. a week for the mother and 3s.0d. a week for each child who would
be accompanying its mother. For other adults, such as teachers, blind or crippled adults
and expectant mothers, the fee would similarly be 5s.0d. per person.m When these
billeting fees were eventually put into effect they would be the subject of much
discontent and difficulty throughout the war years, despite later adjustments.
With regard to schooling, the leaders of school parties were advised to report to the
Chief Education Officer for the reception area concerned, for they would be under the
jurisdiction of the host authority. The problem of status which had troubled the
teachers was resolved by the instruction that, even in the likely event of having to share
premises and educate the children on a shift system, the evacuated teachers and school
children alike would be in the control of Sheffield head teachers, and payment of
salaries would come from the home City.136
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It was clear that the teachers would be involved in a great deal more than teaching the
evacuated children, however. On an optimistic note, the Chief Education Officer, in
whose name the booklet was compiled, stated:
"I have been assured [... ] that there would be a general desire to
organise out of school activities for the children. Teachers will
not be required to supervise children in billets; any help given in
this direction, however, would doubtless be greatly
welcomed."137
This booklet dealt comprehensively with such diverse subjects as the method of
payment of teachers' salaries during the period of evacuation and railway travel
warrants for those escorts who would not be remaining in the reception areas for the
duration of the emergency. In short, it was an invaluable and extremely informative
handbook for teachers. It was, however, a pity that it was not made available for
parents: they were left to gain their information at second hand from either school
meetings or local newspapers, and may perhaps have responded more positively to the
call for registration if they had been aware of the thoroughness of the preparations.
As it was, despite informative meetings held with parents in the affected areas, the
resulting statistics were far from reassuring. Despite the fact that a second opportunity
was given for reconsideration of their decisions, the Chief Education Officer was forced
to report to his committee on 22 May 1939 that there were at that time only 18,392
definite requests for evacuation. However, as it was anticipated that the number may
increase when (not 'if) evacuation became necessary, arrangements had been made
with the billeting and transport authorities for a possible 30,000 evacuees to be moved
137 State of Emergency, op. cit., p.9
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on the first day of evacuation. Should some parents change their minds after the
commencement of hostilities, arrangements would be made for their children to be
moved and billeted in the same reception areas as their school mates who went on the
first day of evacuation.F" It was also intended that families should be billeted in the
same area as far as possible, even if they did not travel on the same day.139
The disappointing response in Sheffield was mirrored in many towns and cities and
signalled an apathy which had not been present at the time of the Munich crisis. With
registrations alarmingly low across the country, the government arranged for
explanatory leaflets to be delivered in July to householders in evacuation areas (see
Appendix 4).140 Local authorities in these zones also undertook a house-to-house
canvas, which resulted in some increase in school children registered, but still a
considerable shortfall in numbers. Nevertheless, it was decided to stay with the
entraining movements already arranged, for it was expected that public reaction might
well be different if war was declared, and demand might even exceed the figures on
which the plans had been based.'?' Official concern about this possibility was
expressed and Sheffield parents were warned:
"If plans are made for 20,000 and 40,000 present themselves,
there is bound to be chaos for some days. It is not just a matter
of transport, but of accommodation and food."142
In the event, the authorities need not have worried.
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Financial arrangements, for long the subject of dispute between local and central
administration and often the cause of delay, were supposed to be settled by the Civil
Defence Bill of April 1939. Local authorities were obliged to obey instructions laid
down by the Ministry of Health, but no additional burden of expense in connection with
evacuation was to fall on local ratepayers, for provision was made for the Exchequer to
repay approved financial outlay.i"
The trouble was that the Treasury often disagreed with what local authorities and the
Ministry deemed to be necessary expenditure: for instance, approval of the purchase of
bedding and blankets for evacuees was delayed until 25 August 1939, (a week before
evacuation) when a frenzy of commandeering and buying took place. Even then the
problem was not solved, as is evidenced by wireless and press appeals from women's
organisations for the public to donate blankets or knit woollen squares.!" Yet as early
as February officials in the reception areas had been required to send in returns of
estimated quantities of bedding needed, and in May the government had foreseen
problems in meeting the huge demands.i"
There was, too, the matter of clothing for the poorest children. In the light of the
Munich experience, Ben Smith, Member of Parliament, had warned the President of the
Board of Education as long ago as 21 December 1938:
"It was found that large numbers of children were not provided
with adequate clothing, boots and other necessities due to
parental poverty. There are fears that evacuation in a future
emergency will be hampered. "146
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Yet approval was not given until eight months later, only days before the children left
their homes under the government evacuation scheme, for expenditure of up to £1 for
every two hundred necessitous children, and even then it was only on condition that no
publicity should be given to the meagre award.147
Given such a gigantic task to perform, it was perhaps inevitable that government
officials treated the evacuation scheme largely as an exercise in logistics, with the
emphasis being placed on questions of transport, billets and finance. But in doing so
both national and local authorities failed to appreciate all the intensely human problems
which would be encountered. As Susan Isaacs summed up the situation:
"If the Government, and the authorities co-operating with the
Government, as well as the general public, had seen that
evacuation, from its very nature, was necessarily far more than
an emergency military measure [... ] if human nature had been
taken into equal account with geography and railway time
tables, there would in all likelihood not have been so serious a
drift back to the danger areas,"148
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CHAPTER TWO
DEPARTURE
The passing of the Civil Defence Act in July 1939 had signalled an escalation in
preparations for war. This had been followed by a burst of government activity at the
Ministry of Health as it established new regional offices or extended existing ones
throughout the country. Similar activities were undertaken by local authorities as
officials there prepared themselves to deal with any immediate problems thrown up by
what was now perceived to be the real threat of war. Seeking to bolster public
confidence and to 'talk up' the need for civil defence and evacuation, government
agencies used the wireless and the press to assure the country at large that plans were
ready.'
However, although official bodies were now demonstrating their preparedness, their
efforts were not always appreciated or taken seriously by the man-in-the-street. Civil
defence organisations were still short of trained manpower: despite sustained efforts
over many months to recruit, results were patchy and volunteers were still reluctant to
come forward in some regions.' Similar problems had been experienced immediately
prior to the Munich crisis, when ARP wardens had been ridiculed for trying to enforce
black-out rehearsals in London and some provincial cities, including Sheffield. Then,
large sections of the public had refused to participate and several people had written
I The Times: 30.8.39, p.ll
2 T H O'Brien: Civil Defence: History of the Second World War, p.208
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complaining letters to their local newspapers.' The Sheffield Star hardly encouraged
public participation as its London correspondent stated: "We can see no war in the
offing. This war mentality seems to have gripped some people and it is a great pity.?"
A year later the situation had apparently not improved markedly in many areas: black-
out rehearsals had taken place on 10 August 1939 in London and the South-East, but
these had been greeted with apathy in the suburbs, while in the metropolis they were
hindered by sight-seeing crowds more interested in the spectacle than in the gravity of
the situation.' This indifference of the British people to air raid precautions also
applied to their general attitude towards evacuation, as events were soon to prove.
Arguably, though, this spirit may have been encouraged by both national and local press
which, throughout the summer months, appeared to pay scant attention to the real
possibility of evacuation: The Times, for instance, was largely silent on the matter. In
the provinces Sheffield people learned nothing from local newspapers about the city's
plans for evacuation for several weeks until the end of August.
Hopes that Britain would avoid confrontation were severely dented by the signing of the
non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939 and by
Hitler's increasing pressure on Poland.6 The passage of the Emergency Powers
(Defence) Act next day, followed by a series of emergency bills, signified the
imminence of war. Rehearsals for the government's evacuation scheme were put into
immediate action. The experience gained from the selective evacuation of some 4,300
3 The Sheffield Star: 11-20.8.38 Letters Columns
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London children in priority groups under Plan One during the Munich crisis, and a full-
scale practice by 5,000 Chelsea children from twenty schools in the borough, carried
out as part ofa civil defence exercise in July 1939, helped to inform the operation.'
In the light of the deteriorating situation in Europe through the summer of 1939 many
local education authorities had kept up the momentum of preparations for a possible
evacuation emergency. All teachers in Sheffield, whether in areas of perceived danger
or not, had been called to a meeting at the end of July as schools had closed for the
summer holidays, and had been informed of the duties expected of them. Those
employed at schools in neutral areas of the city were delegated to help at evacuable
schools. All were requested to leave their holiday addresses with the leaders of the
appropriate evacuation parties'
A BBC broadcast on Thursday 24 August abruptly ended the holidays of those tens of
thousands of school teachers throughout the country who were affected by the
government scheme. While parents whose children were away on holiday were
exhorted to leave them where they were, school staffs were called back home and
directed to report to their appointed schools on the morning of Saturday 26 August. 9
Many teachers would not have been altogether surprised, for the possibility of sudden
recall had been mooted as the schools broke up. In addition, Education, the official
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organ of the Association of Education Committees, had warned two weeks earlier of a
proposal for evacuation drills to be held in schools. 10
Whether foreseen or unexpected, when the order was given towards the end of the long
summer vacation nearly all the teachers left their holidays, returned home and obeyed
the instruction. Most remained on duty for the whole of the weekend: some even slept
overnight in school buildings. A few were on holiday abroad or in remote areas and
therefore unable to return immediately. II The Hallamshire Teacher reported that many
newly-trained young staff, due to embark on their careers at the beginning of the term
on the following Monday, turned up for work three days early and volunteered to help.12
Perusal of The Sheffield Star has shown that their assistance was not entirely due to
altruism, however, for this publication stated clearly:
"Newly appointed teachers and student teachers whose
appointments date from Mon [sic] August 28th, must also report
for duty at the Sheffield schools.t'"
Nevertheless, Jackson asserts that teachers were the linch-pin of the whole evacuation
operation 14and it is difficult to dispute this claim, for without their assistance and
organising skills no orderly evacuation would have been possible. Their willingness to
participate in the government's evacuation scheme had been ensured in the summer of
1938, even before Munich. Then, the Executive of the National Union of Teachers had
met with representatives of the Anderson Committee, the Inspector General of Air Raid
10 Education, No.1910, 18.8.39, p.1S4
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precautions and Lady Reading of the Women's Voluntary Service. The Executive had
passed the following resolution:
"That the National Union of Teachers, while not subscribing to
any suggestion that war is inevitable, are prepared to co-operate
with the Government and the Local Authorities in making plans
for the safety of school children as effective as possible, and to
recommend their members in the local areas to consider the
desirability of co-operation on a voluntary basis.,,15
This voluntary nature of teachers' assistance was reiterated after the crisis, on 24th
November 1939 when a conference of representatives of the government, local
authorities and teachers' unions was told that their co-operation was invited (not
demanded or expected) in working out an orderly plan for evacuating school children."
Compulsion proved unnecessary, for as Weitzman observed, teachers' response
countrywide was almost unanimously in favour of co-operation.17
In the last days of August evacuation rehearsals were held in London and all towns and
cities in the designated danger zones, including Hull, Liverpool, Newcastle-upon-Tyne,
Manchester and Sheffield. Sheffield children were expected to report to school on
Saturday 26 August to receive details of the rehearsal to take place on the following
Monday, but many parents misunderstood the instructions carried in the local press and,
while the teachers turned up in full force at the seventy-five evacuable schools, only an
abysmally small percentage of children arrived. As one local reporter noted:
"Woodbourn Council School, [... ] with 840 scholars, is one of
the largest in the Eastern division [of the city]. Situated in the
heart of one of Sheffield's vital industries, it is one of those
schools which would close down entirely on the outbreak of
hostilities. Parents of only 200 of the children have, however,
IS The Hallamshire Teacher, No.46, p.13
16 ibid.; No.47, p.5
17 PRO.ED.138/49
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agreed to their evacuation, and [... ] only 20 of those attended by
noon today. Similar poor responses were reported from other
schools...18
Misunderstanding did not account for all the absent children, however. In Sheffield, as
in other parts of the country, some parents who had previously registered their children
for evacuation now called at their schools to say that they had changed their minds
about sending them away" In the event, the headmaster of Woodbourn Boys' School
(mentioned above) later recorded that less than half of those children who had been
registered had actually been evacuated."
On Monday 28 August, in the evacuable areas throughout England and Scotland those
children whose parents did agree to their removal arrived at their schools for rehearsal.
Secondary school children in the danger zones whose parents wished them to be
evacuated had been registered at elementary schools close to their homes. These
children, together with mothers with young children, also arrived for the rehearsals.
They were joined by large numbers of adults - women, on the whole - who had
volunteered to be helpers and escorts in time of emergency. These were mainly
members of the Women's Voluntary Service, Red Cross, St John's Ambulance Brigade,
and wives of teachers. All came with their luggage and a day's food supply, prepared
for a full-scale evacuation practice. Teachers checked kit, inspected gas-masks and
handed out two identification labels to each child - one to be attached to the luggage
and the other to be fastened to the child's outdoor clothing." Everyone marched in
18 The Sheffield Star: 26.8.39, p.5
19 ibid.
20 Log book: Woodboum Boys' School, entry 2.9.39
21 R Padley "The Exodus" in R Padley & M Cole (eds): Evacuation Survey, p.37
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crocodile to local departure points; then, as transport had not been laid on for the
rehearsal, they marched back to school and went home.22
There was no mistake about instructions this time, yet the situation in Sheffield on this
Monday was hardly better than it had been two days earlier. School log books record
the results: "Only a very small number turned Up",23"Response meagre"," were typical
entries. Out of nearly 1,000 scholars at Carbrook Council School, for instance, less
than a third had been registered by their parents for evacuation and only approximately
one hundred school children reported for the full-scale rehearsal.25 It was clear that
many of the parents who had responded favourably to registration calls earlier in the
year had had a change of heart in the intervening period. Itmay be held that the attitude
of this school's headmaster, who was also the evacuation leader, had hardly encouraged
a good response from his party, for he made plain his scathing view of the operation in
the school log book: "The whole affair has shown that the majority of people are
indifferent to scare-mongering.,,26 While in some parts of the country evacuation
rehearsals continued for several days," Sheffield children attended their schools after
the Monday practice and resumed their normal work until the Thursday.28 It had
already become clear that there would be a considerable shortfall in the numbers to be
evacuated from many areas, but the full extent of the deficit was not appreciated until
later.
22 Davis Jr: op. cit., p.S4
23 Log book: All Saints' Girls School, entry 28.8.39
24 Log book: Carbrook Council Boys' School, entry 28.8.39
2S The Sheffield Star: 28.8.39, p.S
26 Log book: Carbrook Council Boys' School, entry 28.8.39
27 B Wicks: No Time to Wave Goodbye, pp.34-S
28 Log book: Carbrook Council Boys' School, entry 29.8.39
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The suspense was finally ended just before noon on the last day in August when the
Cabinet ordered that evacuation was to begin the next day. The BBC and both national
and local press promptly issued a number of pre-arranged announcements: one directed
workers in essential industries to remain at their posts, while another requested people
not to obstruct government measures. At least one communication was clearly intended
to prevent panic and at the same time to attempt to promote more widespread
participation in the scheme: the public were informed that all those in the designated
priority classes could be evacuated irrespective of whether or not they had already
registered."
Some newspaper editors now made their contribution towards building morale, too.
The Times confidently pointed to the "remarkable contrast" between the present
organisation for evacuation compared with the improvisation which had taken place in
September 1938.30 And after months of seeming indifference The Sheffield Star carried
an editorial exhorting those in the evacuation areas to take advantage of the government
scheme. Readers were informed that 30,000 billets were waiting in the reception areas;
as only two-thirds of these had been reserved through registration, there was still room
for 10,000 extra evacuees. Parents of children participating in the official scheme were
praised for taking the right line to safeguard their offspring." However, this public
attempt to drum up support was too little and too late for most local people, for their
response was apathetic to say the least, as will be seen.
29 Titmuss: op. cit., p.97
30 The Times, 30.8.39, p.6
31 The Sheffield Star, 31.8.39, p.6
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Head teachers of evacuable schools across the country were informed of the Cabinet
decision by their local education authorities. Sheffield's Chief Education Officer did
not waste words: his telegram to those schools read: "Evacuation Friday September
First. [signed] Newton.,,32 His instructions to non-evacuable schools were more
explicit, however:
"Evacuation commences tomorrow. Your school will close at
the end of this afternoon's session and the teachers attend at
evacuable schools at times arranged by Group Leaders. On
Saturday your teachers must also attend evacuable schools at
same time to be prepared to accompany any remaining evacuees
to reception areas. Please notify Head Teachers of other
Departments. [signed] Newton.,,33
Children were sent home immediately and the city's schools, like those throughout
Britain, closed for the emergency. Mass evacuation under the combined government
Plans Two and Three, or Operation 'Pied Piper', would begin next morning."
As seen in the preceding chapter and Appendix 2, the mechanics of organising for the
departure of non-essential persons from vulnerable cities and towns across England and
Scotland were vast and complex: transport schedules had necessarily mainly been
prepared by using estimates gathered months earlier. In addition to secondary and
primary school children, travel arrangements had to cover handicapped children in
special schools and those in nursery schools and institutions, together with teachers,
escorts and other helpers. Mothers with young children, blind and disabled adults, as
well as expectant mothers also had to be catered for.35
32 Log book: St Barnabas (Cecil Road) School, entry 31.8.39
33 Log book: Ann's Road Senior Mixed School, entry 31.8.39
34 Titmuss: op. cit., p.l 0 1
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In London alone, officials from the railway companies, the London Passenger Transport
Board and Scotland Yard had all co-operated in planning. Arrangements were in force
for thousands of school children and other priority groups to assemble at 1,589
locations. Buses had to be provided to run through back-streets to take some of the
school parties to entraining points, and each route had to be agreed with the
Metropolitan Police. Other parties walked to nearby stations. There were also 172
Tube entraining points. Ninety-eight mainline stations were involved, from which
trains ran on pre-arranged special routes to the reception areas." In addition,
preparations were made for thousands more, mostly children, to be taken by boat to
coastal towns in East Anglia, while buses and coaches were laid on to transport many
more people direct to the reception areas. In the London County Council's vast
programme, planned to take effect over a period of four days, those scheduled to report
on the first day of the operation were confined to unaccompanied school children and
mothers with young children, together with teachers and volunteer escorts." However,
it had become clear during practices that the numbers reporting for evacuation were
much lower than expected. Organisers resolved at the very last minute, therefore, to
speed up the procedure by telescoping the planned four-day programme into three days
- a decision which was to prove disastrous in many areas.
In comparison with London, Sheffield's operation was much smaller and considerably
less complicated. Transport schedules had been meticulously planned months
previously, as will be seen in Appendix 5, and timetables included in the State of
36 Titmuss: op. cit., p.107
37 PRO.ED.138/49
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Emergency booklet distributed to all schools in the evacuation area of the city in May.38
Despite the fact that the numbers coming forward for evacuation had never exceeded a
third of the total eligible, it had been necessary to cater for a possible large increase at
the last moment. Accordingly, officials had planned to complete the task within two
days, with arrangements for the movement of 17,000 of the priority classes on each
day.39
In view of the low turn-out for the full-scale rehearsal in Sheffield, here too it was
decided to accelerate the operation somewhat and to convey most of the priority classes
to the reception areas on the first day, although transport arrangements would remain in
place in case of a last-minute rush on the second day. All school children, mothers with
young children, blind and crippled adults requiring evacuation were therefore instructed
to attend at their appointed schools at the times stipulated by their evacuation leaders.
Separate arrangements were made for expectant mothers and any pre-school children
with them to assemble on the second day at the Child Welfare Clinic in the city, ready to
travel to billets or a nursing home in Mansfield."
Early on Friday 1 September (as early as 5.30 a.m. in at least one school)" the evacuees
mustered at assembly points throughout England and Scotland. All the children
reported with their gas-masks and with name-tags pinned to their coats or on string
around their necks. Most carried sandwiches and a haversack containing one change of
clothing as required by evacuation planners; some of the poorer ones brought their
38 City of Sheffield: State oj Emergency, 11.5.39, p.2
39 The Sheffield Star: 30.1.39, p.5
40 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 30.8.39, p.?
41 Myrtle Road School inLondon, cited in The Nottingham Evening Post: 1.9.39, p.l
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belongings packed into a pillowcase; those poorer still had only the clothes they were
wearing." Parents gathered to wave goodbye, the vast majority not knowing where
their children were going or when they would see them again.
In some Sheffield schools helpers almost out-numbered evacuees as volunteers and
teachers from schools outside the evacuation zone came to help in the organisation.
Burgoyne Road Council School, evacuating a total of 107mothers and children (only a
small fraction of those eligible), was swamped by nineteen extra teachers in addition to
escorts and the combined staffs of its own Infants and Junior Mixed Departments.
Similarly, Darnall Council Schools received help from fifteen staff in addition to their
own establishment, to deal with a mixed party of seventy-one evacuees."
The majority of Sheffield evacuees made their main journeys by rail, but the whole of
the city's transport system was disrupted for the day as over one hundred public vehicles
(mainly tramcars and buses) were laid on to take the evacuees from departure points to
entraining stations. Those meeting at schools which had been allocated buses for that
purpose were picked up and taken to the four most convenient Sheffield stations
(Midland, Victoria, Heeley and Attercliffe), while those allocated to trams walked in
crocodile to pre-arranged tram stops from where they were transferred to the rail
heads." Most of the parents said their farewells in the school playgrounds, but some
followed their children to the stations, as an interviewee remembered:
42 Davis Jr: op. cit., p.55
43 Log books: Burgoyne Road Council Junior Mixed School; Darnall Boys' School; entries 1.9.39
44 The Sheffield Star: 31.8.39, p.7
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"Children were marched up Station Approach, and mothers had
raced the trams down to get a last look at their children but were
not allowed near the station platforms. ,,45
At the entraining points the children followed their school banners, accompanied by
teachers and volunteer escorts wearing distinctive armbands. On the platforms they
were marshalled by railway staff. Sheffield Education Committee Report for 1938/39
stated that school medical officers attended at all local stations, where a room had been
set aside as a First Aid Post and ambulances stood by to deal with any last-minute cases
of sickness, while doctors or nurses also travelled with the evacuees on the trains to the
reception areas." Oral interviews have shown, though, that medical examinations did
not take place for all Sheffield children prior to evacuation.
An interviewee, at the time twelve years old and travelling with his twin brother and
younger sister in the care of Carfield Council School, recalled the excitement:
"I remember marching to Heeley Station. When we got there
we joined hundreds of other children on the platform. We
couldn't see the end of the queue. We hadn't brought any food
with us, but on the platform all the children were given a brown
paper bag with an orange, an apple and some nuts. The boys all
seemed to be wildly excited and happy but some children,
mainly girls I think, were crying and upset about leaving home.
It was all a big adventure to me and my brother; we were very
poor and it was like nothing we had ever known before.':"
These feelings may have been typical of many children at this time and were echoed by
another former evacuee from Sheffield: "The sadness of parting for me was largely
offset, for me at least, by the thrill of the adventure ahead. ,,48
4S Oral intetview: Pamela Denniff, 16.9.94
46 Sheffield Education Committee: Report /938/39, p.40
47 Oral intetview: George Shelley, 12.8.96
48 J Perry et al: Shepshed: Wartime Memories, p.55
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From Sheffield's Victoria Station twenty trains were laid on to run to a variety of
destinations including Newark, Bingham and Ruddington in Nottinghamshire and
Barrow-upon-Soar, Loughborough and Melton Mowbray in Leicestershire. Many of
these trains were less than a third full on this first day: the second one to arrive in
Newark carried only 266 children and adults even though there was room for 840. The
first contingent to leave the LMS Sheffield Midland Station comprised mothers and
small children from Denby Street and Broomhall Nurseries, together with a party of
school children with five teachers and some mothers and younger siblings, all bound for
Melton Mowbray in Leicestershire." A few parties, mainly made up of those with
disabilities or from special schools, were transported all the way to the reception areas
by bus, each party accompanied by a school nurse. The children of Maud Maxfit1c:l
School for the Deaf travelled to Southwell, Nottinghamshire, in this way.50 Departures
on the second day amounted to very small numbers judging from statistics recorded in
log books - the largest total from one school was discovered to be twenty-six from
Owler Lane Council School.51
Despite the government's refusal to allocate Derbyshire as a reception area for the city's
children, at least a few of them were found a refuge in that county under the official
scheme, albeit late in the day. In the midst of rehearsal week, the Sheffield Health
Committee reported to the City Council that the Public Works Department had been
authorised to adapt Thornsett Lodge in the village of Bradfield for the reception of fifty
small children from Herries Road Homes and Nursery and to erect a temporary wooden
49 P Hardy: Sheffield at War, p.12
so The Sheffield Star: 1.9.39, p.l
SI Log book: Owler Lane Council Intermediate School, entry 2.9.39
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hut for staff. Babies from the orphanage at Fir Valewere evacuated to Fulwood Homes
on the city boundary.52
Head teachers and governors of some independent schools had previously made their
own arrangements for accommodation in Derbyshire. Sheffield High School for Girls
moved more than half its pupils to become temporary boarders at Cliff Theological
College, Calver. Ramblers holidaying at Derwent Hall YouthHostel in Ashopton were
quickly moved out in order to make room for one hundred and forty-five children
evacuated from Notre Dame High School.53 The Roman Catholic Church in Sheffield
arranged for its orphanage children to be sent further afield, to St Vincent's Boarding
School, near Preston in Lancashire.54
In 1938, in the haste to provide for evacuation at the time of the Munich Crisis, the
issue of transport - that is to say, the process of getting the children away from danger -
had been the governing factor in planning; billeting received secondary consideration,
with education commanding very little attention indeed.55 Had it proved necessary to
operate full-scale evacuation at that time, it is clear that great problems would have
been encountered under Plan One. A year later, some of the lessons learned had been
taken on board in designing Plans Two and Three: administrative planning had largely
revolved around the parallel issues of transportation and billeting. But even then it is
apparent that not much attention had been paid to the schooling of evacuees once they
reached the receiving districts, until the last minute. It was not until August that the
S2 Sheffield Archives File CA.157/4; Sheffield City Council Minutes 1938/39: p.1152
53 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 1.9.39, p.4; 4.9.39, p.3
S4 Oral interview: Alfred Knowles 20.10.92
ss Padley & Cole: op. cit., p.6
90
Board of Education issued Circular 1469 giving some guidance to evacuating teachers
regarding their duties. Only two days before the exodus were details of education
arrangements in reception areas more fully addressed in Circular 1474, when the
Board's President, Earl de la Warr, perhaps inadvertently, seemed to confirm the lack of
earlier planning as he stated in his foreword:
"[ ... ] extensive preparations have been made for evacuation,
and, now that these are well forward, it is time to consider what
is to happen to children after evacuation.,,56
The destination area for every school in the ninety-three evacuation areas throughout
the country, with the exception of those scheduled late under Plan Three, had been
known in Whitehall by April 1939.57 On the basis of billeting surveys and initial
registrations for evacuation, most of the reception areas had been informed of the
categories and approximate numbers of refugees to expect if it became necessary to
initiate the government scheme. In the evacuating areas some provincial authorities had
been able to acquaint evacuation leaders in confidence of their parties' designated
reception areas. Sheffield head teachers, for example, had received notice when they
received the State of Emergency booklet prepared by the Education Department in May.
But the destinations of others, particularly those in London, were kept secret even from
leaders 'for security reasons' but also because the authorities refused to guarantee that
parties would arrive intact in any given place.58 In the event, the precaution proved to
have been a sound one, but it created many difficulties for those charged with
56 Education: No.1912, 1.9.39, p.196
57 G Hobby: unpublished M.Bd Thesis (1984), p.20
58 M E Cosens: "Evacuation: A Social Revolution", Social Work, Vol. 1, No.3, (1940), p.167
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encouraging registration in the evacuation localities and arguably had acted as a
powerful disincentive to parents' approval of the scheme.
This failure to disclose where their schools were going had for a long time concerned
teachers, who were anxious about what facilities might (or might not) be available for
their scholars in country districts. In the aftermath of Munich, for example, the
headmaster of Barking Abbey School had complained about the secrecy of destinations
in the hurried evacuation plans and requested that these should be made known well in
advance of any future evacuation so that contacts could be made between evacuating
and receiving schools and continuity of education maintained.59 The plea had
apparently fallen on deaf ears, however, for on 1 September 1939 in London and other
cities many of the teachers ('the linch-pin of the whole operation') still did not know
whither they were bound or what facilities awaited them in the reception areas. One
teacher, whose pupils had assembled for evacuation at 6 a.m., wrote later in his school
magazine:
"Finally, at a little after 10 a.m., we did get into a train, still
wondering where we were going, though in the meantime I had
been told in confidence of three different destinations."?
The children, and particularly those who were not accompanied by their mothers, were
just as perplexed. One former evacuee's memory of the experience seemed to
encapsulate the bewilderment felt by many:
"Nobody knew where we were going. And we all got in the
train and went to where we went. [... ] We didn't know where
S9 E A Loftus: "The Evacuation of Schools in Danger Areas", Journal of Education, Vol. 70, p.685
60 Mitcham County School for Boys: The Mitchamian, Vol. 3, No.4 (1939), p.3
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we were going at all, and all those children didn't know where
we were when we got there."?'
A woman who was evacuated as a small child remembered:
"I seemed to be in a world of my own. [... ] 1 cowered in a
comer seat by the window and didn't utter a word on the entire
journey. [... ] It was as if 1 had to accept this fate with a stiff
upper lip and not question the reason why. ,,62
Security precautions were carried to extremes in a few cases, as when prefects
travelling with an East End Convent School were instructed to keep the blinds down in
the train carriages even in daylight because no clues were to be given as to their
destination."
Evidence gathered from interviews with Sheffield evacuees suggests that although the
party leaders were aware of their receiving districts, in general the children's parents
were not informed. Nearly all interviewees emphatically stated that no-one knew their
destination in advance: the only exception was an ex-evacuee whose aunt was head
teacher and leader of her school party and had told her parents where she was going."
Across Britain the exodus was a triumph of organisation - on the surface at least: the
rehearsals had served their purpose. In all, some 1,473,391 children and adults in the
priority classes were evacuated from Britain's largest and most vulnerable cities under
this first official programme, including those who joined the scheme in the first few
weeks after the outbreak of war. Of these, 826,959 were unaccompanied school
61 A Ross: "Children Becoming Historians: An Oral History Project in a Primary School", Oral History,
Vol. 12, No.2 (1984) p.23
62 MCooper (ed): In Our Lifetime: Memories of the Second World War 1939-1945, p.7
63 DE Johnson: Exodus of Children, pp.21,2
64 Oral interview: Pamela Denniff, 16.9.94
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children travelling in the care of over 80,000 teachers and volunteers, many of the
teachers remaining with pupils in the reception areas.65 Herbert Morrison, Leader of the
LCC, while confessing disappointment at the figures, was impressed with "the quiet,
orderly character of the whole business't'" Earl de la Warr, having witnessed the
movement of some of the London children, said: "If arrangements at the other end for
receiving the children are as good as at this end, it bodes well for the scheme.,,67 His
optimism was to be disappointed.
In an operation of such magnitude there were bound to be delays and mistakes. Pupils
and staff of Dulwich College Preparatory School had to wait for ten hours before even
leaving their premises for the station. They did not arrive at their destination in Kent,
less than fifty miles away, until more than twelve hours had elapsed from the time of
assembly and, even then, the older pupils faced a three-mile walk to their camp billet
while the smaller boys travelled in a sheep wagon." Confusion reigned, too, as the
LCC moved some its schools to reception areas in Essex along the Thames estuary,
while at the same time the Essex authorities were arranging to send their own children
away from this region, fearing that the Thames would attract enemy bombing." The
chaos experienced in the reception areas as a result of speeding up the departure of
school parties from entraining stations will be dealt with in the next chapter.
6S Titmuss: op. cit., p.103
66 The Times: 2.9.39, p.12
67 The Nottingham Evening Post: 1.9.39, p.l
68 N Longmate: The Home Front, p.14
69 Iackson: op. cit., p.12
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During rehearsals it had become clear to organisers at the 'sharp end' of the operation
that even in the capital the numbers reporting for evacuation were much lower than
expected. The full extent of the problem was not immediately grasped by some
authorities or the public at large, howeverI" Initially, confusing messages were
published. The Times reported a figure of 3,000,000 mothers and children evacuated in
the first three daYS.71 In fact, less than half of those who had been catered for actually
turned up. The editor of Education did not appreciate the situation either: immediately
following the exodus he stated that the response was generally very good. Commenting
favourably upon Manchester's numbers, but wrongly crediting that city with an
evacuation rate of 80% (official statistics later gave 69%),72the editor nevertheless
correctly drew attention to Sheffield's poor performance: "The feature here throughout
was the unusually low percentage of parents wishing to have their children
evacuated."73
Organisers in London, noting the shortfall there, made a last-minute decision to
streamline the process of evacuation by condensing the planned four-day programme
into three days. This telescoping, though, meant that plans which had been so
meticulously made over previous months were sacrificed to speed. Train and bus
schedules had to undergo extensive and complex changes at impossibly short notice.
Complicating things further, the new railway timetables had to be tailored to fit in with
other priority groups using the network, such as troops and hospital patients. In order to
70 Titmuss: op. cit., p.l02
71 The Times: 4.9.39, p.5
72 Titmuss: op. cit., p.5S0
73 Education: No.1912, 1.9.39, p.194
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avoid congestion on station platforms, children were loaded into waiting trains, often in
haphazard fashion."
Although the majority of London teachers did not know their expected destination, a
few education authorities had made previous arrangements to keep school units together
and to match them with similar schools in reception areas. Even where this had not
happened, many head teachers had gone to great lengths to preserve their school and
class identities to try to avoid stress and to ensure continuity of education on arrival.
Despite this, many groups were now broken up and separated at entraining points,
ending up in different parts of the country. Organisers in one North London school had
carefully sorted children into groups: friends and siblings were to be kept together and
escorts carried detailed registers about every child. In the speeding up process at the
station, railway marshals split the school party into several different crocodiles,
breaking the groups down many times before sending them on their way. To make
matters worse, when they arrived in the reception areas the scholars were distributed
over fifty square miles, providing immense difficulties for teachers trying to track them
all down."
Nor was the trouble confined to insensitive handling at departure points. Some school
parties, having managed to preserve their identities until arrival at detraining stations,
were hastily split up into several groups and children put onto buses which deposited
them in scattered villages, quite separated from friends and teachers." Similar
74 Titmuss: op. cit., p.I 07
75 R Padley "The Exodus" in Padley & Cole: op. cit., pp.39,40
76 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.I 07, I09
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problems were encountered in the provinces. Sheffield did not escape, as the head
teacher of Carbrook Council School records. Having arrived intact at its destination,
his party was broken down and families divided up in several different villages, causing
problems and frustration for teachers.,,77
Nor did all problems arose from muddles at railway stations: many children travelled
with their schools directly to the reception areas by bus and coach. Some of these sped
away from the London area and disgorged their passengers in an apparently
indiscriminate manner. An interviewee who travelled without siblings with her school
by coach demonstrated the random nature of some operations:
"All 'only' children were told to get off at one stop. I got off,
but because I was near the end of the queue and there were too
many children, I had to get back on and ended up at Outwood
[only twenty miles from home] with family groups - probably
better in the long run.,,78
One wonders at the logic of separating singletons from families before even reaching a
distribution centre. No such problems appear to have arisen in the case of Sheffield,
where the numbers of people travelling all the way by bus and coach were confined to
those with health problems, and for whom special arrangements had been made for
their reception.
For many evacuees the train journeys themselves were often less than satisfactory,
especially for the London children who often had to travel very long distances, for
example to Somerset and Devon, and were confined within the carriages for many
77 Log book: Carbrook Council Boys' School, entry 1.9.39
78 Oral interview: Joan Patterson, 18.8.92
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hours without a break. Some trains lacked corridors and toilet facilities, which resulted
in many small, tired travellers arriving in a very soiled, unhappy and unattractive state.
One train-load of London evacuees, bound for Somerset but forced by calls of nature to
stop at Wantage station in Berkshire, never got back on the train but took up residence
instead in that reception zone."
Most parents had supplied children with sandwiches, but others went hungry and many
had nothing at all to drink throughout their journeys. The children had been forbidden
to take drinks with them unless these were carried in vacuum flasks"? which few
families were able to supply. Jackson suggests that although the official reason for
banning drinks was to avoid the dangers of broken glass, it was mainly to avoid toilet
problems." Moreover, the situation was little better a year later, as will be shown in
Chapter Six.
In comparison with many other evacuees, Sheffield children were fortunate. The
distances between the city and their reception areas in Nottinghamshire and
Leicestershire were not great, so many of the indignities suffered by evacuees from
London and other cities were avoided. Local newspapers described the journeys as
cheerful: one likened the operation to "a gigantic Sunday School treat",82 while another
asserted that the children found it easy to keep smiling because they were smartly
turned out in new clothes hurriedly bought by their mothers for the evacuation.f
79 Titmuss: op. cit., p.l08
80 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 1.9.39, p.4
81 Jackson: op. cit., p. 17
82 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 2.9.39, p.5
83 The Sheffield Star: 1.9.39, p.I
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The behaviour of the children in the mass movement was almost unanimously praised -
officially at least - but the mothers came in for much censure, even at this early stage,
though one reporter at least showed some insight:
"Where the children were steady, cheerful and responsive, the
mothers were unstable, dejected and frequently antagonistic.
[...] [It] may be that the worst cases caught the eyes of the
critics.,,84
It was not long, however, before the conduct of evacuees in general was put under
greater scrutiny and became the subject of bitter complaint: this will be dealt with in
Chapter Four.
Evacuees were scheduled to be dispersed over a wide area of England and Wales: under
'Pied Piper' the LCC alone sent school children to 476 billeting authorities and seventy-
three education authorities spread across an area south of a line drawn roughly from
Land's End to the Wash85 where the survey carried out in the previous February had
identified a large surplus of accommodation; most Liverpool and Manchester children
went to Wales. While getting the thousands of evacuees away from perceived danger
had necessarily been the chief preoccupation of the programme, speeding up the
entraining process at departure points had an unfortunate knock-on effect in some of
these reception zones.
One outcome of the escalation was that billeting officers who were awaiting particular
categories of refugees now found themselves having to deal with quite unexpected
groups; for example, secondary school boys were deposited at centres awaiting mothers
84 Education: No. 1913,8.9.39, p.213
8S J Macnicol, "The effect of the evacuation of schoolchildren on official attitudes to State intervention" in
H L Smith (ed): War and Social Change: British Society in the Second World War, p.6
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with young children, and pregnant women arrived where unaccompanied children were
expected." Many country householders, already reluctant to open their homes to
strangers, were confused, disappointed and even disgruntled when they did not get the
evacuees they had expected. In short, accelerating the process in this way was a recipe
for disaster.
Other problems for officials in receiving districts were caused by late changes in
zoning. When evacuation zones were extended under Plan Three, some newly-included
areas were thrown into confusion. O'Leary states that because Dagenham (a heavy
industrial area, inexplicably omitted from earlier Plans) was added to the programme
very late in the day, local officials did not receive any official circulars or proper
instructions, with the result that very little preliminary work had been done when
evacuation took place by boat a day early, on 31 August 1939. Reception authorities in
East Anglia were quite unprepared for the large numbers arriving there, and due to a
shortage of beds, some evacuees had to sleep for four nights on straw covered by
sacking on schoolroom floors, being fed on a diet of milk, apples and cheese for this
period."
Similarly, some of Nottingham's inner-city areas had not been scheduled for evacuation
until July, after strong representations had been made to the government. This city's
teachers were not recalled from their holidays, and no rehearsals took place because
officials were not notified of the reception areas allotted to them until days after the
86 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.107-09
87 J O'Leary "Dagenham", in Padley & Cole: op. cit., p.220
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countrywide exodus had begun." Eventually, the evacuation programme was hurriedly
put into operation a week late and Nottingham city children were moved into many of
the same areas as were allocated to Sheffield.89 Fortunately, the problem of billeting
was not so great here, because the late arrivals (only about half of those expected) were
able to take up the many places left unfilled by those Sheffield children who had
registered but did not report for evacuation.
It will be seen that although, in the main, the departure of children and priority classes
could be counted a successful achievement, the arrival of the evacuees in the reception
areas was another matter altogether. Due to telescoping of timetables, in a few cases all
the efforts to prepare were wasted because no evacuees appeared, while in others the
wrong groups arrived. In some areas there was chaotic pressure as numbers swamped
the available resources. " These factors may have undermined the goodwill so
necessary to the success of the scheme and even prejudiced some householders against
those evacuees who were billeted upon them. Stemming from this, it might be argued
that evacuees who sensed they were not welcome were more likely to be among the first
to return home.
The apparent folly of speeding up the entraining process and telescoping plans
painstakingly prepared for a four-day exodus into the space of three days must be seen
in its contemporary context, however. Plans had necessarily been based on assumptions
of numbers expected to travel. As far fewer people actually reported for evacuation the
88 The Nottingham Evening Post: 25.8.39, p.5
89 Nottinghamshire Education Committee: Minutes for Year Ended 31.7.40, p.7
90 F Ie Gros Clark & R W Toms: Evacuation: Failure or Reform, p.S
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decision to drastically escalate timetables was based on the expectation of immediate
and devastating aerial bombardment of the capital and other centres of industrial
importance on the outbreak of war. It was perceived to be a race against time to get
people away from danger to safer areas. In the event, of course, air raids did not
materialise until several months later - a fact which could not be known at the time.
Despite all the difficulties encountered, however, not one casualty or serious accident
was reported, and in the main the exodus proceeded smoothly." This was a notable
achievement in an operation of such magnitude, particularly considering the many
unknown factors and ad hoc arrangements. It is true that evacuation authorities were
dismayed to find that more than half of those in the priority classes remained behind in
areas defined as dangerous.V nevertheless, had they been faced with the numbers
originally expected, the outcome might not have been so successful.
When statistics were gathered in, it became clear that across England there were wide
differences in numbers of school children who came forward for evacuation. Best
results came from some of the northern counties, with the largest proportions being sent
from Manchester and Salford, Newcastle and Gateshead, Liverpool and other
Merseyside districts. Less successful were Birmingham and Nottingham. Almost the
worst was Sheffield, with 15% (see Appendix 6): only Rotherham, which had been
designated an evacuation area late, sent fewer of its eligible children away.93
91 Titmuss: op. cit., p.lOl
92 AD K Owen: "The Great Evacuation", Political Quarterly Vol. 11 (1940) p.34
93 Titmuss: op. cit., p.550
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As for London, at the height of the Munich Crisis the LCC had reported 83% of eligible
children registered for evacuation." Six months later, in March 1939, the figure had
dropped to 69%95- a warning of the growing resistance of the public to evacuation. Six
months after that, under Operation 'Pied Piper' in September 1939, the figure actually
evacuated from London was only 49%.96
By May 1939 Sheffield authorities had received only 18,392 definite requests for
evacuation out of an estimated total of 60,000 women, children and other priority
classes." On 22 August as tension was building nationally (but went unreported in
Sheffield newspapers) the number of registrations had increased to 19,526, reaching a
maximum of 20,182by the end of the month as rehearsals were under way and a house-
to-house census was undertaken in response to a request by the Ministry of Health to
encourage more people to come forward." At most, therefore, only one third of those
in priority classes in the evacuable parts of Sheffield had signalled any desire to move
out of the danger areas. As has been seen, the local authority decreed that arrangements
would have to go ahead for the full number of possible evacuees to travel and to be
billeted in the reception areas." In the event just 8,757 people travelled on the first two
days, of whom 5,093 were unaccompanied school children. A further 245 children
were evacuated at the end of October - a total of a mere 5,338 out of an estimated
30,000 children in the evacuation zones of Sheffield.100
94 Titmuss: op. cit., p.34
9S ibid.,p.44
96 ibid, p.SS
97 Sheffield Education Committee: Report 1939/40, p.70
98 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 29.8.39, p.4
99 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of School Medical Officer 1939, pp.39,40
100 Sheffield Education Committee: Survey April 1939 -March 1947, p.4
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Sheffield's poor turn-out was noticed and taken up by the national press. Five weeks
after the exodus, when many of those who had left the city had already returned, The
Manchester Guardian viewed the situation seriously:
"[ ... ] the local education committee has 55,000 children on its
hands, 25,000 of whom ought not to be in the city at all. It
might be said in the crude Whitehall manner that these 25,000,
having refused to heed the voice of authority, are contumacious -
or rather, the outward and visible signs of parental contumacy, -
and therefore not entitled to further consideration.?'?'
One Sheffield head teacher, noting the low tum-out, stated that, in his view, hitherto
reluctant parents would soon let their children join those in the reception areas when
they realised how well they were looked after. He also foresaw that in the event of air
raids the parents would be "clamouring for their children to be taken out of the danger
zone.,,102 This prediction was, however, over-optimistic, as will be evident in ensuing
chapters of this thesis.
Why was the response so good in some places and yet so poor in others - in particular,
Sheffield? Although many reasons may be given for the discrepancies between one
evacuating area and another, it is difficult to place them in any particular order of
importance. Geographical location appears to have been irrelevant to Sheffield's
abysmal showing. Leeds, only forty miles to the north of the city, was more than twice
as successful with 33% unaccompanied children leaving that city: Manchester, an equal
distance to the west, evacuated 69%, while Salford, not much further away, recorded
the highest figure in the country with 76%.103
101 The Manchester Guardian: 4.9.39, p.4
102 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 28.8.39, p.6
103 Titmuss: op. cit., p.550
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Some of the differences may be attributed to attitudes of local authorities and the
success or otherwise of publicity in localities. Some councils were both more
persuasive and more efficient than others. Salford officials, for example, kept parents
informed and carried out a very active campaign in the months leading up to
evacuation. In addition, police cars toured the streets after the first main exodus in an
attempt to persuade parents whose children remained in the area to register them for
evacuation, with some success.l'" Again, in Newcastle, where 71% of eligible
unaccompanied children were evacuated.!" meticulous plans had been co-ordinated
with the designated receiving areas and publicised from September 1938 right up to the
eve of war. By this time Newcastle's receiving areas were informed of all schools
expected, including the size and even the nature of the catchment areas.l'"
In other authorities, on the other hand, local officials, teachers and even newspaper
editors were less encouraging - even negative - in communications with the public, or
reluctant to accept government direction regarding reception areas. The previous
chapter showed that Sheffield officials had made their own plans to send children into
selected areas of Derbyshire with which parents were familiar. When, in 1939,
government planners decreed instead that the city's children were to go to the Lindsey,
and later the Kesteven areas of Lincolnshire. Ritchie Calder held that parents baulked
at these new areas - first, because they considered them farther from home than the
villages of North Derbyshire and second, because their children would be nearer to the
104 R Padley "The Exodus" in Padley & Cole: op. cit., pp.45-49
lOS T' . 550rtmuss: op. ctt., p.
106 A M Preston "The Evacuation of Schoolchildren from Newcastle upon Tyne, 1939-1942 ... ", History
of Education, Vol. 18, NO.3 (1989), pp.231,241
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enemy.f" a view endorsed by at least one Sheffield councillor. lOS Be that as it may, the
strong opposition expressed by Lincolnshire people and equally vigorous response of
Sheffield people following the government's decision (shown in Chapter One) did
nothing to boost confidence in the scheme. Reaction was clearly demonstrated by the
low response to registration, which did not increase appreciably even when Sheffield
people were later assigned to other reception areas in Leicestershire and
Nottinghamshire.l'" Ritchie Calder contended that much of Sheffield's failure could be
attributed to muddled administration, 110 and it is difficult to argue with this view.
Sheffield's community leaders had never shown much enthusiasm for the official
scheme, yet in August, during rehearsals for the exodus, the Chairman of Sheffield
Education Committee blamed the government for parents' unwillingness to let their
children go away and asserted that if the Ministry of Health had asked education
authorities to make arrangements on their own initiative the results would have been
more satisfactory. III The City Fathers, having already publicly expressed their own
reluctance with regard to evacuation, had hardly encouraged an enthusiastic response
from citizens, as has been seen.
The press also played its part in determining public attitudes. While the two leading
Sheffield newspapers referred to other civil defence matters in the two months
preceding the outbreak of war, little mention was made of evacuation in general, and
107 R Calder, "The School Child" in Padley & Cole: op. cit., p.145
108 Councillor Asbury, quoted in The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 29.10.38, p.12
109 The Sheffield Star: 29.3.39, p.7
110 R Calder, "The School Child" in Padley & Cole: op. cit., p.145
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none at all of the contingency plans for removal of the city's children in case of
emergency. Not until 24 August, when national emergency legislation plans were being
enacted, was minor attention given to the subject on an inside page of The Sheffield
Star. Even then, despite the above-mentioned re-location of official reception areas
which had taken place several months previously, after a long period of public
wrangling, parents must have been confused to read:
"There is, of course, a scheme for the evacuation of Sheffield
children from schools in the more densely populated areas, the
reception areas for Sheffield including parts of Derbyshire and
Lincolnshire. ,,112
The next day, twenty-four hours after the government order recalling teachers from
holiday, the same publication again relegated the important information to the inside
pages under the headline "City Teachers to Report Tomorrow", no doubt seeking to
reassure the public by stating that the instruction was simply a precautionary measure in
order to ensure that teachers were back at school and ready to carry out evacuation
orders if necessary. 113 Even in its report on the first day of evacuation, The Sheffield
Telegraph & Independent relegated its coverage of this unprecedented and momentous
event in the history of the city to the inside pages of the paper and seemed to have made
a random guess of 2,000 children having evacuated.l'"
It may be argued, too, that teachers in Sheffield could have exerted more influence on
public opinion through meetings with parents. Indeed, some such meetings were
recorded in log books in the spring of 1939 and were well attended. In March the
112 The Sheffield Star: 24.8.39, p.7
113 ibid, 25.8.39, p.7
114 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 2.9.39, p.5
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parents of pupils at St Barnabas School had met to have the evacuation scheme
explained to them. In the same month the three departments of Owler Lane Council
School had mustered more than five hundred parents, who asked the head teacher to
submit suggestions and questions to the Education Committee. (There is, unfortunately,
no record of the Committee's response.j'P But it appears that in some schools no
meetings had taken place at all. While some parents responded to the call to evacuate
their children and expressed confidence that their teachers would look after them,
others complained that they had not been consulted.!" No evidence of any really
positive lead from Sheffield teachers has been found during the course of this research.
On the contrary, one head teacher of an inner-city Sheffield school expressed his (rather
disparaging) view:
"You can understand a mother's reluctance, besides which most
of them are not highly ima_finative and are unable to realise
what an air raid would be."II
Several of the school log books consulted carry very little reference to, or even no
mention at all of the events of what must have been one of the most momentous weeks
in educational history. One head teacher gave two or three lines to the matter, while at
the same time devoting more than two whole pages to the annual report of the school
examination in biblical knowledge.i" Arguably this was an indication of some
teachers' perception of the comparative importance of evacuation, which may have
been conveyed to the parents and pupils of the school.
lIS Log books: St Barnabas (Cecil Road) School, entry 7.3.39; Owler Lane Council Intermediate School,
entry 9.3.39
116 The Sheffield Star: 26.8.39, p.5
111 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 28.9.39, p.6
118 Log Book: Carbrook Council Boys' School, entry 29.8.39
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Le Gros Clark suggested that two significant factors governing public response were (a)
the amount of publicity given to the scheme, and (b) the popular estimate of
vulnerability.i'" But also important was the view that a large portion of the British
population simply did not believe there would be any air raids in the event of war, or
even that war was imminent; 120and they may have felt vindicated by such press
statements as the following editorial, made on the day before evacuation and three days
before the outbreak of war:
"This decision [to evacuate children] does not mean that there is
any disposition to believe that war is any more inevitable now
than it has been hitherto. Very many practicable steps have had
to be taken in these troublous times and this should be looked
upon simply as another one of them,"!"
Nor could all of the indifference be put down to the example set by local community
leaders, newspaper editors and teachers. It could be argued that the government itself
played a part, albeit inadvertently. Only twenty-four hours before the exodus took
place, a joint communique issued by the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State
for Scotland stated: "Evacuation [... ] is being undertaken as a precautionary measure in
view of the prolongation of the period oftension.,,122 The intention may well have been
to reassure the public and avoid panic, but it may be said that the full seriousness of the
situation was not conveyed at a crucial time.
It could also be argued that the government had some responsibility for another factor
which affected the turn-out. A large majority of official evacuees came from inner-city
119 Le Gros Clark & Toms: op. cit., p.4
120 Mass Observation File 942, p.4
121 The Sheffield Star: 31.8.39, p.6
122 ibid, 26.8.39, p.5
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areas, where poverty was rife and the lack of any respectable clothing held some
children back. Local authorities' attempts to alleviate the situation were severely
hampered by the reluctance of the Treasury to approve an allowance to cover footwear
and clothing for the most needy children. Permission was finally given for £1 to be
spent for every two hundred necessitous children, with the proviso that no publicity
should be given to the assistance. Arguably it was a case of 'too little, too late' for
many children because the relevant circular did not arrive in many localities until 28
August - just four days before evacuation took place.!" The lateness in approving the
meagre allowance, and the secrecy surrounding it, were factors which surely inhibited
the success of the scheme.
Even if their children did not qualify as necessitous, parents may well have been
daunted by the list of clothing which they were expected to provide. Although officials
had limited the requirements to what seemed, to them, only what was reasonable and
necessary, the demands were quite beyond the pocket of many parents, especially those
with large families. The list was formidable: a change of under-clothing, night
clothing, house shoes or plimsolls, spare stockings or socks, tooth brush, comb, towel,
handkerchiefs, soap and face flannel, knife, fork and spoon. The children were to wear
a warm coat and/or mackintosh and their thickest and warmest footwear.124 Many
mothers simply could not afford to fulfil these demands, and although many of those
who reported for evacuation did not have all of the items stipulated, some parents were
too proud to allow their children to go away without the items.
123 T' . 92rtmuss: op. cit., p.
124 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: l.9.39, p.4
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Newcastle authorities had understood the problem early on and had made some effort to
alleviate it: from April onwards school children had been able to make garments in
needlework lessons which the mothers were able to buy cheaply. The Director of
Education for that city had written to the Ministry of Health in May stating his opinion
that lack of appropriate clothing and footwear would adversely affect the evacuation
scheme.125 Despite the relatively high number of children reporting for evacuation in
his area, in his report on the first day of evacuation the Director again drew attention to
the number of children in need of boots and clothing:
"Friday was the worst possible day that could be chosen for
evacuation as it is pay-day here. If the children had gone
tomorrow, there would have been fewer badly equipped, and in
some schools there would have been a higher turn_OUt.,,126
It is difficult to know whether this situation also applied to Sheffield, for the only public
comments on the children's clothing seem to have been a few lines in local newspapers,
and these were complimentary:
"A notable feature was the smartness with which the children
were turned out. At a sacrifice in many cases, parents had fitted
them up with new coats, suits and frockS."127
Domestic economics may have played another part in the situation. For the very poor,
the fear of losing the small amount of child allowance paid by the Unemployment
Assistance Board could also have been a strong factor deterring parents from permitting
their children to go, despite the fact that household expenses may have been somewhat
reduced by the children's absence. Often too, there was a reluctance to lose touch with
m Preston: op. cit., p.233
126 PRO.HLG.7/73
127 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 2.9.39, p.5
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family help or local charity funds.128 Uncertainty about financial aspects of evacuation,
such as parental contributions (which were not settled until October), also inhibited
many people from sending their children away.
However, economic factors did not account entirely for the low turn-out. Parents
blocked the evacuation scheme for their own reasons. It has been seen that in every
danger zone throughout the country there were those who panicked at the last moment
and took their children's names off the registration listS.129 In some cases parents
pleaded at a late stage in the proceedings that the child was ill or delicate; in others that
the child was reluctant to leave its family. But a Liverpool University report suggested
that some of these last-minute illnesses of children could have been manifestations of
this unwillingness to be separated.P"
Boyd asserted that parents with one or two children were more anxious about standards
of care in foster homes and less willing to part with them than those with large families,
and many 'only children' were kept at home.!" However, this did not always apply, for
in large and poor families many older children took an active part in child care and
were needed at home. This was particularly so in cases where fathers were unemployed
and the family depended upon the mother going out to work.
But arguably the chief cause for the shortfall was one which had been largely
overlooked by the architects of the evacuation scheme: it was the matter of home ties.
128 Owen: op. cit., p.36
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When it came to the point of parting with their children, thousands of parents across the
country shrank from the prospect. The Liverpool University investigation (mentioned
above) found that 38% of parents who refused to send their children away gave as their
reason that they could not bear the separation.r''' In addition, there was the often-stated
view that it was better for the family to stay together and die than to be split up. To
quote a Sheffield interviewee who was ten years old at the outbreak of war:
"My mother nearly let me go, but my father couldn't bear to
have the family parted. He said we should all stick to~ether and
stay at home. Ifa bomb got us we'd all go together.?"
In some reception areas the shortfall in numbers considerably eased problems of
billeting, for private evacuees flooding into these regions had already taken up places
allocated for the government scheme.l" There were particularly high rates of private
evacuation to south-west England and to Wales: the problem was not so great in the
midlands and the north. By the end of September the reception areas of Devonshire
alone, excluding neutral zones of that county, had taken in approximately 71,800 private
evacuees, while official evacuees accounted for only 10,440. In the same period Wales
received 120,000 private evacuees and 56,000 official refugees.l"
Titmuss contended that there was no panic rush to get out of the capital when the
government evacuation scheme began, but a steady stream of Londoners and other
urban dwellers did make their own arrangements and left the cities quickly, either by
132 Ow . 36en: op. crt., p.
133 Oral interview: Jean Norton, 21.2.96
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rail or road. 136 No doubt many of these unofficial evacuees went to relatives and others
had already made arrangements and booked lodgings in private houses, boarding houses
and hotels in country areas and seaside towns. The Times reported that 5,000 people
had left Southampton by ship for America in the last two days of August.137 In addition,
business firms, nursing homes, families and some schools and other institutions had
previously made their own plans to evacuate their staffs, patients and students from
vulnerable areas. Some had been moving out through the summer months and others
were galvanised into action by the implementation of the government scheme.!" Vera
Brittain, in her diary for 26 August 1939, noted:
"[ ... ] the stream of traffic along the road - buses full of troops,
long distance 'Relief' buses carrying civilians, small cars filled
. hId I furni I ,,139WIt uggage, cots an prams, arge urruture remova vans.
The extent of this private movement could not be known at the time: because there was
no need for people to inform the authorities of their movements, no accurate record
could be kept:140 indeed, it was not until 1944 that a historical analysis was made.!"
Working on figures obtained from the reception areas, Titmuss suggested that, at a
conservative estimate, 1,808,300 people evacuated themselves privately from areas of
perceived danger into reception areas at the outbreak of war. This figure may well have
reached 2,000,000, and does not include those who moved into areas which were
classified as neutral.142
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Immediately after the first exodus parents in many cities requested a second chance to
evacuate their children. Once war had been declared, they may have been persuaded of
the need to get them out of the cities. But they may also have been influenced by the
fact that, with the schools expected to be closed in the danger areas for the duration of
the war, their children were without proper schooling. Although Sheffield's Assistant
Education Officer had been quick off the mark and instituted a Home Education Service
within days of the exodus, in its early stages the best that could be arranged was home
teaching on a limited scale. In London and many other cities there was no prospect of
any education at all.143
In response to parents' requests, the Ministry of Health authorised planning for another
estimated 35,000 children to be evacuated and to link up with their school units already
in the receiving districts, as and when individual evacuating and receiving areas could
co-ordinate their arrangements.l'" Accordingly, the Board of Education issued
instructions for schools to take further registrations of prospective evacuees on 11 and
12 September for a possible second movement to take place at the end of October. The
offer applied only to school children and not to mothers with children under school age
or expectant mothers.!"
The response in Sheffield was once again disappointing, however: by mid-morning on
11 September not one child had arrived at Bow Council School or Cathedral School, 146
while at Carbrook Council School, where 1,000 children were on the roll at the
143 Education: No. 1915,22.9.39, p.260
144 ibid., No. 1917,6.10.39, p.295
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beginning of term and less than a fifth had evacuated already, only eleven arrived for
registration and two of those subsequently dropped OUt.147 A total of six hundred and
eighty names had been taken from all the city's evacuable schools in the period between
the first exodus and the new registration dates. However, after forms were sent to
parents, inviting them to give a definite undertaking that these children would be
evacuated if arrangements were made, only four hundred of them agreed to this.148 As
it turned out, a mere 245 were evacuated on 26 October 1939.149 To make matters
worse, 55% of those who had been evacuated at the beginning of September had
already returned home. 150
In the movement of 1,500,000 people under the government evacuation scheme,
(dubbed by at least one reporter as "The Bible Exodus Completely Dwarfed",I51) the
absence of any casualties indicated that planning and rehearsals had paid off - despite
the problems brought about by the shortfall in numbers and consequent last-minute re-
organisation of arrangements. Those who did report for evacuation followed their
instructions and were accompanied by 40,000 teachers and escorts, many of whom
stayed on in the reception areas. 127,000 members of the Women's Voluntary Service,
together with volunteers from the Red Cross, St John's Ambulance and other
organisations helped in the transfer of the evacuees from their homes in the cities to
billets in the country.IS2
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At least the Minister of Health demonstrated his appreciation of the fact that there was
more to the operation of the evacuation scheme than just the moving. While Herbert
Morrison, referring to the London area, had described the operation as "simply
magnificent", Walter Elliot warned:
"The first bit of the task is over. The move has been made.
That was the work of the organisation. Now we have to tackle
the second half - that is, the adjustment and settling in. That is
infinitely important and can be done by no organisation. It has
to be done by the people themselves; and only the goodwill and
imagination ofthe newcomers can really make it succeed."J53
But he under-estimated the contribution required of the householders, as will be seen in
ensuing chapters of this work.
In the administrative sense and in terms of transportation there appears to be no doubt
that this vast operation was a triumph. But in terms of persuading people to leave areas
of perceived danger and, what is more, to stay in the safety of reception areas, it will be
seen that the government evacuation scheme was a demonstrable failure. As Isaacs
declared, the neglect of human feeling, family ties and personal issues was to put in
jeopardy a scheme which was voluntary, and therefore largely relied for its success upon
gaining the confidence of the people.P" This, unfortunately, the authorities had signally
failed to do.
m Education: No. 1913,8.9.39, p.2l3
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CHAPTER THREE
ARRIVAL
After the first day's evacuation The Times quoted Herbert Morrison, Leader of London
County Council:
"The reception in various districts of the evacuated school
children was carried out with the same efficiency that
characterised the departures. [... ] There was no confusion."}
Two days later, however, the newspaper acknowledged that not quite everything had
gone according to plan. Although claiming that over 3,000,000 people had been safely
evacuated under the government scheme (an over-estimate), the article admitted: "One
or two trains arrived at the wrong destinations'" - a somewhat misleading under-
estimate of the chaos which had really occurred in the reception areas.
It has already been seen that the main preoccupation of those who planned Operation
'Pied Piper' in 1939 was to get people away quickly and unharmed from vulnerable
areas. That objective had certainly been achieved. But what had not been foreseen by
officials who packed the evacuees into trains at departure points was the widespread
confusion which would reign in the reception areas as a result of their last-minute
telescoping of railway timetables. In their efforts to speed up the operation, they had
unwittingly contributed to countless subsequent problems in receiving districts, and it
was several days before matters were sorted out.
I The Times, 2.9.39, p.12
2 ibid, 4.9.39, p.5
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There were wide differences in the experiences of the various reception areas but,
initial arrangements in many provincial districts were unquestionably chaotic in the first
days of September. Due to the shortfall in numbers reporting for evacuation, very few
centres received their predicted quotas: sometimes no-one arrived at reception points or,
what was worse, far greater numbers than anticipated swamped some areas. 3 Under the
official scheme Cornwall, for example, received only 3% of its allotment (though vast
numbers of private evacuees), but in the counties of Berkshire, Cumberland,
Huntingdonshire, Sussex and Westmorland around 50% of those expected arrived.
There appeared to be no geographical pattern in this distribution - for instance, it is
interesting to note that while Suffolk East received a record 59% of those expected, the
neighbouring zone of SuffolkWest received only 38% (see Appendix 7).4
In addition, the composition of groups who disembarked at the numerous country
stations was often entirely different from those expected, as has been seen in Chapter
Two. These changes of categories for particular areas caused considerable trouble for
receiving authorities and rendered obsolete many carefully prepared plans that had been
made for billeting the refugees. It was especially difficult where large numbers of
women with small children arrived unexpectedly, for these were the hardest of all to
accommodate: householders did not want to share their homes with adults, and there
were not nearly enough vacant houses to cater for all the families.'
3 R M Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy: History of the Second World War, p.l 06
4 ibid., p.553; Appendix 7
S F Le Gros Clark & R W Toms: Evacuation: Failure or Reform, p.5
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Because the first requirement was for accommodation, the object was to transfer
incoming refugees to a central point for refreshment and then despatch them quickly,
supplied with basic rations for one day, to billets. The system often worked well in
those cases where the predicted numbers and categories had already been known and
were actually received. In some instances, considerable care had been taken to allocate
children to homes prior to arrival, and where this happened the evacuees went off in an
orderly manner with their hostesses. But this was not the position universally, and a
much more haphazard allocation of children to householders was likely to take place, as
will be seen.
Responsibility for the safe conduct of the evacuees to their billets rested with the
Billeting Sub-Committees in each separate area." It was of paramount importance to
get all the refugees housed before nightfall on the day of arrival and the procedures used
to attain that goal varied from area to area. In some, billeting officers were well
organised and had carried out detailed preparations; the machinery was in place so that
they could cope even where the incoming parties were different from those expected.
But in other areas arrangements had not been completed by the time evacuation began.
The inaction of some authorities may have been encouraged by the unwillingness of
Whitehall to guarantee (however justified by events) that particular parties would arrive
at specific destinations: they could argue that plans could not be made with incomplete
information. Cole made the point, already stated in the Introduction to this thesis, that
the architects of the scheme were, in the main, "military, male and middle-class".
6 The Nottingham Evening Post, 1.9.39, p.7
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Numbers of evacuees, it seemed, were more important to them than the individuals who
made up the parties." In Titmuss's view, the fact that there were only four female
inspectors in the Ministry of Health at the time of the first evacuation may have
significantly contributed to the failure to appreciate the conditions in which the women
and children would arrive and to provide adequate facilities for them," and it is hard to
argue with this.
Itmay also be significant that most organisers and all billeting officers in the first years
of evacuation were willing but unpaid amateurs. Some, it is true, possessed valuable
experience and applied this successfully to the tasks in hand; but others, albeit well-
intentioned, were woefully lacking in the organisational skills so necessary for an
undertaking of such magnitude and complexity. As the months passed and the task of
billeting became more complex, the posts of chief billeting officers eventually became
salaried, but their assistants remained volunteers."
Arguably an even more important reason for the unpreparedness of some provincial
districts, however, was the ban on advance expenditure which had been imposed by the
Treasury on receiving authorities until a very late stage in the programme. Even though
local authorities had made many requests to be allowed to spend money on preparing
hostels and maternity homes, and to purchase vital equipment such as bedding and
waterproof sheets, permission had not been granted until six days prior to the
declaration of'war." The Ministry of Health had not even ordered mackintosh overlays
7 R Padley &M Cole (eds): Evacuation Survey, p.4
8 Titmuss: op. cit., p.IIO
9 T L Crosby: The Impact of Civilian Evacuation in the Second World War, p.31
10 Titmuss: op. cit., p.ll 0
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(those most necessary of items, as events were to show) until May 1939 and very few
had been delivered by the outbreak of war. II Already acute problems of shortages of
clothing, blankets and mattresses were exacerbated by the muddles, especially in those
areas where overcrowding took place.
On the eve of war local officials in Nottinghamshire, getting ready to receive Sheffield
children, were still waiting for supplies of bedding at the twenty distribution points
which had been established. In the case of Southwell, for example, as late as 30 August
the Clerk to the Rural District Council reported:
"[ ... ] the Government are not yet in a position to supply us with
the extra mattresses and blankets that are required. [... ] there
has been a tremendous call for such things.,,12
Here, public appeals for donations were being made even as the refugees were arriving
. . 13m reception areas.
Leicestershire local authorities, also preparing for Sheffield refugees, carried in the
local press similar requests for gifts of bedding." At this late stage, members of
women's and youth organisations came forward to offer their services in knitting
blanket squares and making clothing collections as well as in washing and mending for
unaccompanied children. 15
Pleas were made in the evacuating areas too: the local organiser of the Women's
Voluntary Service appealed to the Sheffield public to give any spare blankets or to knit
11 Titmuss: op. cit., p.121
12 The Newark Advertiser: 30.8.39 p.6
13 The Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser: 1.9.39, p.3
14 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 1.9.39, p.7
15 The Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser: 1.9.39, p.3
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woollen squares. Strangely, perhaps, she added: "Membership of the WVS is not
essential for those who help us in this way.':" Local women, whether members or not,
responded to the call and by the end of September 1,000 blankets had been sent to the
reception areas for the city's evacuees.V A study of contemporary local newspapers has
shown that the crisis continued for several weeks into the autumn.
When many of the meticulous plans for the transportation of the children were undone
by telescoping timetables, it was not those responsible for the speeding-up process who
picked up the pieces at the reception end, but teachers and volunteers such as the WVS,
who had to cope with finding billets for those left at the end of the day. Weitzman's
assertion that teachers' help in the evacuation programme was crucial to its success" is
undoubtedly correct. On the other hand, her assumption that they unanimously co-
operated throughout the operation is not wholly supported by Graves, reporting their
role in the reception centres:
"Some of the teachers of the evacuated schools helped gallantly.
[... ] Others considered that their own social status would be
irretrievably impaired if they gave any practical help in an
emergency, and acted accordingly.':"
The task facing officials in the receiving areas was enormous as parties of evacuees
arrived at the distribution centres. Officials had been supplied with Warrants of
Appointment and detailed instructions on procedure, together with lists of
accommodation and books of billeting forms to be completed for each evacuee. All the
16 The Sheffield Star: 26.8.39, p.4
17 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 30.9.39, p.S
18 PRO.ED.138/49
19 C Graves: Women in Green: p.34
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reception authorities should have been in possession of details of billeting allowances
payable for each category of evacuees - but as this had not been despatched until the
last day of August,20it is likely that not all Chief Billeting Officers had received this
information in time, which may have deterred some prospective hosts from coming
forward.
Emergency rations, which had been delivered to the reception areas several weeks
previously and kept in storage, were taken out and packed into carrier bags. Each bag
contained a tin of corned beef and two of condensed milk, together with a packet of
biscuits and a bar of chocolate, ready to be issued to every evacuee as they left the
distribution centres for their billets." As the newcomers arrived at the centres
refreshments had to be provided and particulars of each evacuee noted down. Once
accommodation had been arranged, billeting forms had to be made out, rations issued
and the evacuees despatched, the vast majority to private homes.
Many organisations, including the WVS, the Red Cross and the St John Ambulance
Brigade, had provided escorts to assist in the transfer of the evacuees from their homes
in industrial towns and cities. Upon arrival in the country much of the work of initial
reception, billeting and after-care fell upon these same volunteers. Together with
members of Women's Institutes and others acting either independently or under the
aegis of many different voluntary bodies, the women helped at railheads in the country
and were particularly needed at the distribution centres where they provided
20 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 1.9.39 p.7
21 The Mansfield Reporter, 8.9.39, p.2
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refreshments and assisted in allocating and escorting the evacuees to billets." As
Graves recorded in his account of the contribution of the WVS:
"It was not easy to disentangle hundreds of tired, sick, nervous
children and their numerous parcels from the general melee and
deliver them at their billets in a state of body and mind which
promised well for future relations with the foster parents; yet
more of the success of the billeting depended upon the
personality of the helpers at the dispersal points than perhaps
any of them realised at the time.,,23
The government had stated all along that although evacuation was to be voluntary,
reception and billeting of refugees would be compulsory. However true in theory, this
did not always tum out to be the case in practice. Enforcement was difficult within the
confines of small villages, where the billeting officer was often the social inferior of the
local gentry and reluctant to fall foul of them. Chapter One drew attention to the
animosity felt in some quarters even while plans were being drawn up, and resentment
against evacuees did not abate when the scheme was put into operation, as will be seen.
Longmate asserted that at first, despite the many problems encountered, there was in
general a remarkable public spirit of welcome for the evacuees in the reception areas.
As an example, he cited the arrival in Luton of four hundred mothers and children from
the East End of London. As they walked through the streets of that town, Luton
housewives "poured out of their front doors" to carry luggage and give the children
drinks of milk.24 However, there were many instances where it was made plain that the
refugees were unwanted. Milburn was one of several observers who noted that, even
22 N Longmate: Haw We Lived Then, p.369
23 Graves: op. cit., pp.32-3
24 N Longmate: Haw We Lived Then, p.4S
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when householders had agreed in advance to take in refugees, many now found that for
one cause or another they could no longer do SO.25 It was often difficult for local
officials delivering evacuees, even to householders who had agreed to offer hospitality,
for their reception on the doorstep varied considerably. Graves asserted that mostly
there was a warm welcome - initially, at any rate - but sometimes prospective hosts
changed their minds or did not like the look of the newcomers and slammed the door in
their faces. Then the work of billeting had to begin again."
This is not to say, however, that the newcomers were everywhere unwelcome.
Administrators in some reception areas had prepared well for their evacuees. Crosby
cites Reading, Berkshire, as an example of good practice. Here, the education officer
acted as reception and chief billeting officer and thus combined responsibility for both
the education and accommodation of the evacuees - an unusual occurrence, but one
which largely avoided many of the pitfalls experienced in other areas. In a speedy and
efficient operation the children were met at the station, escorted to schools where they
were fed, then issued with their temporary rations before being taken individually by
teachers and volunteers to their new homes." But although Crosby asserts that
organisation in reception areas was smooth," ample evidence has been cited to the
contrary: Reading was, by his own admission, an exceptionally good example.
Itwas evident, even before they left home, that Sheffield evacuees were not going to be
universally welcome in their allotted reception areas. Reporting on Leicestershire's
2~ P Donnelly (ed): Mrs Milburn's Diaries: An Englishwoman's Reflections 1939-1945, p.IS
26 Graves: op. cit., p.36
27 Crosby: op. cit., p.30
28 ibid., p.28
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preparations as evacuation rehearsals were well under way, a local newspaper recounted
how the county's householders had had to be reminded that the local authority had
power to require them to billet.29 At the same time the Mayor of Loughboroughwarned
householders, in a circular letter setting out billeting allowances, that they were bound
to fulfil obligations to billet evacuees, even if they were unwilling."
Not all Nottinghamshire householders seemed eager to take in refugees either:
Newark's Chief Constable of Police warned that there was no getting out of the
obligation to billet.31 Praising the vast majority who were showing "the utmost
willingness and public spirit", the Chairman of the County Council acknowledged that
some people displayed an inadequate sense of their responsibilities." One description
of Sheffield evacuees' arrival arguably suggests that problems with Nottinghamshire
householders may have been envisaged:
"Each group was accompanied by a billeting officer and a
special constable [... ] and armed with full legal powers to
enforce billeting where necessary.,,33
The chaos experienced in East Anglia has already been cited in Chapter Two, where
unexpectedly large numbers arrived and some evacuees spent four nights sleeping on
schoolroom floors." In Weston-super-Mare it was not only the numbers, but also the
lateness of the hour, which caused similar problems. Organisers knocked at
householders' doors until long after midnight, but many mothers and children were left
29 The Newark Advertiser: 30.8.39, p.5
30 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 1.9.39, p.7
31 The Newark Advertiser: 30.8.39, p.5
32 The Nottingham Evening Post: 30.8.39, p.8
33 The Newark Advertiser: 6.9.39, p.3
34 J G O'Leary, "Dagenham," inPadley & Cole: op. cit., p.220
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without billets. They were forced to spend the first night in school halls where, no beds
being available, they slept on wood block floors or on chairs placed against the walls,
with only a blanket issued to keep them warm, and small babies were put to bed in
desks."
In hindsight it was inevitable, in such a massive and unprecedented undertaking,
presided over by such a huge number and wide variety of individuals, that some
mistakes would be made. Some of these were more easily put right than others,
especially where 'special categories' were concerned. A report on evacuation
conditions in reception areas, now in the Public Record Office, stated that although
Scarborough was organised to receive school children from Hull, the town's billeting
officers found themselves dealing instead with a different group:
"[ ... ] a few demented people, large numbers of mental
defectives, children suffering from infectious diseases and very
many women and children in a very filthy bodily condition.,,36
The small numbers arriving in most places meant that much of the transport laid on in
the reception areas was redundant. In Nottinghamshire a fleet of buses provided by five
East Midlands bus companies stood ready at detraining stations to take evacuees to
reception centres either in the receiving towns or in outlying villages. In the event,
many of the vehicles were surplus to requirements.V
Very many trains, too, were under-subscribed. Newark officials, anticipating 1,400
Sheffield evacuees on the first day of evacuation, were shocked when so few finally
35 Weston Mercury & Somersetshire Herald: 4.9.39, p.4
36 PRO.ED.138/50
37 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 1.9.39, pA
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arrived - a total of 540. The first train, destined for rural areas, contained 274 evacuees,
less than half the number expected. Of the 840 scheduled for the second train only 266
detrained. On the second day it was much worse: only 26 people arrived in each of the
two trains from Sheffield, leaving most carriages empty and rendering nearly all the
waiting buses redundant.38
Newark's first arrivals were chiefly from Pye Bank School: the evacuees marched to
nearby Lovers' Lane School, from where they were taken by buses to country reception
centres. The children's behaviour was praised and they were reported to be happy and
cheerful: furthermore, they were described as "a bunch of well-clothed and well-fed
children.,,39 The second contingent were mainly from Owler Lane School: the
newcomers walked to the Technical College, where they were provided with a meal by
volunteers of the WVS before being allocated to billets in the town.40 Newspapers in
the reception areas were filled with upbeat details of the refugees' arrival but, as one
observer noted:
"Although there were smiles and jokes, it seemed a sad
procession. Youngsters marched along with their pillowcase
kitbags over their shoulders, haversacks on their backs and their
luggage in their hands.?"
Southwell Rural District Council had made preparations for 4,000 people, but in the
event less than a quarter of that number arrived.V The first train from Sheffield
contained only 186 evacuees instead of the 800 expected - school children, teachers,
38 The Newark Advertiser: 6.9.39, p.3
39 ibid.
40 Log book: Owler Lane Intermediate School: entry 1.9.39
41 The Newark Advertiser: 6.9.39, p.2
42 The Newark Herald: 2.9.39, p.l
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mothers and small children - in four coaches, with the remaining eight empty. Only four
of the twelve waiting buses were needed to take the evacuees along streets lined with
watching people to the Ideal Cinema, from where they were despatched to billets. It
was reported here:
"The whole scheme was efficiently carried through and with
whole-hearted co-operation from everyone concerned, there was
a minimum of fuss. ,,43
But the party's "strangely silent attitude" was noted. Four more trains arrived at
Southwell during the day, and again the total number of refugees was far smaller than
had been catered for. On the following day the first train was cancelled and only forty-
seven evacuees arrived on the second."
It was even worse at Kimberley, where arrangements had been made for 700 evacuees
from Sheffield. No figures were given for the first day's arrivals, but on the second day
a total of less than sixty passengers, mostly mothers with children arrived in two twelve-
coach trains at Kimberley Station. The fifteen buses waiting to convey the evacuees to
outlying districts were superfluous." What was more, the second train of the day
brought only four passengers from the city - a doctor, a teacher and a woman with a
baby." Children arriving at Basford and Ruddington were despatched by specially
chartered buses to the designated reception centres."
43 The Newark Advertiser: 6.9.39, p.3
44 The Nottingham Evening Post: 2.9.39, p.7
4S The Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser: 8.9.39, p.3
46 The Newark Advertiser: 6.9.39, p.2
47 The Nottingham Evening Post: 1.9.39, p.7
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Papplewick, expecting 120 Sheffield evacuees, received only a sixth of that number.
The small village of Linby, anticipating fifty, fared somewhat better and received thirty-
one school children from the Pitsmoor area: here, after refreshments and prayers in the
local school hall, the local vicar gave a speech and assured the newcomers that they
were among kind people and "all he asked of them was that they should be kind in
return." Describing the scene, The Hucknall Dispatch, showed a certain foresight:
"[ ... ] few realised to the full what it meant to them, but being of
an impressionable age, the circumstances will be seared into
their minds, so that if they are privileged to live they will
recount the memory with a shudder.,,48
It was much the same story of depleted numbers in Leicestershire. The market town of
Loughborough was originally scheduled to receive a total of 9,000 Sheffield evacuees
(school children, expectant mothers, blind and crippled adults) in the first two days of
evacuation.t" However, numbers were scaled down in the light of poor registration
results, and in the event only 720 arrived.50 Reporting on the event, The Loughborough
& Shepshed Echo stated that the first train brought a party from Abbeydale School
comprising 300 school children and some mothers and younger children. Twenty
buses, far in excess of requirements, were waiting to take the evacuees to Shelthorpe
Schools where they were divided into small parties and placed in charge of billeting
officers who took them to the streets "where they were to be distributed." The report
went on to say that the children were "mostly welcomed warmly when taken to their
billets?" - perhaps an implicit acceptance that not all children were happily received.
48 The Hucknall Dispatch: 31.S.39, p.3; 7.9.39, pp.5,S
49 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 1.9.39, p.7
so Loughborough Education Committee: Report 1939, p.6
SI The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: S.9.39, p.5
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Shepshed had expected 1,600 Sheffield evacuees over the two days, but only 236 in
total arrived. 52 This small town had been well prepared for larger numbers and boasted
a billeting staff of one hundred. 53 At Melton Mowbray no statistics were given, but it
can be assumed that here, too, numbers fell short of expectation. The party who arrived
from Burgoyne Road Council School at 11.30 am on the first day were shepherded to
the Com Exchange where milk and biscuits were handed round before women billeting
officers took the evacuees to their new homes. 54
Various local dignitaries appear to have been in control at the different detraining
stations in Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire reception areas. At Basford, the Clerk to
the Rural District Council was in charge, assisted by members of the WVS, while in
some areas - for example, Ruddington - it was the local vicar who directed operations. 55
The Mayor of Newark met all the trains arriving in the town, 56 while at Loughborough
the Chairman of the County Council turned out to oversee the proceedings. 57
Evacuation was presented as an exciting adventure. Cinema newsreels and photographs
in national and local newspapers showed children with happy faces peering from
railway carriage windows as they left their home stations, and smiling hosts in the
country welcoming small groups with the billeting officer looking on. In the first few
days, cheery messages were conveyed in press reports and pictures published of
evacuees engaged in country pursuits. Nevertheless, despite the early optimistic reports
52 The Nottingham Evening Post,: 27.9.39, p.8
53 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: l.9.39, p.7
54 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 2.9.39, p.S
55 The Nottingham Evening Post: l.9.39, p.7
S6 The Newark Herald: 2.9.39, p.l
57 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 8.9.39, p.S
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that everything had gone well in reception, it was soon clear that dissatisfaction was not
far below the surface.
In this first evacuation the subject of medical inspections seems to have been a rather
'hit-or-miss' affair. Nationally, the government had not made general provision for
children to be examined before they went away, because the first priority was to remove
non-essential persons from perceived danger.58 Coming at the end of the long summer
holidays, when school clinics were closed, children had been without medical
supervision for several weeks. The consequences of this situation were far-reaching, as
will be seen in the next chapter of this thesis.
At local level, most Sheffield evacuees received at best a cursory medical check before
leaving the city,59although one log book recorded that some children had already been
examined at school.60 Children suffering, or having had contact with, infectious
complaints were officially deemed unacceptable for evacuation but in the event, as the
School Medical Officer afterwards reported, in fact not one city evacuee was turned
away after examination at the departure stations.'"
What happened in the Nottinghamshire reception areas has been difficult to ascertain,
for there appears to have been no specific policy on the matter and little evidence that
examinations were carried out as a routine practice. No mention was made of medical
inspections in the town of Newark as the children detrained, but at Basford and
58 Titmuss: op. cit., p.126
S9 Sheffield Education Committee: Report 1939, p.40
60 Log book: Philadelphia Infants School, entry 31.8.39
61 Sheffield Education Committee: Report 1939, p.40
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Ruddington the children were medically checked on arrival at the stations.f Nothing
has been discovered about the procedure at the remaining detraining stations for
Sheffield evacuees in the county. Of Leicestershire's policy on the matter there is very
little additional information. At Loughborough any children suspected of suffering from
infectious or other illnesses were inspected at the station by a nurse, but it was reported
that "very few cases arose which gave rise to difficulties in immediate billeting." In
Melton Mowbray evacuees were medically examined before leaving for their billets,
but only a few cases of tonsillitis were found: these were sent direct to hospital.63
On this showing, the health of Sheffield evacuees on arrival in the reception areas
would seem to have been generally good, but across the country, revelations of
pediculosis, skin infections and other ailments, discovered almost immediately after
the children had arrived in their billets at the outbreak of war, caused a public outcry.
Medical staffs in reception areas faced a gargantuan task in dealing with arriving
children who had already been without medical care for weeks and many of whom,
from the poorest and most overcrowded inner-city areas, were in need of urgent
attention for these ailments." The furore was such that the success of future evacuation
schemes was severely in doubt. It was considered essential to avoid such problems in
the future: consequently, on 5 October the Minister of Health instructed evacuating
local authorities to carry out medical inspections and necessary treatments of infected
children before dispatching further parties to the reception areas.65
62 The Nottingham Evening Post: 1.9.39, p.7
63 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 2.9.39, p.5
64 The Health of the School Child: Report of Chief Medical Officer Ministry of Education 1939-45: p.3l
6' HoC. Deb. 5.10.39, Vol. 351, col. 2106
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Sheffield Education Committee made a determined effort to head off potential trouble
in the receiving districts in further movements of pupils. The few Sheffield children
who had registered were medically examined during the weekend before the follow-up
evacuation of 26 October 1939 in order to give the reception areas warning of any cases
needing special supervision and so that officials there could make suitable billeting
arrangements. Children rejected at the first examination were checked again on the
following Wednesday, when 255 out of the original 264 were passed as fit to travel.
The report of the School Medical Officer gave the following statistics:"
Condition of children when referred for re-examination:
Number re-examined
Number cleared of any defect
Number with few nits still present
Impetigo healing satisfactorily
28
18
9
1
Number of children inspected at first examination 264
Number passed as fit at first examination, including: 227
2 Nervous and highly strung
5Nocturnal enuresis (occasional)
Number referred for re-examination 36
Definitely unfit (rheumatic endocarditis) 1
Conditions referred for re-examination:
Pediculosis scalp 1
Nits 28
Swabs (throat) 6
Impetigo (face) 1
Number of children passed as fit for evacuation
66 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of School Medical Officer 1939, p.41
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It is interesting to note that nine children with unclean heads and five with occasional
enuresis were apparently not rejected. In the event 245 actually transferred to the
reception areas and all were once more examined at the stations before boarding trains
to the reception areas.67
Arrangements in the reception areas were invariably reported as a triumph of
organisation and efficiency in the local press, and no doubt this was true in many cases.
It is interesting to note, however, that of those former evacuees interviewed who
remembered their feelings on arrival in the reception areas, few were left with that
impression. Only one former interviewee from Sheffield, who travelled with All Saints
School, confirmed the official view:
"It was very orderly at the Station - no panic, just like a holiday.
We got the bus to Victoria Station and the train to Kimberley.
We went straight from Kimberley Station to the buses which
were waiting. Someone must have organised that brothers and
sisters stayed together. It seemed a very long way, but I don't
remember any children crying."
Arriving at Linby School she added, however, that selection was less methodical. As
the children were supplied with bread and jam sandwiches and Horlicks, the local
residents entered the hall in haphazard fashion and picked out the children they
wanted."
This random selection of children was widespread. A Sheffield ex-evacuee
remembered a similar procedure on her arrival at Awsworth, Nottinghamshire, where
the Parish Room was used as a reception centre:
67 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of School Medical Officer 1939, p.4l
68 Oral interview: Dorothy Knowles, 21.3.95
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"We had to wait around until we were picked. There were a lot
of people there, who came around us. Someone said: 'Would
you like to go with this lady?' and she came and took my
brother and me."
Although this interviewee went home after a short time, she returned to the same billet
after the Sheffield blitz in December 1940 and rejoined her brother who had remained
with the foster family, which suggests that the arrangement was successful in this case
at least"
One evacuee from a very poor Sheffield home stayed in her first Nottinghamshire billet
only a few hours: she recalled:
"My sister and I were taken somewhere by mistake at first. We
were sat there in this posh house, frightened to move because
they were very upper-class. When it all came to, we'd been
taken to the wrong people. They came and brought us to Mr and
Mrs Smith and it was much nicer. [... ] They lived in a terraced
house in a block."
It is possible that these girls were not, in fact, sent to the wrong house: their first hosts
may have been unwilling to take them. In the event, the second placement turned out to
be very successful and the interviewee remained in that billet for four years. "
At Whatton, Nottinghamshire, another interviewee's experience of selection for
billeting was typical of many. Travelling with Pitsmoor Church of England School, he
remembered:
"We were taken to the village school. [... ] So far as I
remember, no-one had decided who was to go with whom, so
we all stood around the school and local people came along and
took whoever they wanted.':"
69 Oral interview: Margaret Bennett, 16.3.95
70 Oral interview: Brenda Cox., 8.3.95
71 Oral interview: Douglas Pearson, 2.9.95
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In Leicestershire, the evacuees destined for Loughborough largely avoided this
embarrassment, it appears. One, who was evacuated along with his twin brother in the
Carfield Council School party, recalled that the WVS were in charge at the church
reception centre where his party was taken:
"When we arrived we all had a number attached to us and they
called the numbers out [... ]. When our number came up we
were taken into another room and introduced to the people who
were going to look after us, then we walked to their home with
them. We didn't know where we were going and they didn't
talk to us or tell us much. It wasn't far away: it was at the back
of a pawn shop in the centre of Loughborough."
Although they had set out from home early in the morning and travelled only
approximately fifty miles from home, it was evening when they reached their billet.72
But not all Leicestershire reception arrangements were well organised. A former pupil
of Firshill School, remembered a chaotic scene at Mountsorrel, where she was taken
before she eventually found a temporary home with an elderly woman:
"It was like a slave- or cattle-market [... ]. We queued up for
mugs of cocoa from long tables and the residents came in to
choose, walking around the outside of the room. Children kept
disappearing with people. The door opened a few inches to let
them out, then it banged shut and the rest of us were left.,,73
Across Britain this haphazard process of allocation of children was widespread. Tired
children were lined up in school halls while local people viewed them and selected their
'guests' for themselves. It was a discomfiting and humiliating experience at the end of
a long and traumatic day, and the despair and degradation felt by many poorer or less
attractive children as they were scrutinised and passed over may be imagined. Brothers
72 Oral interview: George Shelley, 12.8.96
73 Oral interview: Pamela Denniff, 16.9.94
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and sisters who insisted on staying together were often left until last. Wicks aptly
described the humiliation of waiting to be chosen as "seared into the mind with a
branding iron?" - never forgotten by those who experienced it.
In these circumstance it was sometimes observed that, while housewives were inclined
to pick clean and respectable-looking children, farmers often chose strong boys.75 This
was corroborated by another Sheffield evacuee to Mountsorrel, who remembered that
her foster father had not wanted any evacuees at all, but reluctantly agreed to take in a
boy to help in the garden. He was shocked when his wife returned with a mother and
two small girls instead."
Calder's assertion that the best-dressed children were often assigned to any local gentry
who had expressed willingness to take evacuees77was borne out by another Sheffield
interviewee:
"One lady came and picked my sister and me and took us into
the billeting room, but the billeting officer (Miss Gray) said
'You can't have those two little girls - they're mine!' That was
because we had all lovely hand-knitted garments on - jumpers,
skirts and cardigans to match."
The girls were quickly taken to the manor house where the billeting officer lived with
her father, the local colliery owner, and a staff of five servants.78
Not all householders were happy with the evacuees assigned to them, and some seemed
to regard the children as commodities. One Loughborough woman was reported as
74 B Wicks: No Time 10 Wave Goodbye, p.53
7S J Macnicol, "The effect of the evacuation of schoolchildren on official attitudes to State intervention" in
H L Smith: War and Social Change, p.6
76 Oral interview: Pamela Grayson, 12.3.96
77 A Calder: The People's War, p.40
78 Oral interview: Dorothy Knowles, 21.3.95
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saying "I ordered a boy, and you've sent me a girl." Another complained: "I asked for
two little girls aged five and six, and you've sent me two aged six and seven.?" Some
were even more specific: one Shropshire woman, whose husband was on the local
billeting committee, recorded:
"He had asked if 1 would like girls or boys, dark or fair, blue
eyes or brown. I (smilingly) replied, 'Two girls - fair hair and
blue eyes, please.'"
In this case the householder was a satisfied customer: she was granted her wish.80
Pupils of special schools were not generally caught up in this kind of confusion. They
travelled with their teachers and adult helpers to the reception areas as school units and
were, for the most part, accommodated in camps, large houses and hotels which had
been arranged in advance." There they remained as separate entities and did not
normally integrate into the community or attend local council schools, though some
were combined with schools dealing with similar categories of children in reception
areas. The eighteen children evacuated with Sheffield's Maud Maxfield School for the
Deaf, for instance, joined forces with Normanton Hall School in Southwell,
Nottinghamshire.Y However, most special schools in Sheffield, such as the School for
Blind Children, were situated in neutral areas of the city and went on with their work
without interruption." A few cases were discovered where one or two individual
children from open-air schools in Sheffield were received into ordinary schools in
reception areas, as seen in the register for St Peter's School Loughborough where three
79 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 8.9.39, p.5
80 C & E Townsend: War Wives: A Second World War Anthology, p.16
81 P H J H Gosden: Education in the Second World War, p.177
82 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of the School Medical Officer 1939, p.40
83 The Health of the School Child: op. cit., p.82
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pupils from Whiteley Wood Open Air School were admitted." This, however, seemed
to be the exception rather than the rule. The log book of the only other special unit in
the evacuable area of Sheffield which has been discovered in research, Pomona Street
Special Centre for the Mentally Deficient, makes no mention of evacuation but gives
details of the Home Tuition Scheme, indicating that these pupils did not go away.85
Arrangements for adults in the special categories did not always run smoothly.
Chester's chief billeting officer apparently omitted to make arrangements to
accommodate a large party of blind people from Liverpool, despite having had prior
warning of the arrival. These people spent the first night in the Poor Law Institution
and the next at a teachers' training college, after which eighty of their number
'mutinied' and went horne."
Nottinghamshire officials had apparently not expected all of the blind or otherwise
disabled adults who arrived from Sheffield, either. Arrangements had been made for
one contingent of twenty-nine adults who detrained at Newark, for they were quickly
taken to the town's Isolation Hospital, where accommodation had been adapted for their
use.87 But another party went to the village of Papplewick, where residents were
surprised to find a number of elderly blind people included in the first batch of arrivals
there. The problem was quickly tackled, and in one weekend members of the WVS in
84 St Peter's School Admissions Register 1939-1943, Leicester Record Office, ref DE 1360/131
85 Log book: Pomona Street Special Centre (previously Highfield Special Mentally Deficient School)
86 J Croall: "Chester during the Second World War", Sheffield University, BA Dissertation (1992)
87 The Newark Advertiser: 6.9.39, p.3
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two neighbouring villages had found and equipped a bungalow for the use of these
evacuees which became known as 'The WVSHome for Blind Evacuees' in Linby.88
Expectant mothers largely avoided these difficulties at reception centres. Mansfield, at
first designated a neutral area, was selected to receive three hundred pregnant Sheffield
women. There, the Berry Hill Miners' Welfare Convalescent Home had been adapted
for their use and was ready. However, billets for the women's accommodation before
and after confinement were not so easily obtained. Even three days before evacuation,
there was such a shortage that volunteers had been hurriedly called out to canvass
hundreds of houses to find room for them."
At home in Sheffield, the women knew nothing of this, for the following day The
Sheffield Telegraph & Independent reported encouragingly that a list of private
householders willing to take in the women had been drawn Up.90 In the event, only
eighty-one expectant mothers, together with their fifty-three small children, elected to
leave the city on the day before the outbreak of war. They travelled direct to Mansfield
in three buses, accompanied by three municipal midwives" who were temporarily
seconded to Nottinghamshire County Council to help in caring for them."
Pupils of independent preparatory or secondary schools also mostly escaped the
confusion: not being included in the official scheme, their staffs had generally made
their own arrangements for evacuation. Derwent Hall, lately a youth hostel, had been
88 Hucknall Public Library: File L.90.2: "Hucknall in the Second World War"
89 The Nottingham Evening Post: 29.8.39, p.3
90 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 30.8.39, p.4
91 The Mansfield Reporter: 8.9.39, p.2
92 Sheffield City Council: Report of Chief Medical Officer of Health 1939, p.25
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made ready for pupils of Notre Dame School, Sheffield. Eleven nuns and eight maids
had travelled to Ashopton earlier to clean and prepare the neglected building, and
school equipment was transported from the city school by willing parents." The girls
of Sheffield High School, moving into Cliff College at Calver, found the classroom and
boarding facilities, which served the theological students who were normally resident,
needed little adaptation: they even had a private chapel.94 Other groups made their own
arrangements, too: for instance, an offer by the Vicar of Ashboume to take in the
choirboys from his former church (St Cuthbert's) in Sheffield was gladly accepted."
National and local newspapers carried cheerful reports of the evacuees' arrival. On the
day after the exodus The Sheffield Telegraph and Independent informed its readers that
the evacuees were greeted with warm welcomes in their new quarters and had quickly
begun to settle down. In its next issue it reported "complete satisfaction with all the
arrangements"." The priest of St Charles' Church in Sheffield, who had escorted
children to Barrow upon Soar from Attercliffe, publicly reassured mothers that their
children were happy in their new homes."
Despite these assurances, however, it is clear that not all Sheffield evacuees were
content. The headmaster of Carbrook Council Boys' School complained that, having
arrived intact at the Leicestershire station of Quom & Woodhouse, his party was broken
93 V Hallam: Silent Valley at War: Life in the Derwent Valley 1939-1945, pp.20,22
94 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 4.9.39, p.3
9~ ibid, 2.9.39, p.5
96 ibid: also 4.9.39, p.3
97 ibid., 2.9.39, p.5
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down and families divided up in several different villages, causing problems and
frustration for teachers. He reported:
"Everything went well until we reached the rail head at Quom -
where by some excellent muddling by too many in authority, all
our careful work of arranging parties was undone in a few
minutes and families broken up, causing great dissatisfaction. ,,98
The headmistress of Carbrook Infants' School recorded in the school log book that
children and teachers were distributed between the villages of Anstey, Newtown
Linford, Thurcaston and Cropston, while mothers with young children were sent to
Rothley. When more mothers arrived on the second day they were housed in yet
another village, Reresford." By December the situation had apparently not improved,
for a meeting of Leicestershire Education Committee was told that the children from
Sheffield were so widely scattered that a teacher was continuing to act as organiser for
the area.lOO Appendix 8, compiled from details of Leicestershire Education Committee
Attendance Record of Evacuated School Parties and showing the eventual destinations
of pupils from Sheffield schools who arrived in that county, bears witness to this
fragmentation. Although no such information has been discovered for those evacuated
to Nottinghamshire, it is likely that a similar situation existed there: indeed, The Newark
Herald reported that at least one Sheffield party, from Pye Bank Council School, was
similarly split up and sent to five neighbouring Nottinghamshire villages - Balderton,
Coddington, North and South CoIl ingham, and Farndon.'?'
98 Log book: Carbrook Council Boys' School, entry 1.9.39; Leicestershire Record Office refDE2I 44/33I
99 Log book: Carbrook Council Infants' School, entry 2.9.39
100 Leicestershire Education Committee: Minutes 1939, p7723; ibid., File CC4/16/1/25
101 The Newark Herald: 2.9.39, p.l
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Receiving authorities were reluctant to shoulder all the responsibility for difficulties
which arose and Sheffield Education Committee was blamed for some of the problems
in the reception areas. In prior negotiations with reception areas, the authority had
insisted upon the city's children being billeted only in villages where a Sheffield teacher
was present. But in Nottinghamshire, Basford councillors protested that the policy had
caused unnecessary trouble to householders and had been the cause of parents removing
their children. At a meeting of the Rural District Council, the Sheffield authority was
criticised for its failure to supply information on numbers and categories of evacuees
which, it was stated, could have been sent both in advance of planning and by telephone
after the trains had left for the reception areas on the actual days of evacuation. 102
Itwas not just a local problem, but a national one. Fragmentation of school parties was
not uncommon, and in an extreme example London teachers found that their pupils
were scattered in villages spread out over four hundred square miles; in another case
children from one school were accommodated in twenty-three different villages. 103 One
head teacher, criticising the splitting up of school parties, felt strongly:
"There was no co-ordination between the different bodies. The
transport people transported; the reception people received; the
billeting officers billeted. [... ] If evacuation is ever arranged
again, let it be 'x children will be billeted at y and will attend z
school'. No school- no billeting.v'?"
It was claimed that much of the separation of school groups was later shown to have
been unnecessary, because villages often received several disconnected groups from
102 The Nottingham Evening Post: 10.10.39, p.6
103 T· . 112nmuss: op. CIt., p.
104 M E Cosens: "Evacuation: A Social Revolution", Social Work, (January 1940), p.174
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different schools and would have been able to take complete units. Furthermore, the
scattering of school parties also meant that some teachers, who had promised parents
that they would stay with the children, were quite unable to do SO.105 Itmay be argued,
however, that the Ministry of Transport, in its refusal to guarantee the destination of any
party, had foreseen that these difficulties might occur and had tried to avoid such
problems.
Provincial press reports of the arrival of Sheffield children did not criticise the methods
of allocating evacuees to homes, highlighting instead the warm greetings of hosts and
the satisfaction of evacuees.'?' The headmaster of Sharrow Lane School was so
impressed with the welcome extended to his party that he wrote to the local newspaper
expressing the appreciation of Sheffield teachers for the help and kindness offered by
Loughborough teachers and citizens. However, praising the reception of the evacuees
which had been very carefully thought out and carried out rapidly and efficiently, he
acknowledged that there had been some misfits in the initial billeting.l'" It was not
until later that criticisms surfaced about the methods employed in this essential task.
In hindsight it is clear that there was bound to be some mis-matching of hosts and
guests. Like was matched with like in many cases, but inevitably some children were
billeted in poorer homes than they were used to, while others found themselves in much
better circumstances than they could ever have imagined and were equally unhappy.
An anonymous letter writer to The Nottingham Evening Post asserted:
lOS Cosens: op. cit., p. 167
106 The Sheffield Star: 1.9.39, p.l; The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 1.9.39 & 2.9.39, p.5
107 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo, 13.9.39, p.4
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"Some children have been extremely fortunate in the 'lucky dip'
method of distribution and billeting employed, while others find
themselves in surroundings certainly lower than their previous
home life. A simple system of reference as to conditions from
which each child has been taken [... ] would have avoided many
of the admitted misfits now coming to light."
The signature "All Away" suggested the writer was a dissatisfied parent of evacuees. lOS
Calder's view that at the outbreak of war 1,000,000 people were "stuffed under a
government scheme from cities into 'reception areas'?'?" may appear now to over-state
the case. However, at the time it may well have seemed to some of those who arrived
in strange towns and villages tired and hungry, after long and difficult journeys, and
found themselves faced with chaotic conditions and unwilling hosts, that they were
indeed being 'stuffed' into any available place. General confusion was widespread and
it was several days before many matters were sorted out. The often random assignment
of children to billets may have secured for them a bed for the night: but for too many, it
provided little more. no
It is true that some householders did not honour earlier promises of accommodation,
which added to difficulties and frustration for organisers and evacuees alike. Perhaps
surprisingly, many teachers found it difficult to get accommodation. III Here, the wide
discrepancy between their billeting allowances of five shillings and the twenty-one
shillings for civil servants may well have been an important factor. A more surprising
reason was given by Chuter Ede in the House of Commons who related that one teacher
108 The Nottingham Evening Post: 7.11.39, p.8
109 A Calder: The Myth of the Blitz, p.60
1100 L Davis Jnr: "The Invisible Evacuees ... " History of Education Society Bulletin, No.49 (1992) p.56
111 N Longmate: How We Lived Then, p.56
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was told by her billeter: "I am so disappointed to have you because I expected to have
one of those mothers who would have been useful in the kitchen." 112
Dispersal of the evacuees in the reception areas was further complicated by the
condition of some of the children as they arrived, which did not endear them to
prospective hosts. Many had had to endure long, hot journeys in non-corridor trains
without lavatories and this contributed to the dirty and dishevelled state of some upon
arrival: this should have been expected. But others had actually set out from home with
their clothing and belongings in a deplorable state, as some hostesses were soon
horrified to discover.113 What had also not been anticipated was that some evacuees
were found to be suffering from lice and/or skin diseases.i'" These issues will be
discussed in the following chapter.
It was not only the children who arrived in disarray: long journeys for mothers travelling
with small children were often exhausting. One such evacuee woman, arriving at a
distribution centre set up in a non-conformist chapel in Westmorland, not only desired
but needed a bath. There was no privacy in the chapel, but a solution was found by
allowing her to enjoy a tub of hot water which was carried into the large pulpit.115
Local newspapers reported the public disgust at the state of some of the evacuees, and
related some accounts about evacuees from Leeds and other cities, but published no
112 HoC Deb. 7.9.39, Vo1.351, col. 805
113 Mass-Observation File 11
114 Gosden: op. cit., p.165
m Graves: op. cit., p.34
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such criticisms of Sheffield children, who were praised for being well turned out and in
good health:
"[ ... ] they were wearing smart new clothes and suits which their
mothers had hurriedly bought for them for the evacuation.
Brightly polished shoes, clean socks and [girls'] newly curled
hair added to a spruce appearance ..,116
Teachers' representatives also commended the Sheffield children: "The quality of the
kit brought was generally good."ll7
In the reception areas, however, it was sometimes a different story. A Nottinghamshire
foster mother who was interviewed, indicating that her Sheffield evacuees were not
well equipped when they arrived, stated:
"We took them to Ilkeston and rigged them up. I think it was
done on purpose, you know. [... ] But the parents helped with
clothes after that."!"
Who, or what, was to blame for the shortcomings which came to light upon the arrival
of the children in the reception areas under the official government schemes; and what,
if anything, was done to remedy the situation?
Officials in the reception areas were often held responsible for failures of organisation.
But it may be unfair to blame billeting authorities in every case. Their officers could,
after all, only act upon information received and it has been seen that much confusion
arose because inadequate details were given to the reception areas of the numbers and
116 The Sheffield Star: 1.9.39, p.l
117 Education: No. 1910, 18.8.39, p.194
118 Oral interview: Gladys Smith, 12.5.95
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categories of evacuees who would arrive. Even after the mistakes of 1939, billeting
officers were sometimes given insufficient notice of the arrival of evacuees in their
areas: sometimes they were informed by telegram when the children were already on
their way, and sometimes not at all.119
In drawing up plans for evacuation, government planners had seen the task of billeting
officers as of temporary duration and not meriting the employment and special training
of skilled personnel. Consequently, at the outset of evacuation at least, most billeting
officers were volunteers, few of whom held any appropriate qualifications for what was
to become a particularly onerous and taxing job. 120 Some mis-matching of evacuees to
billets might have been avoided if more trained skill had been available for the work
from the beginning, for prompt attention could have avoided serious friction in many
cases. Moreover, it had not been foreseen that not one, but several evacuations would
take place throughout the war and would be spread out over five years.
And it should not be overlooked that, whereas numerous rehearsals had been held in
evacuation areas to highlight potential problems and ensure smooth operation of the
departure, it had simply not been possible to carry out similar procedures at arrival
points. Officials in reception areas were, therefore, dealing with some problems which
even the most far-sighted of them could not have envisaged.
Padley asserted that the Ministry of Health's unwillingness to guarantee that any
particular party would arrive at a specific destination may have had serious
119 N Longmate: How We Lived Then, p.62
120 Crosby: op. cit., p.31
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consequences with regard to the numbers of children registering for the first
evacuation.!" Dent, too, considered this a "big error".':" However, the wisdom of the
Ministry was borne out by events, as has been seen.
Again, much has been made of the failure of parents in 1940 to respond to a new
publicity campaign enjoining them to register their children for evacuation as fear of
invasion spread. But public condemnation of urban evacuees in 1939, and first- or
second-hand unhappy experiences in the reception areas may well have deterred many
from registering their children. In addition, the desire of families to stay together in
adversity was a deterring factor.
The condition and behaviour of many of the children was the subject of much
complaint, especially in the first movement. It had, however, proved impossible for the
schools medical staffs to carry out all the necessary inspecting and cleansing of the
children before they were sent away from the danger areas at such short notice and at
the end of the long summer holidays. Nevertheless, in his report on the health of school
children during the war years, the Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Education
pointed out:
"The unbilletable minority gained much more notoriety than the
great majority of well brought up and well behaved children
who settled down with foster parents in happy relationships.v'f
This seems to confirm the later view that the condition of the unfortunate few was
attributed, by rumour and reportage, to the many who presented no such problems. Still,
121 R Padley "Until the Outbreak of War" in Padley & Cole: op. cit., p.32
122 H C Dent: Education in Transition, p.17
123 The Health of the School Child: op. cit., p.31
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it is clear that there were serious problems awaiting medical staffs when these large
numbers of children arrived in the countryside.
In subsequent evacuations many of the lessons had been learned, and there were fewer
and less urgent problems. This was largely because, under the 'Trickle' programme,
there was not the frenetic rush to get the children away in such large numbers. With
smaller numbers of children leaving over a period of time, it was possible to examine
the children before departure and pinpoint potential problems. In addition, the hostels
and clinics so hastily set up in the 1939 emergency were still available for children who
were difficult to billet in private homes.124
Much has been made of the 'cattle-market' method of allocating children to host
families, and from the point of view of the evacuees the policy is hard to defend. Boyd
expressed the opinion that the method of selection by prospective hosts left a feeling of
resentment among both hosts and evacuees who got second pick. 125Yet that was not the
fault of householders who came to choose the children, for most of them were
responding with good intentions. However, Longmate's view, that this "slave-market"
method of allocation to billets at least provided a temporary bed and avoided the trudge
from door to door in search of a home,126seems to dodge the issue - that neither should
have been necessary had there been more communication between evacuating and
receiving authorities and less last-minute reorganisation. As Burt observed, much more
detailed advance planning of reception should have been made, entailing evacuees
124 The Health of the School Child: op. cit., p.Sl
I2S W Boyd: Evacuation in Scotland, p.60
126 N Longmate: How We Lived Then, p.S}
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being greeted individually and refreshments provided before being introduced to their
hosts and departing to billets. 127
The government evacuation scheme had been based on the theory that almost all
evacuees would be billeted in private households, as has been seen in Chapter One. But
until the evacuees arrived in the reception areas in September 1939 it was not fully
realised just how vast a gulf existed between the standards of life and cultural outlook
of the average country householders and the inhabitants of poor inner-city districts.
In 1939 it had certainly not been appreciated by the mainly male and middle-class
organisers of evacuation just how difficult it would be to billet the mothers and yet,
arguably, if more females had been involved in planning this possibility would have
been plain. Billeting was (perhaps not unreasonably) seen by many householders as no
more than an unpleasant necessity. It was to be expected, then, that if pressed they
would prefer unaccompanied school children, who would be out of the house for the
best part of the day during the week at least and would more easily conform to hosts'
customs and expectations. Much less welcome would be mothers and small children
who would be continually under foot, sharing kitchens and bathrooms, making noise
and less able or willing to try to adjust. Noting their hostile reception and quick return
home, the government's offer of assisted evacuation from 1940 meant that the problem
of billeting large numbers of mothers and young children on private householders was
much less likely to arise in later evacuations.i'''
127 C Burt: "The Billeting of Evacuated Children", British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. XI
(1941), p.92
128 S Ferguson & H Fitzgerald: Studies in the Social Services, p.148
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Complaints came from both sides - from reluctant hosts, discouraged by unhappy
experiences or rumours, and from truculent guests disaffected with country life and
unwelcoming billeters. On the other hand, the difficulties and uncertainties which
faced individual host families in connection with the arrival of evacuees have often
been overlooked. Lord Tonypandy, at the time a teacher in a Welsh evacuation area,
recalled that a sympathetic crowd gathered to watch the arrival of the evacuees. He
noted, as he called out their names, that it was not only the newcomers who were
nervous and fearful:
"The people [of the village] were fearful. They did not know
what the children would be like. All they knew was that here
were children in need. [... ] It took some readjusting on both
sides.,,129
Dent asserted that there had been no preparation of householders for their daunting task
of receiving the evacuees, or guidance given to evacuees as to their behaviour in the
billets. In his opinion it was an exceptionally hazardous experiment which had been
planned and initiated by people who had no inkling of its far-reaching implications130
and it is difficult to disagree with this.
Just how willing were people to take in evacuees? In 1939, many householders in the
reception areas were initially motivated by a genuine desire to help those whom they
perceived to be in real danger. Patriotic feelings were also an important factor. But
Cole suggested something else: that to some extent the obligation was enforced by local
mass opinion'<' - no-one wanted to be accused by their neighbours of not doing their
129 Lord Tonypandy: BBC interview "Songs of Praise", 8.10.95
130 Dent: op. cit., p.3
131 M Cole, "General Effects: Billeting" in Padley & Cole: op. cit., p.72
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bit. When the expected aerial bombardment of industrial centres did not materialise,
however, the initial fervour abated.
When the second evacuation programme was introduced in 1940, only one householder
in fifty volunteered to take evacuees, despite the improvements which had been
implemented in regard to medical inspections and hostels for children with special
needs.132 But when the bombs started dropping, prospective hosts were tom between
sympathy for the victims of the blitz and memories of the vast problems which had
arisen the previous year. Harrisson found, too, that the evacuees themselves were more
ready to make the best of things.133
The success of the 1944 evacuation was partly helped by the fact that many evacuees
fleeing the rocket attacks on the south of England were sent to cities in the north of
England and the midlands, where their hosts often had personal experience of both
evacuation and bombing raids. And while many of the refugees this time had made
their own arrangements and could be expected to have found congenial conditions for
themselves, a Mass-Observation survey found that even the official scheme worked
well on the whole, and householders received "a better type of evacuee than they
expected.,,134
Where there were problems, it was not always the householders who were at fault; the
evacuees were sometimes difficult to please. One account tells of an extreme case:
132 N Longmate: Haw We Lived Then, p.60
133 Mass-Observation File 483, p.9
134 Mass-Observation File 2189, p.1
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"There were five ladies each prepared to take two children. The
party when it arrived consisted of a Mother and nine children,
from none of whom she was prepared to be separated."
The problem was solved by a Rest Centre for the first night, after which a warden found
a house for the family.135
The government rightly claimed success for the mass movement of so many people on
this unprecedented scale. But the first objective of the evacuation, to clear areas
vulnerable to attack of the priority classes, had largely failed for, as Calder remarked,
"the cities were still loud with children".136 And within a fortnight of this vast
operation, it was evident that a drift homeward was already taking place among many of
those who had been evacuated.
As Boyd assessed the situation:
"The evacuees were dumped on private householders. That
done, the Government and most local authorities seemed to
think that their main task was over."!"
It was assumed that once safely billeted, the evacuees would stay put: in fact a great
deal of moving and re-allocating was about to begin.
m Mass-Observation File 2189, p.8
136 A Calder: The People's War, p.39
137 W Boyd: op. cit., p.52
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CHAPTER FOUR
PROBLEMS IN THE RECEPTION AREAS
In hindsight, it ought to have been apparent from the beginning that it was always going
to be unrealistic to expect large numbers of townspeople to move into the countryside
and then settle into other people's rural homes without trouble. Similarly, it should not
have been surprising that country folk would refuse to accept willingly what amounted
to an invasion of their homes by urban strangers with different habits and mores. Itwas
simply asking too much of both sides.
What could not have been anticipated, however, was the speed at which criticisms of
the new arrivals began to emerge. Even as they reached their billets, mothers with
small children and unaccompanied school children alike found themselves castigated by
householders, for the reprehensible state of their bodies and clothing. Officials and
journalists joined the condemnation as the poverty of large industrial towns and cities,
so long hidden, unseen, unremarked, or ignored, was suddenly laid bare for all to see in
market towns and small villages throughout the country.
Initial sympathy for the refugees quickly degenerated into vilification: goodwill
evaporated and was replaced by hostility and suspicion. Having first carried
encouraging reports of the successful movement of many thousands of women and
children from the towns and cities, and the warm welcome awaiting them in rural
districts, national newspapers and those in receiving districts were within days filled
with articles highly critical of the condition of evacuees. Within weeks they were
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relating complaints about their unsocial manners and bad behaviour. This chapter will
concentrate on some of the problems encountered.
At the planning stages of the evacuation programme local authorities had been advised
to set up small committees to deal with any difficulties which might occur. Problems
were expected to concern unaccompanied school children more than any other group
but, in fact, it was the mothers with young children who came in for most opprobrium. I
The billeting of mothers and their small children with private householders was
arguably doomed to failure from the beginning. As St Loe Strachey commented, the
remarkable plan by which the government expected strangers to do their own catering
and cooking in other women's houses had never sounded promising to housewives.i
Undoubtedly there were problems on both sides, for it cannot have been easy for either
evacuee or host when it came to sharing household facilities. On the one hand, country
people were required to allow into their homes, for an indefinite period of time,
unknown mothers with small children - women who sometimes did not respect their
values, possessions, or way of life and whose cigarette-smoking, manner of speech and
dress were quite foreign. On the other, evacuated women were expected to adapt to the
homes and ways of strangers with entirely different life experiences, cultures and
standards. Moreover, they were inevitably subordinate to the householder and often
subject to close observation and severe disapproval of their hosts.
IHe Dent: Education in Transition, p.6
2 A St Loe Strachey: Borrowed Children, p.49
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In addition, domestic and sanitary arrangements in country cottages were sometimes
primitive by the standards of even the poorest townspeople. Some homes were without
electricity and offered only oil lamps for light and coal ranges for cooking. Even worse
was the lack of flush toilets: instead there were often earth closets situated at the end of
gardens. It was perhaps inevitable that in the face of so many unforeseen difficulties
many evacuee women returned to their homes within weeks, and sometimes within
days, of leaving the cities.
No doubt some reports were exaggerated or coloured by class prejudice, for some
evacuees had been ill-matched to their billets in the rush to get a roof over their heads.
It is also arguable that, had the predicted bombing of danger areas materialised, the
short-comings of both the government scheme and the newcomers might have been
largely overlooked in the interests of patriotism. Yet the facts could not be ignored - the
condition and clothing of many evacuees was very poor - and in the absence of expected
stories of courage and solidarity under enemy air attack following the announcement of
war, it was these who made the news headlines instead. Only a week after the first
evacuees had arrived in the reception areas, The Spectator declared:
"Many of the mothers were the lowest grade of slum women -
slatternly malodorous tatterdemalions trailing children to
match."j
If this judgement was unnecessarily harsh and too general, it may nevertheless have
helped to reinforce prejudices already held by some country people against city dwellers
as a whole. In one Oxfordshire reception area, for example, it was reported that
3 T L Crosby: The Impact of Civilian Evacuation in the Second World War, p.34
159
although most people did their best for the evacuees, hostile comments were heard from
others that only the "hysterical type of woman" had been evacuated and that "a decent
woman would never leave her husband"." Perhaps it was no wonder that no mothers
with children were left in the district by Christmas 1939.5
In the evacuation areas, it seemed, the press was keen to reassure the public at large,
and parents in particular, that all was well in the reception districts. Initial coverage of
Sheffield refugees' reception had been enthusiastic. The local press informed readers
that many reassuring letters from happy Sheffield evacuees and from their new foster
parents had been received and the children were regarding their absence from home as a
'grand holiday'. The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent reported great goodwill in the
receiving areas towards the city's children and mothers. 6
Unfortunately, this happy situation appears not to have lasted long. In Nottinghamshire,
just ten days after their arrival, the Chairman of Basford Rural District Council
announced that a tribunal had already been set up to deal with complaints about
evacuees.i At the next meeting councillors were told that local officials were shocked
when so many mothers with large families had arrived on the first train from Sheffield
and there had been many problems in finding homes for them."
Itwas a similar story in Leicestershire, where it is evident that reception authorities had
to resort to coercion to get some evacuees billeted. The Illustrated Leicester Chronicle,
4 M Graham: Oxfordshire at War, p.47
s ibid., p.38
6 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 4.9.39, p.3; 7.9.39, p.7
7 The Nottingham Evening Post: 12.9.39, p.5
8 ibid., 10.10.39, p.6
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in a post-war resume of the period immediately following the announcement of war,
reported:
"The task with evacuee mothers was not far from being
embarrassing. [... ] The officials had powers of enforcement
and requisition: sometimes these powers had to be used."?
A billeting officer in the county blamed Sheffield women for discord in the reception
areas: many women had come with four or five young children, and getting them to
agree with another family in the same house was a very difficult matter, he said. Here,
too, tribunals had been set up within days to analyse complaints, and empty properties
had been inspected with a view to furnishing them for evacuated families.'? Less than
a fortnight after the first evacuation, the Clerk to Leicester City Council protested to the
Ministry of Health that 75% of evacuated mothers with pre-school children were
objectionable on grounds of health, habits or character: however, further investigation
revealed the figure to be nearer 15%.11
When the National Federation of Women's Institutes conducted a survey of 1,700
branches of the organisation throughout the country it concluded that although many
women were conscientious and capable, "a distressing proportion" were described by
householders as feckless and ignorant, often apparently unable to sew or cook and
unwilling to help in the home or even to keep their children or their own quarters clean.
The survey found that country hosts were further outraged that many of their 'guests'
9 The Illustrated Leicester Chronicle: 2.11.46, p.6
10 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 28.9.39, p.S
11 PRO.HLG.7/76, cited in Crosby: op. cit., p.39
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bemoaned the lack of fish and chips and cinemas, and went unescorted into public
houses.V
It was not just receiving officials and rural householders who reproached the women,
either, for a Nottinghamshire newspaper quoted the view of an evacuated teacher from
Sheffield on the subject:
"It is the mothers and not the children who are complaining
about the conditions and causing trouble. They are not prepared
to put up with any of the little inconveniences which one is
bound to get in rural districts and they won't adapt themselves
to country life." 13
However, not all the faults were on the evacuees' side, for some of the billets offered to
them were neither clean nor suitable." Some evacuee women complained that, after a
wonderful initial reception at the rail heads, they were taken to billets which left much
to be desired in the way of cleanliness, particularly in those reception areas where large
unoccupied houses had been set aside for families to share. A member of Mass-
Observation noted a typical comment from families in one such overcrowded building:
"They gave us that great welcome at the Town Hall, and then they put us into this dirty
place and forgot all about US.,,15 In Shepshed, a receiving district for Sheffield, there
were so many evacuee families with poor facilities in their billets that washbasins and
baths were installed for their use in an empty shop in the town."
12 National Federation of Women's Institutes: Town Children Through Country Eyes, pp.I,IS
13 The Nottingham Evening Post: 18.9.39, p.l
14 C Graves: Women in Green, p.37
IS Mass-Observation File 2189, p.20
16 J Perry et a1: Shepshed: Wartime Memories, p.S2
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Sometimes, even when facilities were adequate, other factors influenced the speedy
return home of some families, as one interviewee demonstrated. Arriving with his
mother and seven of his ten siblings in Stowmarket from Ilford, the very large family
was allocated to an unoccupied house which was hastily renovated and furnished by
local volunteers. Beds were in short supply and the children were obliged to sleep on
straw mattresses, but otherwise the house was well equipped. Two days after moving
in, however, a burglary took place. The former evacuee said:
"That was enough for my mother. Next morning she got us all
packed and ready and went down to the village to see about bus
times. She said we couldn't stay there and we all went home
that day."
Some of the children from this family were later successfully evacuated without their
mother. I7
Occasionally a voice was raised publicly in support of the women. Only a fortnight
after the exodus, a writer to the 'Letters' column of Education told of the humiliation of
mothers with babies having to return to the distribution centre of an unnamed reception
area many times before being admitted into any billets:
"It was rather the [local] mothers who were 'fretful and
complaining' . One I heard of went so far as to say she would
commit suicide if a mother and young babe were billeted on
her!,,)8
Some hosts reacted more sympathetically than others. Mass-Observation investigators
reported that, although goodwill was often shown by working-class hosts, it was badly
lacking among the middle classes, whose reaction to the evacuees was often
17 Oral interview: George Green, 17.12.93
18 Education, No. 1914, 15.9.39, p.248
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'deplorable' .19 Dent, too, held that repulsion ousted pity and any sense of Christian
duty went by the board as many middle-class householders set about the task of getting
rid of their unwanted and undesirable guests."
Within days the 'grand holiday' was drawing to an end for some, and signs of
discontent in reception areas were already filtering back to the cities as mothers began
to take their children home. It was not only that the women felt unwelcome in the
billets but, used to the bustle of inner-city life, many were frankly bored with the
limitations and the quietness of the countryside. In an apparent reference to unofficially
evacuated families in Derbyshire, a local journalist reported:
"I met many Sheffield people, and the biggest grumbler was a
woman: 'Derbyshire is so dead' she wailed. 'It's so dull here
after dark. There's simply nothing doing.",21
The women were castigated for their behaviour in their billets, and condemned when
they left them to go back to the cities. In October The Sheffield Telegraph &
Independent continued the censure of mothers:
"With supreme self-assurance they did not worry about the
possibility of danger to their children. All they wanted was to
get back to their crowded tenements where they could do as they
liked.',22
However, given the public outcry about evacuation, it was perhaps small wonder that
even within a fortnight the return of many mothers and children to danger areas was
causing grave concern to national and local government authorities. As early as 12
19 Mass-Observation File 482, p.6
20 Dent: op. cit., p.12
21 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 11.9.39, p.S
22 ibid., 17.10.39, p.4
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September, the Ministry of Health warned that tact, tolerance and understanding, as
well as administrative enterprise and ingenuity would be required to keep them in the
reception areas.r' The drift back, which was to cause concern throughout the war years,
will be covered in the next chapter.
So much for evacuated mothers. Many unaccompanied children found their welcome
short-lived too, as the distressing condition of some was quickly revealed. The dirty
and unkempt appearance of some who tumbled off trains, buses and ferries into
reception centres after long journeys might have been anticipated. What had not been
expected was that, as the children arrived in their billets, a significant number were
found to be suffering from head lice, nits and/or skin diseases. In addition, the clothing
of some was ragged and inadequate, or even infested with vermin: for instance, a large
number of householders in Welsh villages who took child evacuees from Liverpool
reported their clothing so dirty and vermin-infested that it had to be burned. Worse was
to come: when the children awoke next morning, many wet beds were discovered.
Soon, there were further complaints - of dirty habits, dishonesty and bad behaviour.i"
The possibility of contagious health problems had been anticipated by at least a few
agencies involved in planning evacuation, however. In May 1939 some local medical
authorities had warned that in a massive movement of population the mixing of
different strains of infection posed a potential threat to general health: town children
might take with them into the reception areas diseases to which country children had
23 The Nottingham Evening Post: 13.9.39, p.1
24 R M Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy: History of the Second World War, pp.11S, 117, 122
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not built up immunity. One medical journal intimated that evacuees should initially be
kept separate from local children, but the suggestion was ignored."
The Board of Education had also foreseen the possibility of such issues ansmg.
Importantly, it had predicted that pediculosis, impetigo and scabies would be the chief
problems in the first instance, and advocated that medical staffs should be increased and
cleansing facilities provided to pre-empt any such difficulties. Again, the proposals had
fallen on deaf ears, mainly because civil defence measures were perceived to be of
greater importance." Had adequate medical inspection and supervision been made
available before the evacuated children left their home towns and cities, it is arguable
that much of the furore which followed their arrival in the reception areas could have
been avoided.
As it was, it quickly became clear that among almost every batch of evacuees arriving
in reception areas throughout the country there were some (and often many) children
who needed rigorous cleansing and treatment. Billeting officers, school doctors, nurses
and health visitors were swamped with cries for help for evacuees and also for the
householders. Local authorities responded by calling upon their school medical officers
to visit all schools in reception districts and to carry out a speedy medical review of all
the recently-arrived children"
23 The Medical Officer: Vol LXI, 6.5.39, p.174, cited in Titmuss: op. cit., p.1S, n.l
26 Board of Education Circular No.1469, 19.5.39, cited in P H J H Gosden: Education in the Second
World War, p.l64
27 The Health of the School Child: Report of Chief Medical Officer Ministry of Education 1939-45, p.3}
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In some areas officials took drastic action as evacuees stepped off the trains. At
Wigtown, where large numbers of mothers with children were received, the medical
officer assembled a team of helpers armed with hair-clippers, who proceeded (without
permission) to shave the heads of all the evacuees." Itwas not unknown for individual
householders to take extreme measures to deal with the problem: an interviewee told of
a foster parent in AId brough who, becoming infested with lice from her Hull evacuees,
treated the whole family with sheep-dip to cleanse them.29 This was apparently not an
isolated instance, for Mass-Observation quoted another householder in Colne who
bought a cake of sheep dip to wash her evacuee's head and then passed it on to
neighbours for their evacuees."
Public response to the revelations of infestation was immediate and furious. Press
reports were damning: the response of one West Country journalist was not untypical:
"The condition of some of the children was almost incredible -
and an eye-opener to those who believed that London's sordid
slumdom had died with the Victorian novelists.v'"
The implication was that 'dirty diseases' of lice, impetigo and scabies were connected
with character faults or with shortcomings in the behaviour and habits of the urban
lower classes.
It should not be assumed, however, that all - or even most - evacuees had been living in
squalor in the cities; nor that all billets were clean and wholesome. There were indeed
many cases where verminous children from inner-city slums were sent to fastidious
28 PRO.CABIHIST/S/4/8/6, cited in Titmuss: op. cit., p.84
29 Oral interview: Margaret Laing, 4.3.97
30 Mass-Observation File 11
31 The Weston Mercury: 4.9.39, p.l
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foster parents; but there were also instances where delicately nurtured town children
were dispatched to unclean and uncaring country householders. Moreover, it was not
unknown for evacuees to catch infectious skin diseases or head lice in their billets: at
least one interviewee from a clean home became infected with head- and body-lice
within weeks of arrival,32 and another evacuee was infected with scabies on three
separate occasions while in her billet.33 Loughborough's Medical Officer of Health
stopped short of suggesting that unaccompanied children were deliberately neglected,
but implicitly criticised some foster parents:
"[ ... ] there is naturally a certain lack of interest and attention
devoted to them compared to that given to the householder's
own children. [... ] The result is that many slight infestations,
with lice for instance, are not treated which would be
immediately dealt with in the case of the householder's own
children.,,34
Reasons may be advanced for many of the problems exposed by evacuation, not least
the incidence of infestation. As seen in Chapter Three, the exodus happened at the end
of the summer holidays, when school medical services had been largely unavailable for
several weeks. Government planners had regarded the need for speed in getting people
away as paramount, and no official provision had been made for the children to be
medically examined before they left the danger areas. Few reception areas had
arranged for inspections on arrival, and some had even been misled about the need for
such preparation: officials in Liverpool, for instance, had told Welsh receiving
32 Oral interview: Pamela Denniff, 16.9.94
33 Personal experience of writer
34 Report of Lough borough Medical Officer ofHeaIth on the Medical Aspects of Evacuation, p.l,
Loughborough Library Local Studies Collection
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authorities that their children would arrive clean and free from infectious disease."
Some children may have been infected by close contact with others during long
journeys on crowded trains, for in hot weather pediculosis and skin diseases spread
rapidly. But in many cases the condition undoubtedly already existed in their homes: as
the Women's Group on Public Welfare found, cramped and poor living conditions,
shared beds, no baths and sometimes no tap water all provided a breeding-ground for
vermin and infestation."
Whatever the reasons, the discovery that large numbers of children were suffering in
this way rocked authorities and householders alike. The revelations, and the resulting
outcry across the whole country, prompted the Board of Education and the Ministry of
Health to expedite an investigation by Dr Kenneth Mellanby into the incidence of head
lice which he had already begun before the war. His results were to prove disturbing: in
industrial cities lousiness was found in approximately 50% of all girls under fourteen
years and in boys to a smaller extent - declining from 45% at two years to 20% at
school leaving age. A much lower percentage of such infections was discovered in
rural areas" and this may account for the shock experienced in the reception areas. On
the other hand, perusal of pre-war newspapers had indicated that there was already
concern about head lice in children in at least one district which received Sheffield
children in 1939, with The Hue/mall Dispatch reporting that 25% of girls of school age
there had "unsatisfactory hair conditions'v"
35 Titmuss: op. cit., p.127
36 Women's Group on Public Welfare: op. cit., p.93
37 Titmuss: op. cit., p. 127
38 The Huckna/l Dispatch: 22.6.39, p.3
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It has been possible to ascertain from the Report of Sheffield's School Medical Officer
for 1938 that 15.15% girls and 1.82% boys were unclean at that time." No medical
statistics are available for the first evacuees from Sheffield in 1939 for, as has been seen
in the previous chapter, the majority received at best only a cursory inspection before
leaving. However, when a second chance was offered for evacuation in October, all
those who registered were examined by the school medical services, when the School
Medical Officer reported that thirty of these children, or 11.36%, were found to have
infectious conditions of the head or skin." It seems reasonable to believe that the
percentage for September would have been at least similar, if not higher in view of the
absence of medical services due to summer holidays. Indeed, when registrations were
invited again seven months later, in May 1940, the proportion had risen to 13.9%.41
It is clear, therefore, that some Sheffield children did take infectious conditions with
them into the reception areas. The Nottinghamshire School Medical Officer reported
that 30% of the evacuees arriving in the county from the combined evacuation zones of
Sheffield, Leeds and Nottingham in 1939 were found to have been suffering from
vermin and/or skin diseases. Although the foregoing research suggests that this
percentage may have been overstated, at least in regard to Sheffield, it is not possible to
refute it categorically.
In Nottinghamshire, the county's School Medical Officer's Report showed that school
nurses were deployed in making regular visits to both billets and schools and close
39 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of the School Medical Officer 1939, p.39
40 ibid, p.41
41 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of the School Medical Officer 1940, p.32
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liaison was maintained between the school medical service and the relevant reception
and billeting authorities. Some hosts appear to have refused, or been unable, to deal
with the problem, for the Report stated:
"[ ... ] it is to be regretted that evacuee children were all too
frequently returned to the evacuation areas by reception
authorities when billet difficulties arose.,,42
In Leicestershire it was apparently a similar situation, for Loughborough's Medical
Officer of Health stated that it was a common occurrence for householders to request
that verminous children be removed." When the town's Education Committee met just
two weeks after the evacuees' arrival, the Clerk reported that the billeting tribunal had
already sat twice, the most common cause of complaint being the condition of the
children. Several nurses had come from Sheffield to look after a number of 'special'
children and see they were put in a condition which would eliminate any grumbles, and
more nurses had been asked for from the city." The Committee's Report for 1939
shows that schools in the town, temporarily closed due to the emergency, were
commandeered for the purpose of making a thorough medical inspection of every
evacuated child." In Shepshed, examination of a school log book showed that weekly
visits were made by a school nurse from Sheffield to check on evacuees from the city."
Initial reports conveyed by The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent on the city's
evacuees had been cheerful, indicating very few problem cases." Predictably, perhaps,
42 Nottinghamshire Education Committee: School Medical Officer's Report 1939-1940, p.4
43 Report of Loughborough Medical Officer of Health on the Medical Aspects of Evacuation, p.l,
Loughborough Library Local Studies Collection
44 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 22.9.39, p.4
4S Loughborough Education Committee: Report 1939, p.6
46 Log book: Shepshed Council School, several entries
47 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 2.9.39, p.5
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even though complaints were fully aired by local newspapers in the reception areas,
very few references have been found in the Sheffield press. Sheffield's School Medical
Officer, in his Report for 1939, took issue with many of the complaints from receiving
officials as he observed: "Experience showed when the committee's nurses went into
the reception areas that the reports [... ] were undoubtedly exaggerated.,,48
Evacuees were also sometimes blamed for bringing other infectious diseases into the
reception areas, too. When thirty-eight cases of diphtheria were reported in
Loughborough, the Medical Officer of Health for Leicestershire stated that, in his
opinion, the disease was probably brought by a carrier from an evacuated area.
Referring to Sheffield children in particular, he said that since the evacuees had been in
Leicestershire there had been an increase in infectious diseases." At a meeting on 19
October 1939, members of Loughborough Town Council agreed to call upon the
Sheffield authorities for more medical help in addition to that already sent.50
In rural areas where the school population had suddenly ballooned by huge proportions,
sometimes increasing by 100% within a few days, child welfare services were strained
to the limit. In evacuation areas the normal work of school clinics was temporarily
suspended and doctors, dentists and nurses were deployed in reception districts to assist
local authority staffs dealing with affected children. Nurses continued to make frequent
visits to schools throughout the period of the war wherever there were appreciable
numbers of evacuees in schools. Hostels for the 'unbilletable minority' (those with
48 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of the School Medical Officer 1939, p.4l
49 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 13.10.39, p.5
so Borough of Lough borough Town Council: Minutes 1939/40, Item 9
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contagious skin diseases, lice, enuresis and severe behavioural problems) had to be
hastily improvised by local authorities. Voluntary organisations, particularly the Red
Cross, St John Ambulance Association and Women's Voluntary Service, helped to
bring the situation under control so that the school medical services in reception areas
were able to resume more normal working conditions. 51
The Ministry of Health did not respond officially until January 1940, when two
memoranda - "Scabies" and "The Louse and How to Deal with It" - were produced and
distributed to medical officers in reception areas. 52 In March the Board of Education
radically amended its policy on medical examinations to ensure that evacuees would be
inspected before evacuation took place, and again upon arrival in the reception areas. A
new system of coding the children's identity labels was established in May, so that
receiving authorities could be warned of any potential problems as evacuees arrived.
This innovation helped to avoid the recurrence of the 1939 fiasco. The symbols were as
follows: 53
+ = medically inspected C = vermin
o = hostel recommended D = nits
o = special consideration E = enuresis
A = impetigo F = infectious disease contact
B = scabies G = other conditions
~IThe Health of the School Child: op. cit., p.31
~2 R Padley "Six Months' Practice" in R Padley & M Cole (eds): Evacuation Survey, p.62
~3 Gosden: op. cit., p.168 n.20; p.169
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Infestation and skin problems may have been foreseen by at least some medical
authorities: but no-one, it appears, had expected that nocturnal enuresis would quickly
become a problem. In fact bed-wetting was not a new phenomenon but it had been a
hidden one. Lack of reportage and ignorance had caused its incidence to be grossly
under-estimated, and it was not until thousands of children were suddenly uprooted
from their homes and deposited in strangers' houses that the problem was exposed.
The very first morning after the young refugees' arrival in their billets brought shock
and horror to hosts for it seemed, as Isaacs put it, that "evacuation produced a Niagara
all over English and Scottish country beds". Householders were outraged at the
discovery of so many wet beds and they protested loudly. Sweeping allegations about
the filthy behaviour of evacuee children of all ages were carried in the national press
and local newspapers in reception areas and made it seem that all inhabitants of
evacuation areas were 'tarred with the same brush,.54
Local authorities had certainly not anticipated the full extent of the problem, and the
ban on advance expenditure for such items as mackintosh overlays for evacuees which
had been imposed by the Treasury until late in evacuation preparations had not helped
either. When approval was finally given in May 1939 supplies of waterproof sheets
were ordered for children under five years, but few consignments had been received by
the time that evacuation began. Crucially, no provision at all had been made for older
children for this had not been deemed necessary.55 As a result, many householders had
54 Isaacs: op. cit., p.47
55 Titmuss: op. cit., p.121
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their mattresses and bedding spoiled, and were faced with a great deal of extra washing,
all of which caused natural resentment in the reception areas.
Bed-wetting was one of the most publicised features of complaints against evacuees, at
least in the first few weeks. Although its extent was often exaggerated, it was difficult
to quantify: Boyd quoted figures ranging up to 33% of school children, but many reports
to the Ministry of Health cited numbers of between 10% and 20%.56 Evacuees were
universally stigmatised and parents often blamed for failing to train their children, when
the truth was more likely to be that the cause was insecurity, and the nervous strain of
separation from home was responsible for initial nocturnal accidents. Another
contributory factor was that many country homes had only outside earthen closets:
urban children, used to well-lit cities and unfamiliar with total darkness, were
sometimes afraid to go down long garden paths to 'privvies' at night. With patience
and understanding much of the trouble was soon put right, but with foresight it could
probably have been largely avoided.
An enquiry by Bradford Education Committee in November 1939 (instigated in
response to complaints about its evacuees) refuted allegations that most enuretic
children came from homes where no training had been given, while accepting this was
so in a few exceptional cases. The report also found the condition may have affected
some children to a minor degree already but become exacerbated on evacuation; and
often it was a new phenomenon caused by unhappiness in billets.57 Burt's study of a
group of children in areas of London, Birmingham and Liverpool, published in 1940,
S6 Titmuss: op. cit., p.121. n.4
S7 Education, No. 1928, 22.12.39, p.521
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noted a significant increase in nocturnal enuresis after evacuation and maintained that it
was not a habit but largely a new manifestation, often caused by temporary emotional
disturbance due to leaving home. 58 He went on to assert that ignorance about sanitary
arrangements in the billet, or even shyness, could exacerbate the situation:
"A girl of 13 years remained four days in her new home without
learning where the lavatory was, explaining later that she 'didn't
know what to say' .,,59
No complaints relating specifically to Sheffield children have been found in local
archives, newspapers, documents or other sources in reception areas regarding bed-
wetting, and only one reference to the subject has been discovered in the evacuation
area itself. The Annual Report of the School Medical Officer for 1939 showed no
statistics for September. Of the 264 city children who registered for evacuation in
October that year, only five (less than 2%) were recorded with "occasional nocturnal
enuresis" and all were passed fit to go to the reception areas: however. this sample is
too small to be representative of Sheffield evacuees as a whole." The subject was not
referred to in later reports on evacuation concerning Sheffield and no interviewees
mentioned the problem in regard to themselves.
Often, bed-wetting was rectified with time and patience, but for several months the
burden fell on foster parents. It was June 1940 before an extra laundry allowance of
3s.6d. weekly was made for householders dealing with persistent cases of enuresis." In
ss C Burt: "The Incidence of Neurotic Symptoms Among Evacuated School Children", British Journal of
Educational Psychology, Vol. X (1940), p.1O
S9 ibid., p.14
60 Sheffield Education Committee: Report of the School Medical Officer 1939, p.41
61 Titmuss: op. cit., p.125
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most cases foster parents were reasonable, but there were some cases where
householders sent the child home, or wrote to parents telling them to remove the child
without consulting the billeting officer.f Most problems were comparatively short-
lived as the remaining children settled down in their new surroundings. Health
improved, cleanliness was established and enuresis often proved to be a temporary
inconvenience. Nevertheless, for a few children the only answer was hostel
accommodation.
Titmuss found that a small minority of children deliberately fouled their billets, either
because they had been untrained or sometimes as a demonstration of despair and
unhappiness or rebellion against new regimes.f The National Federation of Women's
Institutes' report on evacuees from the East End of London stated:
"Some were simply crawling with lice, etc, and actually never
used a lavatory; the children simply sat down in the house
anywhere to relieve themselves and actually one woman always
sat the baby in the bed for this purpose."
The survey blamed some mothers for failing to train their children but considered that
bad habits reflected the conditions of home life.64 In crowded inner-city tenements
many families may have had to share one communal lavatory: these conditions may
have accounted for some of the perceived 'dirty habits'.
The problem of enuresis did recur in further evacuation programmes during the war, but
it was not accompanied by the rancour that it had aroused in 1939. There were several
reasons for this. Firstly, later movements did not involve the huge numbers or the speed
62 Education, No. 1928, 22.12.39, p.521
63 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.121-25
64 National Federation of Women's Institutes: op. cit., pp.15,16
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of removal which had been experienced in 1939 and which had rendered authorities
unable to inspect children before they left. Improved medical supervision and
examinations of children registered for future programmes enabled staff to identify the
condition, and the new system of labelling drew the attention of reception authorities to
potential problems as the children arrived. In addition, hostels were set up in 1940 so
that severely enuretic children were not sent to unsuspecting householders."
Poor sleeping habits were also a cause for complaint, with many reports of children
refusing to go to bed at reasonable hours, or to sleep in beds provided by hosts.
Leicestershire Director of Education quoted a case where an evacuee's mother
complained that the child's new bedtime was far too early, for at home he never went to
bed before to.30 p.m: she took him back to the evacuation area." It was said of
Manchester evacuees: "Some had never slept in beds.,,67 But it was not always
appreciated by country people that children of large families living in overcrowded city
tenements were often used to retiring very late and sharing beds with several siblings or
their parents.
Evacuation authorities and householders were in for a further shock when the pitiful
state of clothing of many evacuees was revealed. As children arrived in the reception
centres it was seen that large numbers of them were inadequately clad or shod: even
worse, some were in verminous and ragged garments. The outcry at the poor and filthy
state of some children's attire was reported countrywide in local and national
65 Titmuss: op. cit., p.125
66 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 13.10.39, p.5
67 National Federation of Women's Institutes: op. cit., p.3
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newspapers, many of which carried appeals for clothing and boots for needy evacuees.
Some parents were accused of expecting hosts to clothe their children.r" Ministry of
Health policy was that parents were responsible for providing footwear and clothing for
evacuated children, with voluntary help or poor law assistance only in needy cases.69
The failure of many parents to provide sufficient or suitable garments was a frequent
and continuing complaint of hosts throughout the war. It was one of the problems
investigated by the National Federation of Women's Institutes, whose results showed
that large numbers of children arrived in the reception areas ill-shod and very poorly
clad, and clothing was often sent dirty and in need of repair. In extreme cases evacuees
were sewn into their clothes which then had to be burned and replaced by foster parents.
A frequent observation was that many children's footwear was entirely unsuitable for
country life; while some were entirely without underwear or nightwear. One
householder said that her evacuees were so unused to night clothes that they simply put
them on over their everyday clothes."
London and Liverpool evacuees came in for most criticism, but there were similar
problems with children from other areas. From Lindsey, in Lincolnshire (a reception
area for Leeds), it was reported that many evacuees arrived in rags and some were
completely re-clothed by their hosts." Accounts sometimes differed on children from
the same district, however. One Women's Institute branch reported on Leeds evacuees:
68 Mass-Observation File 11
69 R Samways (ed): We Think You Ought to Go, p.IS
70 National Federation of Women's Institutes: op. cit., pp.7,8
71 Women's Group on Public Welfare: op. cit., p.S4
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"With very few exceptions, they were pitifully badly clothed.
Quite half the children came with very dirty and ragged clothes
and a quarter ofthem had no boots or shoes fit to wear."n
But another, relating to the same city, stated: "These children were well dressed and
perfectly clean but not accustomed to discipline.t'" Lindsey householders who had
earlier been so outspoken about their unwillingness to take in children from Sheffield
[see Chapter Two] may have regretted their comments as they came to realise that other
towns and cities also had their share of social problems.
Sheffield evacuees did not escape censure, though. In Nottinghamshire the first report
of the Chief Billeting Officer for the area south of the Trent criticised the poor and dirty
condition of some of the city's children.74 An Awsworth householder who was
interviewed remarked on the poor state of her evacuees' clothing on arrival. Although
their father later co-operated with her to provide for them, when one of his daughters
was chosen to be the local May Queen, it was the hosts who provided her outfit. 75
In Leicestershire there were also indications of problems over evacuees' attire. The
Loughborough & Shepshed Echo reported that many of the clothes of Sheffield children
had been unsatisfactory. Supplies of boots and clothing were requested from the city
and a scheme had been set up to send more garments from the evacuating area, while a
Children's Evacuation Fund had been established in Loughborough." The log book of
Shepshed Council Senior School recorded a conference arranged by the Leicestershire
72 National Federation of Women's Institutes: op. cit., p.7
73 ibid, p.ll
74 The Nottingham Evening Post: 10.10.39, p.6
75 Oral interview: Gladys Smith, 12.5.95
76 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 22.9.39, pA
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Director of Education with head teachers in the county to discuss problems of clothing
for the evacuee children who included some from Sheffield.77
The Sheffield Star, which had praised Sheffield evacuees for their spruce appearance as
they left home on I September.i" had within a month changed its tune, reporting that
many city children had arrived in their billets very poorly clad, and people in the
reception areas had rallied round to clothe them properly." Meanwhile, Sheffield
authorities had acted promptly to address the problem. The subject was discussed by
the city's Emergency Committee, when the Public Assistance Officer reported that he
had taken up with the Minister of Health the question of provision of boots and clothing
for evacuated children whose parents were in receipt of relief80 The Sheffield
Telegraph & Independent reported that leaders of all the city's evacuated schools were
asked to conduct a survey of the needs of individual needy children in the reception
areas and welfare officers visited parents to encourage them to equip their children
properly. Most responded positively, but in other cases the Sheffield Clothing Guild
sent garments and footwear to foster parents. The Chief Education Officer was at pains
to point out that parents' financial circumstances were investigated before their children
received free donations of this kind, however." Documents examined at Brookside
School (formerly East Leake Primary School) show that this Guild was still helping
needy Sheffield evacuees in 1943and 1944.82
77 Log book: Shepshed Council Senior School, entry 18.3.40
78 The Sheffield Star: 1.9.39, p.l
79 ibid., 28.9.39, p.5
80 Sheffield Archives Files CA 157/2(a) & (b); CA 157/4, Minute 250
81 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 29.9.39, p.5
82 Nottinghamshire County Council letters to Head Teachers, 25.8.43, 26.8.44, East Leake School papers
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The clothes of some children were, indeed, in a deplorable condition and presented
serious problems for many householders. Some dug into their own pockets to dress the
children, while others bought clothing and then asked for reimbursement from parents.
But not all householders were willing to do this and children could be left feeling guilty
at their parents' neglect or inability to provide." However, as Titmuss pointed out,
country householders who took in the children were often ignorant of the poverty which
produced this state of affairs. Many mothers in poor, inner-city areas had long been
forced to use clothing clubs to equip their families and did not realise that cheap and
shoddy clothes which had been adequate for town wear would be entirely unsuitable for
the country, particularly in the oncoming winter." Le Gros Clark and Toms held that
most families had tried their best to follow instructions and patched and washed their
children's 'best' which was often their 'only' .85
Some evacuating authorities had evidently been unaware of the full extent of
deprivation until rehearsals for the exodus were under way. Then, Newcastle-upon-
Tyne officials estimated 21% of its children registering for evacuation had insufficient
clothing and 13% had inadequate footwear, while Manchester reported about 20% of
evacuees arriving in plimsolls." But, whereas local education authorities in Scotland
already had power to provide boots and clothing for the poorest children during the
inter-war years, in England and Wales no such authority existed until a few days before
evacuation began." This factor, no doubt, accounted for many complaints levelled at
83 J S Clarke: "Family Life" in Padley & Cole: op. cit., p.160
84 Titmuss: op. cit., p.116
8~ F Le Gros Clark & R W Toms: Evacuation: Failure or Reform, p.4
86 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.II5, 117
87 ibid., p.l l S
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evacuees by those in the reception areas, for the covert allocation of £1 for every two
hundred necessitous children awarded by the Treasury at the eleventh hour'" had come
too late for some of the most needy. In any case, the paltry amount eventually granted
was woefully inadequate: Liverpool, for instance, spent more than five times its £502
allowance and even then its children were among the most severely criticised for their
abysmal standard of dress.89
In November the Ministry of Health was forced to respond to public demand by
providing some financial relief, either to issue essential clothing to needy children or to
the parents so that they might supply their children with the necessary items.90 A sum
of £15,000 was distributed to Directors of Education to enable them to deal with
'necessitous cases' but, as with the August allowance of £1 per two hundred children,
the award was not to be made public." In April 1940 Sheffield Education Committee
passed a resolution urging the government to make provision within the official
evacuation scheme empowering local education authorities to supply clothing to
necessitous children and to pass on the charge to the Exchequer" and by the time the
'Trickle' evacuation was under way the government had increased the clothing
allocation to £1 per year per thirty evacuated children," as will be seen in Chapter Six.
Another widespread complaint about evacuee children concerned their eating habits.
The Women's Institutes Survey found that, whereas opinions sometimes differed with
88 T' . 92itmuss: op. ctt., p.
89 Education No. 1916,29.9.39, p.283; also Titmuss: op. cit., p.119, n.l
90 MoH Circular 19077.11.39 inEducation: No. 1925, 1.12.39, p.465
91 Titmuss: op. cit., p.120
92 Sheffield Education Committee: Report 1939140, p.544
93 Titmuss: op. cit., p.375, n.2
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regard to other matters, on the matter of food there was universal agreement among
householders:
"Wherever diet is mentioned it is in identical terms. The
children are used to being fed on bread and margarine, fish and
chips, tinned food and sweets. This comment is not confined to
areas with very poor housing conditions.,,94
Mass-Observation diarists, also, noted frequent complaints from hosts that evacuees
were quite unaccustomed to using cutlery and sitting down at a table to hot meals,
preferring instead to have a packet of chips or hunk of bread in their hand on the
doorstep. Some foster mothers reported that their evacuees would only eat bread and
lard, and refused more wholesome food." Several stories exist (some no doubt
apocryphal) of children requesting beer and chips for their supper."
A much more vexed question was the conduct of evacuees. When the government
evacuation scheme was being drawn up, it was based on the theory that almost all
evacuees would be housed with families in private homes. True, officials had
anticipated some minor behavioural problems at the beginning, but confidently
expected householders to have little trouble in controlling the vast majority of children
and preserving reasonable discipline in the home." A limited number of hostels were
set up to deal with an expected "small proportion of children" whose care and
supervision might place an undue burden on ordinary householders."
94 National Federation of Women's Institutes: op. cit., p.4
9S Mass-Observation File 11
96 egoA Marwick: The Home Front, p.27; National Federation of Women's Institutes: op. cit., p.5
97 Dent: op. cit., p.5
98 The Health of the School Child, op. cit., p.64
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Most children did settle down without senous problems. However, behavioural
difficulties with evacuees proved to be much greater than expected and many more
hostel places were needed than were available. The problem was that it was not until
the children were deposited in billets that householders found they could not cope with
some of them. The Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Education held that the
great majority of children who were found to be troublesome after arrival had given no
indication previously that they were difficult. 99 This was disputed by both the Bradford
enquiry'l" and by Leslie, who (unsympathetically) opined that those children who were
difficult in reception areas were most likely to be difficult at home and were likely to be
"neglected brats". 101
It cannot be denied that many householders had genuine cause for complaint, but some
accounts were embellished and sensationalised, especially where an excuse was wanted
to avoid taking in evacuees or to have them removed. The adverse publicity caused the
behaviour and condition of all evacuees to be under constant scrutiny, with small
transgressions often magnified out of all proportion to their seriousness.l'" Bradford's
enquiry into complaints about its children embraced all the agencies involved in
evacuation - billeting officers, receiving householders, schools, parents and the children
themselves. The Chief Education Officer explained:
"This five-fold approach was found to be necessary because of
the unreliability of accounts of evacuees' behaviour. This
unreliability was in some cases found to consist not only of
gross exaggeration but also of complete falsity of facts. ,,103
99 The Health of the School Child, op. cit., p.65
100 Education, No. 1928, 22.12.39, p.521
101 I M Leslie: "Some Problems of a Hostel in a Reception Area", Social Work, (July 1940), p.307
102 D . 13ent: op. cit., p.
103 Education, No. 1928,22.12.39, p.521
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The Report of Sheffield's School Medical Officer confirmed this view and implicitly
criticised some householders:
"It must be pointed out that the psychological disturbance
caused in some of the children transferred to the country, under
such emotional conditions, seem to have affected also a certain
number of the recipients of the evacuees.?'?'
Nevertheless, reception authorities reported a sharp Increase In juvenile cnme,
particularly in theft from shops and stores, which was publicly connected with
evacuees. Burt challenged the theory that evacuation itself was to blame: he held that in
most cases petty crime was committed by children already known to steal before they
were evacuated. He attributed much of the problem to the fact that country shopkeepers
were unused to "predatory tricks of city youngsters" and to new opportunities for
mischief afforded by the move to a new environment. lOS The Bradford investigators
considered that much of the pilfering and bad behaviour was caused by unhappiness,
but also found a considerable amount of robbing from orchards and other trees occurred
in the early weeks of evacuation by children unused to country living.l'" A Sheffield
evacuee explained:
"We had never seen anything growing on trees before, other
than leaves, but the Rector had conker trees in the Rectory
d d . th ,,107gar en an we went In to get em.
Another said many children used to go 'scrumping' apples when the fruit was ripe.108
104 Sheffield Education Committee: Report oj the School Medical Officer 1939, p.4l
1O~ C Burt: "The Incidence of Neurotic Symptoms Among Evacuated School Children", op. cit., pp.B,11
lOO Education, No. 1928,22.12.39, p.521
107 Oral interview: Elaine Piotrowicz, 21.3.95
108 Oral interview: Jean Perry, 4.9.96
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At first Sheffield newspapers carried only upbeat, if ambiguous, reports on evacuees
"somewhere in Leicestershire":
"The village policeman said he had much more work in the past
fortnight. He said, however, that the children from Sheffield
were better behaved than those living in the village. ,,109
But, although Sheffield reporters were apparently loath to admit that the city's children
may have given trouble in the reception areas, it is clear that some did. Examination of
the punishment book at East Leake Junior School, for instance, (where the school
population swelled overnight by 35% when fifty-one Sheffield children joined the
school)! 10 showed that three of the city's evacuees were mentioned several times. Two
were punished for stealing apples within the first days of arrival at the school and one
was caned for bad behaviour no less than eight times in his first year in the reception
area.. All these boys appear to have settled down eventually: at any rate, their names
did not appear in the book after October 1940, although they all remained in the area
until at least 1942.1JJ
'Scrumping' fruit was one thing. Maladjustment and crime were more serious, and it
was soon clear that a number of children were unsuitable for billeting in private homes
and would need specialised care in institutions. It has been seen in Chapter One that
the government had been reluctant to approve the provision of hostels, for private
homes were a much cheaper option; and although funding for fifty institutions was
eventually granted in May 1939 very few had been completed by the outbreak of war. !!2
109 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 18.9.39, p.5
110 Miscellaneous papers: Brookside Primary School (formerly East Leake Council SChool)
III East Leake Council School Punishment Book
112 T· . 36itmuss: op. cit., p.
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It was not until a further wave of evacuation was envisaged, amid fears of failure in
view of the first experience, that funding for the project on any significant scale was
approved in May 1940.113 The appointment of regional welfare officers was sanctioned
the following month, when an expansion in the number of hostels followed.i"
The problem was that in the rush to provide more hostels, and in the absence of
sufficient qualified statT to run them initially, children deemed unbilletable for a
number of varying reasons tended to be lumped together.!" It was not until January
1941 that the Shakespeare Report on Conditions in the Reception Areas was published,
identifying the need to separate children who were unclean or sutTeringfrom short-term
illnesses from those with more severe difficulties, including maladjustment, mental and
physical handicaps, 116 as will be seen in Chapter Six.
Even where behavioural problems were not severe, reports about the children were
often critical. The initial goodwill and altruistic intentions of many hosts at the outset
gave way, as the 'phoney war' dragged on into months, to irritation and intolerance as
the evacuees stayed longer than expected while no danger appeared imminent. Some
host families began to feel that advantage was being taken of their hospitality, and a
frequent complaint was of the lack of gratitude or appreciation shown by evacuees
whose arrival had greatly disrupted country life. But the headmaster of an evacuated
school took a more balanced view, reporting that evacuation had had considerable
success despite examples of ingratitude on the part of some evacuees on the one hand,
113 T' . 380rtrnuss: op. cit., p.
114 G A N Lowndes: The Silent Revolution, p.216
115 T' . 380itmuss: op. cit., p.
116 PRO.HLG.7/85 Shakespeare Report, p7
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and obstruction, incompetence and delay on the part of some officials and householders
in the reception area on the other.1I7
Varying reports on Sheffield evacuees were received. Some householders complained
that evacuated children lacked all social graces and one foster mother protested that
although her three evacuees from the city were clean and friendly, they were yet
completely lacking any co-operation, responsibility and pleasant manners although they
were not "from the poorest and most depressing slums" but their parents were "decent
and well paid working people".118 But Sheffield children were defended by the Rector
of Linby-cum-Papplewick in Nottinghamshire, who nevertheless recognised there had
been problems in other areas:
"The children sent to Linby and Papplewick are a very nice
collection - I should say the best of that city. We have not much
to complain of as in other places."!"
A Women's Institute report upon Sheffield evacuees was also complimentary:
"They appreciated everything that was done for them. Mix very
well with village children and have behaved well, no reports of
damage or theft.,,120
It is clear from press reports in reception areas that dissatisfaction there was not far
below the surface almost from the beginning. Only ten days after the first exodus,
members of Basford Rural District Council (where many Sheffield evacuees were
received) discussed the suggestion that rural areas had been exploited. A councillor
advocated that if more evacuees were sent, they should be allocated to the suburbs of
117 Mitcham County School for Boys: Minutes of Governors' Meetings 1939-1942
118 The Hallamshire Teacher, Vol. 51152, p.IS
119 The Hucknall Dispatch: 5.10.39, p.5
120 National Federation of Women's Institutes: op. cit., p.ll
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urban areas where there were younger people who could look after the evacuees better
than old people in the country.!"
In the evacuation areas, however, local newspapers continued for several weeks to print
upbeat reports about the success of billeting. In November The Sheffield Telegraph &
Independent praised householders in the city's reception areas, the majority of whom, it
was said, accepted the situation as their patriotic duty, and were forging friendships
which would never be broken.122 Yet the next day the same newspaper implicitly
accepted all was not well with some foster parents when it carried a suggestion that
householders could pair up to share the care of evacuees month by month.123 It is not
known if this proposal was taken up, but one might venture to suggest that it was a
proposal hardly suitable for already insecure children.
In a movement of such huge proportions as Operation 'Pied Piper' it was inevitable that
some mistakes would be made in placements: for instance, The Nottingham Evening
Post reported that an ageing bachelor, living with his equally elderly sister and a cook,
was allocated eight unaccompanied children.124 Angus Calder asserted that billeting
officers were 'bombarded' throughout the early part of the first evacuation scheme by
householders demanding that their evacuees should be removed and quoted the case of
Maidenhead, where re-billeting averaged 750 transfers in the first three months.l"
Undoubtedly some billeting breakdowns could have been avoided if more officials
121 The Nottingham Evening Post: 12.9.39, p.S
122 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 17.11.39, p.4
123 ibid., 18.11.39, p.5
124 The Nottingham Evening Post: 14.9.39, p.4
us A Calder: The Myth of the Blitz, p.60
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trained in social work had been available for the work of billeting from the outset, for
prompt attention could have avoided serious friction in many cases.
Inevitably, some Sheffield children suffered from errors in billeting, too. The
headmaster of Sharrow Lane School, while praising officials in the Loughborough
reception area for their carefully-made plans which had been rapidly and efficiently
carried out, acknowledged that there had been some misfits in initial arrangements:
"Some of the evacuees were not quite happy in their billets and
some of the Loughborough citizens found themselves unable to
retain the evacuees who had been billeted with them." 126
Harrisson considered the hostility of householders was directed against all evacuees in
1939 regardless of religion or race,127but it is evident that these were factors in some
mismatches in billeting. Jackson averred that there was no reference to either subject
on evacuation registration forms, because architects of the scheme believed there would
be no time to consider individual requirements in an emergency.!" However, the fact
that Non-conformist Welsh hosts tended to be unfamiliar with the needs of the many
Roman Catholics destined for the area, while Jewish customs were often entirely
unknown to Gentiles in rural reception areas, should have flagged up the possibility of
problems.
When country districts of Protestant Wales were swamped by Liverpool Catholic
children with nowhere to worship and often no teachers nearby, foster parents did not
always appreciate that spiritual health was more important than physical safety in the
126 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 13.9.39, p.4
127 Mass-Observation File 483, p.9
128 C Jackson: Who Will Take Our Children?, p.23
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eyes of the church. One Catholic priest, calling upon parents to bring their children
home from a reception area, warned that any physical danger they might incur thereby
was trifling when compared with the spiritual dangers they ran by remaining.l"
It was difficult for rural villagers to avoid noticing an influx of Jewish evacuees, as in
the case of Chatteris, Cambridgeshire, whose population of five thousand was swelled
in a day by seven hundred evacuees, 85% of whom were Jewish East End children.i"
Grunfeld described the attitude towards Jews in some reception areas:
"There was a strong element of fear and prejudice, nourished by
ignorance and superstition and mixed with the usual portion of
the traditional dislike of the unlike."J3J
For some children, the exodus of September 1939 was not their first evacuation, but the
second. Jewish children, who had come to England as refugees from Nazi oppression
after the Czech crisis only a year before, were moved again.132 Ironically, in the
atmosphere of suspicion created by war conditions, some of these children were
shunned or detested for their foreignness or for speaking German, their mother
tongue. J33 However, one evacuee asserted: "It was not that we were Germans and it
was not that we were Jewish. It was that we came from London."!" In other words, the
animosity was simply due to the fact that they were evacuees. Mass-Observation also
noted that in some areas the term "Jew" was used synonymously with "evacuee".135
129 S Herbert "Rural Wales" in Padley & Cole: op. cit., p.237
130 T Kushner: The Persistence of Prejudice, pp.67-70
I3I J Grunfeld: Shefford: The Story of a Jewish School Community in Evacuation, /939-1945, p.3
132 C L Mowat: Britain Between the Wars 1918-1940, p.615
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Ignorance on the part of hosts led to considerable problems for some children, isolated
from their religious leaders and friends, especially Jewish evacuees. Food was a
particular problem, and sometimes the only way for them to become acceptable to their
foster families was to abandon their religious rituals and adopt the local customs.!" but
some problems were solved by the drift back to the cities. Some Gentile foster parents
actively encouraged the children's different religious beliefs. Chaim Bennett, a Latvian
Jewish refugee, settled happily with two Gentile Englishwomen who took care of his
dietary requirements and were sensitive to his religion. However, when he told his
parents of his foster family's preparations for their own Christmas, he was quickly
removed by his angry father.!"
Baumel found no evidence of any kind of preparation for those householders who took
in evacuees of different faiths, although some printed information sheets were
distributed to Jewish teachers and leaders regarding essential dietary requirements after
they were evacuated. The subject received little press attention, but a radio broadcast
by the Chief Rabbi on 3 September 1939 implied that problems had arisen early, for
Jews were advised: "[ ... ] in a national emergency such as the present, all that IS
required is to refrain from eating forbidden meats and shell fish."J38
No specific problems concerning religion or race came to light during research on
Sheffield evacuees: in fact, a local newspaper optimistically suggested that evacuation
was breaking down denominational barriers when it reported that some Church of
136 T Kushner: The Persistence of Prejudice, p.70
137 The Daily Telegraph: 14.12.96, p.lO
138 Baumel: op. cit., p.177
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England children were attending a Baptist Sunday School in a Leicestershire reception
area.':" One Methodist interviewee, evacuated from Sheffield to an Anglican billet in
Nottinghamshire, related how she successfully negotiated the religious diversity:
"In the mornings I went with the housekeeper to Chapel in
Hucknall. Then I used to go to Church in Linby with Miss Gray
in the evenings.,,140
Some Roman Catholic school parties from the city were matched with schools of the
same denomination in reception areas, but not all: examination of Leicestershire
attendance records of evacuated school parties showed that St Catherine's and St
Charles' Catholic schools were split up between three different schools in
Leicestershire, none of them Roman Catholic.l" No reference to Jewish evacuees from
the city has been found.
Many problems which arose in billets were less attributable to misunderstandings about
religion and race than to differences in social class. It has been seen in Chapter One
that householders of all classes were unwilling from the very beginning to open their
homes to potential evacuees from industrial towns and cities, and the previous chapter
showed how members of the 'gentry' who did accept their obligations were often
assigned the best-dressed children. It was often (and conveniently) contended that
working-class evacuees were more likely to settle with hosts of their own class, and a
teacher confirmed that this view was held in her reception area:
"The upper half of the village wish to take the best evacuees, for
apparently cottage folk 'do not mind'. On the other hand, most
139 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 20.11.39, p.6
140 Oral interview: Dorothy Knowles, 21.3.95
141 Leicestershire Record Office: File DE 2144/269
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children from 'ordinary homes' seem happier with the humble
people of the village - they describe it as more like home.,,142
Opinions voiced by community leaders in Lincolnshire expecting Sheffield's refugees
had demonstrated their pre-conceived fears of the urban lower classes, as mentioned in
the first chapter. Few other references have been found to problems of class
specifically concerning the city, but a Leicestershire teacher who received Sheffield
evacuees intimated that there had been some difficulties in this regard:
"The people who arranged where they were to go did not study
the types of people and that caused problems. Ordinary people
were put in with upper middle-class homes and it was a problem
for both sides. Neither side felt comfortable with the other.,,143
Throughout evacuation there were complaints in reception areas that working-class
householders had to bear the brunt of billeting while the middle classes and wealthier
country people were allowed to dodge their responsibilities. The last chapter has shown
some of the difficulties of billeting officers who were often reluctant to offend
neighbours and local dignitaries, and took the easier path of depositing evacuees with
poorer villagers with already cramped accommodation. Harold Nicolson tacitly
acknowledged this when he wrote in his diary only two weeks after evacuation that the
condition of many of the children "horrifies the cottagers upon whom they have been
billeted" but made no mention of any shock felt by the middle classes.!"
Billeting officers undoubtedly had a difficult job to do, and were not helped by the fact
that at the beginning of evacuation they were mostly untrained volunteers. They were
142 St Loe Strachey: op. cit., p.47
143 Oral interview: Violet Hutchinson, 6.9.96
144 N Nicolson (ed): Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters 1939-1945, p.33
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often unpopular, and in cases where there was no-one from the evacuation areas to keep
an eye on recalcitrant children, they were the ones who mediated between evacuees and
foster parents and who fielded complaints about anything from bed-wetting or bad
behaviour to parental visits or their failure to provide clothing or, later in the war,
coupons for their children. 145
The Ministry of Health stipulated that billeting officers should visit all evacuees in their
billets to satisfy themselves that all was well, but no guidance was given on the
regularity of supervision and it was not until in March 1941 that local authorities were
advised that visits should be made monthly.!" However, it is evident that not all
billeting officers were conscientious in overseeing their evacuees: one ex-evacuee
hardly ever saw hers,147and another, who was billeted with a shopkeeper, remembered:
"The regular visit of the billeting officer was a bit of a farce.
She would pull up outside the shop, then one of my foster-
parents would invariably go out to the door and the billeting
officer would call out 'Is he being a good boy?' When they
replied that I was, she wound up the window and drove away.
No-one asked me how I felt.,,148
It was also the remit of the billeting officer to find alternative homes for evacuees
whose hosts either could not or would not continue to look after them. One apparently
found an innovative way of dealing with some unaccompanied child evacuees, as
Liberal Member of Parliament Sir Percy Harris told the Commons:
"One billeting officer in a village asked the children to go home.
They did not go, so he put three or four on a coach and sent
them off to Kings Cross in charge of the conductor."
145 "T EL": "The Second Evacuation", Social Work, Vol. 3, No.5, p.122
146 Ministry of Health Circulars No 1857,27.8.39; No 2307, 14.3.41, in Titmuss: op. cit., pp.390,391
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Their headmaster was not aware that they had left until days later, and it was a week
before he was informed that they had arrived home safely.149 Refusal to accept
evacuees was an offence punishable by law, but in practice few prosecutions were
brought, and fines were nominal. Some offenders were local dignitaries: in Blackpool,
for example, a local magistrate was fined £5 for refusing to take in evacuees. ISO
There were undoubtedly cases where children and foster parents were incompatible,
and conversations with ex-evacuees suggested that older children seemed more difficult
to settle in private homes than younger children. One Sheffield interviewee, evacuated
with his twin brother to Loughborough, was moved on after a month while his brother
remained in the billet. He thought the foster parents had taken on too much with two
twelve-year-old boys:
"I got naughty and they reported me. The billeting officer came
and told me frankly that they didn't want me. I was sorry to
leave my brother, but if they hadn't reported me I would have
wanted to go home because I wasn't happy there."l5l
In the event, his next placement was very successful and he stayed there until he left
school two years later. Another ex-evacuee, aged fifteen when he left home, had
several changes of billet which he thought were caused by misdemeanours, such as
smoking.152 But Isaacs quoted a boy who was asked why he had left his billets and
replied: "They said I ate too much.,,153Moreover, acceptance of children seemed, in
some cases at least, to be conditional upon good behaviour, as one host's letter to a new
149 HoC. Deb. 2.11.39, Vol. 352, cols. 2172-74; Education, No. 1923, 17.11.39, p.421
ISO PRO.ED.1 0/251
lSI Oral interview: George Shelley, 12.8.96
IS2 Oral interview: John Patterson, 18.8.92
IS3 I . 89saacs: op. cn., p.
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evacuee's parents illustrated: "I feel sure he is a good boy, and ifhe is, I can assure you
we will do all in our power to make him comfortable.t'P'
Many children were parted from siblings when billeted and several interviewees
regretted this. Although efforts were generally made to keep families within the same
village or town, they were sometimes separated by considerable distances.
Understanding foster parents sometimes made arrangements for brothers and sisters to
meet regularly, however. One interviewee and her sister remained closely in touch
despite being billeted several streets away,ISS but another, evacuated with two brothers
from a Sheffield orphanage to a Lancashire residential school, hardly saw the older boy
because fraternising was not encouraged.l" Some children were able to meet with
other family members at school, but where differing age groups were involved and
children attended different schools it was often difficult to keep in touch. Others found
that members of their families were billeted in different social environments. When
one twin was separated from his brother, he was fostered by the prosperous owners of a
sweet factory, while his sibling remained with a small pawnbroker and they were only
able to meet occasionally in a park after school.157
There was some resentment in reception areas that parents were not required to pay
anything towards the upkeep of their children for several weeks after their children had
left their homes in the evacuation districts. When parental contributions were
introduced on 28 October 1939, the amount demanded did not cover the full billeting
IS4 Ernest Joy to C Goring (undated letter): Imperial War Museum, Evacuees' Exhibition October 1996
ISS Oral interview: Iris Howard, 4.9.96
IS6 Oral interview: Alfred Knowles, 20.10.92
m Oral interview: George Shelley, 12.8.96
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allowance paid by the government to householders, for officials took into consideration
the fact that children's absence from home did not markedly affect the overhead costs
of housekeeping when rent, electricity and other bills still had to be paid. The rate was
means-tested and ranged up to six shillings per child per week. Parents who were
unemployed, receiving public assistance or on very low wages were not required to pay
anything. Those considerably better-off were invited to pay more than the statutory
rate, up to nine shillings per child, although it was estimated that only 2% actually
contributed this amount.P"
Some parents unofficially subsidised the billeting allowance directly to foster parents,
but it is evident that others tried to avoid paying anything at all. In July 1940 twenty-
nine Sheffield parents were summoned for being in arrears with billeting contributions
for their evacuated children.V" The problem clearly persisted throughout the war, for a
meeting of the Emergency Committee for Civil Defence on 20 October 1944 heard that
there were still fifty-eight cases concerning evacuees from the city where all reasonable
steps had failed to recover arrears of billeting allowances and an amount of £412.15s. 9d
was written Off.160 It is evident that the refusal of parents to accept their financial
responsibilities riled some householders in the reception areas. The impact upon the
success of the evacuation scheme of the government's demand for parental
contributions will be examined in the next chapter.
IS8 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.156, 160
159 The Sheffield Star: 28.7.40, p.5
lOO Sheffield Archives File CA 157/7
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The Government billeting allowances to foster parents were a continual source of
contention throughout the war. The original allowance took no account of the age of
the evacuees, even though big boys were clearly more expensive to feed than small
girls. In addition, the cost of living rose sharply in the early months of the war, yet it
was not until June 1940 that the amount payable for older children was finally increased
in an effort to improve the poor response of householders to requests for billets for the
proposed 'Trickle' evacuation.'?' In March 1942 the rate rose marginally for older
children once more, but that for younger children remained static for almost five years.
It was not until July 1944 that an extra shilling was finally wrung from the Treasury
which covered all age groups. The table below, constructed from figures supplied by
Titmuss, illustrates the changes in rates throughout the war.162
Billeting Allowances for Unaccompanied Children 1939-1945
Age 1.9.39 1.6.40 23.3.42 25.5.44
5-10 years 10s.6d.* 10s.6d* 10s.6d. l1s.6d.
10-11 years 10s.6d.* IOs.6d. 10s.6d. lls.6d.
11-12 years lOs.6d.* IOs.6d. Us.Od. 12s.0d.
12-14 years IOs.6d.* IOs.6d. 12s.0d. 13s.0d.
14-16 years 10s.6d.* 12s.6d. 13s.0d. 14s.0d.
16-17 years lOs.6d.* 15s.0d. 15s.6d. 16s.6d.
Over 17 years lOs.6d.* 15s.0d. 16s.6d. 17s.6d.
*lOs.6d. where one child was taken; 8s.6d. for each child where more than one child was taken.
161 T' . 164rtmuss: op. cit., p.
162 Figures taken from Titmuss: op. cit., pp.161,163, 397( nn.2,3)
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Mass-Observation found that, while middle-class hosts found it hard to keep up their
normal standard of living on the billeting allowance, particularly in the first months of
evacuation, poorer hosts were often more satisfied with the amount. 163 Surprising as it
may seem, only two weeks after the first evacuation began, some newspaper headlines
were even expressing concern about householders profiteering from evacuees.l'"
There was also speculation in some quarters that hosts were taking evacuees for the
money and then neglecting them, and a former evacuee from Sheffield confirmed her
experience of this:
"My foster mother had a cousin [who] took in three families of
children and let them live in the back part of the house. The
front part of the house where he lived with his wife was
beautifully furnished [... ] but where the children lived it was
really bare. [ ... ] The children did all the household jobs except
the cooking.,,)65
Complaints about evacuees soon extended to their parents remaining in the evacuation
areas. Although members of the WVS and Women's Institutes often arranged to use
village halls as meeting places for families.l'" national and local newspapers reported
parents descending upon their children's country billets, often regarding the visit as a
day out for themselves and expecting to be fed and entertained at the host's expense, or
spending their time drinking in public houses.
The accusations mainly referred to parents whose children had been evacuated within a
reasonably short distance from home and who could afford to visit them. In mid-
163 Mass-Observation File 11
164 Weston-super-Mare Gazette, 16.9.39, p.I
16S D Lacy: Recollections of Evacuation, taped conversation, courtesy of J Jones, Sheffield Hallam
University
166 N Longmate: How We Lived Then, p.53
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November 1939 cheap fares were sanctioned for parents to make monthly Sunday rail
journeys of less than 160 miles except at Christmas and holiday periods, but it was not
until 1941 that railway tickets at reduced rates were made available for longer journeys.
Many children who were billeted in distant reception areas therefore received few visits
or none at all for almost two years.167
It is clear that some Sheffield parents were guilty of abusing country householders'
hospitality, for criticisms began in Leicestershire soon after the children's arrival. By
the end of September 1939 the Chief Billeting Officer for the county reported that
parents were causing much embarrassment.
"In many cases, parents had visited Shepshed, had two meals
with the foster parents and caused a lot of inconvenience and
very seldom paid for what they ate!,,168
A week later another host complained that when five people arrived just before lunch to
visit his evacuee he told them it was not fair to expect a meal, but they replied that there
were no cafes open and he felt obliged to do what he could.169 It was a similar story in
Nottinghamshire reception areas for city evacuees, where Southwell's evacuation
officer advised local householders that they should charge for meals served to evacuees'
., 170VISitors.
Some householders did not seem to mind the imposition, however, and were even
indulgent about parents' visits. A Nottinghamshire foster parent who was interviewed
167 Titmuss: op. cit., p.178, n.l
168 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo, 29.9.39, p.8
169 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 2.10.39, p.S
170 The Newark Advertiser: 4.10.39, p.6
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had willingly provided her evacuee's father with hot meals on his regular visits to his
daughter. She did not seem to mind his behaviour at all when she said:
"Her dad came to visit her more than her mother. [... ] He'd
have his dinner here, go for a drink, have a rest and then his tea
and catch the train home to Sheffield.,,171
Not all Sheffield parents were inconsiderate, of course, and one mother who wrote to
the editor of The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent, signing herself "Humiliated", was
clearly aggrieved at the plethora of adverse reports in the press. While it was natural for
parents to want to see their children, she commented:
"But it would be a nice change if someone would say a kind
word in favour of the considerate parent [... ]. All the sympathy
seems to be for the hostess and none for the parent."172
A few parents were guilty of more than thoughtlessness. Less than three weeks after
evacuation, a Sheffield man was fined £10 (a considerable sum of money) for assault
while on a visit to his family who were billeted with the Chairman of Loughborough's
Magistrates. Having been invited to stay overnight at Prestwold Hall, he then became
drunk and disorderly and assaulted police who had been called to evict him. He was
also ordered to leave the town forthwith. It was stated in his defence that he had
become depressed through not eating proper meals in his wife's absence.!"
Some parents did not visit their children at all, for varying reasons: for instance, some
felt intimidated by their children's new environment, and this could lead to a sense of
alienation in both parent and child. One Sheffield interviewee was billeted in
171 Oral interview: Gladys Smith, 12.5.95
172 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 4.10.39, p.4
173 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 22.9.39, p.3
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Famsfield, Nottinghamshire, with a childless, middle-aged couple who were more
affluent than her parents and led a different life-style. She recalled:
"My parents didn't visit at all: they were too poor. I wrote home
every week and I remember chewing my pencil and saying
'What can I say now?' ,,174
Foster parents were not above reproach, either, and occasional incidences of violence
towards evacuees were published in the press throughout the war. Sheffield newspapers
carried some reports of cruelty in areas which had received city evacuees, though none
was specifically linked to Sheffield children. Sometimes these cases seemed to be dealt
with comparatively leniently. In Nottinghamshire a blacksmith was found guilty of
severely assaulting a seven-year-old evacuee, causing him two black eyes, punching and
banging his head on the ground: the magistrate said he had had considerable
provocation and fined him £2 with £l.ls. costS.175 When a three-year-old evacuee was
beaten with a brush, severely bruised and rendered unable to walk, the foster parents
were found guilty but not fined: instead they were ordered to pay £2.17s court costs. 176
Less violent, but nonetheless cruel incidents, occurred too. An interviewee who was
evacuated from Sheffield to Shepshed with three siblings, reported:
"My brother used to be shoved into the coal hole with the door
slammed shut. I remember other things too: there were a lot of
things that happened to me.,,177
174 Oral interview: Patricia Gamble, 12.3.96
175 The Nottingham Evening Post: 12.10.39, p.6
176 ibid., 29.12.39, p.8
177 Oral interview: Amy Saddington, 4.9.96
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But she did not elaborate on this information. Another evacuee was frequently beaten
for such minor offences as a hole in her sock throughout the four and a half years she
spent in one billet. 178
Some evacuees endured a harsh existence in institutions. An interviewee who was
evacuated at eight years old from a Sheffield orphanage to a Roman Catholic boarding
school for boys in Preston for four years, said of his experience:
"I can't remember any good times. Life was very hard and we
didn't get much food. A yard-man kept discipline. [ ... ] He hit
the children with the chair leg, and 1got twelve on each hand
often. ,,179
Some billets were unsuitable in other ways, as one Sheffield interviewee illustrated.
Evacuated to Loughborough with Firs Hill School where her aunt was headmistress, she
was separated from her brother and initially billeted with an eccentric old woman.
"There was only the elderly lady and myself and we slept in the
same bed together with the monkey. Everywhere we went the
monkey went too, on a chain, and 1was allowed to sit and nurse
it if 1was good. There was no bathroom and no hot water.,,180
After a short time her aunt, hitherto occupied with the problems of more than a hundred
evacuees, heard that her niece, previously kept spotlessly clean and well cared for, was
filthy, verminous and running wild and the child was re-billeted with a young couple in
a modem house. No-one believed her when she said she had slept with the monkey.
Many evacuees did not suffer overt cruelty, unkindness, or thoughtlessness but were
nevertheless not easily accepted into the local community. One Sheffield evacuee
178 Personal experience of writer
179 Oral interview: Alfred Knowles, 20.10.92
180 Oral interview: Pamela Denniff, 16.9.94
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wrote of her Leicestershire reception area: "The people are very kind but blame the
wrong doings on to Sheffield children.,,181 Another commented: "The local children
didn't like us: we were labelled as evacuees always.,,182 Several other interviewees
confirmed this view and it was also borne out by a local resident in a Nottinghamshire
village which received Sheffield children, who admitted: "Yes, we did gang up on the
evacuees - well they were incomers, weren't they?,,183
Cultural differences between town and country were difficult to overcome, and
integration of evacuees into some rural communities was often a very long process,
occasionally never achieved. Even private evacuees suffered discrimination, as one
interviewee from Sheffield showed: "They didn't like us: any excuse they would take to
slight you. You were labelled really." Still living in the same Leicestershire area fifty
years later, she went on: "I've been here all these years and yet we're always pointed
out as evacuees and not Shepshed people."I84 On the other hand, residents often saw
things differently, as a teacher from that area demonstrated in interview: "The Sheffield
children got on all right with the local children - well, children do really, don't they?,,185
There were difficulties for local people too, however, as the same resident teacher
explained: "It was only a small village at the time, and the large number of evacuees
made a huge impact. It was a bit of a shock.,,186 Only 236 of the expected number of
1,600 arrived here, whichrr""'plsthequestion of how local inhabitants could have been
181 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 10.11.39, p.6
182 Oral interview: Amy Saddington, 4.9.96
183 Oral interview: Ellen Baldry, 16.7.97
184 Oral interview: Mary Mabe, 4.9.96
18S Oral interview: Violet Hutchinson, 6.9.96
186 ibid
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expected to have coped with a full quota. The mere presence of large numbers of
evacuees in small villages could cause problems of all kinds to residents, and one of the
greatest - the effects on education - will be dealt with in the next chapter.
It has been demonstrated that the first evacuation programme, although hailed as an
outstanding success in terms of its speedy and safe execution, nevertheless brought with
it many unforeseen difficulties once the refugees arrived in the reception areas. Some
of those problems have been covered in this chapter, and others - concerning the
unofficial movement from urban to rural areas, the effects of evacuation on education,
and the drift back to the danger areas, all of which further threatened the success of the
government scheme - will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Many householders had viewed their task of billeting as an unpleasant necessity,
somewhat more bearable in the case of unaccompanied school children than mothers
with small children. At least school children were out of the house for several hours a
day; but the invasion of privacy caused by mothers with small children underfoot and
sharing kitchens and bathrooms could prove a strain for householders. Yet some hosts
who had initially been unwilling to take in evacuees became very fond of them in a
short time, and long-lasting friendships were formed.
Most hosts, like most evacuees, were working-class people who buckled down and got
on with the job of coping. A Nottinghamshire host reflected the popular view of
evacuees:
"Everybody found fault with this, that and the other, you know.
They were bed-wetters and that sort of thing. A rough lot, but I
think that people weren't very charitable. [... ] but they were
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usurpers in our lives, weren't they? They did integrate into the
life after a time, those that did stay on. I don't think there was
any compulsion [to take in evacuees] [... ] no, I think it was that
no-one would have dared to say no, so we took them."J87
Householders were not the only grumblers, for some parents complained that foster
parents failed to love their charges, while others felt threatened if householders were
too loving, or worried that their children would develop a taste for living at a standard
above their own. But most complaints did come from hosts, for disenchanted evacuees
were apt to vote with their feet: and it was, of course, chiefly those who were
dissatisfied who were heard, and not the countless numbers of billeters and billeted who
settled happily together.
The National Association of Women's Institutes, striving to present a fair report and to
give reasons for many of the problems in reception areas, nevertheless concluded that
many of the children were dirty and ill-kempt - they did have lice and nits, and other
skin diseases and were badly clothed. Much of their behaviour - at least in the first
weeks of evacuation - was said to be unacceptable, and a degree of maladjustment
greater than expected was revealed by evacuation. Criticism was heaped upon parents,
who were indiscriminately blamed for failing to bring up their children properly; for
visiting too much or too little; for being selfish in sending their children away, or
conversely, for bringing them home again. But their most damning evidence built up
against the mothers who were evacuated with small children, as has been seen.
In 1939 it had not been fully appreciated that provision of adequate welfare services
would be crucial to the success of evacuation. While official action was relatively
187 Nottinghamshire Local Studies Library: taped conversation Ref A89 a/b/1
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prompt in dealing with infestation and infectious skin diseases, it took several months
before the problems of bed-wetting and maladjustment were properly addressed and
hostels established to deal with severe cases. Voluntary organisations, such as the
Women's Voluntary Service, moved quickly to set up clothing schemes for needy
children and to open day centres where evacuated mothers with pre-school children
could meet. But national government was slow to respond to the need for extra finance
throughout the period of evacuation, whether for clothing or hostels for children,
provision for laundry costs or improved billeting allowances for householders.
Arguably, if the evacuation scheme had been adequately funded from the outset, many
of these difficulties could have been avoided.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DRIFT BACK
The previous chapter has shown some of the difficulties encountered by hosts and
evacuees who participated in the government evacuation scheme in 1939. The intention
of this section is to study three more problems: the unofficial movement of individuals
in this first programme; the drift homeward of evacuees; and the effect upon education
of the evacuation of children.
Titmuss, whose investigation of the subject was published in 1950 and is still the most
extensive and reliable study of the subject, estimated that 1,473,391 people in the
priority groups moved under the first official scheme in the first few weeks of war. In
addition, large numbers of other people made their own arrangements and moved to
safer areas without government help.' Just as official evacuation ebbed and flowed
according to the progress of the war, with continual transference of individuals between
danger areas and reception districts, so unofficial refugees also moved back and forth
between 'safe' areas and their homes.'
It is impossible to assess accurately the number who evacuated themselves unofficially
throughout the Second World War, for no records were kept of individuals who did not
call upon official agencies for help. However, by studying the loss of population of the
evacuation areas, Titmuss calculated that approximately 2,000,000 people made their
1 Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy, History of the Second World War, p.I 0 1-1 03
2 N Longmate: How We Lived Then, p.73
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own plans for private evacuation from areas of perceived danger to safer areas in
England and Wales during the period from the end of June to the end of September
1939alone.3
In Sheffield, where the initial number of official evacuees was only 8,757,4 the actual
count of people who moved out of the city in this period was estimated to be 13,200:5
this would seem to give a figure for private evacuees of 4,443, or 34% of the total. By
December 1941 it was reported by the local press that the number of private evacuees
from Sheffield had equalled those officially evacuated." Few official references to
private evacuation have been found in relation to Sheffield and because this thesis is
concerned primarily with official government schemes, few interviews have been
conducted with unofficial refugees.
Who were these unofficial evacuees? Harrisson maintained that it was largely the
middle classes who evacuated themselves privately.' Boyd concurred, adding that small
families with only one or two children or those who were better off financially were
more likely to make their own arrangements, while the poorer (or larger) the family, the
more ready parents were to send their children away under the official scheme." This
seems a reasonable assumption, for large families would have found it more difficult to
stay together, even with relatives, and poor or working-class parents would have been
dependent upon government provision.
3 Titmuss: op. cit., p.l 02
4 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of School Medical Officer 1939, pp.39, 40
~Titmuss: op. cit., p.543
6 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 10.12.41, p.3
7 Mass-Observation File 942
8 W Boyd: Evacuation in Scotland, p.84
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Little is known of the journeys of unofficial evacuees to their various receiving areas.
Some were already on holiday and simply remained where they were: others travelled
privately, often in family groups, to friends or relatives in the country areas. With an
estimated half of the 2,000,000 private evacuees having already earmarked their
accommodation several months earlier," it seems fair to assume that most travel plans
would also have been made in advance. It is likely, therefore, that their journeys would
have been much less fraught with difficulties than those arranged by government
agencies, which had ended up in chaos for so many official evacuees.
It is difficult to know whether there were as many complaints against those who
removed themselves privately as against official evacuees, for little specific reference to
them has been found. It is probable, however, that because they were able to make their
own arrangements, they chose familiar places or at least an environment similar to their
own in cultural and economic terms, where they felt they could comfortably settle: they
were therefore less likely to encounter many of the problems or the ensuing hostility
that assailed those who moved under official schemes. Whether they were more
inclined to stay put, once they had arrived in safer areas, is debatable.
In September 1939 the drift back of official evacuees had begun almost as soon as they
arrived in the reception areas. Boyd saw this more as a succession of waves of home-
going than a steady filter back, with the initial peak showing as early as the end of the
first week, and the second after the first month. Another followed when billeting
charges were levied on parents in October, and a fourth in December when many
9 Titmuss: op. cit., p.102
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children were brought home for Christmas and did not return to their billets afterwards.
The movement homeward slowed down between January and Easter, but as schools in
evacuation areas were allowed to reopen in March 1940, more children returned to their
home cities.l'' Contrary to expectations, the bombing which finally began in the
summer of 1940 did not create a great demand for mass migration; nor did it discourage
the early return home of those who did opt to leave the cities, and the pattern of ebb and
flow continued throughout ensuing years. Even in 1944, when large numbers evacuated
London and southern England to escape the terrors of rocket attacks, the drift back
began even while flying bombs were still arriving. II
The previous chapter has drawn attention to problems of evacuee mothers with young
children in the reception areas and, perhaps predictably, these were among the first to
return to the cities. Barely had some been found homes before they left them: there
were even a few who did not wait to be billeted before catching the next train home.12
Within a week of the first evacuation, national and local government authorities were
expressing anxiety about the early return of both mothers and children and newspapers
were denouncing the women for their failure to give evacuation a chance to succeed.
As has been seen in the previous chapter, many women found it very difficult to settle
in the reception areas. Several who had come with large families were separated from
their older children, who were sometimes billeted a considerable distance away. They
missed their husbands and homes as well as town facilities with their familiar shops and
10 Boyd: op. cit., p.95
11 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.370,429
12 Titmuss: op. cit., p.112
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cinema entertainment. In addition, they were often expected to stay out of their billets
during the day: many found their accommodation dull, cold and comfortless in the long
dark evenings of approaching winter. Although the Women's Voluntary Service and
other organisations opened clubs and social centres where they could meet, it was not
enough to keep the women in the countryside.
One remedy, a scheme to set up nursery centres to be supported by volunteers, was
quickly advanced to help cope with these difficulties and avert the threat to the
evacuation scheme of mothers returning home. As with other aspects of evacuation,
however, the Treasury proved yet again to be a stumbling block, dithering about giving
financial approval so that by the time the scheme was agreed, on 9 January 1940, much
of the damage had been done: 13 the national situation showed an average of 88% of
evacuated mothers had already returned to the danger areas. In Sheffield the figure was
even worse, with 95% of mothers having returned by 5 December 1939.14
There were other reasons for the premature return of the women, too: Isaacs' view, that
family financial difficulties were an important factor in the drift back," seems to be
upheld by a report in The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent. A city mother who had
returned home with her three children within ten days admitted being lonely in the
country but said her main reason for return was monetary: the billeting allowance (five
shillings for herself and three shillings for each child) was inadequate for she had to pay
the householder extra for food and had expenses at home:
13 S Ferguson & H Fitzgerald: Studies in the Social Services, pp.179, 180
14T' . 544itmuss: op. cit., p.
15 S Isaacs (ed): The Cambridge Evacuation Survey, p.129
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"There was still the rent [at home] to pay, and my husband had
to pay for his board out. Then there were small items such as
insurance. I could not afford it.,,16
Many women also worried about husbands left alone in the cities, and could hardly
have been reassured to read the views of some religious and municipal officials which
were reported in the press: for instance, barely two months after evacuation began, the
Bishop of Winchester stated in a House of Lords debate on the subject:
"A man's home is most unhappy and uncomfortable without his
wife. The wife is not only wife and mother but she is
housekeeper, she is cook, she is parlourmaid, she is
laundrywoman and everything else rolled into one. I think it is
quite natural that women should desire to return to their
husbands."
He went on to say, however, that the children should be encouraged to stay; but many
women would not or could not leave their young children. I? Even while registrations
were being invited for an imminent second evacuation in October, The Sheffield
Telegraph & Independent reported on a heated meeting of the Education Committee
and quoted one city councillor's comment: "To divide women from their husbands is
opening the door, in my opinion, to immorality.t'" Government attempts to dissuade
evacuees from returning home were surely undermined by statements such as these.
All the above factors contributed to the early return of mothers with small children.
But, even if the drift back home of women was deplored by those in authority, the fact
was that it was sometimes welcomed by those who had received them. One hard-
pressed billeting officer, apparently reflecting the views of foster parents, stated:
16 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 12.9.39, p.3
17 HoL Deb 1.11.39, Vol 114, Col 1601; The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 2.11.39, p.7
18 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 24.10.39, p.IO
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"The only satisfactory feature of the whole unfortunate business,
from the rural householder's point of view, is that a good many
of these mothers are skedadling back home to their vulnerable
.. ,,19cines.
Nor was it only mothers with children who took the road home: it was the same with
pregnant women. At the outbreak of war eighty-one expectant mothers left Sheffield
for Mansfield, but thirty-five returned within eight weeks, before their confinements.i''
Only three were left by Christmas." Annual Reports of the Chief Medical Officer for
Sheffield for the war years show, however, that a total of919 expectant mothers elected
to be evacuated from the city to Nottinghamshire nursing homes for their confinements,
the last case in July 1944.22 The chart below has been constructed to illustrate the
position: the largest number moved after air raids on the city. No indication of how
many returned home before their confinements after 1939 has been found.
Movement of Expectant Mothers from Sheffield to Nursing Homes in
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19 Education, No. 1914, 15.9.39, p.248
20 Sheffield City Council: Report of the Chief Medical Officer 1939, pA
21 The Mansfield Reporter: 29.12.39, p.3
22 Statistics were as follows: 1939, 81; 1940, 80; 1941, 339; 1942, 276; 1943, 99; 1944, 44: cited in
Sheffield City Council: Annual Reports of the Chief Medical Officer 1939-1944
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Some women with young children did settle amicably in their billets, and some
remained in the reception areas even after the war had ended. A Sheffield woman
praised the welcome extended by members of the Women's Institute in Kegworth, even
though she and her four young children were initially left without a billet and eventually
split up. The family made friends and never returned to the city.23 Ex-evacuees
interviewed in Shepshed also mentioned that several Sheffield families had remained in
the area after the end of hostilities. 24
So much for the women. It was the return home of school children which caused the
most anxiety and this was publicly expressed by officials at both national and local
level. Within days of the exodus the Minister of Health voiced his concern about the
returning tide, warning that tact, tolerance and understanding, as well as administrative
enterprise and ingenuity would be required by everyone in both reception and
evacuation areas if the flow was to be halted.f The President of the Board of
Education broadcast a wireless appeal, pleading with parents to send their children
away and keep them away, though he was later rebuked by another public figure, Lady
Simon, for his "extremely feeble appeal" to parents to keep their children in the
reception areas." By March 1940 the situation was so bad that propaganda campaigns
were undertaken and posters and leaflets were distributed widely in both evacuation and
reception areas, and the help of the BBC was enlisted in attempts to dissuade refugees
from returning. 27 All was in vain, for the trend continued inexorably.
23 A Porter, "I was an Evacuee", Cogwords, No. 16 (1985), p.3, Kegworth Public Library
24 Oral interviews: Jean Perry and Mary Mabe, 4.9.96
2S The Nottingham Evening Post: 13.9.39, p.1
26 Education: No. 1920,27.10.39, p.360; No. 1923, 17.11.39, p.420
27 PRO.HLG.I0S/21
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Many different reasons have been advanced for the premature return home of
unaccompanied school children. In Isaacs' view, there were three important factors
governing the return home of many child evacuees. Firstly there were family ties -
either the children became homesick, or parents missed them, or both. Secondly, there
was the knotty problem of the relationship with foster parents: sometimes parents were
dissatisfied with their child's billet, either because it was not good enough, or else
because it was too good and represented a threat to their family security. A third
important cause was financial strain - either due to the introduction of parental
contributions to billeting, the cost of clothes or fares to visit the children, or the need to
have a child of wage-earning age at horne."
Homesickness was undoubtedly an important factor. The National Federation of
Women's Institutes' reassurance that there were "hardly any reports of home-sickness"
among evacuees'" contrasts with other findings that it rated highly among reasons for
return. Isaacs, for example, quoted many cases of children missing their parents and
homes, even if they were happy in their billets: her view, that young evacuees were
most likely to be homesick if they were separated from older siblings or there were no
other children in the billet, was also supported by John."
Emotional letters and visits from parents to the children were also blamed for causing
anxiety which often translated itself into homesickness, resulting in home-going, for
children often felt guilty if they realised their parents were unhappy without them. The
28 Isaacs: op. cit., p.129
29 National Federation of Women's Institutes: Town Children Through Country Eyes, p.12
30 Isaacs: op. cit., pp.55-61; E M John, "A Study of the Effects of Evacuation and Air Raids on Children of
Pre-School Age", British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. XI (1941) p.179
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Bradford enquiry, carried out in the early months of evacuation, concluded that a high
proportion of children who had found it hard to settle in reception areas were 'only'
children or from small families, where parents were anxious about them. But the
enquiry also found that some "slum" children missed their crowded homes and were
often difficult to billet.31
Nonetheless, some middle-class officials were unsympathetic about homesickness and
found it difficult to appreciate the feelings of close-knit, poor and working-class
families. In Loughborough, a reception area for many Sheffield children, the town's
Medical Officer of Health criticised the "deplorable attitude" of parents who took their
children home simply because they could not bear to be parted from them. He asked:
"Where would the people who had had boarding school
educations [sic] be today if their parents had not been able to
stand being parted from them?,,32
He was evidently not alone in his views, for the Vicar of St George's Church in
Sheffield, himself father of five evacuated sons, described the desire of parents to bring
their children home as "pure selfishness".33 Evacuation leaders, too, were often
exasperated with parents. One head master asserted that parents naively believed the
first tale of bad conditions, ignoring children's tendency to make up any story to cover
the real reason for wanting to come home. In his report to the governors of the school
he castigated parents for ignoring the children's best interests and for disregarding
agreements they had made with the school to keep the children in the reception areas."
31 Education: No. 1928, 22.12.39, p.520
32 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 13.10.39, p.5
33 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 12.12.39, p.6
34 Mitcham County School for Boys: Minutes of Governors' Meetings 1939-1942
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The demand for the return of children was not always at the parents' behest, however.
An interviewee in Ratcliffe-on-Trent recalled two young brothers, evacuated from
Sheffield, who made several unsuccessful attempts to run away to their homes and were
always brought back by the police." Another city evacuee, sent to Newark with his
sister, intimated that his was not an isolated case when he recalled:
"The house was so dirty that we both decided we weren't
stopping. Next morning we packed our bags and we went. [... ]
We didn't know where we were going but a policeman picked
us up and took us back to the community centre where the
teachers were looking after other children who were in trouble."
Later, this evacuee was billeted unofficially with the wealthy Batchelor family (of
canned food fame) in Edale where he and nine other evacuees were well treated. 36
Another, evacuated from Sheffield to Leicestershire in September 1939, although happy
in his billet, resisted his parents' instructions to stay in the reception area. He said:
"I spent many happy hours in activities unknown to city kids. I
took the scholarship exam at Shepshed and passed. But by the
summer was secretly longing for my mother [... ] so, against all
advice, back to Sheffield I went.,,37
Another interviewee missed her mother and went home, while her brother remained
with their foster parents. After the heavy bombing of the city in December 1940,
however, she returned with her mother to the same billet in Nottinghamshire, where the
family stayed together for several months before again joining the drift home."
3$ Oral interview: Ellen Baldry, 16.7.97
36 J Lacy: Recollections of Evacuation, taped conversation, courtesy of J Jones, Sheffield Hallam
University
37 J Perry et al: Shepshed: Wartime Memories, p.55
38 Oral interview: Margaret Bennett, 16.3.95
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Even when parents were reluctant to bring back homesick children, they often found it
very hard to refuse, and were sometimes encouraged by foster parents to accede to the
child's request. A Sheffield woman illustrated the dilemma in a letter to the local press
signed: "A Worried Mother". Although well satisfied with her four children's billets
and education she was distressed that three of them had not settled and wanted to come
home. Visiting for only the second time in the seven weeks that they had been away,
she observed that one child had developed a nervous twitch and was said to be so
unfriendly and unmanageable that his foster parents advised that he should go horne."
Another justified her decision to bring her unaccompanied children home within days:
"My daughter wrote me letters every day that nearly broke my
heart. [Both children] had good billets and were well looked
after. But they wouldn't settle down.,,40
It was, of course, a difficult situation for many parents when unhappy children pleaded
to be taken home, yet some did turn a deaf ear to their appeals. An interviewee told
how he was homesick and secretly wrote home several letters begging his parents to
take him home, but these were ignored. He remembered:
"When mymother came to visit, all she seemed to want to know
was whether I was being a good boy and helping out. She didn't
want to know how I felt and refused to discuss going home.T'!
It was often the case that when one child became homesick or was missed by a parent,
brothers and sisters were brought home at the same time, and examination of school
39 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 28.10.39, p.4
40 ibid., 12.9.39, p.3
41 Oral interview: James Roffey, 30.3.97
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registers has borne out this point.42 But it was not always so: when siblings had settled
happily in their billets they sometimes returned at different times: one interviewee's
young sister was taken home early because her mother missed her, yet he and his
brother remained much longer, themselves returning at separate times later in the war.43
In Sheffield some officials expressed dismay at the flood of returning children at a
meeting of the Education Committee early in October. Seeking to reassure anxious
parents, Canon Dunford, a member of the committee, had visited the billet of every
evacuee from the city's Roman Catholic schools and declared himself very satisfied
with them." Others were less positive, however: when the committee met again two
weeks later the Chairman commented: "We have to recognise that for one reason or
another there is no confidence in the scheme as a whole." Alderman Bancroft, another
councillor was more explicit about his feelings, which were hardly encouraging, to say
the least. Never a supporter of the scheme, he proclaimed:
"Why we should endorse a big blunder that has been made I don't
know. The whole thing has been a fiasco and I don't want to
associate myself with endorsing something I don't believe in.,.45
The rate at which Sheffield evacuees flooded back home is demonstrated in the table
below. This has been constructed from statistics presented to a meeting of the city's
Education Committee and carried in a report of The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent
on 24 October 1939, and shows both the numbers of evacuees in all the priority classes
42 For example, Admissions Registers: St Peter's School, Brookside County Primary School (formerly
East Leake Council School)
43 Oral interview: George Shelley, 12.8.96
44 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 12.10.39, p.4
45 ibid., 24.10.39, p.10
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who left the city under the first government programme at the beginning of September
and of those who had returned within a mere eight weeks. Although the newspaper
reported an average of 55% of all classes returning, the actual figure is even higher, at
almost 57%.46
Position of Official Evacuation from Sheffield at 24 October 1939
*Many teachers, although willing to stay in the reception areas, were recalled when there were
insufficient Sheffield evacuees to teach.
To have achieved a truly accurate assessment of the numbers of official evacuees of all
priority groups in all the reception areas at any given time would have been an almost
impossible task. Dent considered that the only way in which this could have been
achieved would have been by a simultaneous house-to-house survey" - clearly an
impractical undertaking in time of war. However, an estimate of the homeward
movement of official evacuees using figures given by evacuating authorities in the six
largest English cities at 5 December 1939,just three months after the first exodus, was
46 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 24.10.39, p.4
47 H C Dent: Education in Transition, p.28
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made by Titmuss.48 The chart below, compiled from these statistics, shows that
Sheffield recorded the highest percentage of returnees in each category when compared
with Greater London and Manchester and Salford (the latter chosen because of its
relative geographical proximity to Sheffield).
Sending authorities' estimate of returns of evacuees at 5 December 1939
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Sheffield parents had already shown themselves to be among the most reluctant in the
country to send their children away, and it seemed that they were also some of the most
eager to bring them back. Chapter Two showed the number of 5,093 unaccompanied
school children evacuated from the city at the beginning of September 1939 was
increased by 245 on 26 October. However, at the end of that year there were only 1,962
still away. Investigation of Annual Reports of the School Medical Officer for Sheffield
48 Titmuss: op. cit., p.544
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from 1939 to 1945 has shown how few children in this category remained in the
reception areas during the war years. By the end of December 1940, two weeks after
heavy bombing of the city, the figure had increased to 2,900. But by the following year
there was a sharp reduction to 1,150, despite the fact that a «private assisted scheme"
was by then in force, under which all unaccompanied child evacuees were entitled to
billeting allowances and free travel to the reception area,49 as will be seen in Chapter
Six. At the end of 1942 the number was halved, to 580; twelve months later it was
down to 328, and finally ninety-five when evacuation ended for the city in 1944.50 The
following chart, compiled from the above figures, illustrates the position.
Unaccompanied Sheffield school children in reception areas
of Nottinghamshire & Leicestershire 1939-1944
2.9.39 31.12.39 31.12.40 31.12.41 31.12.42 31.12.43 31.12.44
49 Titmuss: op. cit., p.361
so Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Reports of the School Medical Officer, 1939-1945
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The relationship between parents and foster parents was another vital factor in
determining whether evacuee children stayed in their billets or returned home.
Children's unhappiness may well have been a common reason for homecoming but,
conversely, Burt asserted that problems arose with parents who were concerned that
their offspring were too happy with their new foster parents and feared they might grow
apart from them." Other parents were dissatisfied if the standards of the host family
differed from their own: for instance, Loughborough Education Committee was
informed of a mother who took her child home because he was not allowed to stay up
until his normal bedtime of 11o'clock at night."
The Bradford enquiry found that sometimes a difference in social status, with the child
feeling the host unfriendly, was an important factor in difficulties.53 One interviewee's
wife who had lived in a reception area remembered an altercation when her mother
took in evacuees:
"She tried to improve one little boy's manners, but when his
mother came down to see him she said they were making him
far too posh and promptly took him home with her.,,54
When Basford Rural District Council discussed the early return of evacuees from
Sheffield, the Chairman said some evacuees had gone back home because they had
found the treatment they had received in rural areas to be better than that to which they
were accustomed. He added: "A dog got used to its kennel.t'"
" C Burt: "The Billeting of Evacuated Children", British Journal of Educational Psychology, p.94
'2 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 13.10.39, p.S
'3Education: No. 1928,22.12.39, p.520
54 Oral interview: Stanley Smith, 20.12. 92
" The Nottingham Evening Post: 12.9.39, p.5
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Tension between parents and hosts could be caused by financial issues. The previous
chapter has referred to the resentment of some householders concerning parental
contributions towards the upkeep of evacuees, but parents were also hostile to this
measure, and its implementation was blamed by many for the early return home of
unaccompanied children. On the one hand, many hosts felt that parents were not paying
enough: on the other, parents objected to the 'means test' method of assessment and
some had not expected to have to pay anything at all.56 Maintenance payments were not
demanded of parents until 28 October 1939, several weeks after the first exodus. Yet it
had always been the government's intention to exact some payment from parents. At a
meeting of the War Cabinet on 4 October, when it was agreed to impose the charges,
Sir John Anderson admitted that one effect of introducing parental contributions "would
probably be to encourage some parents to bring their children back" but considered it
was a risk which could not be avoided.57
Several evacuating authorities expressed concern that the proposal to introduce parental
contributions would encourage the return of evacuees. In a report to the Ministry of
Health, Gateshead's Director of Education declared it had "knocked the bottom out of
the evacuation scheme"." Salford Education Committee canvassed other local
education committees in evacuation areas with a view to asking the government to
postpone the implementation of the plan, in a bid to stem the drift back. The matter
was debated by Sheffield Education Committee at the end of October, when it was said
that it would cost more to collect the contributions than the government would gain:
S6 R Padley & M Cole (eds): Evacuation Survey, p.60
S7 PRO.CAB.65fl WM 36(39): 4.10.39, War Cabinet Conclusions, reference courtesy ofR Mee
S8 PRO.HLG.7/73, Report 27.10.39
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representations were made to the government, but without success.59 At the meeting
some members asserted that the trek home of evacuees had only developed since
parental contributions, but others disputed the claim. Canon Dunford maintained that
"the wholesale return of children had taken place long before the question of payment
was ever mentioned: from the first week the children had begun to pour back.,,60
Evidence from contemporary newspapers and secondary sources supports this view.
In the reception areas, too, the introduction of maintenance payments was blamed for
the early return of evacuees. The small town of Shepshed had only received 236 of the
2000 evacuees expected from Sheffield, yet more than a third had already returned to
their homes by the end of September." Six months later there were only forty-five
Sheffield evacuees left - less than 20% of the original, already low, number. The Chief
Billeting Officer reported that, in his opinion, the main reason for the drift back of
children was the government's enforcement of billeting charges"
Chapter Four has dealt with the effect upon hosts of parents' visits to their children.
Many national and local authorities also blamed them for encouraging the early return
home of children. Only three weeks after the start of the scheme a Ministry of Health
official reported:
"Visits by parents to children have, on the whole, proved to be a
nuisance [... ] and offered too easy an opportunity for them to
bring their children home.,,63
S9 City of Sheffield Education Committee: Report 1939140, p.304
60 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 24.10.39, p.10
61 The Nottingham Evening Post: 27.9.39, p.8
62 Perry: op. cit., p.4S
63 PRO.ffi.,G.7/73
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The impact of parental visits upon the drift back was debated by several contemporary
researchers. Davidson and Slade held that visits to evacuees had little effect, and did
not appear to prevent the children from settling in their billets," and Isaacs concurred
with this view." Burt, on the other hand, considered the visits were an important factor
in the premature return of children and called for visits to be more formally arranged,
thus avoiding disruption of foster parents' routines." Had this initiative been
implemented, it might well have gained early support in the reception areas and avoided
some friction.
The concern of evacuating authorities was clear. On more than one occasron
Sheffield's Chief Education Officer appealed to parents not to visit their children
frequently for fear of unsettling them, adding that the response to evacuation has been a
considerable disappointment, but the tendency to bring the children back was even
more SO.67 In the city's reception areas, too, officials upheld this view: for instance, the
Clerk to Loughborough Education Committee commented: "Visits by parents certainly
do upset the children.v'" Press reports were also critical: readers of The Loughborough
& Shepshed Echo were told that appeals had been made to parents to refrain from
paying frequent and lengthy visits to their children because the hardship of parting
increased the children's demands to be taken home.
64 M A Davidson & I M Slade: "Results of a Survey of Senior School Evacuees", British Journal of
Educational Psychology, Vol. X (1940), p.193
65 Isaacs: op. cit., p.60
66 Burt: "The Billeting of Evacuated Children", op. cit., pp. 93,94
67 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 29.9.39, p.S; 3.10.39, p.4
68 Tbe Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 27.10.39, p.S
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Not all children found their parents' visits unsettling, however. An interviewee, the
youngest of nine siblings, was very happy in her Nottinghamshire billet and remained
there for five years, although her sister returned home almost immediately. She said:
"1 remember my father and mother often coming to visit, with
my sisters and brothers at various times, and 1 never wanted to
go back with them.,,69
There were, of course, other reasons for the drift back. In addition to parents' visits to
evacuees in their billets, those children whose reception areas were within reasonable
distance of their homes were able to travel home to see their families, and this could be
an unsettling experience. Titmuss contended that the distance between the evacuated
child and its home was an important factor in the drift back, particularly before
concessionary fares for parents were introduced: only 19% of the London children
evacuated to Somerset had gone home by January 1940, whereas 35% of those
evacuated to Hertfordshire had returned." The distance factor may well have had a
bearing on the flood back of Sheffield children to their homes, for their reception areas
were easily and cheaply accessible to parents, being at most only an hour's journey by
rail: 65.6% were back at home by this time, as will be seen in the table on page 234
below.
Boyd found that children were more likely to settle and stay in their billets if parents
visited at long intervals rather than frequently, and applied this finding to privately
evacuated children as well." Burt concluded that children who went home for a visit in
the early weeks were less likely to return to the reception area than those who went at a
69 Oral interview: Brenda Cox, 8.3.95
70 Titmuss: op. cit., p.I78 ni, p.I74
71 Boyd: op. cit., p.95
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later stage in the war.72 Another reason cited elsewhere by the same psychologist was
the fact that, as winter approached, the novelty and excitement of life in the country
wore off and boredom set in, and disenchanted evacuees went horne."
Parents' concern over their children's health was another important factor in their early
return home. Much was made by teachers, psychologists and doctors in the reception
areas of the rapid and noticeable improvement in health of the majority of evacuees,
and Macnicol suggests that Board of Education officials were keen to find confirmation
of this in their efforts to convince parents to leave the children in the country.
However, despite extensive surveys, no conclusive proof could be produced of any
significant difference in the growth of evacuated children." Burt and Simmins even
considered that in a minority of cases health actually deteriorated, and maintained that
this induced some parents to tum their backs on the evacuation scheme in the early
weeks of the programme.f
Vernon's theory was that the return of some children to the cities often had a knock-on
effect, with others following soon after, for evacuees often felt a strong pull from
friends at horne." This view was borne out by an interview with a Sheffield evacuee
who had been billeted in "palatial surroundings" with a wealthy industrialist, along with
72 C Burt: "The Billeting of Evacuated Children", op. cit., pp.93,94
73 C Burt: "The Incidence of Neurotic Symptoms Among Evacuated School Children", British Journal of
Educational Psychology, Vol. X (1940), p.ll
74 J Macnicol, "The effect of the evacuation of schoolchildren on official attitudes to State intervention" in
H L Smith (ed): War and Social Change, p.19
7~ C Burt & CA Simmins: Review ofS Isaacs (ed): The Cambridge Evacuation Survey, p.74
76 M D Vernon: "A Study of Some Effects of Evacuation on Adolescent Girls", British Journal of
Educational Psychology, Vol. X (1940), p.133
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another schoolmate and a family of three brothers. Although very happy in their new
household, all five went home for Christmas and never returned to the reception area:
"One boy was leaving school, so he wasn't going back anyway.
Two of the three brothers didn't want to leave home again, so
their parents wouldn't let the other one go back without them. I
was quite willing to go back there but because I would have
been the only one, I didn't go either.?"
The early drift back to the cities and its relationship to family ties had been foreseen by
some psychologists. Winnicott, for example, had warned in a BBC broadcast at the
time of the first exodus that, although mothers had been pressed to give up their
children, any initial compliance with the scheme could not be expected to last.78 In
Sheffield, a city councillor declared that it was mainly British love of home that was
bringing children back: at first, evacuation was seen as a joy ride, but when the Prime
Minister warned of a three-year war or even longer, parents were not content to be
separated for so long." In one of Sheffield's reception areas The Newark Advertiser
took up the theme, asserting that it was not because evacuees were dissatisfied with
conditions in the area but that they missed their homes.8o The headmaster of Carbrook
Council Boys' School simply commented: "Home ties are too strong"."
Another important reason for the drift back to the cities was simply that no bombs fell.
Many of those who had rushed to the reception areas, expecting immediate and
devastating air attack on the outbreak of war, became restive as months passed with no
77 Oral interview: Douglas Pearson, 2.7.95
78 C Winnicott et al: D Winnicott: Deprivation and Delinquency, p.3
79 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 24.10.39, p.10
80 The Newark Advertiser: 15.11.39, p.2
81 Log book: Carbrook Council Boys' School, entry 7.9.39
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sign of bombing or other danger in the cities. This was one of the reasons cited by
teachers of Broomhall and Denby Street Nursery Schools. Two hundred mothers and
small children left in September 1939 but, persuaded home by the absence of air-raids,
there were only enough children to form one class when term started in January 1940,
and by April only two of the original evacuees remained in the reception area.82
Harrisson confirmed the lack of bombing as a reason for the drift back, asserting that
this psychological factor had been overlooked by the authorities. In his view, parents
brought their children home because they thought it safe to do so: when no bombs had
fallen in the first winter of war, many parents felt there would be no raids. When raids
did come, some sent their children away again, but when there was comparative calm
once more, the process was repeated." Isaacs put it more succinctly:
"In a country in which it is generally agreed that the family is
the greatest source of security and incentive, it seems odd to ask
why children go home when there is no obvious reason for their
staying away. The more sensible question [might be] why did
they stay?,,84
Whatever the causes, the early return of the children from the reception areas was not
only deprecated by officials: it was also resented by some hosts. A Nottinghamshire
reporter, reminding readers that many Sheffield children had arrived in poor condition
and townspeople had rallied to their aid, observed: "For those people to feed and clothe
them well and then see them drift back to Sheffield is very unfair to them and to the
children.18s In Leicestershire, too, the Chief Billeting Officer in Shepshed expressed the
82 Sheffield Archives File CA 522(44); The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 3.5.40, p.l
83 Mass-Observation File 916
84 Isaacs: op. cit., p.123
83 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 28.9.39, p.S
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vexation of local people. The Rural District Council was one of many authorities to
experience a lot of trouble with evacuees, he said; and the council should advise
Sheffield Education Authority that no school children should be taken back to the city."
Several authorities at both national and local level called for strong measures to be
taken, both to compel parents to evacuate children in danger areas and to prevent them
from bringing their children home. The War Cabinet discussed the proposal that
parents should be asked to give a voluntary undertaking to keep their children in the
reception areas, but dropped the suggestion for fear that such a requirement might
encourage even more parents to bring their children home immediately." The decision
was attacked by teaching authorities, who criticised the government for leaving
responsibility with the parents."
Local newspapers deployed varying methods in attempts to persuade parents to leave
their children in the reception areas. The Sheffield Star adopted a threatening approach,
stressing the possibility of air raids and warning that if children were evacuated again it
would not be easy to re-billet them." The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent tried to
reassure parents: in an effort to persuade parents not to bring their children home, the
paper carried stories for several weeks of city evacuees who were happy in their billets
in the country.'" Statistics have proved that neither method had much success.
86 The Nottingham Evening Post: 27.9.39 p.8
87 PRO.CAB 65/2. W.M.121(39)
88 Education: No. 1923, 17.11.39, p.420; The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 11.8.41, p.2
89 The Sheffield Star: 28.9.39 p.9
90 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 25.9.39 tT.
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When the War Cabinet discussed the worrying drift back of evacuees in December
1939, a comparison was made between statistics for London and those for other cities.
It was reported that figures for London, where the need for evacuation was greatest,
showed the best results. By contrast, those for Yorkshire and other northern counties
showed that, in that part of the country, the evacuation scheme was "practically a dead
letter"." In the House of Lords the Archbishop of Canterbury gave his view:
"In Yorkshire, the home of a very independent and sometimes
obstinate race, there was very little response to the plea for
evacuation. ,,92
It has already been seen that the percentage of mothers and children returning early to
Sheffield was alarmingly high. The table below, constructed from statistics presented
by the Minister of Health to Parliament in February 1940, shows the city also had the
worst result in respect of unaccompanied school children."
Unaccompanied school children from major English cities remaining in
reception areas at 31 December 1939
Evacuation Area Number Evacuated Number Returned Percentage
Remaining
Sheffield 5,338 3,500 34.4%
Manchester 66,300 41,000 38.2%
Newcastle-upon- Tyne 28,300 14,000 50.5%
Leeds 18,935 8,500 55.1%
Birmingham 25,241 11,000 56.4%
Liverpool 60,795 23,000 62.2%
London 241,500 79,500 67.1%
91 PRO.CAB.73fl, CDC 14(39)
92 HoL Deb. 7.2.40, Vol. 115, Col. 468
93 Data compiled from HoC Deb. 1.2.40, Vol. 356, Col. 1285; also cited in C Binfield et al: The History of
the City of Sheffield, p.l07
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By the following 16March the figures were even worse: there were only 1,550 (or 29%)
Sheffield elementary school children still in the reception areas," and by 4 June the
President of the Board of Education reported that only 2.5% remained, compared with
32.8% from London and 8.8% from Leeds."
Early in 1940 the government, aware that urgent steps had to be taken to encourage
movement in the likelihood of later evacuations and to stem the return flow, introduced
a more liberal financial policy. Throughout that year more money was made available
to improve and extend welfare services in reception areas and to provide staff for
hostels, group homes, social clubs, welfare centres as well as feeding centres and
canteens for mothers and children." In 1941 the Shakespeare Report identified the
need for full-time welfare officers and further growth of hostel and residential nursery
accommodation for children." the introduction of these improvements and the
development of a clothing scheme illustrated the fact that increasing attention was now
being paid to individual needs. Although the fundamental purpose of these
improvements was to help maintain the evacuation scheme and prevent mothers and
children from returning to cities, it is difficult to assess their success, for the ending of
heavy bombing raids around mid-1941 led to many evacuees returning home."
The government's exhortations to evacuees to remain in the reception areas may be said
to have been continually undermined by views expressed by some municipal leaders,
94 HoC Deb. 2.4.40, Vol. 359, Col. 31
9S HoC Deb. 4.6.40, Vol. 361, Cols. 781-2
96 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.372, 374
97 PRO.HLG.7/85 Shakespeare Report, p7
98 Titmuss: op. cit., p.386
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however. In February 1940, responding to a newspaper reporter's criticism of Sheffield
as "the worst city in England with the most stubborn people", the Chairman of Sheffield
Education Committee (at best a lukewarm supporter of evacuation) was defensive:
"Stubbornness is not exactly a vice. [... ] It is true that
comparatively few Sheffield children now remain in the
reception areas, but we put the pros and cons to the parents and
left them to decide for themselves. ,,99
The following month, at a heated meeting of Sheffield Education Committee regarding
possible future evacuation, a city councillor expressed his view that parents of children
who were still evacuated were either both out working or else did not want to care for
their offspring. Other members of the committee disagreed, one denouncing the
comment as "a foul lie". lOO It might be argued that the public airing of such views did
not encourage Sheffield parents to send their children away: indeed, a parent was quick
to respond: "It is no wonder that people bring their children back in the face of such
criticism.t''?' Registrations for the next programme were again disappointingly low in
the city.
The anxiety of the authorities at both national and local level about the drift back was
not only related to the children's safety but also to their education. Schooling was to
prove one of the most important issues: in February 1940 Lord Addison (a former
Minister of Health) went so far as to opine that the national system of education had
been the first major casualty of the war.102 Because the chief concern of the authorities
99 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 16.2.40, pp.4, 6
100 ibid., 30.3.40, p.8
101 ibid., 3.4.40, p.3
102 A St Loe Strachey: Borrowed Children, p.l 07
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had been to put a roof over the heads of the evacuees, billeting had taken first priority
and education requirements were largely neglected initially.
Schooling could not begin until children, often scattered over many miles, had been
traced and sometimes re-billeted nearer to school units. It has been seen in Chapter
Three that many Sheffield evacuees were despatched to billets in several different
villages in the reception areas and separated from their school units, as were children
from other danger zones. It often took many days for teachers to round up all their
pupils, and sometimes they were not wholly successful, for distances were too great and
some evacuees had to be absorbed into local schools. Nor was the problem of schools'
separation always resolved quickly: in December 1939 Leicestershire Education
Committee members heard from the county's ARP (Education) Sub-Committee that
Sheffield children were so widely spread throughout the county's reception areas that
an official from the Council staff was still required to assist with organisation. 103
The Board of Education, in its circular No. 1474 issued so late in August 1939, had
stipulated that local schools and visiting schools would each retain their own
individuality. In some areas a double-shift system of education would be necessary,
enabling two schools to share the same building and ensuring each could retain its own
identity. In this way teachers would remain in charge of their evacuated pupils and
would be responsible for organising social activities or nature walks during the half-
days that they were not in school. 104 It was soon clear, however, that this part of the
103 Leicestershire Education Committee: Minutes 1939140, p.7723
104 Board of Education Circular No. 1474, Education, No. 1912, 1.9.39, p.196
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evacuation scheme was fraught with difficulties: in some cases the plan never came to
fruition at all, while in others the arrangements were often short-lived.
One big problem for schools struggling to maintain solidarity was that in many cases
only half the pupils, and sometimes (as in the case of Sheffield) far fewer, had been
evacuated in the first place: the rest of them stayed at home or were privately evacuated
to other areas. Another difficulty was that the plan had already been severely damaged
by the fragmentation and separation of school parties either on departure or arrival (or
both). Appendix S, the details of which have been collated from Leicestershire
Education Committee records, shows how many Sheffield units evacuated to that
county were split up and distributed among several schools in different villages. lOS (No
such information has been discovered relating to reception areas in Nottinghamshire.)
Lowndes' view was that only large-scale redistribution of billets would have ensured
that all schools could have operated as separate entities 106 but that would have caused
even more disruption to children already traumatised by evacuation and all that it had
entailed.
In addition, the early shift homeward of large numbers of evacuees gradually, or
sometimes quickly, rendered it uneconomic to employ two sets of teachers in the
countryside. Consequently, as school logs books show, large numbers of teachers who
had volunteered to stay with their charges in reception areas were soon called home to
help in setting up tuition schemes in the cities, causing even greater loss of unity in the
reception areas. Government ministers expressed concern about problems in schooling
10' Leicestershire Education Committee Attendance Register of Evacuated School Parties 1939-40
106 Lowndes: op. cit., p.211
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caused by the drift back of evacuees to the cities, not least that of planning school
accommodation for unknown numbers of children in both evacuation and reception
areas. But, despite strong pressure, they stopped short of introducing an element of
compulsion into the evacuation scheme for fear that such a requirement might
encourage even more parents to bring their children home immediately.l'"
By early November 1939 the original plan to retain the separate identities of all schools
had been re-examined and watered down. Forced to accept that the education of older
children, in particular, had been adversely affected by billeting difficulties, the Board of
Education now permitted some reorganisation of placements to enable schools to retain
their identity. At the same time, it acknowledged that it was not possible, or indeed
desirable, for all schools to try to function independently and some would have to
merge with local establishments. The main concern by this stage was to ensure that all
officially evacuated children should have access to a teacher from their own schools.l'"
From the beginning of evacuation the constantly changing school population, resulting
from the drift back, caused considerable problems for education authorities in both
evacuating and receiving areas and contributed to an often chaotic state of education,
particularly in many of the danger zones. An editorial in Education seemed to sum up
the dilemma, criticising the 'come and go as you please arrangement' of evacuation:
"If all the children had gone, we should know what to do. If
none had gone we should have arranged something. But with
some here and some there, and constant movement backwards
and forwards, the confusion becomes more and more difficult to
107 PRO.CAB 65/2. W.M.121(39)
108 Board of Education Circular 1480, Education: No. 1922, 10.11.39, p.400
240
straighten out. We are disappointed with the government
scheme.,,109
The intention to retain schools as separate entities had been seen by many as good in
theory, but attempts to stick to it rigidly were almost bound to create problems.
Although the evacuating staffs may have been keen to retain their independence, it is
clear that not all receiving authorities agreed. While the Director of Education for
Bedford, for example, supported the principle, he attacked it as impracticable and
unnecessary, pointing out that school identities had already been destroyed by the large
proportion of children whose parents had refused to evacuate them in the first place,
and by the rapid return home of many others.!"
Nottinghamshire's Director of Education had reservations about the matter from the
very beginning, as documents held at Brookside County Primary School (formerly East
Leake Council School) show. In a letter dated 4 September, he asked head teachers of
receiving schools to treat evacuated teachers "as friends, so that a complete harmonious
interchange of ideas and responsibility" would be achieved, but instructed:
"You should deal with them as one community, in fact as if they
were all Nottinghamshire children. [... ] It is at present
considered highly inadvisable to make any arrangement that
provides for the Nottinghamshire children being educated in one
shift and the visiting children in the other shift."!"
It was not long, however, before some evacuated teachers were being criticised for
intransigence. In October, members of Basford Rural District Council complained that
109 Education: No. 1918,13.10.39, p.322
110 ibid., No. 1922, 10.11.39, p.402
111 Letters 4.9.39,6.9.39 Brookside County Primary School (formerly East Leake Council School)
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Sheffield teachers had expected to be sent to a suburban area and were intent upon
keeping not only their schools, but also their classes, together as units. But Basford was
a rural area covering many scattered villages and it was not possible to accede to the
wishes of the evacuating authority.!" The minutes of Nottinghamshire Education
Committee also record criticism of some Sheffield teachers for their insistence on
maintaining school entities in small villages.113
Some Sheffield teachers clearly did disapprove of their school units being split up.
Carbrook Council Boys' School log book contains a testy reference to the fact that its
pupils had been dispersed over a wide area:
"By this scattering, the Leicester [sic] Authority are able to
claim 7 of our teachers to remain to look after less than 100
children."
Despite dwindling numbers as the drift back escalated, several evacuated staff of this
school remained in the area for several months. The last teacher to leave that reception
area in 1944 seemed to concur with the head teacher's opinion as she later commented
on her long stay: "It was a bit of a luxury considering wartime economies.,,114As it is
apparent from records held in Leicestershire archives that there were only eight of the
original 158Carbrook pupils still in the evacuation area by March 1943,115this seems a
reasonable observation.
112 The Nottingham Evening Post: 10.10.39, p.6
113 Nottinghamshire Education Committee: Minutes 1939140, p.7
114 Log Book: Carbrook Council Boys' School, several entries; also C Parsons: Schools in an Urban
Community, p.l35
m Leicestershire Education Committee Attendance Registers of Evacuated School Parties 1939-44
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However, not all Sheffield teachers insisted upon teaching their children separately, and
no doubt the comparatively small numbers arriving in the reception areas sometimes
helped the situation. In Newark, Nottinghamshire, (where less than a third of the
expected evacuees from the city had arrived) members of the Education Committee
heard that several schools in reception areas were operating satisfactorily less than three
weeks after evacuation and no double shifts were necessary, indicating that merging had
taken place from the beginning.!"
Likewise, in Leicestershire, where 642 evacuees from twelve Sheffield schools had
been received in Melton Mowbray and distributed over thirty-seven neighbouring
villages, integration was evident, as the Girls' Secondary School log book indicated:
"[On 4 September] the Head teachers of these groups met at this
school to formulate schemes of procedure for the education of
their children. Most of the Sheffield Heads were in favour of
assimilating the evacuees into the various village schools.,,117
Elsewhere in the county, however, the shift system did operate. In an extreme case,
severe overcrowding caused attendance times to be staggered from 10.00 am until 7.00
pm, to be operated initially at Kegworth School, as seventy Sheffield children arrived,
mostly from Hillsborough Council School. 118 The head teacher of Firs Hill School
managed to keep most of her pupils together by acquiring accommodation in two
church halls.!" Even so, staff and pupils experienced a short period of confusion:
"Initially, the teaching accommodation was very cramped, with
no space to move about without disturbing other classes. Once
116 The Newark Advertiser: 20.9.39, p.l0
117 Log Book: Melton Mowbray Modern Girls' School, 12.9.39
118 Cogwords No.1 (1972), p.12; also Leicestershire Education Committee Attendance Register of
Evacuated School Parties 1939-40
119 Leicestershire Education Committee Attendance Register of Evacuated School Parties 1939-40
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more suitable premises had been found, and tables and desks
had been borrowed and furniture had been transferred from
Sheffield, things improved a good deal.,,120
The immediate impact on receiving schools was often great and, while Sheffield
newspapers were reassuring parents at home that there was "a pleasant feeling between
the evacuees and the village people",121it is plain that the picture was not always so
rosy and local teachers in the reception areas had their own misgivings about the
situation. The minutes of a meeting of Nottinghamshire National Union of Women
Teachers revealed concern: "Rural education cannot stand up to it: they have not the
equipment, staffs or buildings.,,122 In Sutton Bonington, a resident Nottinghamshire
teacher commented on the influx of evacuees and teachers from Sheffield which caused
teaching problems through overcrowding and over-staffing. Her relief as the situation
resolved itself by the drift back is apparent:
"The curriculum was severely affected for a time but after the
first year or so of the war most of the evacuees and teachers had
returned home and normality reigned.,,123
Another teacher who was interviewed described the impact of the sudden influx of
evacuees from Sheffield upon her small school in Leicestershire and, perhaps
unwittingly, revealed her feelings of dismay at the disruption:
"Yes, an entire class came. The children and teacher were
dumped on us really. We only had three classrooms in the
school and it was very awkward. She had to move with the
children from one room to another. Then they integrated with
h I 11 ,,124our se 00 rea y.
120 Firs Hill Schools 1893-1993: pp.28, 29
121 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 11.10.39, p.4
122 National Union of Women Teachers Minute Book 1940-41, Nottingham Archives Ref DDrrul1411
123 I Judson: Remembering Sutton Bonington, p.55
124 Oral interview: Violet Hutchinson 6.9.96
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An ex-evacuee, sent to Nottinghamshire, remembered the difficulties at the small
village school at Farnsworth:
"It was so crowded at first that we had to sit three to a desk. I
think we were educated with the village children in the
mornings and went for walks many afternoons in the
countryside. But after six months there were only six of us
evacuees left in the village.,,125
Yet despite the many difficulties, education in the reception areas did generally get
under way quickly. Some evacuated schools were operational within a week of arrival,
and nearly all pupils had been found school accommodation by the middle of
September.!" That is not to say that schools were functioning normally, however:
indeed, it would have been natve to expect this, for overcrowding and shortages of
equipment were problems suffered by both evacuees and local pupils, to say nothing of
their teachers.
Pupils of evacuated special schools tended, on the whole, to suffer less upset. In
general, children at these schools were not billeted with householders, but were usually
sent in parties with their teachers and other helpers to communal accommodation in
camps, large houses or hotels, where they operated as separate entities within the
community, often being educated independently of local children.l" In Sheffield, as
has been seen in Chapter Three, the children of Maud Maxfield School for the Deaf
were briefly evacuated to Normanton Hall School in Southwell, but other Sheffield
m Oral interview: Patricia Gamble, 12.3.96
126 Leicestershire Education Committee: Minutes 1939/40, p.7717
127 The Health of the School Child: Report of Chief Medical Officer Ministry of Education 1939-45, p.82
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special schools were either situated in neutral areas of the city or do not appear to have
been evacuated.
Where schools could operate autonomously the interruption to education was obviously
less than where pupils were dispersed over large areas and separated from their units, or
where schools had to share premises with local establishments and operate on a shift
system. However, it is clear that many evacuees did not receive their customary hours
or quality of education, although it may be argued that opportunities afforded by the
countryside for nature study compensated for the lack of formal teaching. Moreover,
the absence of specialist staff for secondary school pupils often meant that older
children were deprived of learning those subjects at a critical stage for examinations. In
addition, younger children sutTered disruption when their familiar teachers were
recalled to the cities. 128
It has been disappointing to find that the thirty-five relevant log-books available in
Sheffield Archives (accounting for only half the number of schools officially evacuated)
contain very few references to the school curriculum as experienced in the reception
areas. Exceptionally, the head master ofOwler Lane Intermediate School reported that
in Newark the children met in the afternoons for organised games, rambles, and visits to
places of historical interest. 129 Other information, such as the fact that pupils from Firs
Hill Council School integrated well into local community life, has been gleaned from
booklets produced by local history societies 130 and from personal interviews.
128 A Calder: The People's War, p.4S
129 Log book: Owler Lane School, entry 12.9.39
130 Firs Hill Schools 1893-1993, p.28
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Although evacuation imposed many strains on education in reception areas, there were
benefits too. Urban children experienced a new way of life in the countryside, which
broadened their horizons; and country children also learned from the newcomers a new
outlook and new ambitions. 131 As one former evacuee from Sheffield attested:
"Nature study lessons started off for me, and probably for many
of the other children, a life-long interest in flowers, birds and
insects. The lessons took the form of long rambles with
frequent stops to examine objects of interest. ,,132
In Leicestershire, some of the Sheffield evacuees who remained in Shepshed joined
local school children in playing their part in the war effort. Senior boys dug gardens,
grew vegetables and fruit while the girls picked blackberries and made jam. In 1942
senior children were allowed to work in the fields for three days a week at harvest time
and were paid for their efforts. 133
If educational arrangements in reception areas were less than satisfactory, they were far
worse, and frequently non-existent at first, for those remaining behind in the danger
areas. At the outbreak of war all schools in evacuation areas had been closed, as well as
medical and dental services and milk and meals schemes, for it had been expected that
large-scale evacuation from the danger areas would render them unnecessary.l" Many
school buildings had been commandeered by civil defence authorities and equipment,
books and furniture had often been removed. The log book of Philadelphia Infants'
School, for instance, recorded that a company of Royal Engineers moved in and stacked
desks in the playground even as the evacuation party of school children were waiting to
13J Lowndes: op. cit., p.213
132 D Lacy: Recollections of Evacuation, taped conversation, op. cit.
133 Log book: Shepshed Council Senior School; also oral interview: Jean Perry, 4.9.96
134 Lowndes: op. cit., p.2l1
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leave for the reception areas.i" In the first months of the war there was initially little or
no opportunity of formal schooling for those children who had either returned home
early or who had not gone away in the first place. Titmuss estimated that by the end of
December over 1,000,000 children had been without education for more than four
months in the danger zones.136
The problem of school children, their numbers ever swelling as more and more
evacuees returned home, running wild in large towns and cities was widely aired in
public. In October The Manchester Guardian, for example, took up the urgent cry for
schools to be reopened in the danger areas, stating that across the country evacuated
children were returning to their homes each day in hundreds to towns and cities where
no education awaited them.137But the government faced a dilemma: to reopen schools
may be taken as an admission of the failure of evacuation and could threaten the
government's scheme. Also, civil defence arrangements would be disrupted if schools
that had been taken over had to be returned to the education authorities. As a
compromise measure, in the face of popular pressure to reopen empty schools and
reclaim occupied premises, the Board of Education recommended on 29 September that
local authorities should organise home tuition in small groups for children in danger
areas but made clear that no authority was given for the opening of schools for ordinary
instruction.!"
J35 Log book: Philadelphia Infants' School, entry 2.9.39
136 T'Itmuss: op. cit., p.146
137 The Manchester Guardian: 27.10.39, p.7
138 Board of Education Circular 1479, 29.9.39, Education, No. 1917,6.10.39, p.298
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In Sheffield, where the need was great because of the disappointingly small number of
children evacuated, the Deputy Chief Education Officer, Dr W P Alexander, had
already put such a plan into action. By 18 September, less than three weeks after
Operation "Pied Piper", the first stage of the Sheffield Home Tuition Scheme was up
and running, enabling small groups of children to receive some education in their own
or neighbours' homes from peripatetic staff. In order to operate the scheme 341
evacuated teachers - nearly two-thirds of those who had gone away less than three
weeks earlierJ39 - were called home, no longer needed in the reception areas in view of
dwindling numbers there. Many others soon followed, as examination of available log
books shOWS.140The amount of teaching was necessarily limited but fulfilled a useful
purpose, as one of the teachers involved in teaching the children in their homes later
observed: "The children didn't learn much but at least the schools kept in touch with
them, and that was all that could be hoped for.,,141
The Sheffield initiative was widely praised in Parliament and by education authorities
across the country as well as by national and local newspapers.if but calls continued in
both press and Parliament for school buildings in evacuation areas to be reopened.
However, it was not until 1 November 1939 that the government announced that those
schools with adequate shelter provision and which were not needed for civil defence
purposes could reopen. Others which were not required by other agencies could reopen
139 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 19.10.39, p.5
l~g books, e.g.: Philadelphia, St Barnabas, Wybourn Schools
141 C Parsons: Schools in an Urban Community, p.135
142 HoC Deb. 6.11.39, Vol. 353, Cols. 884-5; also, eg, Education: No. 1916,29.9.39, p.277; No. 1920,
27.10.39, p.358; The Manchester Guardian: 7.10.39,p.7
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when shelters were built and they complied with government safety conditions.l" In
theory this went some way to address the problem; but in practice it was many months
before adequate safety arrangements could be completed for some schools and formal
education for all children could recommence.
However, simply reopening schools did not provide a complete answer to the problem
because, while children in reception areas were legally bound to attend school, there
was no such obligation on those in the evacuation areas, even where facilities for
education were available. With concerns about escalating numbers of children still out
of school, and increasing hooliganism in some areas, there were continued calls for
children in the danger zones to be compelled to attend school. In February 1940, after
apparently dragging its feet for several weeks, the government eventually instructed
local authorities to re-introduce compulsory education throughout the country from the
beginning of April.!" The outcome was encouraging: Parliament heard that by 2 May
an average of half the children of elementary school age in evacuation areas across the
country were receiving full-time education by May and only 10% (about 115,000) were
getting no education at all: 87% of secondary school children were receiving full-time
schooling and only 5% none.!"
Sheffield's results were slightly better: at that time all the city's children of school age
were catered for in some measure, with 65% receiving full-time education, 25% being
taught part-time and 10% still receiving home tuition.l'" Formal schooling in Sheffield
143 HoC Deb. 2.11.39, Vol 352, Cols. 2187-8; Education, No. 1922,10.11.39, p.400
144 Sheffield City Council: Minutes 1939140, p.271
14S HoC Deb. 2.5.40, Vol 360, Cols. 884-6; also Titmuss: op. cit., p.147
146 Percentages calculated from figures given in The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 23.5.40, p.l
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then continued throughout the war, despite intermittent raids on the city, apart from a
short break in December 1940 after heavy bombing, when all schools were closed and
teachers deployed in evacuation work until those schools which were undamaged could
reopen in mid-January 1941. J47
Education was not the only casualty of the war: welfare services for children, in
particular for those who had not been evacuated, also suffered greatly. It has already
been seen that school medical services, essentially in abeyance for a month before the
first exodus because schools were on holiday, were largely suspended in evacuation
areas on the outbreak of war even though large numbers of children remained in these
regions.!" While some school doctors, dentists and nurses were sent to reception areas
to assist existing staffs there with problems concerned with suddenly increased school
populations, medical personnel not evacuated were often redeployed in civil defence
services, thus leaving many children who remained at home without normal medical
services.l'" In Sheffield, despite the fact that some members of the school health
service were initially seconded to the reception areas, medical facilities were
maintained throughout the war. School clinics, too, continued to be staffed even though
some were shared with Civil Defence services. Nevertheless, depletion of staff meant
that routine medical examinations of school children were considerably scaled down.""
The situation was unsatisfactory in regard to provision of free milk and school meals for
poor children. This time it was not only those remaining in the danger areas who were
147 Dent: op. cit., p.76; Log books, e.g. Woodbourn Boys' School; Carbrook Boys' School
148 Titmuss: op. cit., p.145
149 The Health of the School Child: op. cit., p.31
ISO Sheffield Education Committee: Survey April 1939-March 1947, p.25
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left without these services when schools closed: many evacuees were also without them
for many weeks. As early as May 1939 Board of Education Circular 1469 had
expressed the intention that children entitled to these facilities would continue to
receive them in the reception areas; but administration of such schemes was at the
discretion of the local authorities concerned.l" Titmuss asserted that the failure of the
government to specify fully how these services should be funded in the reception areas
led to prevarication and delay for evacuees. It was not until mid-1941 that provision
was fully restored in both reception and evacuation areas.152
The issue of free milk for needy evacuees was somewhat clarified when the Board of
Education specified that the cost of provision was to be recovered from the evacuating
authority. But the further suggestion, that other evacuees could also benefit from the
school milk service with parents contributing the halfpenny charge per bottle, led to
wrangling between receiving and evacuating authorities about how to recover
payment.P' Research at Brookside School in the former reception area of East Leake
has shown that Sheffield Education Committee furnished lists of evacuees entitled to
free milk to the receiving authorities and reimbursed the costs. Not all evacuating
authorities were as forthcoming, however, as a circular from the Director of
Nottinghamshire Education Committee to the county's head teachers indicated:
"Leeds authority have stated that it would appear necessary to
supply milk to those cases only where the Nottinghamshire
school Medical Officer reports under-nourtshrnent."!"
I$l PH J H Gosden: Education in the Second World War, p.185
m Titmuss: op. cit., p.222
IS3 Board of Education Circular 1475,31.8.39 in Titmuss: op. cit., p.222(n.3); Gosden: op. cit., p.185
154 Letter Sept 1940: Nottinghamshire Education Committee, at Brookside County Primary School
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The subject of school meals was a thorny one, too. As early as 1938, the Anderson
Report had foreseen the need to help foster parents by providing communal meals for
evacuees. In August 1939, on the eve of evacuation, the Board of Education made it
clear that free provision would not be necessary because the billeting allowance would
cover the COSt.155But many foster parents were, understandably, unwilling to pay the
two shillings asked of them from their billeting allowances, and parents had already
been assessed for their contributions.P" In addition, delay in hiring and equipping
premises for communal feeding centres caused by confusion over financial
responsibility was not resolved until November, when the government agreed to defray
the cost. 157Even then, the scheme was slow to get off the ground because of apathy on
the part of receiving authorities: by March 1940 only 3% of evacuees were receiving
communal meals, two-thirds of these authorities having reported there was no demand
for the service.P" Itwas not until late in 1941 that the situation regarding both milk and
meals improved, when the government raised the grants for these facilities and rest
centres were used for providing school meals. In 1944 free milk was made available to
all unaccompanied evacuees billeted officially.159
Problems of funding various aspects of the government evacuation scheme have been
discussed in earlier chapters. Financial arrangements regarding education were the
subject of constant deliberation between the various local authorities, as records lodged
ISS Board of Education Circular 1475, 31.8.39; Education: No. 1913,8.9.39, p.217
1S6 Titmuss: op. cit., p.164
IS7 Board of Education Circular 1484,21.11.39; F Le Gros Clark & R W Toms: Evacuation: Failure
or Reform?, p.14
ISS Titmuss: op. cit., p.l64
IS9 ibid., p.222; R Samways: We Think You Ought to Go, pp.40, 41
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at Leicestershire Record Office demonstrate. The county's Director of Education wrote
regularly to Sheffield Education Committee setting out the costs incurred for educating
evacuees in the county's secondary schools. At Loughborough Grammar School £10
per head per year was claimed for Sheffield boys where no city teacher was present, but
at the town's High School for Girls the evacuees were accompanied by a Sheffield
teacher and only £ l.16s. 9d per head per year was requested until Easter 1941, when it
was increased to £10 per head, presumably because the teacher had returned to the city.
A charge of £2.12s.6d for each evacuee who sat for the School Certificate examination
was levied on the sending authority. Other, more obscure, expenses were incurred too:
at Rawlins Grammar School in Quorn, for example, an amount of one shilling per
evacuee per annum was claimed towards the upkeep of the school grounds.l'"
In December 1939 the Board of Education, realising the need for reading matter to
occupy evacuees in the long winter evenings, made representations to the government
for funding. The Exchequer finally agreed to meet the costs incurred in sending
additional books to reception areas on a scale of £ 1 per annum for every 800 children in
reception areas under the government's evacuation scheme. There was also a Treasury
allowance of £1.1Os per 1,000 books to help libraries in evacuation areas willing to send
books to reception areas for evacuees.l'" At the same time Sheffield Libraries
Department sent 2,480 library books to the reception areas for the use of evacuated
Sheffield school children.162
160 Various letters, Leicestershire Education Committee: Education General File
161 Board of Education Circular 1493, 15.12.39; Education, No. 1928,22.12.39, p.523
162 Sheffield Education Committee: Report 1939-40, p.393
254
In 1939 the continued drift back worried local education officials in Sheffield, as in
other cities. Members of the Education Committee, dismayed by the likelihood that the
constant homeward stream of evacuee school children would jeopardise the home
tuition scheme, visited local teachers in the reception areas and praised arrangements
there. But they warned parents:
"Our chief concern at the moment is that the children there are
enjoying possibilities of education which may not be
forthcoming for a long time in Sheffield and may perhaps in
some districts never be forthcoming at all until the war is
over.,,163
Nevertheless, the stream of evacuees returning to the city continued relentlessly. Itmay
not be surprising to note that figures were high where pupils were separated from their
peers: Wybourn Council School, dispersed among seven village schools, showed half
the original number of 137had returned six weeks later, while Walkley Council School,
similarly scattered, recorded an even higher figure with two-thirds of the original sixty-
six having left in the same period and only twelve remaining in the reception area by
Easter 1940.164
Where evacuated schools operated as independent units and friends remained together
the homeward flow appeared less rapid, however: Firs Hill school, accommodated in
two church halls, showed a loss of only a third of the original number in the first six
weeks. However, by the beginning of the January term numbers were so small that only
two teachers of the original four were needed, both of whom had returned by mid-1940
163 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 12.10.39, p.4
164 Leicestershire Education Committee Attendance Register of Evacuated School Parties 1939-40
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when only fourteen children remained.l'" Even where very small numbers had been
evacuated the rate of returning was high, as the log book for Philadelphia Infants'
School demonstrates. Twelve children from this school were evacuated to
Nottinghamshire on 1 September, but by 9 October only four remained there, two of
whom were from the same family.l'" Hillsborough Council School appears to be the
only one which maintained its numbers fairly well, with thirty-nine of the original fifty-
six junior children still present at Kegworth School when the summer holidays
commenced the following July - perhaps influenced by the presence of the head
teacher, who travelled to the reception area and remained there for several months.l'"
It was little different for older pupils. Comprehensive lists have not been available for
evacuees to Nottinghamshire, but Leicestershire Education Committee records show
that a total of 612 senior school children from Sheffield were received into schools in
the county at the beginning of September, of whom only 349 were left by the end of
November.168 In Loughborough, where St Peter's Church Hall was acquired for senior-
age school evacuees, 145 pupils from a variety of Sheffield schools were admitted on
18 September. Examination of the school registers shows that this number had been
halved by the end of October, and only twenty-eight of the original entrants, or 19.3%,
were still there six months later: a mere eight were left when the school merged with
local schools in September 1942. The chart below, compiled from the registers,
illustrates the position.l'"
16S Leicestershire Register of Evacuated School Parties 1939-40; Firs Hill Schools 1893-1993, pp.28,29
166 Log book: Philadelphia Infants' School, entries 1.9.39,9.10.39
167 Cogwords No.1 (1972), p.16; Leicestershire Registers of Evacuated School Parties 1939-44
168 Leicestershire Education Committee: Minutes 1939140, p.77S3
169 St Peter's School Admissions Registers 1939-1943, Leicestershire Record Office, Ref DE 13601131
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Sheffield Senior School Evacuees on the Register of St Peter's School,
Loughborough, from 18 September 1939 to 31 July 1942
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Schools which had made their own arrangements also had their problems with the drift
homeward. Reference has already been made in Chapter Two to Notre Dame School,
whose staff and pupils had moved to Derwent Hall in Ashopton at the beginning of the
war. Although the evacuation was deemed a success, some children had inevitably
remained behind in the city and others gradually returned to Sheffield, leaving staff
obliged to reopen the city premises in 1940. Managing both sites proved uneconomic
and the country premises were closed in May 1941 when they were condemned as unfit
by a Board of Education Inspector."? In answer to severe criticism by the local press,
the governors set out their dilemma:
"The government has now changed its view and sanctioned the
opening of all schools in Sheffield. Under these circumstances
the authorities of Notre Dame were compelled to reopen their
school in Cavendish Street or lose the majority of their
pupils. ,,171
170 V Hallam: Silent Valley at War, pp.23-25
171 The Sheffield Telegraph &Independent: 12.7.41,p.2
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Nor was the wish to return home confined to evacuated mothers and unaccompanied
children: it was hardly surprising to note that school teachers, too, became restive as the
months passed. The demands upon evacuated teachers were great: charged with taking
on new and arduous duties in the reception areas, teachers also often acted in loco
parentis to their pupils as the only familiar adult to whom unhappy evacuee children
could turn. Lacking their customary equipment and surroundings, they were forced to
adapt to new ways of teaching, either fitting in around the timetables of local schools or
improvising independent units in church halls or similar buildings. In addition, some
staff organised play centres after school hours during term-time in order to keep the
evacuees out of trouble and relieve householders.Y' They were often also burdened
with the task of reviewing the state of evacuees' clothing, maintaining contact with
parents and householders, and recovering money (and coupons later in the war) from
parents for boot and shoe repairs.!"
Governmental parsimony, discussed earlier in regard to evacuees, also affected
teachers. Having left their homes and families for an unknown length of time, many
had to find their own accommodation in the receiving areas and often found it
particularly difficult to find billets. Faced with a choice between the higher lodging
allowances available from civil servants who had been granted twenty-one shillings per
week for full board, or the five shillings payable from teachers (for room only), many
householders naturally preferred the former.174
172 Education: No. 1923, 17.11.39, p.424
173 Titmuss: op. cit., p.375
174 Education: No. 1914, 15.9.39, p.237
258
Although evacuation service was voluntary, many teachers had willingly accompanied
their pupils to the reception areas initially: but the shortfall in numbers of children
leaving Sheffield, and the early homecoming of many more, had necessitated the early
return ofthe vast majority of staff to the city. Not only was it uneconomic to keep them
in areas where there were insufficient pupils to teach, but they were needed in the city
as the home tuition scheme got under way. Examination of log books in both Sheffield
and the reception areas has shown that, throughout the early part of the war at least,
there was a constant coming-and-going of teachers between the receiving authorities
and the city. As numbers dwindled and evacuees were absorbed into village schools,
some of those who remained took on the role of peripatetic staff, moving around
between evacuated units as the need arose.!"
But it was apparent by the end of the year that some of those who had stayed on in the
reception areas initially were also ready to come home. An article in The Hallamshire
Teacher, the journal of the Association of Sheffield Teachers, stated that there had been
"some difficulties" for evacuated staff and went on:
"Quite a number of Sheffield teachers who have been in
Leicestershire or Nottinghamshire since September 1st feel that
it is time that somebody relieved them for a period."
The ensuing request for those with few personal ties in the city to come forward may
imply a reluctance of some teachers to volunteer for evacuation service as the war
progressed.!" On the other hand, some teachers apparently enjoyed working in the
reception areas. Three Sheffield teachers from Newhall Council School were still in
m Log books: Awsworth, Linby, Shepshed Schools in Notts & Leics; Ellesmere Road, Owler Lane
Schools in Sheffield
176 The Hallamshire Teacher: Combined Nos. 51152, p.4
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the Kegworth area three years later. Another, evacuated to Loughborough for two
years, wrote to the above journal: "Yes, evacuation is pleasant, its duties resting lightly
in these calm surroundings."!"
By November 1939 the Board of Education was considering what to do with evacuee
children remaining in the reception areas during the Christmas holidays. Evacuated
teachers were asked to take their holidays on a rota system, leaving some available to
organise out-of-school activities during the period while schools were closed.!" Local
authorities were requested to contribute towards the cost of organising play centres for
evacuated children, and records show that Sheffield Education Committee made a grant
available to Nottinghamshire County Council of a sum "not exceeding £75" for this
purpose.!" Although no mention has been found of a similar grant to Leicestershire
County Council it may be assumed that similar action was taken.
Despite these arrangements, growing fears were expressed that large numbers of
children would return to their homes for Christmas and that, once reunited, families
would not wish to be separated again. The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent made a
rather half-hearted attempt to dissuade parents from bringing their children home:
"We do not suppose the evacuated children will really suffer
much. There will be Christmas joys of some sort for them in the
reception areas. [... ] The children will be better off and safer
where they are. ,,180
177 The Hallamshire Teacher: No ..8, p.l
178 Education, No. 1923, 17.11.39, p.424
179 Sheffield Education Committee: Report 1939140, p.393
180 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 4.11.39, p.4
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But six weeks later stronger pressure was perceptible. An article announced the
intention of reception authorities to provide parties and entertainment for the evacuees
and declared:
"Those who remain [in their billets] will have a much better
time than those who come back. [... ] It is expected that this
will be the dullest Christmas on record for children in Sheffield,
as school parties will be out of the quesnon."!"
The Minister of Health appealed through both national and local newspapers to people
in reception areas to make the evacuees' first Christmas away from home a happy one.
Avoiding any government financial liability for festive arrangements, he suggested that
local authorities in evacuation areas should help with the costs involved,
Optimistically, he continued:
"Simple entertainments are all we suggest. A tea party in a local
hall, with a Christmas tree, a bag of sweets, a conjuring turn
perhaps, will be enough to make a child enjoy and remember his
Christmas as an evacuee.,,182
The Finance Committee of Sheffield City Council responded with a special grant
towards the cost of Christmas festivities for evacuated children at the rate of two
shillings per head, to provide Christmas entertainment for officially evacuated city
children in the reception areas. Reflecting the number of children remaining away from
home, this amount was successively reduced year by year. Whereas in 1939 the grant
was for £200, by the following year it was £100. In 1941 a sum "not exceeding £60"
was allowed; but by 1942 it was down to £15 and remained the same in the following
181 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 14.12.39, p.8
182 The Newark Herald: 2.12.39, p.2
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year.183 By Christmas 1944 Sheffield children had officially returned home, and no
grant was made.
In many reception areas there was evidence that efforts were made to entertain evacuees
during the festive season for several years. Both local and evacuated teachers combined
to hold parties in school halls at Newark and at Hathern, while in East Leake it was the
WVS who were responsible for organising a party for evacuees and their parents.l"
Many local groups and individuals also provided Christmas parties and presents for
Sheffield evacuees. In Nottinghamshire, for instance, the Order of Oddfellows
distributed gifts for evacuees to its members who were acting as foster parents.I" In
Leicestershire, Toe H organised toy distributions for necessitous children, while local
people entertained evacuees at Kegworth and Shepshed. Numbers of evacuees
remaining in reception areas influenced arrangements in following years: in some areas
there were so few evacuees that they were integrated with local children. In Shepshed,
dwindling numbers enabled organisers to take evacuees to the local cinema in 1940,
and were apparently small enough in 1943 for a party to be held in a local Cafe.l86
The increased drift back at Christmas continued to be a problem in ensuing years, as did
official efforts to discourage parents from bringing their children home. The
suspension of special low railway fares for parents over the holiday period throughout
183 Sheffield Education Committee: Reports: 1939140, p.185; 1940141, p.39; 194/142, p.346; 1942143,
p.318; 1943144, p.339
184 The Nottingham Evening Post: 21.12.39, p.8; The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 29.12.39, p.5;
Brookside County Primary School (formerly East Leake Council School) papers.
18S The Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser: 15.12.39, p.3
186 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 24.11.39, p.4; 22.12.39, p.5; 29.12.39, p.8; 12.1.40, p.10;
26.1.40, p.8; 3.1.40, p.6; The LoughboroughMonitor: 6.1.44, p.5
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the war was no doubt also aimed at dissuading parents from visiting over the Christmas
period. In 1941, by which time there were only six hundred official unaccompanied
evacuees and a similar number of privately billeted children, local newspapers drew
attention to the fact that many parents were now employed in war work and unlikely to
get more than one day's break, urging parents not to visit their children or to allow them
to come for a holiday.187
Not all children returned home early, however, for evacuation could prove a happy
experience for them and for their householders. One of the few evacuees interviewed
who stayed with her foster parents for the full duration of evacuation said that her
experience in Awsworth, Nottinghamshire, was very positive, although her sister was
unhappy and joined the drift back at an early stage. She stated:
"I was happy from the start. [... ] I used to go all over with them
- everywhere they went, I went. They were very kind. They
looked on me as a daughter really. When I came home they
were very upset.,,188
This evacuee's foster mother confirmed the success of the placement and said of her
charge: "We made a princess of her. We wanted to adopt her.,,189
It was not unknown for evacuees to settle so well with their foster parents that they
never returned to their own homes. One interviewee was evacuated with four siblings
to Shepshed, where the children were split up in several different billets. When she
returned home early after her first unsuccessful placement, neighbours of the foster
mother wrote to Sheffield and pleaded to take her into their home. This second billet
187 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 10.12.41, p.3
188 Oral interview: Brenda Cox, 8..3.95
189 Oral interview: Gladys Smith, 12.5.95
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proved successful beyond anyone's expectations, for she remained with this couple
when her natural parents died in 1944:
"I lived with them until 1married, and then lived in the house
next door to them. I cared for them in their last years, so
hopefully I repaid them for their kindness to me."
Her sister, billeted separately nearby, also stayed with her foster parents until she
married.l "
Very few private evacuees were interviewed. One, however, told how, having returned
home soon after the first official programme, she was sent to Shepshed after the
Sheffield blitz to join her sister who was already successfully billeted there. She
recounted her experience as the evacuation scheme officially ended for city children:
"When the government said the evacuees could go back, I went
back too. But my mother persuaded me that the other people
could give me a better chance in life than she could.,,191
This woman settled in Shepshed after the war and was still living there when
interviewed over fifty years later.
Some interviewees commented that they thought their parents were pleased to have
their children away: it was noted that these tended to be members of large families.
One observed that his mother was relieved when some of her ten children were
evacuated.192 Another, one of four brothers evacuated to Surrey, said:
"I think it was quite a help for my parents having two of us boys
away, and they only brought us back to prevent my mother being
called up for munitions work.,,193
190 Oral interview: Iris Howard, 4.9.96
191 Oral interview: Shirley Hull, 4.9.96
192 Oral interview: George Green. 17.12.93
193 Oral interview: James Roffey, 30.3.97
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Likewise, another Sheffield interviewee, evacuated with his twin brother and a sister
but who had seven more siblings, said: "I think it was a good thing for my parents. It
had been hard for them to make ends meet at home. ,,194
Chapters Six and Seven will show that, while many of the problems outlined in this and
the previous chapter were successfully tackled in ensuing movements, some were not
resolved as the war progressed.
194 Oral interview: George Shelley, 12.8.96
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CHAPTER SIX
THE 'TRICKLE' EVACUATION
As the 'phoney war' progressed and the expected heavy bombardment of Britain failed
to materialise, the problem of cities crowded with vulnerable citizens continued to
exercise the minds of government officials. In February 1940a new scheme, known as
Plan Four or the 'Trickle' programme, was announced for evacuation. Drawn up in
close consultation between the Ministry of Health and the Board of Education, together
with representatives of local authorities and the teaching professions in England and
Scotland, the objective was to retain in the reception areas as many as possible of those
evacuees already there and to provide for further large-scale movement of civilians if
serious air raids developed.I
The new programme was initially intended to apply only to school children, who would
travel to safety in their school groups over a period of time as and when the need arose.
Evacuation would be voluntary but, in an attempt to prevent the premature drift
homeward which had caused such havoc with the previous scheme. parents were to be
asked to sign an undertaking to leave the children in the reception areas until the school
units returned. Billets in private houses would remain the main source of
accommodation for the majority of evacuees, but hostels would be provided for difficult
children and those unsuitable for billeting with foster parents. Revealing the new
1 R M Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy, History of the Second World War, p.174
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scheme, Walter Elliot, Minister of Health, optimistically declared that the longer period
available for planning would enable arrangements to be more satisfactory than the last
time. At the same time, he announced that billeting allowances for children over
fourteen years of age would be increased by two shillings to lOs.6d. from 2 March
irrespective of the new scheme, and billeting allowances would be extended to cover
unaccompanied children evacuated under private arrangements, even if they were
billeted with relatives'
As German forces swept through Belgium and Holland in May, Plan Four had to be
hastily re-drawn as reception zones along the coasts of south and east England were
exposed to attack. It was considered essential to move as many civilians from these
areas as possible, including large numbers of people who had already been evacuated
there from London. From 19 May the task began of removing London evacuees and
local children from a ten-mile radius of the coasts of Sussex, Kent, Essex, Norfolk and
Suffolk, and later from the Medway towns, inland to the Midlands and South Wales.
With the fall of France, children were also moved from Portsmouth, Southampton and
Gosport and the following month from several towns on the east and north-east coasts.
At the same time, the 'Trickle' scheme (now known as Plan Five) was put into
operation to remove parties of school children from London at regular intervals.'
At the end of June it became necessary to encompass other vulnerable groups. Partly to
stimulate the voluntary migration of mothers and young children from the coasts, and
also to meet a growing demand for facilities to be offered to mothers in other areas, at
2 HoC Deb. 15.2.40, Vol. 357, Cols. 993-6; also The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 16.2.40, pp.5,6
3 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.242,3
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the end of June the Ministry of Health announced an additional programme. This new
'assisted private evacuation scheme' applied only to women with children under the age
of five years, although older school children were allowed to accompany their mothers
as well, and the onus of finding accommodation in reception areas rested with these
evacuees. The government agreed to provide free travel vouchers and to pay to
householders a billeting allowance of five shillings a week for the mother and three
shillings per child.4
By the end of October the onset of the Blitzkrieg induced the government to adopt an
even more liberal policy towards private evacuees in an effort to encourage non-
essential persons to move away from the affected areas. Free travel and billeting
allowances were offered to several other categories of individuals who normally resided
in the Greater London evacuation area and could make their own arrangements: mothers
with children of any age, expectant mothers and elderly, disabled or homeless people
were now included in the arrangements. At the end of the year the allowances were
extended to private evacuees of all the official categories from any of the danger areas,
provided that they specified a definite destination in reception areas. At the same time
some districts which had previously been classified as neutral were brought into use as
reception areas. In addition, agreements were made with the governments of Eire and
Northern Ireland for billeting allowances to be paid for mothers and children who could
make private arrangements there.'
4 T H O'Brien: Civil Defence: History of the Second World War, p.361; also Titmuss: op. cit., pp.242,43
'Titmuss: op. cit., p.361,367; also HoC Deb. 17.10.40, Vol. 365, Col. 814
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But the welter of amendments brought in by the Ministry of Health regarding categories
eligible for evacuation sometimes led to confusion among evacuating individuals as
well as receiving authorities. Mass-Observation reported as typical the reaction of the
Deputy Clerk of one local authority:
"The arrangements are too involved for average folks to
understand, and too many forms to fill in and sign. [... ] This
for people whose whole world has come about their ears in the
previous 24 hours.?"
In designing the 'Trickle' scheme, mindful of earlier unhappy experiences, planners had
been loath to include mothers in any future organised movement of evacuees. But the
onset of heavy air-raids on the capital in September, which left women with no official
facilities except for the 'private assisted' scheme, forced the government to introduce a
limited programme on 22 September for the officially-organised evacuation of
homeless mothers with their children from a few East London boroughs. This,
however, met with little response, with only 2,600 evacuees leaving under the scheme
by the end of that month. The government evacuation programme was then quickly
extended to all mothers and children in the whole of the Metropolitan area of London,
becoming Plan Seven, (a complicated Plan Six having been abandoned/ with the result
that approximately 89,000 mothers and children were evacuated in October: however,
numbers once again fell off to 11,200 in November and only 1,300 in December."
Throughout the years of planning for evacuation, and following the disappointing
response of so many in the priority groups in September 1939, the subject of making
6 Mass-Observation File 483, p.9
7 R Samways: We Think You Ought to Go, p.ll
8 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.285,6
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evacuation compulsory had been frequently discussed and discarded. With the enemy
advance through Europe, the government once more came under increasing pressure to
make obligatory the evacuation of school children. But, in the light of experience
gained in Operation 'Pied Piper', officials feared that parents would refuse to comply
with any official order to evacuate their children, which would leave the government in
the tricky situation of either having to ignore their refusal or else of taking punitive
measures against them. Pressed on the subject in Parliament, Malcolm MacDonald,
now Minister of Health, announced on 30 May 1940:
"My information from all parts of the country is that a
considerable proportion of parents would not co-operate in any
scheme for their compulsory separation from their children. ...
We have come to the conclusion ... that we should continue this
as a voluntary scheme.?"
Six months later he repeated that it was impractical to bring in compulsory powers to
prevent the return of children from reception areas." The President of the Board of
Education echoed the message on 13 December, the day after the first blitz on
Sheffield, when he told a local reporter: "Compulsory evacuation is socially and
politically impossible.,,11
Nevertheless, compulsory evacuation was applied in a limited way. In the face of
continued heavy bombing and in response to concern about the effect of shelter life on
children remaining in danger areas of Greater London, the government assumed new
powers under Defence Regulation 31C. Local authorities in Greater London were thus
9 HoC Deb. 30.5.40, Vol. 361 Cols. 637-8
10 HoC Deb. 19.12.40, Vol. 367 Col. 1330
11 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 13.12.40, p.S
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permitted to order the medical examination of any child under fourteen years old
believed to be suffering in mind or body as a result of war conditions and to require a
distressed child to be sent away from the area under the evacuation scheme.V Little
immediate use appears to have been made of these powers, however, for in mid-
February 1941 the Minister of Health reported to Parliament that only two children had
been compulsorily evacuated in this way.13The LCC Record of Education examined at
the Public Record Office showed, however, that "about 470" children under the age of
five years were evacuated:14 no further mention of the subject has been traced in the
course of this research.
The reluctance of large numbers of people in danger areas to comply with government
plans for evacuation had been noted in 1939. It was no surprise, therefore, that
resistance was again evident when the 'Trickle' scheme was introduced. In March
1940, when a publicity campaign began a month after the announcement of the new
plan, over nine million circulars were sent to householders in evacuation and reception
areas throughout the country, explaining the programme. More than three and a half
million of these were sent out in danger zones, (one hundred thousand forms in
Sheffield alone), asking parents to decide whether they wished to register their children
for evacuation to safe areas if air raids developed. IS Once more, national and local
response was apathetic. In an effort to drum up more support in the city, The Sheffield
Telegraph & Independent reported an extension of the closing date for registration: but
12 HoC Deb. 19.12.40, Vol. 367, Cols. 1330-1; The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 13.12.40, p.5
13 HoC Deb. 13.2.41, Vol.. 368, CoIS.1493-4
14 PRO.ED.138/49
" The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 1.3.40, p.7
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it was to no avail, for only a few hundred parents bothered to return their forms and
many of those stated the wished to keep their children at home."
With the threat of invasion looming, the Board of Education stepped up its preparations
to institute the new programme of evacuation. Schools throughout the country were
ordered to open specially for medical inspections to take place on Whit Monday 1940.17
Although details were broadcast on radio and publicised in the national and local press,
with reassurances that billets were waiting for evacuees under the new scheme,"
Sheffield parents once more demonstrated their determination not to be separated from
their children. Very few of the city's children arrived to be medically examined, the
largest number (sixty-six) discovered by this research having been at Wybourn Senior
Mixed School, where there is no record of how many actually registered for evacuation.
Although twelve children turned up for examination at Owler Lane Intermediate School
on the appointed day, none was registered for evacuation two weeks later." Despite the
early reticence, 22,420 city children were eventually inspected at their schools. and kept
under supervision with special regard to contagious skin diseases and uncleanliness.
However, after all the efforts, the School Medical Officer for Sheffield Education
Committee reported that only 1,656 children (a tiny fraction of those eligible) had
finally been registered under the new scheme."
16 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 30.3.40, p.8
17 Sheffield City Council: Medical Officer's Report 1940, p.32
18 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 13.5.40, p.1
19 Log books: Owler Lane Intermediate School, 13.5.40; Wybourn Senior Mixed School, l.6.40
20 Sheffield City Council: Medical Officer's Report 1940, p.33
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Confusion about destinations, so rife in the run-up to the first scheme, still appeared to
reign in 1940 and it may be argued that this aggravated the situation and did not inspire
confidence in parents. It is apparent from research that new reception areas had been
identified for Sheffield children, although no authorised information on this matter has
been discovered during examination of local archives and libraries. Two school log
books reveal that the Derbyshire villages of Clowne and Dronfield were scheduled to
receive city children in 1940, but there is no evidence that parents were informed
officially or that Sheffield children arrived there." In April, readers of The Sheffield
Telegraph & Independent may have been perplexed to learn that the previously neutral
areas of Worksop and the surrounding villages of Blyth, Carlton, Harworth, Bircotes
and Langold had already been chosen as new reception areas for potential evacuees
from Sheffield but then rejected. So that children could be sent where there was
sufficient school accommodation, the villages of Oldcotes, Carburton, Norton, Cuckney
and Nether Langwith were then selected, along with the town of Worksop.22 Within
weeks the list was yet again amended, to Oldcotes, Carburton, Nether Langwith,
Carlton, Bircotes and Langold."
But it was not only parents in evacuating areas who showed themselves unwilling to
comply with government requirements. There were difficulties, too, in persuading
reluctant householders in some of the receiving districts to offer billets. Despite many
improvements which had been implemented in regard to medical inspections and
hostels for children with special needs since the first evacuation programme began, only
21 Log books: Carbrook Council Boys' School, entry 11.3.40; Dronfield Junior School, entry 18.12.40
22 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 12.4.40, p.6
23 The Worlcsop Guardian: 17.5.40, p.2
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one householder in fifty volunteered to take evacuees when the 'Trickle' programme
was introduced" - a situation which would hardly have encouraged parents of potential
evacuees to consider participation in the scheme. Throughout March and April the
government mounted a widespread publicity campaign in an effort to recruit more
foster parents. The Minister of Health sent a circular for publication in newspapers in
reception areas, appealing to householders to "Join the Roll" of those willing to take in
evacuee children if future need arose, and weekly advertisements also appeared in the
press with similar messages.f
Worksop householders did not rush to volunteer homes for Sheffield evacuees when, in
March, 3,260 circulars were delivered in the area requesting offers of accommodation.
Only 204 favourable replies were received for an estimated intake of eight hundred
children. The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent, informing readers of the position on
12 April 1940, suggested that one difficulty was that as soon as a scheme was prepared,
the government requisitioned billets reserved for children to use for their own staff or
members of the armed forces, and people could not be expected to billet children and
others at the same time. It was feared that compulsory billeting would have to be
introduced" The situation was hardly likely to change the minds of parents who were
already worried about separation from their children.
Interestingly, Worksop people themselves were not told of their poor performance until
a full week after the announcement in the Sheffield press. It was not until 19 April that
24 N Longmate: Haw We Lived Then, p.60; Titmuss: op. cit., p.17S
23 PRO.ffi-G.IOS/21; also The Loughborough Echo: 22.3.40, p.S, and March-April 194O,passim
26 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 12.4.40, p.6
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the weekly local newspaper carried an account of the Worksop Rural Council meeting
which had been held nine days earlier. It was clear that preliminary discussions had
already taken place between officials from both evacuation and reception areas, for
detailed travel plans had already been worked out and reception centres had been
identified for Sheffield evacuees in the event of further evacuation. Perhaps seeking to
excuse poor local response, the Clerk stated: "Although householders in the area have
had no experience of billeting, they have heard such bad reports from elsewhere that
they fought shy.,,27
It was not until a month later that sufficient billets were found, after volunteers from the
WVS had been brought in to canvass householders in an effort to persuade them to take
the children." Even then, it is apparent that local fears about refugees had not been
altogether allayed, for at the next Rural Council Meeting members were assured that the
number of evacuees would not exceed the allocation of eight hundred and would all
come from Sheffield. As the majority would come from the east side of the city and
would be billeted in the industrial part of the reception area, it was felt that the
available billets would be "entirely suitable". Medical examinations would take place
upon arrival in Worksop, before the children were taken by bus to surrounding villages.
Billets would be found for accompanying teachers and it was hoped that school parties
would not be separated." In the event, as will be seen, although Worksop householders
were eventually called upon to billet evacuees, very few came from Sheffield.
27 The Worksop Guardian: 19.4.40, p.2
28 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 13.5.40, p.1
29 The Worksop Guardian: 17.5.40, p.2
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It took the intensified bombing attacks on London, in early September 1940, to
persuade people to leave the danger areas. Parents who had initially been reluctant to
register their children for evacuation did begin to send them out of the metropolis with
their school parties when heavy bombing of the capital began. But by the following
month, after the scheme was extended to include mothers with their children, it was
noted that the nwnbers of unaccompanied children reporting for evacuation slumped.i''
In the opinion of one London social worker at the end of October, it had "practically
killed the scheme for parties of [unaccompanied] school children". It was asserted that
whereas between twenty and thirty official school parties of children had been leaving
for the country daily, the nwnber of family parties arriving in the reception areas under
the voucher scheme had on several occasions run into hundreds." Titmuss confirmed
the trend, citing the fact that, whereas 20,500 unaccompanied children were evacuated
in September, and 15,000 in October, by November the number was down to 4,000 and
December showed a figure of only 760.32
Paradoxically, while Sheffield parents were being urged to send children away to safer
areas in October 1940, the city's Emergency Defence Committee was arranging for the
city to receive seven hundred evacuees from London. These refugees were mothers and
children who were homeless or had suffered injuries in the Blitzkrieg on the capital and
were in transit to reception areas in the north of England." In the event, five hundred
arrived and were taken to four reception centres set up in hospitals around the city: the
30 O'Brien: op. cit., p.397
31 Mass-Observation File 483, p.6
32 Titmuss: op. cit., p.285
33 Sheffield Archives File CA. 157/5, Minute 1240
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City General, Wharncliffe and Nether Edge Hospitals and Firvale House for one night.
Members of the WVS together with ARP volunteers helped with reception. After being
offered baths, hot meals and overnight accommodation, the evacuees were transferred
out of the city to billets in various parts of the West Riding of'Yorkshire."
As in 1939, Sheffield people once again showed themselves unwilling to heed official
exhortations to leave their homes. Itwas not until the city was hit by severe air raids in
December that some victims of the bombing began to take advantage of the scheme,
and even then it was indeed a mere trickle who evacuated beyond the city boundaries to
the reception areas, under the official scheme at least. Worksop was alerted to receive
Sheffield evacuees, but it is clear from newspaper reports that very few indeed arrived,
and none under the government evacuation scheme." It is evident that it was a similar
story in Dronfield, where the local school became a reception centre for Sheffield
children, for the school log book records: "No evacuees arrive, therefore school re-
opened but three unofficial evacuees enrolled.,,36 Indeed, when an attempt was made at
this time to persuade five thousand homeless Sheffield people to transfer to rest centres
offered by neighbouring authorities, less than one fifth agreed to go, and the vast
majority had returned within twenty-four hours."
As for householders in the reception areas, Harrisson, reporting for Mass-Observation,
asserted that when the bombs actually started dropping prospective hosts were tom
between memories of the vast problems which had arisen the previous year and
34 Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 25.10.40, p.4
3S The Worksop Guardian: 10.1.41, p.l; 24.1.41, p.7
36 Log book: Dronfield Junior School, entry 20.12.40
37 MWalton & J P Lamb: Raiders Over Sheffield, p.97
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sympathy for the victims of the blitz." In some receiving districts local people
remained obstinate in their refusal to open their homes even after the Blitzkrieg had
begun, and on 21 October 1940 the Ministry of Health asked the relevant local
authorities to implement compulsory billeting powers without hesitation where
necessary." After the heavy bombing of Sheffield in December householders in the
Worksop area came forward with one thousand offers of accommodation for city
evacuees even though they had already been called upon to billet children from
Yarmouth and the Midlands: a surprising tum of events in view of their unwillingness in
the previous April's census."
Even by December the position had not changed in some areas, however, and in some
places attitudes appear to have hardened. In Loughborough, where Sheffield evacuees
had generally received a welcome the previous year, local people were reproached by
the editor of The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo:
"Some of you have refused to take evacuees; some of you have
made them uncomfortable. [... ] Are you selfish and greedy
about your home - its privacy and its comfortsj'?"
Itwas clear that widespread reports of difficulties with evacuees in 1939were seen as a
contributing factor in the continuing resistance there, for two days later the same
newspaper carried a large advertisement headed "A Vital Message" appealing for more
householders to come forward with billets:
38 Mass-Observation File 483, p.9
39 Mass-Observation File 467, p.4
40 The Worksop Guardian: 7.6.40, p.l; 6.12.40, p.8; 20.12.40, p.4; 10.1.41, p.l; 24.1.41, p.7
41 The Loughborough& Shepshed Echo: 27.12.40, p.3
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"Be a rumour stopper. Do not pass on stories you hear about the
misfits among evacuees. These are mostly exaggerated and an
injustice to the vast majority who are successfully billeted. ,,42
It might be expected that by 1940, when the 'Trickle' plan commenced, the difficulties
experienced in the first evacuation programme would have been ironed out, and indeed
many had been rectified. Overcrowding and muddles at railway stations were largely
avoided because smaller numbers of evacuees were travelling at any given time. Strong
efforts were also made to avoid the fragmentation of school parties which had occurred
the previous year. However, at least some of the old problems remained, as an official
complaint received from an escort on an evacuation journey in 1940 indicated:
"Drinking water was not available on the train in accordance
with general policy. It was supplied at the only stop, four hours
after the journey began, when only three porters were available
to give cups of water to three hundred children in eleven
minutes. ,,43
Organisation in the reception centres had been improved to some extent by the
appointment of trained and paid billeting officers. But, reporting for Mass-Observation,
Harrisson found that much use was still made of volunteers. Complaining that little had
been learned from the previous evacuation in this regard, he considered the success of
reception was largely dependent upon "a few really energetic and intelligent individuals
usually from the WVS. ,,44 With more information available on categories of expected
evacuees, organisers in most reception areas tried to match incoming school children to
foster homes before arrival. Nevertheless, in some districts experiences were
42 The Loughborough & Shepshed Echo: 29.12.40, p.3
43 PRO.ED/SO/206
44 Mass-Observation File 483, p.9
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remarkably similar to those of a year earlier and some children still found themselves
being paraded before prospective hosts in conditions resembling a cattle-market.45
Overcrowding, too, was still a problem in some reception areas after the onset of
bombing, with small towns suddenly receiving an unexpectedly large influx of people.
A Mass-Observation report quoted one evacuee's account of arrival in Oxford:
"I slept the night in the cinema. [... ] The majority sleep in the
gangways and between the seats. There are perhaps 800 in all in
the cinema. [... ] Nearly every mother has a small child and as
soon as one cries, three or four others start too. It was quite
impossible to get more than ten minutes uninterrupted sleep...46
The cultural gulf between the classes was surely epitomised by Lady Patricia Ward who
saw the same scene in a different light:
"The East End loved it. They settled themselves down, each
night, on rugs and cushions and blankets along the corridors;
[... ] and wasn't it a lovell' bright place, almost like a palace?
So they told each other." 4
By 1940, too, school children were competing for accommodation with war workers
and business evacuees, who offered householders better remuneration. Private
evacuees, in particular those prompted by the blitzes between September 1940 and May
1941, also produced many problems for administrators, for they took many billets
reserved for evacuees under the official scheme.f" As an example, a survey of evacuees
undertaken in Weston-super-Mare in December 1941 showed that, while there were
3,172 people in priority classes officially evacuated under government schemes present
45 Personal experience of writer in Weston-super-Mare
46 Mass-Observation File 482, p.8
47 ibid.
48 Mass-Observation File 916
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in the town at that time, the number of unofficial evacuees (including war workers) was
approximately 9,000.49
Problems of keeping siblings together in billets also remained. Like many older
children, an interviewee who was fourteen years old at the time, had been given strict
instructions before he left home:
"My mother told me to keep the family together, so I tried to
stop a woman taking my two little sisters away. Then the
woman's neighbour offered to take me, so I thought it would be
all right. That was the start of the enforced split with my sisters.
I didn't realise my billet would only be temporary, and we were
soon separated for good. Itwas never the same again.,,50
Once in their billets, some of the complaints about earlier evacuees resurfaced, but
others were avoided by measures which had been taken in the intervening period. It
appeared that many of the lessons had been learned and there were fewer and less
urgent problems.
In the aftermath of the first evacuation programme temporary hostels had been
hurriedly opened to cater for children who were unclean or suffering from short-term
illnesses, and some of these, together with the clinics so hastily set up, were still
available for children who were difficult to billet in private homes. Eager to avoid a
repetition of the protests received in 1939 from householders, the Treasury had given
permission for more hostels to be set up, but the problem was that when this work was
started in the winter of 1940 children suffering from a variety of conditions were often
lumped together."
49 PRO.HLGI7I80
30 Oral interview: John Patterson, 18.8.92
31 Titmuss: op. cit., p.379
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In January 1941 the Shakespeare Report on Conditions in the Reception Areas
identified the need to set up a separate category of institutions for children with
behavioural or emotional problems, staffed with trained social and psychiatric
workers.52 By the end of 1941 re-organisation had begun, and in August 1943 there
were 233 hostels catering for these children. By the time the 'Trickle' evacuation was
under way it had also been accepted that hostels or camps were also better than private
billets for older children attending secondary, technical and central schools, so that
facilities for after-school study could be provided. The number of hostels for this group
of children increased from five in July 1940 to ninety-four in August 1943, when there
were also 254 other hostels catering for short-stay cases, convalescents, nursery children
and other miscellaneous categories. Whereas in early 1941 only 3% of unaccompanied
children were accommodated in camps and hostels, by March 1944 this proportion had
risen to 12%.53
The 'Trickle' programme did not involve the huge numbers of people nor the speed of
removal which had been experienced in 1939 and which had rendered authorities
unable to inspect children before they left. Improved medical supervision and regular
examination in schools of children registered for future programmes enabled staff to
identify medical problems, which clearly still persisted. When 22,420 Sheffield
children were medically inspected in May 1940, 2,632 were found to have nits and 52
were suffering from impetigo: it seems reasonable to assume that a similar situation
existed in other industrial areas. However, without the frenetic rush to get children
52 PRO.HLG.7/85 Shakespeare Report, p7; The Health of the School Child, op. cit., p.65
53 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.382,3
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away and with smaller numbers leaving over a period of time, it was possible to check
the children before departure, and the new system of labelling alerted reception
authorities to potential problems as the children arrived: consequently fewer unclean or
severely enuretic children were sent to unsuspecting householders.54
The problem of enuresis did recur in further evacuation programmes during the war, but
measures taken in June 1940 ensured that the condition was not accompanied by the
rancour that it had aroused in 1939. The Ministry of Health organised better
distribution of mackintosh underlays, and an extra laundry allowance of 3s.6d. weekly
was made for householders dealing with persistent cases of enuresis.55 When
evacuation began again these actions helped to ease the situation for many
householders. Some abused the allowance, however, and there was evidence that a few
even invented bed-wetting problems. Although a doctor's certificate was required as
evidence before the money could be claimed, it was discovered that in one Welsh
village alone, the considerable sum of £350 was paid out for laundry allowances in
1941-42. This was a meteoric rise from the £43 claimed for the previous year.
Following an official investigation there was a sharp fall in reported cases of enuresis in
the village.56
The state of clothing of inner-city children evacuated to the country had been the
subject of many complaints in September 1939, and it has been seen in Chapter Four
that the £1 allowance per two hundred necessitous children, awarded so belatedly by the
54 The Health of the School Child: op. cit., p.31; Titmuss: op. cit., p.125
55 Titmuss: op. cit., p.125
56 PRO.lll..G.7/162, Memoranda: cited in J Macnicol, "The effect of the evacuation of schoolchildren on
official attitudes to State intervention" inH L Smith (ed): War and Social Change, p.16
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Treasury, was pitifully inadequate to deal with the widespread poverty revealed by
Operation 'Pied Piper'. By the time the 'Trickle' programme was under way these
problems had been largely dealt with, mainly thanks to voluntary action in both
evacuating and receiving areas where members of Women's Institutes and the WVS set
up clothing depots and sewing groups to make or mend children's garments.57
In Sheffield, in the light of earlier problems encountered by evacuation officials, the
Education Committee had passed a resolution in April 1940, urging the government to
make provision within the official scheme to empower local education authorities to
supply clothing to necessitous children and to pass on the charge to the Exchequer.i"
In October the government increased the clothing allocation to £1 per year per thirty
evacuated children." After heavy raids on Sheffield in December 1940, and in
anticipation of numbers leaving the city for the reception areas, officials made efforts to
head off complaints from prospective hosts by authorising Worksop Borough Council to
purchase nine hundred pairs of boots for evacuees: it is not known, however, whether
this instruction was carried out. An appeal for second-hand clothing was made in the
city, and the proceeds were sent to Worksop in readiness for the influx - which, in the
event, did not materialise."
The manners of evacuees, mothers and children alike, had attracted much criticism in
1939 and it is evident that things were little different in 1940,when the conduct of some
continued to cause offence in the country. The good intentions of householders were
57 National Federation of Women's Institutes Survey, pp.7,8
58 Sheffield Education Committee: Report 1939140, p.544
59 Titmuss: op. cit., p.375, 0.2
60 The Worksop Guardian: 10.1.41, p.I; 24.1.41, p.7
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tested as the evacuees stayed longer than expected and fatigue set in. Some hosts began
to feel that advantage was being taken of their hospitality, and a frequent complaint was
of the lack of gratitude or appreciation shown by evacuees whose arrival had greatly
disrupted country life. Visiting Oxford in September, Vera Brittain observed:
"Amongst the rugs and perambulators on the short dry grass lie
pieces of chewed apple core, fragments of orange peel, and the
inevitable sheets of tom dirty newspaper which indicate, like a
paper trail, the presence of an evacuee population the moment
that it moves from its normal environment."?'
On the other hand, as a Mass-Observation reporter noted, there were still some shocking
rest centres in the reception areas, and many unsympathetic touches. In one crowded
town the billeting officer had a huge notice on the door:62
KNOCK ONCE AND WAIT OUTSIDE.
NO BEDDING, BLANKETS, ETC.
Moreover, billeting difficulties were still impeding educational arrangements in 1940 as
they had a year earlier, with some schools experiencing the same problems of
fragmentation that were evident after the first evacuation. In October, with the
'Trickle' programme well under way, the head teacher of a Surrey secondary school
evacuated to Somerset informed his school governors that pupils' education was gravely
jeopardised by the fact that they were divided among several schools in the
neighbourhood and unable to function as a unit. He reported: "For one reason or
another they seem to be pushed where there is least opposition to their coming. ,,63
61 V Brittain: England's Hour, pp.16S-66, cited inM Graham: Oxfordshire at War, p.40
62 Mass-Observation File 483, p.7
63 Mitcham County School for Boys: Minutes of Governors' Meetings 1939-1942
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Attention has been drawn in Chapter Four to problems relating to religion and race in
the first evacuation programme. As Harrisson saw the situation, in 1939 the hostility of
some householders had been directed against all evacuees, regardless of race or
religion: amid the distress caused by the blitz in 1940, however, resentment was not at
first focused on the evacuees except for Jews who, he asserted, were scapegoated
because they were conspicuous." By February 1941, however, four Mass-Observation
investigators found that anti-semitism appeared to be much reduced, although it
continued to manifest itself in some areas." But even if racial tension had decreased,
indiscriminate resentment of evacuees was evident in some cases, as in 1939.
Published anecdotal accounts of evacuation contain many instances of this,66 and ex-
evacuees also recalled acts of unkindness by hostile foster parents and bullying by local
children" As a teacher in a Cheshire reception area commented:
"Evacuation is bitterly unpopular. [... ] What chance of
happiness has a child in a household in which he is an unwanted
intruder? A reluctant 'hostess' can make a child's life miserable
without any definite act of cruelty. ,,68
Many problems were related to social class. Harrisson's investigators considered class
conflict still existed in the second programme, as it had in the first, but asserted that the
problem decreased "appreciably" after October 1940.69 Nevertheless, throughout the
years of evacuation there were constant complaints about the unfair social distribution
64 Mass-Observation File 483, p.9
M Mass-Observation File 577
66 For example, B Wicks: No Time to Wave Goodbye; B S Johnson (ed): The Evacuees; P Schweitzer et
al (eds): Goodnight Children Everywhere
67 Oral interview: Jean Perry, 4.9.96; also personal experience of writer
68 The Times Educational Supplement: No. 1375,6.9.41, p.423
69 Mass-Observation File 577
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of accommodation, with working-class householders called upon to bear the brunt of
billeting while wealthier country families were often untroubled by evacuees.
A letter to The Times Educational Supplement in September 1941 showed that some
householders in reception areas were still reluctant to take in evacuees of any kind, but
particularly those from the lower classes. A teacher from the independent Sheffield
High School for Girls, which had evacuated as a unit in September 1939 to a
theological college in nearby Derbyshire and housed its pupils in boarding
accommodation and local billets, complained that if for some a reason a billet had to be
changed, difficulties were always encountered, especially as people in larger houses
who were well-known to have plenty of room consistently refused to help:
"They are not prepared to open their houses to us except when
there are rumours of a 'worse type of evacuee' from a
neighbouring industrial city. When this 'menace' does not
materialise the evasive offers of hospitality are withdrawn=""
The pupils of this school were likely to have been, on the whole, children of middle-
class parents: if a party of children from Sheffield's inner-city areas had been sent to the
district, it is likely that they would have been even more unwelcome.
Billeting officers were sometimes accused of going back to the same people time and
time again. According to one critic: "The distribution of billet notices is as
indiscriminate as German bombing. There are many eligible billets which have been
missed, whilst others have been well and truly strafed.,,71 One reason for this was that
billeting officers were usually local people, inclined to act within the constraints of their
70 The Times Educational Supplement, No. 1377,20.9.41, p.447
71 Mass-Observation File 483, p.9
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position in the community and often loath to upset influential neighbours. Criticism
was voiced in Parliament, with Eleanor Rathbone complaining of the snobbery and
weakness of local billeting officers who had not the courage to stand up to local
grandees who refused to take in children."
Some billeting officers were themselves members of the local gentry: for example, Lady
Beryl Mayhew, President of Norwich Division of Red Cross, was involved in finding
homes for evacuees in October 1940. A letter to her stepson seems to show her class-
consciousness: "Mrs L looked the grubby type that might settle down in Mrs P's rather
hugger mugger establishment." She settled "a very smart woman indeed in a fur coat"
on her own family's estate farm but made no mention of taking any evacuees herself. 73
In 1941 there was at least one attempt to match evacuees with hosts of similar social
class. Barrow-in-Furness teachers forwarded details of evacuees, including comments
on their health, ability, character, interests and homes to billeting officers in the
reception area of South Westmorland. The types of home were indicated as follows:
A first-class, including bath and w.c.
B good class home with sound parents of artisan types
C overcrowded home, lack of parental interest or poverty
resulting in children likely to be verminous or ill-clothed.
The plan was hailed as "the try-out of Britain's newest evacuation idea", but it was
clearly controversial: it was stated that many billeting officers had ignored the scheme
which was undemocratic and discriminatory. However, it was defended on the
72 HoC Deb. 10.10.40, Vol. 365, Cols. 504-5
73 P Mayhew (ed): One Family's War, p.116
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(distinctly class-conscious) grounds that a remark such as "A really good girl" might
place a child from a "C" home into a "B" or even an "A" class billet where she would
greatly benefit. When the matter was discussed at a meeting of the South Westmorland
Rural District Council, the press were asked not to publish the disclosure and it did not
appear in the Chief Billeting Officer's official report. Although it was said to have been
working successfully, no further mention of the project has been discovered/"
One of the biggest problems encountered by officials operating the first evacuation
scheme - that of persuading those in danger areas to leave their homes - had brought
about sweeping changes and a more liberal policy by 1940. But an equally vexing one -
how to keep evacuees in the reception areas - was to dog the authorities throughout the
war. In September 1939 the drift back had begun almost as soon as those who did opt
to leave the cities arrived in reception areas, and a similar pattern was apparent in
October 1940, at the height of the London blitz, when a social worker reporting for
Mass-Observation on the problems encountered in reception areas stated:
"We have had one or two instances this week, however, of
parents going to visit their children, not liking the billets,
bringing them home to London and immediately coming to the
office to register them for re-evacuation!"
In this case, evacuees' parents defended their actions by stating that billeting officers
were either unable or unwilling to find other billets for the children in the original
reception areas." An article in The Times Educational Supplement, deploring the
return of children to danger areas and rebuking parents, drew a spate of letters from
74 The Times Educational Supplement: No. 1376, 13.9.41, p.436
7~ Mass-Observation File 483, p.6
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teachers who criticised householders for their often unwelcoming attitudes. A further
article two weeks later reported that the large amount of correspondence received was
almost unanimous in defence of parents and critical of householders. 76
It is clear that opinions in reception areas and in danger areas differed on reasons for the
premature return home of evacuees. In November 1940, when London mothers and
children escaping the bombing were evacuated to villages on the outskirts of Sheffield
which had previously been designated neutral, the drift back was again soon evident.
Here, a local newspaper reported that even though their welcome had been warm, a
quarter of the families sent to Stannington had returned home within days and, while it
was understood that separation from husbands and fathers proved too much of a
wrench, the women were blamed:
"Some allowed themselves no time to settle in their new
surroundings and went back home within a few days and some
women followed each other back to London.,,77
Within weeks the familiar pattern of early return was to be repeated by Sheffield
refugees when the city was hit by heavy air raids and again by Londoners in the 1944
'flying bomb' evacuation, as will be seen.
By 1941 there were more complaints from the reception areas that some evacuees were
making a holiday of evacuation, becoming "habitual nomads" and using the government
scheme to travel around the country, returning home at the first hurdle only to re-
register and move to a different destination." When Gainsborough Rural Council, for
76 The Times Educational Supplement: Nos. 1374-1376,30.8.41-13.9.41
77 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 14.11.40, p.5
78 PRO.ED.138/50; Mass-Observation File 11; Social Work: Vo1.2, No.1, p.8
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instance, considered the problem in August that year, the Clerk reported that some
families had been evacuated five or six times under the official scheme.
Representations were made to the Ministry of Health.79 In an effort to check this
activity 'selective evacuation' was introduced in late 1941, requiring returned evacuees
to showjust cause before being re-evacuated/"
In October 1942, when Leicestershire Education Committee agam discussed the
decline, members were informed that the number of Sheffield children attending
elementary schools in the county had fallen by nearly two-thirds in the previous
eighteen months, leaving only 132 of the city's children in Leicestershire reception
areas. While the chief reason for this was acknowledged to be the prolonged freedom
from heavy air attack, the meeting was informed that the figures should be seen in the
light of two other important factors. Firstly, many children had been joined in the
county by their parents and were no longer considered evacuees because billeting
allowances were not payable. Secondly, as there had been no considerable evacuation
for two years, many children had reached school leaving age." No further reference to
evacuation was found in the Minutes of Leicestershire Education Committee after this.
In March 1941 the Shakespeare Report on conditions in reception areas found that,
despite enormous difficulties associated with such a vast disruption of normal life, the
scheme was succeeding in the great majority of cases. The Ministry of Health followed
this on 29 May with its own report, asserting that 80% of the movement on the
79 The Sheffield Telegraph& Independent: 6.8.41, p.3
80 T L Crosby: The Impact of Civilian Evacuation in the Second World War, p.55
81 Leicestershire Education Committee: Minutes 1941142,p.8016
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reception side had been a success. However, the proportion of children who remained
in the reception areas for long periods was relatively small, and many of these had
several changes of billet during their stay. 82
While plans were laid for the 'Trickle' evacuation, and civilians were being moved
further inland from southern and eastern coasts of England, another government-
sponsored scheme was inaugurated - one which involved sending children much further
afield. During the summer of 1940 many spontaneous offers of hospitality were
received from private homes through the governments of the Dominions and the United
States of America. In June, in response to calls from members of the public and of
Parliament and in view of the worsening situation in Europe and the fear of invasion of
Britain, the Children's Overseas Reception Board (CORS) was established under the
chairmanship of Geoffrey Shakespeare, Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions.
Under the scheme the return voyage would be free for children attending grant-aided
schools, and parental contributions on the same basis as for children evacuated within
Britain were payable direct to the CORS central fund. Registration of potential
evacuees began on 18 June."
Curiously, in view of their unwillingness to register their children for domestic
evacuation, parents showed no such reluctance to send them overseas. There was an
immediate rush of applications, and on 4 July the public was informed that no further
requests could be accepted. By this time 211,000 requests had been received across the
country for the evacuation of children aged between 5 and 16 years - this despite the
82 PRO.ED/138/49
83 C Jackson: Who Will Take Our Children? The Story of the Evacuation of Britain 1939-1945, p.134
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fact that no attempt at persuasion was made, no guarantee of safety was offered, nor
was any promise made by the government to bring the children back at any specified
time. In addition, 32,000 applications were received by the Board for evacuation to the
United States of America. 84
In the short life-span of the CORB scheme (delayed at the start by the lack of escort
ships and tragically ended in September by the sinking of the City of Benares with the
loss of seventy-three children and six escorts) 2,664 children had been evacuated from
Britain under the official scheme: 1532 to Canada, 577 to Australia, 353 to South
Africa, 202 to New Zealand).85 At the same time the United States of America received
4,200 children accompanied by 1,100 adults who were allowed to make private
arrangements. An additional 838 children, who had sponsors and whose parents could
pay their passage, were sent with the co-operation of CORB under the auspices of the
American Committee for the Evacuation of European Children. CORB reported that
some 11,000 children were evacuated overseas privately, (exit permits still having been
granted to those who wished to make their own arrangements after the closure of the
official scheme) though Titmuss calculated this figure as being nearer to 13,603.86
Sheffield appears to have followed the national trend. It is interesting to note that,
although reluctant to register their children for inland evacuation within easy reach of
their homes, city parents responded far more enthusiastically to the notion of sending
their offspring overseas. Whereas only 1,656 school children had finally been
84 Titmuss, op. cit., p.246
8' HoC Deb. 25.2.42, Vol. 369, Col. 374
86 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.246,7
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registered for the 'Trickle' scheme (see above), the report of the city's Medical Officer
of Health showed that 2,429 children were medically examined in the city by medical
officers for the Children's Overseas Reception Board, with 2,241 being passed as
suitable to travel to the Dominions." It was reported that some mothers wanted to
register babies, while others asked in vain to accompany their children to supervise
them.88 In the event, it is clear that only seventeen Sheffield children eventually
travelled under this scheme (nine to Australia, six to South Africa and two to Canadaj.'"
no statistics have been found regarding private overseas evacuation.
While the authorities strove to dampen public enthusiasm, with the Chairman of CORB
warning that the scheme would be limited by the number of ships available and billets
offered in prospective host countries, the Prime Minister let it be known that he
opposed the mass emigration of British children, seeing it as likely to encourage a
defeatist spirit.90 The Bishop of Sheffield, on the other hand, appeared to be persuading
city parents to let their children go overseas as he stated:
"Parents are faced with the choice of two evils - either expose
their children to the risks and strain of intensive bombing, or
send them away to less congested parts of the country, or better
still, overseas. The lesser evil seems clearly to send children as
far away as possible.,,91
There followed several articles in the local press, exhorting parents to send their
children away, and especially to the Dominions."
87 Sheffield Education Committee: Medical Officer'S Report i939140, p.33
88 The Sheffield Telegraph & independent: 27.6.40, p.5
89 Sheffield Education Committee: Survey, p.4; Sheffield Civic Record, Nos.25-26, p.3
90 M Gilbert: The Churchill War Papers Vol. II, pp.4SI, ,541; Jackson: op. cit., p.81
91 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 21.6.40, p.5
92 ibid., 21.6.40, p.l; 22.6.40, p.4; 29.6.40, p.4
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However, Vera Brittain, who sent her own children to the United States (but had not
evacuated them within Britain) voiced the dilemma faced by many parents: "There
seemed to be no right decision to be made [... ] whichever course I took would involve
bitter regrets.,,93 The debate continued for several weeks in Parliament, where
Churchill's view was not supported by some Members. Colonel Wedgwood, for
instance, who had often expressed the need to reduce the number of 'useless mouths' in
Britain, announced:
"The fewer mouths we have to feed, the more ammunition we
can afford. [... ] I put forward the plea that America should be
asked to take our useless mouths.,,94
Others pointed out that although government had urged British people to have
confidence in their country, some ministers' actions in sending their own families
overseas was showing that they had no confidence themselves."
Class divisions were evident in overseas evacuation as in the British schemes. The
CORB programme was attacked as being class-conscious in Parliament by the Member
for Llanelly, who warned that there would be considerable feeling in the country if well-
to-do children were allowed to leave the country." But government officials anxious
to avoid allegations of class bias, were at pains to make the official scheme available to
all school children, and the Under-Secretary for the Dominions reported on 20 August
that 99% of those children selected by CORB for evacuation attended grant-aided
schools.97
93 A Bishop & Y A Bennett (eds): Vera Brittain's Diary 1939-45, editors' note, p.50
94 HoC Deb. 2.7.40, Vol. 362, Cols. 743-4
95 HoC Deb. 16.7.40, Vol. 363, Cols. 19-23
96 ibid.
97 HoC Deb. 20.8.40, Vol. 364, Col. 1113
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In addition to the government-organised scheme, vanous American business
organisations, such as Warner Brothers, Kodak Company and Hoover Vacuum Cleaner
Company, made their own arrangements for children of their British employees to be
evacuated privately and billeted with American families." No accusation of class
distinction has been discovered against these companies, but it is evident that class did
play a part in other schemes for overseas evacuation, some of which were highly
selective. The Boston Daily Transcript advertised and sponsored a scheme to bring out
children of 'professional and clerical' families.99 The headmaster of the Cambridge
Tutoring School in New York offered to take one hundred British school boys at a
special offer of £100 each, but stipulated: "Boys from a cultural background only can be
accepted. Sons of Army and Navy officers and professionals would be welcome."
Similarly, American, Canadian and Australian doctors contacted the British Medical
Association offering to take children of British doctors, while Douglas Fairbanks Junior
planned to set up a large colony in Hollywood to cater entirely for British actors'
children.l'" At the same time, Yale University put forward a scheme for the reception
of children of intellectuals from Cambridge and Oxford universities. Cambridge
demurred, partly on the grounds that such a scheme would be seen as privileged;
Oxford, on the other hand, sent a contingent of twenty-five wives and one hundred and
twenty-five children of academics who were taken into affluent and welcoming
homes.'?'
98 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 27.12.40, p.S; Crosby: op. cit., p.l13
99 Crosby: op. cit., p.117
100 Jackson: op. cit., pp.68,71
101 A Spokes Symonds: Havens Across the Sea 1940-1990, p.2; Crosby: op. cit., pp.115,6
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Despite the efforts of government to make the CORB scheme open to all, it is clear that
more middle-class parents were able to send their children abroad than were the
working class. For one thing, poor parents would have found it almost impossible to
comply with the clothing requirements for overseas evacuation, which were more
stringent than for inland evacuees. An interviewee who travelled under the scheme
from Sheffield to Australia, remembered that his parents had to provide a khaki uniform
suitable for Scout activities on board ship, and also a panama hat - items which were
hardly likely to be owned by many inner-city children.l'" Replying to concerns of
Labour politicians, Viscountess Astor implicitly accepted the part played by privilege
when she told the House of Commons: "It was not the government's fault that people
who had the money sent their children out of the country. ,,103
Once overseas, CORB evacuees, like those within Britain, were not immune to changes
of billet, for various reasons. Sometimes foster parents' circumstances changed, or the
children simply could not settle with their hosts: in other cases hosts asked for financial
contributions which could not be met due to government restrictions.l'" A Sheffield
evacuee moved three times around his extended family in Australia due to the illness of
his hosts and, fourthly, to a family who had applied in 1940 for a British evacuee and
were still on the waiting list in 1942.105 As with British householders, some hosts who
had rushed to take children initially had not anticipated that they would stay so long and
disillusionment and fatigue set in. Jackson noted that once the United States entered
102 Oral interview: Geoffrey Stevens, 12.3.97
103 HoC Deb. 16.7.40, Vol. 363, Col. 352
104 J Statler: Special Relations, pp.98, 132, 139
10~ Oral interview: Geoffrey Stevens, 12.3.97
297
war in December 1941, British evacuees seemed less welcome than earlier: American
lifestyles, hitherto affiuent, were suddenly cramped, affected by rationing of gasolene
and some foodstuffs, and evacuees were in danger of outstaying their welcome. 106
To the chagrin of CORB officials, the drift homeward so apparent in domestic
programmes also affected overseas evacuees. While most evacuees remained to the end
of the war in keeping with the agreement signed by their parents, some began returning
early by privately-arranged means, often by ship via Lisbon. Some hosts and guests had
quarrelled, while some parents worried that their children may become too fond, not
only of their foster parents, but also of their host country (with its greater freedom and
less rationing) and forget their own parents and homes.!" Vera Brittain's children,
evacuated to America in June 1940, were among those who left prematurely. By
January 1942 she had sensed growing disillusionment on the part of their foster parents
and soon noted veiled criticisms of her son.108 Brittain recorded in her diary: "He has
obviously been wrongly handled and made recalcitrant. ,,109 Six months later, "faced
with the grim dilemma of again risking John's life or losing him for the duration and
virtually altogether", she began active efforts to get her children brought home, though
it was more than a year before both children were back in England. lID
It is clear, from examination of files lodged with the Sheffield Archives, that evacuation
was under constant discussion at local, as well as national, level throughout the war.
106 Jackson: op. cit., p.139
J07 ibid., p.168
J08 Bishop & Bennett: op. cit., pp.IIS, 153
109 ibid., p.199
110 ibid., pp.189, 155,233,236
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Several schemes of civil defence were planned and adapted as circumstances dictated,
as has already been seen. Documents show that early in December 1940, after the
devastating bombing attack on Coventry and only days before heavy raids on Sheffield,
the city's Emergency Committee for Civil Defence met to discuss arrangements for air
raid precautions in the event of heavy air assault on the city. Contingency plans were
drawn up for the possible evacuation of city hospitals and arrangements made for
approximately five hundred beds to be set up and equipped in Carterknowle and
Greystones schools and in the Teacher Training College. These establishments,
together with "certain golf club houses", would be used as emergency hospitals in case
of necessity.III
At the same time, The Sheffield Star reported details of a new and comprehensive plan
to deal with homelessness in the event of heavy air attack. Known as the "Sheffield
Come Right In" scheme, it was devised by the city's Public Assistance Officer and a
member of the ARP Committee and described as "the first of its kind in the country."
Unveiling the scheme, the Chairman of the Emergency Committee stated that it was
already clear that compulsory billeting of evacuees upon unwilling householders caused
problems and damaged morale. Therefore, Sheffield women were being asked to make
immediate arrangements for their families to stay with friends or relatives in the event
of bomb-damage to their homes by future air raids. Councillor Asbury announced:
"We appeal to all householders in Sheffield to pair off with each
other, and make arrangements now to go to, or receive, another
household at a place not less than haIfa mile away." 112
III Sheffield Archives File CA.157/5, Minute 1354
112 The Sheffield Star: 2.12.40, p.6
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On 6 December, only a week before the Sheffield blitz, the Public Assistance Officer
revealed more details of the scheme. Four thousand volunteers would carry out a city-
wide canvass of homes in order to compile records of each family's proposed
alternative accommodation. Public Assistance authorities would be responsible for
information as to the whereabouts of people after any air raid. Throughout the city
fifty-four feeding centres, which had already been set up, would henceforth be manned
continually. Stores of food and clothing and field kitchen equipment were held at the
centres and also at various points on the outskirts of the city. Arrangements were in
hand for people who may need to sleep at the centres, which would be provided with
shelters, though it was hoped that the "Come Right In" scheme would avoid this
necessity in most cases.'!' No further mention of this scheme has been discovered in
the course of research: it is assumed that the heavy raids on Sheffield, which began
within days of its inception, rendered it unworkable.
On 12December 1940 (only hours before the onset of bombing of the city) members of
Sheffield Emergency Committee held a timely meeting with Chief Officers of the
Corporation to plan for action after a potential air raid. The Public Assistance Officer
was requested to contact religious authorities and to ensure that cinemas and schools
could be made available for sheltering homeless people. It was also agreed that the
WVS would supply cooks and assistants for feeding centres and that education welfare
officers and city rent collectors would act as billeting officers in such an emergency.l'"
The Chief Education Officer reported that a scheme was currently in existence which
113 The Sheffield Star: 6.12.40, p.6
114 Sheffield Archives File CA.39(71)
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would cover the immediate evacuation of 1,800 children but did not provide for
mothers. After recent consultations with the Minister of Health it had been decided to
retain this skeleton scheme and to modify it to meet such circumstances as may arise. I IS
No-one attending that meeting could have envisaged how soon the scheme would have
to be revived and modified.
After the heavy raids of 12 and 15 December, the 'Trickle' scheme was immediately re-
publicised through the Information Committee's news service and evacuation officers
were ready for parents to register their children for evacuation at the information bureau
situated at the Central Library. However, as in the previous year, the people of
Sheffield again proved implacably resistant to evacuation. Walton and Lamb,
employees at the Central Library, recorded that officials from the city's Public
Assistance Department attempted to evacuate five thousand homeless people in over-
crowded halls to rest centres made available by neighbouring authorities. After two
days of concerted effort to persuade the refugees to move only nine hundred had agreed
to go, and within twenty-four hours seven hundred of these had returned. I 16
Even when, on 18 December, the Emergency Committee for Civil Defence decreed that
all mothers with children of school age, as well as expectant mothers, the blind and the
aged, should be brought within the official evacuation scherne.l'" public reaction was
extremely poor. It seemed that Sheffield people who had been bombed out of their
homes preferred to find billets in the suburbs. lIS Records show that only two hundred
11~ Sheffield Archives File CA. 157/3
116 Walton & Lamb: op. cit., p.97
117 Sheffield Archives File CA.39nl, Minute 1413
118 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 20.12.40, p.S
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evacuees responded immediately and were transferred to rest centres outside the city,
and travel vouchers and billeting certificates were issued to an additional ninety adults
with children to go to private billets in other areas. The exodus continued very slowly
until Christmas.!" after which the government decision to extend travel and billeting
allowances to private evacuees in priority categories from any of the danger areas 120
[see above] may have influenced the sudden increase to 3,776 by 31 December and to
6,121 over the following ten days. After steadily climbing to 8,631 two months later
demand then fell off, until by 23 Maya total of 9,246 (comprising 2056 mothers, 4692
children, 2498 others) was shown to have left and statistics were apparently
abandoned.l" The graph below demonstrates this pattern of movement but there are,
unfortunately, no details available of numbers who returned home during this period.
Total Evacuated from Sheffield, December 1940 - May 1941,
including both government-organised and 'assisted private'
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Local newspapers aired concern at the abysmal response of Sheffield people to the call
for evacuation and published a Sheffield doctor's solution to the problem. Flying in the
face of government policy, Dr Bessie Goodson advocated compulsory evacuation, but
maintained that this need not mean the forcible separation of children from their
parents. Certain cities and centres could be put out of bounds for children, and mothers
could be encouraged to accompany them to safe areas so that they would be evacuated
in family groups. The group principle could be extended so that neighbouring families
went together armed with their own familiar helpers. She asserted:
"One of the causes of failure of evacuation was the fact that the
minds which had conceived evacuation had been for the greater
part male, military and upper-middle class, whereas those who
had tried to carry it out had been largely female, civilian and
working class."J22
This plan, like the "Come Right In" scheme, appears to have sunk without trace.
As in the past, however, it may be argued that the encouragement to evacuate offered by
some in authority was hindered by the statements and actions of others. Women and
children were urged to leave the city for safer places but men were denounced for
accompanying their families. While The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent carried
articles urging women and children to leave, it also printed several letters criticising
men who accompanied their families - "able-bodied trekkers" who travelled into the
city daily - for allegedly evading their responsibilities as fire-watchers and special
constables at home.!" Readers were told: "The great majority of men and women are
facing up to it with grim determination, refusing to seek safety in flight.,,124 The
122 The Sheffield Star: 16.12.40, p.4; The Sheffield Telegraph & Independem: 17.12.40, p.5
123 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 16.1.41 - 7.3.41
124 ibid., 5.2.41, p.4
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Chairman of the city's Emergency Committee remarked that evacuation should be
limited to the priority groups who could make no really useful contribution in the
community or to the war effort, in particular mothers and children.125 However, it is
clear that mothers did not escape criticism, for a woman who had evacuated with her
three small children wrote that her relatives were accusing her of lack of courage and
hinting that her duty was in Sheffield.126 The intimation, in March, by the Ministry of
Health that travel vouchers and certificates for billeting allowances should be restricted
to those in the priority classes normally resident in evacuable districts was seen as
unhelpful by the Emergency Committee. Sheffield officials were still working to
encourage citizens to leave the city, and the Director of Education was instructed to
inform the Regional Officer that such a course was impracticable at that time.127
Many child psychologists voiced concern about the psychological effects of war and
evacuation upon children.128 The Director of Sheffield Child Guidance Clinic echoed
the fear that they could suffer mentally as well as physically from the separation from
parents (or even the fear of this) and also from the fear of bombing.129 National and
local newspapers published articles on the matter, but at times it seemed that the efforts
of some journalists to encourage evacuation were sabotaged by their editors. Having
carried many articles exhorting parents to send their children out of the city for more
12S The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 23.1.41, p.5
126 ibid, 7.3.41, p.4
127 Sheffield Archives File CA.157/S, Minute 1781
128 W Boyd, "The Effects of Evacuation on the Children", British Journal of Educational Psychology,
Vol. XI (1941), pp.120-127; C Burt, "The Incidence of Neurotic Symptoms Among Evacuated School
Children", op. cit., pp.8-15; M D Vernon, "A Study of Some Effects of Evacuation on Adolescent
Girls", British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. X (1940), pp.114-134
129 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 14.10.39, p.6
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than a year, The Sheffield Star perversely carried the headline "Some Children Better
Off After a Blitz" in August 1941. The report summed up: "Some children, far from
baving their nervousness increased by the bombing, are actually happier and better.,,130
But the paper continued to carry almost weekly reports of city evacuees who were
happy in their billets.
As has been seen, although Worksop was ready to receive evacuees from Sheffield after
the December blitz on the city, few arrived there. Some of those who did leave under
the organised scheme were accommodated in Doncaster, where four rest centres were
quickly opened for the refugees. Some large families were difficult to billet because
they refused to be separated; and here, as in other parts of the country, it is apparent that
social distribution of accommodation was uneven. In an uncomfortable echo of past
experiences, The Sheffield Star reported: "People responded well to an appeal for
billets, especially in working-class areas."!"
As in earlier programmes, the behaviour of some evacuees drew complaints. In
Bakewell, for instance, some recent arrivals from the city were unpopular in the town.
It was said of them: "They are condescending in their attitude and made it plain that
they regard Bakewell people as country bumpkins.,,132 But generally the welcome was
warm. The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent reported:
"Country folk in the area around Sheffield differentiate between
genuine evacuees and those seeking to avoid responsibility.
Genuine cases have been received with sympathy." 13
130 The Sheffield Star: 5.8.41, p.S
131 ibid., 6.1.41, p.4
132 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 25.1.41, p.S
133 ibid, 23.1.41, p.S
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It should be remembered, too, that an influx of evacuees in small villages or even in
country towns could cause considerable inconvenience to local inhabitants and inflame
a natural antipathy towards 'foreigners'. As the war progressed everyday products, for
example envelopes or toilet paper, became more difficult to come by. As rationing
ensued some shopkeepers imposed their own restrictions and put up signs stating that
goods in short supply were reserved for 'registered customers only' .134 But some
evacuated Sheffield women complained that, even though they had registered with
shopkeepers in reception areas and received their rations, they were denied supplies
which were kept for local people because they were not considered regular
customers.i"
The numbers who had left the city under the first official scheme in 1939 had been
pathetically low, as has been seen. The drift homeward had continued relentlessly until
there were only seven hundred city children still away in the reception areas of
Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire by December 1940.136 Once again, those who did
opt to leave Sheffield followed the national trend in returning to the city soon
afterwards. At the end of January 1941 it was reported that "close on 3,000" had been
evacuated under official arrangements.F' but Dent's assertion that 59,695 pupils were
in attendance at schools in Sheffield by 7 February!" (a mere eight weeks after the
blitz), indicates that evacuated children were again a tiny minority.
134 Jackson: op. cit., p.9
13S The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 21.8.41, p.2
136 Walton & Lamb: op. cit., p.97
137 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 28.1.41, p.5
138 H C Dent: Education in Transition, p.77
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In March 1941 an official in a nearby country town compared the situation with that of
a year earlier: "We had 1,000 children from Sheffield living here, settling down nicely.
Now there are only about a dozen - they all went back. ,,139 A local editor illustrated the
dilemma faced by mothers: "The women are tom between their duty to their children,
their own nervous fears, and the claims of their husbands."!" When, in May 1941, the
Emergency Committee requested the Director of Education to obtain details of the
number of persons evacuated under the government scheme who had subsequently
returned to the city he reported that the task was impossible and the instruction was
withdrawn.l'" It may be argued that, as in 1939, the concerned statements of some of
those in authority were undermined by ineffectual responses of others: for instance,
King George VI, visiting Hull soon after devastating air raids and hearing that a number
of children had already come back to the city, merely remarked: "It is very naughty of
them.,,142
The subject of evacuation failure was again taken up by Sheffield Education Committee
in August 1941. Its newly-elected Chairman reported that, almost two years after the
war had begun and eight months after heavy bombing of the city, there were only 1,500
unaccompanied school children from Sheffield still evacuated (in Nottinghamshire and
Leicestershire): these included the small residue of those who left under the official
programme in September 1939 but the numbers had been boosted by others who went
away privately and who had become included in the government billeting scheme by the
139 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 27.3.41, p.2
140 ibid, 5.2.41, p4
141 Sheffield Archives File CA. 157/5, Minutes 1944, 1983
142 The Sheffield Star: 6.8.41, p.l
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amendments of the previous year. The new Chairman's attitude was less ambivalent
than his predecessor's and he appeared disappointed:
"We have tried every method we could think of to persuade
parents to send their children away. [... ] but the figures speak
for themselves. Even after last December they would not do
anything about it." 143
It was not all gloom and doom, however, and there were many instances where hosts
and evacuees settled amicably together. In 1941, after widespread bombing of many
towns and cities, an unattributed article in Social Work reported that householders in an
unnamed midland town had found a peaceful coexistence with evacuee families from
Birmingham and Sheffield. Some local women who wished to go out to work had
come to arrangements whereby evacuee mothers would run the host household and
mind all the children in the house in exchange for their keep. The report went on: "This
district is one of the few in reception areas in which the local residents do not complain
about the evacuees. ,,144
Although it was impossible to control the homeward drift of those who had evacuated
themselves privately or under the assisted scheme, a hard line was apparently taken
with those who had taken advantage of the government-organised scheme. When one
family, bombed out of their Sheffield home and evacuated to Doncaster, requested
permission to return and be rehoused in the city, instructions were given to the Housing
Manager to refuse, on the grounds that in accordance with government policy evacuees
should remain outside the target areas.l"
143 The Sheffield Star: 8.8.41, p.4
144 Social Work: July 1941, Vol. 2, No.1, p.10
14$ Sheffield Archives File CA. 157/6, Minute 2337
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Throughout 1941, as indeed throughout the war, evacuation planning continued at
national and local level. A file labelled "Local War Instructions: Secret Documents,"
held by Sheffield Archives, revealed that in September the Sheffield Emergency
Committee met, apparently secretly, to design a new "Homeless" evacuation scheme.
New reception areas were identified and train timetables prepared to transport homeless
evacuees out of the city over a period of three days from seven local Sheffield railway
stations (Brightside, Tinsley, Darnall, Wincobank, Wadsley Bridge, Victoria and
Midland) to Southwell, Halifax, Tibshelf, Huddersfield, Worksop, Clowne, Mansfield
and Denby Dale. (Doncaster, Barnsley, Tickhill and Bentley were initially included in
the list but by January 1941had been removed.j"
In October the evacuable area of the city was extended to include additional districts
which had suffered heavy bomb damage in the preceding months. The Emergency
Committee agreed to limit the issue of travel vouchers and evacuation certificates to
those residing in these areas, with the proviso that restrictions would be relaxed for a
limited period immediately following severe air raids. It was also agreed that
contingency plans should be prepared for the speedy evacuation of up to 10,000
unaccompanied school children in the event of heavy bombing.l"
It was envisaged that the Sheffield "Homeless" evacuation scheme would not become
operative until the third or fourth day of continuous attack, by which time it was
expected that many homeless people would have been billeted in other areas of the city.
Evacuation out of Sheffield would be confined to homeless persons who were unable to
146 Sheffield Archives File CA.41/29
147 Sheffield Archives File CA.l 57/6 Minutes 2278, 21 SO
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obtain billets within the city limits. The Director of Education (responsible for
evacuation) specified the categories eligible to take advantage of the scheme:
"The only persons eligible are those who are homeless and who
are not men and women who are in employment nor persons
requiring special attention, eg bedridden, cripples, mental
defectives, etc." 148
Within the city an amended list was drawn up of rest centres - which, although it could
not have been foreseen at the time, was to be resurrected and brought into operation in
1944 when Sheffield became a reception area for evacuees from the flying bombs [see
Appendix 9, Chapter Sevenj.!" Correspondence between the city's Director of
Education and the Director of Social Welfare disclosed officials' concern that the
number of rest centres had been cut to a minimum and voiced the need to recruit
voluntary help to register homeless people for evacuation in any emergency. A request
for some preliminary training for those who were to staff the rest centres if the need
arose was refused on the grounds of secrecy: the Deputy Senior Regional Officer
explained: "The existence of the scheme is not be made known until it is actually
decided to bring it into operation. ,,150
The threat of invasion was clearly taken seriously in Sheffield: in July 1942 an
instruction leaflet was compiled by members of Sheffield Invasion Committee with the
object of avoiding public disorder in any future invasion. Local newspapers offered to
carry inserts in their publications urging the public to stand firm in the case of invasion
148 Sheffield Archives File CA.41129, memos 28.11.41, 23.1.42
149 Sheffield Archives File CA.41129
I~O Sheffield Archives File CA.41129, memos 28.11.41, 1.1.42
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but the suggestion was refused.'?' Instead, house-to-house visits were made by
officially appointed Visitors (mostly ARP wardens and members of the police) in order
to prepare the public in advance to meet invasion conditions. The Visitors were
instructed to learn the contents of the instruction leaflet and not to deviate from it in any
way when talking to householders, to avoid upsetting people and causing panic. It
appears that not all efforts were successful in this regard, for one councillor reported
local talk of Fifth Column activity after Visitors had called upon constituents in his
area. When the Chief Constable was called in to investigate, he dispelled the rumours
and complained in tum that the councillor had been derogatory about the way
volunteers dealt with a difficult job. 152
In October 1942 a new Draft (Revised) Civil Defence Plan was considered and adopted
by the Sheffield Invasion Committee. Importantly, under this detailed plan there was to
be no organised evacuation of civilians to reception areas outside the city. Billeting
within the city boundaries was to be extended to cover all Sheffield people rendered
homeless, either by enemy air raid or other damage to their homes (presumably by
invasion) and those who might be rendered homeless by evacuation. In addition, all
refugees from outside Sheffield, including people made homeless by evacuation and
sent to Sheffield on the order of the military authority, were included. Under this plan
Sheffield was divided into six sections in each of which a number of rest centres and
intermediate hostels had been earmarked. A total of 63,000 potential billets had already
been identified in house-to-house visits by ARP volunteers, and it was estimated that
lSI Sheffield Archives File CA.157/6, meeting 21.8.42
JS2 Sheffield Archives File CA.43/13(a)
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20,000 people could be dealt with per day, subject to special transport being available.
Official evacuation in organised parties does not appear to have been envisaged,
however. Billeting officers had been appointed (to be assisted by teachers if necessary)
to deal with people made homeless in the event of heavy bombing and to billet them in
private homes in undamaged areas within the city borders. Compulsory billeting was
not ruled out if the number of voluntary billets were to prove insufficient in the case of
heavy damage to particular districts of the city. Pre-empting any possible reluctance on
the part of hosts, the ARP Controller stated:
"The only rule to be applied will be - is there room in the house
for such persons? - if the billeting officer is of the opinion there
is, the householder will be expected to receive one or more
persons for a short time and to do his or her best for them.,,)53
Evacuation out of the city was back on the agenda in June 1943, when the Emergency
Committee for Civil Defence met to review schemes for the organisation of school rest
centres, emergency feeding, billeting and evacuation in the event of any future crisis.
The Director of Education issued particulars to committee members and other council
officials which showed that facilities would be available for the movement out of the
city of all the priority classes of civilians able to make arrangements for
accommodation with relatives or friends in reception or neutral areas and travel
vouchers and billeting certificates would be provided. Official evacuation in organised
parties does not appear to have been envisaged, however.154
1S3 Sheffield Archives File CA.43/13(a)
154 Sheffield Archives File CA.681(14)(27)
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Although evacuation had largely fallen off nationally by 1943, organised plans were
made for it to be resumed in case of emergency. On 9 July Duncan Sandys reported
plans made by the Home Office, not for any wholesale movement out of London, but
for the removal when the time came of 100,000 persons in priority classes, such as
school children and pregnant mothers, at the rate of 10,000 a day.155
The continual updating of evacuation plans throughout the years was shown to have
been necessary when, the following year, London and the south of England were
attacked by flying bombs. This last phase of evacuation will be covered in the next
chapter.
m W S Churchill: The Second World War: Vol.. V. Closing the Ring, p.205
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE LAST PHASE
By the spring of 1942, when air attacks on the cities had decreased and the need for
evacuation appeared to have diminished, opinion in the reception areas was in favour of
winding up the scheme. Even those householders who had willingly accepted the
'guests' thrust upon them at the outset of war were wearying of their task, for few of
them could have envisaged how long they would be expected to put up with strangers in
their homes, and some saw no justification for being required to continue to care for
other people's children while their mothers were going out to work in the cities.
Moreover, the risk of danger appeared, to the public at least, largely to have abated. I
But when the War Cabinet reviewed the matter in April of that year it was decided to
retain the evacuation scheme.' For one thing, dismantling such a huge and intricate
structure was considered premature at a time when plans were already afoot for Britain
to invade Europe and civilian populations of ports might have to be moved in
consequence. For another, the demand for very young children to be evacuated to
residential nurseries and for expectant mothers to move to country maternity homes had
not abated - indeed, numbers were even to increase throughout the following year. In
addition, there was a continued need for billets for resident nursery children as they
reached the age of five years and left to go to primary schools in reception areas.'
1 R M Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy: History of the Second World War, p.424
2 PRO.CAB173/10 C.D.C.(E)(42) 11th mtg. 30.4.42; cited inTitmuss: op. cit., p.425
3 Titmuss: op. cit., p.425
314
Some restrictions on evacuation were, however, introduced in 1942. In March the
organised scheme (Plan Seven) for mothers and children - demand for which had, in
any case, largely fallen off - was halted. Evacuation of unaccompanied school children
in organised parties under the 'Trickle' scheme (Plan Five) remained in place until the
end of the year, when it was suspended except in such vulnerable areas as London, Hull,
Portsmouth, Southampton, and Plymouth. But schemes for assisted private evacuation
were maintained, with travel vouchers and billeting certificates provided for those in the
priority classes who were able to make their own arrangements to move to safer areas."
The government's decision to keep the official evacuation scheme in force throughout
the country, albeit in a restricted form, turned out to be a wise one. In the summer of
1944, when VI rockets (popularly known as 'flying-bombs' or 'doodlebugs') attacked
London and the south-eastern counties of England and demand for the movement of
mothers and children away from this wide area quickly followed, the scheme was
resurrected and put into effect.5
In fact, although the devastating assaults by these pilotless aircraft came as a profound
shock to the public at large, the new bombardment was not unexpected by War Office
officials. O'Brien maintained that planning against rocket attacks had begun in early
1944, when the Government prepared Evacuation Programme VIII (code-name
'Rivulet') for the voluntary evacuation of school children, mothers and young children
and expectant mothers from London, Southampton, Portsmouth and Gosport." But the
4 Titmuss: op. cit., p.425,6; R Samways: We Think You Ought to Go., pp.ll, 12
s Titmuss: op. cit., p.426
6 T H O'Brien: Civil Defence: History of the Second World War, p.650
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Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health asserted that complete arrangements
had been in place even before that - since the previous September, when timetables had
been drawn up for 10,000 to be evacuated per day from the capital to designated
reception areas. In July 1944 Florence Horsbrugh told the House of Commons: "We
merely had to say 'Go ahead'. The order was given and the machine worked. The plan
was ready."7
Whatever the case, the new onslaught upon a wide swathe of southern England forced
the government to make drastic changes to the map of evacuation, reception and neutral
areas which had existed since 1939. Many of the original designations were now
rendered obsolete. Former reception authorities, particularly those in the path of the VI
rockets, became responsible for evacuating persons in the priority classes to areas
earlier defined as danger zones. At the same time some provincial towns and cities,
which had previously evacuated 'inessential' civilians with varying degrees of success,
were quickly compelled to adapt to their new status as reception authorities.
As may be imagined, considerable difficulties were encountered by authorities
previously geared to evacuation and now in what were deemed reception areas.
Administrative machinery had to be quickly adapted to cope with the imminent arrival
of large numbers of women and children requiring accommodation in the homes of
householders with no previous experience of receiving evacuees. As one woman
observed: "Yes, one day we were a 'prohibited area' and the next we were receiving
evacuees!,,8
7 HoC Deb. 21.7.44, Vol. 402, Cols. 503-4; The Sheffield Star: 2l.7.44, p.4
8 Mass-Observation File 2189, p.5
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Sheffield was one of the industrial cities which changed its position from a (largely
unsuccessful) evacuation zone to a successful reception area, as will be seen. Many
local women who had evacuated their own children out of the city in September 1939
now became foster parents themselves. Two interviewees who had left Sheffield with
their schools in 1939 recalled this change of status. The mother of one, having been
herself evacuated with her children after the bombing of Sheffield, accepted a London
mother and daughter in 1944.9 The other ex-evacuee had barely returned from her
billet in Linby, Nottinghamshire, when she found herself sharing her home with two
unaccompanied school children from the south of England. 10
Flying bomb attacks began on 12 June 1944 but, despite Florence Horsbrugh's
assurance that the plan was ready, evacuation did not start until three weeks later.
O'Brien claimed that evacuation of the priority classes was seen as less urgent than the
repair of bomb-damaged houses. There was criticism from an uninformed public about
the apparent absence of an official scheme and a great deal of private evacuation had
already taken place before the start of the officially organised movement.11
On 1 July the government requested the London County Council to take responsibility
for the resumption of the official programme and registration of school children began
immediately.V Six days later the Prime Minister announced to the House of Commons
that unaccompanied children whose parents wished them to be moved out of the danger
areas were already being evacuated. Registers were being opened "for people of small
9 Oral interview: Margaret Bennett, 16.3.95
10 Oral interview: Elaine Piotrowicz, 21.3.95
11 O'Brien: op. cit., p.655
12 Titmuss: op. cit., p.427
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means and not engaged on war work". Lessons had apparently been learned from the
earlier reluctance of parents to part with their children, for Churchill continued: "We
do not propose to separate the mother from the child except by her wish." Registration
of pregnant women and mothers with small children would begin next day. It also
seemed that private evacuation was now being actively promoted, as Churchill went on:
"We are not discouraging people who have no essential work to
do from leaving London at their own expense [... ] in fact, they
assist our affairs by taking such action at their own expense.,,13
Titmuss estimated that, in the period between 5 July and 7 September 1944, 307,600
women and children were evacuated under the official programme 'Rivulet' (popularly
known as 'the flying-bomb evacuation') along with children and staff in more than
ninety residential schools and nurseries situated in 'bomb alley'. In the same period a
far greater number (a total of 552,000 mothers, children, aged and homeless people)
took advantage of the assisted scheme and made their own arrangements to evacuate
themselves, aided by billeting certificates and travel vouchers provided by the
government.14 Some evacuees returned to billets they had occupied in earlier
programmes. IS An evacuation census taken on 30 September 1944 showed that
1,012,800 people of all the priority classes were moved from their homes into reception
areas in England and Wales in 1944, including 284,000 unaccompanied children."
The first organised parties left London for reception areas in the midlands and north of
England three weeks after the new attacks began. For nine weeks trainloads of refugees
13 HoC Deb. 6.7.44, Vol. 401, Col. 1329; The Sheffield Star: 6.7.44, p.1
14 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.427,428
IS R Inglis: The Children's War: Evacuation 1939-1945, p.139
16 Titmuss: op. cit., p.430; p.562, Appendix 9
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departed from London stations at regular intervals - at first in large numbers but, as time
went on, demand decreased until the official scheme was largely suspended on 7
September. I7 Expectant mothers, nursery children and the old and infirm remained
eligible for organised evacuation, as well as children joining evacuated secondary
schools, while homeless mothers with children remained covered by the assisted
scheme." While this emergency evacuation was in progress, plans were being laid for
the possible large-scale official movement from London of hospital patients, key
government departments and important production units to meet the consequences of
any escalation of flying bombs and long-range rocket attacks over a prolonged period.
But simultaneously, and perhaps paradoxically, discussions were also taking place
regarding scaling down all the various schemes covering evacuation, as will be seen."
Once again, private evacuation impeded efforts of administrators as it had in 1939, as
large numbers of unofficial evacuees complicated official billeting arrangements. In
Sheffield, the first organised party of mothers and children arrived on 11 July, but they
were preceded by many people who had made their own arrangements: The Sheffield
Star reported that three hundred had arrived in the first few days of July and had either
taken up private lodgings or were helped to find accommodation by city billeting
officers." At a meeting five weeks later, on 18 August, members of Sheffield
Emergency Committee for Civil Defence were informed that the number of private
evacuees had risen to an estimated 3,500 and the flood showed no signs of decreasing."
17 Titmuss: op. cit., p.427
18 Ministry of Health circular 129/44, 23.9.44; cited in Titmuss: op. cit., p.427 n.4
19 Titmuss: op. cit., p.428
20 The Sheffield Star: 10.7.44, p.8; 11.7.44, p.2
21 Sheffield Archives File CA. 15717, Report 18.8.44
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The total number who made their own arrangements to come to the city during the
period of rocket attacks is unknown.
The news of Sheffield's change of status was hardly trumpeted to its citizens: The
Sheffield Telegraph & Independent made no mention of the subject until after the
arrival of the first party of evacuees. The Sheffield Star carried front-page headlines on
6 July 1944 announcing the restoration of evacuation and outlining details of the new
programme, but it was only when they turned to the back page that observant readers
would have noticed a small item informing them that their city was in the front line for
receiving refugees. No doubt seeking to reassure readers, the article declared that no
special difficulties were anticipatedf The task began immediately of encouraging
local people to respond positively to the challenge of its reversal of role. Next day The
Sheffield Star exhorted its readers to give sanctuary to the evacuees: they could
demonstrate their honour and admiration for Londoners by "taking the evacuees to their
hearts in true Yorkshire style".23
Chapter Six demonstrated that many of the lessons learned from problems which arose
in the first ('Pied Piper') programme were heeded when the 'Trickle' scheme was
operated. Similarly, the LCC officials who were responsible for evacuation made
strong efforts to avoid pitfalls encountered in the second programme when 'Rivulet'
was executed. On the whole, journeys appear to have been better organised in 1944
than in earlier programmes. Advance notice of transport arrangements was given to the
Women's Voluntary Service, which provided four welfare workers on each train and
22 The Sheffield Star: 6.7.44 , pp.1, 8
23 ibid., 7.7.44, p.2
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supplied urns of tea and baby bottles for mothers and infants, while the LCC provided
paper cups and churns of milk. Some of the travellers had lost all possessions in
bombing attacks and steps were taken to try to ensure that needy children and adults
were provided with sufficient clothing before travelling, so avoiding some of the earlier
criticisms levelled against evacuees. In the receiving areas rest centres were generally
used as clearing houses where the evacuees stayed, usually for the first night, giving
billeting officers more time to allocate the evacuees to suitable billets. Graves
observed that although, as before, unaccompanied children proved easiest to billet,
while mothers with large families who refused to be separated were the most difficult,
local authorities recognised the need to requisition large houses as hostels or communal
billets more quickly this time."
For all the efforts of organisers, however, some procedures had not improved in the
intervening period. The secrecy which had attended journeys in earlier programmes
was again evident in some areas. Prior knowledge of destinations was not always made
available to those travelling; neither were all reception officials informed of numbers
and categories of evacuees allocated to their districts. The Sheffield Telegraph &
Independent showed that confusion apparently accompanied at least the first trainload
to arrive in the city, for it was reported that the refugees had been unaware that they
were bound for Sheffield until the train drew into the station, and city officials receiving
them had not known how many to expect.25 An interviewee who travelled with this
party recalled that the mothers passed the journey by community singing, returning
24 C Graves: Women in Green: pp.231-2
2S The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 12.7.44, p.3
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again and again to the refrain "We don't know where we're going till we're there". She
felt this indicated that the party did not know their destination. Her older brother,
however, asserted that he knew where the family was going but was not allowed to
divulge the secret. Waiting to depart, he was about to inform a friendly minister of
religion where he was going, when he was whisked away by his mother and other
women and soundly rebuked. According to his sister, he remembered:
"I was told I must not tell a soul - not even someone who
appeared to be a vicar. Apparently the feeling was that one had
to be careful of enemy spies, and one dog collar did not a vicar
make.,,26
In reception areas across the country, despite all efforts, some of the confusion of 1939
and 1940 was experienced yet again in 1944. Education reported that householders in
one village, standing by to receive forty mothers with young children, were confronted
with thirty unaccompanied school children whose escorts had no details and knew
nothing about them: billeting staff had to copy names and addresses from the children's
coat labels. Within a fortnight the same village was swamped by more than one
hundred additional official and private evacuees who arrived without any warning."
There were other, similar, muddles. Holman cites the case of the official evacuation
from Ilford, when a party of women and children got out at the wrong station and ended
up in Accrington, where unaccompanied school children had been expected: the school
children went to Oldham, where the mothers were awaited.28 An interviewee who was
evacuated with another Ilford school group was more fortunate, however. He spent the
26 Oral interview: Frances Pullen, Part 2, 19.2.98
27 "T EL": "The Second Evacuation", Social Work, Vol. 3, No.5, January 1945, p.121
28 B Holman: The Evacuation: A VeryBritish Revolution, p.66
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first night in a Barnoldswick rest centre cared for by the WVS. Next morning, it was
clear that allocation of billets had already been made, for the children were called out
by name and taken by coach to neighbouring villages where their hosts stepped forward
to greet them."
But random selection of children continued elsewhere. A Nottinghamshire woman
remembered the ad hoc arrangements made by her mother and other neighbours when a
bus full of young children appeared without warning on their street in 1944:
"My mother found out that they were evacuees. I was upset to
see the children so unhappy. [... ] Suddenly one little girl got
hold of my mum's arm and said 'Lady, lady, take me home with
you. ' [... ] She stayed with us until 1947."
This woman maintained that many other children found homes in nearby houses in the
same way."
With regard to Sheffield, as stated in Chapter Six, examination of files lodged with the
City Archives has shown that the subject of evacuation had been under constant
discussion by various local committees throughout the war. Several schemes of civil
defence were planned and adapted as circumstances dictated. In January 1941, in the
aftermath of the city blitz, the responsibility for billeting people made homeless by
bombing was transferred to the Education Welfare Department. 31
A list of rest and distribution centres in the city which was drawn up in 1942 as part of
contingency plans for any further heavy bombing of the City32was resurrected for use in
29 Oral interview: George Green, 17.12.93
30 Nottingham Local Studies Library: File L94: News Cuttings 1939-1943
31 Sheffield Archives File CA.43/15; Sheffield Civic Record: No 25-26, Aug/Sept 1949, p.3
32 Sheffield Archives File CA.41129
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the 'flying bomb' evacuation and brought into operation for the reception of incoming
refugees [see Appendix 9]. Detailed arrangements for reception had also been worked
out in advance and the procedure was broadly followed for each party arriving. The
refugees were met at the station by the Director of Education, together with welfare
officers, members of the Education Office staff and several teachers who were present
to offer assistance to the evacuees. Doctors and nurses were also on hand to deal with
any cases of illness. On the platform they were organised into parties and transported to
distribution points while their luggage was sorted, loaded into waiting vans and sent on
after them. The Hallamshire Teacher proudly pronounced: "Marshals accompanying
the parties have expressed their opinion that the Sheffield arrangements are the best that
they have encountered. ,,33
On arrival at the rest centres the evacuees were provided with hot meals prepared by a
British Restaurant depot. Members of the WVS took charge of sleeping arrangements
and provided breakfast for all the refugees next morning." The newcomers were
welcomed at the centres by the Lord Mayor, who visited each contingent of official
evacuees as they arrived throughout the ensuing weeks." Officials from the Food
Office and Labour Exchange also visited the distribution points to deal with ration book
transfers and requests for financial assistance." Local women teachers helped with
filling in billeting notices while their male colleagues set about the urgent task of
finding homes for the refugees: others used their cars to convey the evacuees to billets.
33 Hallamshire Teacher: No 20, July 1944, pp.2,3; No 21, Sept 1944, p.3; The Sheffield Star: 11.7.44, p.4
34 The Sheffield Star: 11.7.44, p.4
3S The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 20.7.44, p.3; 7.8.44, p.3; 8.11.44, p.3
36 ibid., 19.7.44, p.3
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Having assisted with marshalling and billeting throughout the period of evacuation,
many teachers went on to volunteer to stand by to help in the school summer holiday.37
Although reception procedures seem to have followed a pre-set pattern, billeting
procedures were a different matter. Varying accounts have been found of methods of
selecting homes for evacuees to Sheffield. To begin with, lists of billets appeared to
have been pre-arranged. An interviewee who was one of the first to arrive in the city
recalled:
"We spent a night at the reception place before being billeted
next day. We sat on benches and listened for our names to be
called, to be assigned a billet. Many children had come without
their mothers, and even those with mothers found themselves
separated at this point and sent to different homes."
Her family was divided, the two elder children taken by an elderly widow and her
mother and young brother billeted a few houses away." A press report showed that all
the first arrivals found billets, except for one family of eight who refused to be
separated and were finally settled into a hostel. A large family of six children was taken
in by the Vicar of Owlerton, but some other families were split up in amicable
arrangements."
Not everything went so smoothly for later arrivals, however. In an uncomfortable echo
of past procedures, a London widow who was interviewed described her experience
when she was evacuated to Sheffield with her four children in August:
"We were taken to a church hall and selected like slaves in the
cattle markets. 'I'll take that one, etc. etc.' Knowing the
difficulty in arranging for five, I allowed the two older children
37 Hallamshire Teacher: No 21, Sept 1944, p.3; The Sheffield Star: 31.7.44, p.3
38 Oral interview: Frances Pullen, 11.7.97
39 The Sheffield Star: 13.7.44, p.4
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to go with a man and wife and I went with the two youngest
children. ,,40
This ex-evacuee's daughter (also interviewed) remembered that her mother and small
siblings did not find a billet immediately, but were taken in temporarily by a local
doctor until they were accommodated with a family in another area of the city."
Another evacuee to the Sheffield area remembered a kind welcome at the reception
centre which, however, ended in misery:
"There was food and drink, just like a party for children, but for
many of us the party did not end on a happy note. [... ] It
seemed that the adults were there to pick a child who appeared
to be 'suitable' either by size, looks or gender, and eventually
that resulted in my brother and I being separated. We were
devastated. ,,42
The numbers who arrived in Sheffield fell short of those expected - another reminder of
past experiences in other reception areas. Although the first train had brought a total of
681 evacuees (including 222 mothers)" all those following were less full, and many ran
half-empty. The second party, arriving three days later, comprised 584, only three-
quarters of the anticipated quota," but this may have been affected by an unfortunate
incident. On 14 July twenty people queuing for clothing at a WVS centre prior to
evacuation were killed by a flying bomb: fifteen of the dead had been destined for
Sheffield.45 The shortfall continued throughout the following weeks, however, as will
be seen in the table below. In a scene reminiscent of Sheffield evacuees' own reception
40 Oral interview: Gwen McDermott, 24.10.97
41 Oral interview: Hazel Robbins, 29.9.97
42 Oral interview: Patricia Jones, 3.11.97
43 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 12.7.44, p.3
44 Sheffield Archives File CA.I5717: Meeting 21.7.44
4~ The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 15.7.44, p.3
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areas of Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire in 1939, the third contingent brought only
half of the 1,600 expected, the first train carrying only 280 evacuees." The table
below, constructed from figures taken from several successive editions of The Sheffield
Star and the Lord Mayor's Secretary's files lodged in the city's Archives, illustrates the
positi on. 47
Evacuees received into Sheffield under Government Evacuation
Programme 'Rivulet', Autumn 1944
Date of Arrival Numbers Expected Numbers Arrived
11 July 1944 800 630
14 July 1944 800 584
19 July 1944 1,600 859
3 August 1944 1,000 740
6 August 1944 800 692
8 August 1944 1,600 654
10 August 1944 900 873
13 August 1944 800 640
22 August 1944 800 667
25 August 1944 800 500
Total 9,900 6,839
Local newspapers reported that when the newcomers were taken to rest centres, many
would-be foster families were disappointed that there were not enough evacuees to go
round." An examination of archive files has revealed that, throughout the period of this
evacuation programme, reception plans were frequently revised as it became clear at the
last minute that fewer evacuees would arrive in the city than originally expected.l"
46 Sheffield Archives File CA.15717; The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 20.7.44, p.3
47 Figures taken from Sheffield Archives File CA.509/5; also The Sheffield Star: 11.7.44, p.4; 14.7.44, p.4;
19.7.44, p.4; 31.7.44, p.3; 5.8.44, p.2; 8.8.44, p.l; 10.8.44, p.3; 12.8.44, p.3; 21.8.44, p.3; 25.8.44, p.4
48 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 20.7.44, p.3; The Sheffield Star: 19.7.44, p.4
49 Sheffield Archives File CA 509/5/1-12
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A meeting ofthe Emergency Committee for Civil Defence on 21 July was informed that
2,073 official evacuees had arrived in the city by that date. An estimated 800 unofficial
evacuees had also come, who had made their own arrangements under the assisted
scheme. All had been found accommodation, with the exception of a few large families
who were temporarily being housed in intermediate hostels until more suitable
accommodation could be found for them.50
The local press was keen to publicise the fact that arrangements for the evacuees were
widely acclaimed by officials of the local authorities from whence they had come. At
first there was little difficulty in accommodating all the evacuees - indeed, it was stated
that at two rest centres so many offers of billets had been received that evacuees did not
need overnight accommodation but went straight to the homes of their host families.
The Sheffield Star reported:
'The generosity of housewives has been amazing. [... ]
Voluntary billeting means happiness for all parties and we
would not have our visitors return with anything but pleasant
memories of their stay.?"
For several days the euphoria continued. Under the headline "Sheffield Clamours for
Child Evacuees", the same publication stated that Sheffield was one of the few places
in the country where there were more billets than evacuees, and billeting officials had
been besieged with offers for children. But a cautionary note intimated that mothers
were less welcome: "While we have had literally thousands of offers [... ] we want more
offers for accompanied children." Various suggestions were put forward to ease any
so Sheffield Archives File CA 157/7 Report of the Director of Education 21.7.44
~l The Sheffield Star: 15.7.44, p.2
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future problems of accommodation, including one proposing the use of hostels built for
Bevin boys which were well equipped with sick bays and shower baths: no further
mention has been found of this, however. 52
Within a fortnight a hint of the familiar aversion to mothers appeared in a newspaper
article under a more sobering headline: "City May Have a Billet Problem". Although
there was still no problem in finding homes for unaccompanied school children,
Sheffield's Director of Education warned: "If great numbers of mothers arrive we will
need more volunteers to billet them.,,53 The arrival of 740 more evacuees (including
157 mothers) on 3 August showed that there were still plenty of Sheffield hosts eager to
offer accommodation, however. It was reported that when the evacuees arrived at two
rest centres there were "queues waiting to take them - indignant at having to wait until
the new arrivals were fed and had gone through the routine medical examinations'v"
Suddenly, on 5 August, the quota of evacuees scheduled for the city was quadrupled:
originally set at 3,000, it was now fixed at 12,000. Perhaps in an effort to sweeten the
bitter pill, the news was published alongside a letter from the War Cabinet thanking
Sheffield people for their "fine work". With another trainload of refugees expected,
officials were concerned that compulsory billeting powers might become necessary, but
the Chief Billeting Officer announced optimistically that many people had previously
turned up at rest centres without prior notice and asked for evacuees, which had helped
S2 The Sheffield Star: 18.7.44, p.S; 17.7.44, p.5
S3 ibid., 31. 7.44, p.3
S4 ibid., 4.8.44, p.S
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greatly. 55 Citizens may have been encouraged by the implied invitation, for homes were
found for all except a few large families in the party which arrived next day. 56
Until the change of quota, officials had relied on offers of accommodation from
volunteers and had mostly been able to prepare lists of potential billets in advance of
the arrival of parties. 57 But, with the news of such a significant escalation, rumours of
compulsory billeting began and rumbled on for several days. The Sheffield Star
announced that, although accommodation had easily been found for around 4,000
evacuees so far, people were pouring in almost daily and the vast increase in numbers
threatened to make compulsion inevitable. 58 (In fact, it is clear that the number had
been under-estimated, for archive files show that over 5,000 official evacuees had
arrived by this time. )59 In contrast to the earlier, happy situation, there were now some
families languishing in rest centres for more than four days because of a lack of suitable
billets." The newspaper advised that tolerance and tact would be needed on both sides
if billeting were to be successful: householders might be resentful, but most would be
sympathetic, and evacuees should be reminded that they bore some responsibility toO.61
It was, of course, essential to find billets for each party as quickly as possible, for the
rest centres had to be cleared ready to receive the next group. The Director of
Education warned that if not enough volunteers came forward, billeting officers would
SS The Sheffield Star: 5.8.44, p.4
S6 ibid., 7.8.44, p.8; The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 7.8.44, pJ
S7 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 9.8.44, p.3
S8 The Sheffield Star: 11.8.44, p.4
S9 Sheffield Archives File CA.15717: Meetings 2l.7.44, 18.8.44:
60 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 11.8.44, p.3
61 The Sheffield Star: 1l.8.44, p.2
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tour the district around the rest centres: but householders were assured that they need
not fear unnecessary hardship, for the officers would use discretion. The Town Clerk
would oversee machinery for any appeals against compulsory billeting, and tribunals
would be set up consisting of members of the City Council.62
Sheffield officials were clearly embarrassed by the notion of introducing compulsory
billeting and made clear that it was not due to wholesale refusals.'" In the event, half of
the next party of 640 who arrived on 13 August were found homes. There appeared to
be little trouble in billeting unaccompanied children, but families continued to pose a
problem." Billeting authorities announced the intention to requisition some large
houses which had formerly been in military occupation to serve as hostels for families
with several children." In this way, four suburban mansions in one small road were re-
designated and became home to nine families, and other premises were also adapted.
Once again, officials visited the newcomers with details of organisations such as the
Child Welfare Centre, the Food Office and the Fuel Office.66
Although the hostels were furnished and equipped with essential items, the Housing
Department was unable to provide the many domestic articles needed by refugee
families who had been forced to carry with them only the bare necessities of clothing.
As a former evacuation zone, Sheffield had not been issued with the stocks of
furnishings supplied to authorities which had operated as reception areas from the
62 The Sheffield Star: 11.8.44, p.4
63 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 14.8.44, p.3
64 The Sheffield Star: 14.8.44, p.5
65 ibid., 12.8.44, p.3
66 ibid., 14.8.44, p.; 16.8.44, p.3
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outset. An appeal was carried in city newspapers for local people to donate such items,
including flat irons and 'bedroom utensils' .67 The children's column of The Sheffield
Star also carried appeals over several weeks for toys and games to be donated for the
use of evacuees in hostels."
At a meeting on 18August the Emergency Committee for Civil Defence was informed
that compulsory billeting had been necessary in only a very limited number of cases.
Roughly 90% of each trainload had been billeted without difficulty, but members were
told:
"The remammg 10% form a residue and are, for various
reasons, unbilletable. These are taken from the rest centres to
intermediate hostels. Once in these hostels it is a most difficult
matter to persuade them to leave and go into the billets
provided."
At that time there were 168 families in hostels throughout the city, and others were to
be transferred to the Queensbury Hostel in the West Riding.'" By 11 September the
number had been reduced, with only eighteen official and three unofficial evacuees
remaining in hostels. By mid-December all the hostels had been closed."
In addition to mothers with small children and unaccompanied school children,
evacuees to Sheffield included elderly people: one couple celebrated their golden
wedding anniversary at Intake rest centre." There were also several expectant mothers,
who were invited to attend the Maternity and Child Welfare Centre, where
67 The Sheffield Star: 17.8.44, p.5
68 For example, The Sheffield Star: 29.7.44, p.5; 14.8.44, p.4
69 Sheffield Archives File CA.15717: Meeting 18.8.44
70 Sheffield Archives File CA.15717
71 The Sheffield Star: 26.8.44, p.5
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arrangements were made for their confinements.P Some families who came to
Sheffield in 1944 had already been evacuated several times after various bombing
raids." A few even seemed to treat the situation lightly - in a depressing reminder of
complaints in earlier programmes, one family was reported to have already been to
Eastbourne and Wales and were looking forward to the 'holiday' because it was not
expected to be for long."
Brinton-Lee, of Mass-Observation, considered that this last evacuation was more
successful - from the point of view of organising officials, hosts and evacuees - than
earlier migrations, for various reasons. Firstly, the programme was on a smaller scale
and was mainly a movement of people from the south northwards. Secondly, whereas
earlier evacuations had mainly concerned the inhabitants of inner-city areas, this time a
broader cross-section of the population was involved because flying bombs fell over a
much wider area, including the outer suburbs of London as well as south and south-east
England. In addition, since many urban districts had now become reception areas it was
often (but not always) possible to match like with like - town-dwellers with urban hosts
and country people in rural billets.
On the other hand, new difficulties had arisen. Everywhere, food and household goods
were in shorter supply than earlier. In some of the new reception areas, where heavy
bombing had taken place earlier in the war, the housing shortage was acute. In
addition, many cities were already filled with war-workers and troops; middle-class
72 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of the School Medical Officer 1944. p.37
73 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 10.8.44. p.3; The Sheffield Star: 12 July - 25 Aug 44
74 The Sheffield Star: 25.8.44, p.4
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hosts had fewer domestic staff; and some, who had earlier encountered difficult house-
guests, were wary of going through the experience again. A Cambridgeshire
householder summed up the feeling: "I won't pretend about this, the more experience
we have, the less we like it. ,,75
Titmuss asserted that very few mishaps and no substantial complaints were reported in
the reception areas.f However, investigation has shown that, as in earlier evacuation
movements, billeting once more proved a thorny issue and many instances of reluctance
to accept evacuees were discovered by contemporary researchers. The Economist
reported that the welcome extended to refugees was generally good and the evacuation
was largely successful but observed:
"The centuries-old dislike of British people for billeting in
private houses [... ] has not grown weaker with the passage of
time and is now much stronger in the case of civilians
(especially families) than of troops."
It was said that this was mostly due to the general disinclination of local people to share
their homes with 'foreigners' from another part of the country, which had been noted in
1939 and still much in evidence five years later."
The Spectator referred to a 'hate campaign' directed at evacuees, allegedly being
worked up by some popular London newspapers which complained that evacuees were
offered free transport and free accommodation and were free to return home whenever
they liked. A letter to the editor stated:
7S Mass-Observation File 2189, pp.l-4
76 Titmuss: op. cit., p.428
77 The Economist: 29.7.44, p.142, unsigned article
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"As long as evacuation is voluntary - and therefore irresponsible
- and reception compulsory, the seeds of the hate campaign will
yield a bumper crop.?"
Criticisms of billeting officers surfaced once agam: some were accused of being
generous in their offers of other people's hospitality in villages which had been 'once
bitten' in 1939 and were 'twice shy' in 1944.79 Moreover, the passage of time did not
appear to have affected class consciousness in reception areas: complaints about
discrimination in favour of upper- and middle-class householders in the reception areas
were still in evidence. As one Mass-Observation reporter observed:
"Small householders have been put to inconvenience and
threatened with compulsory billeting while members of the
town council and people living in large houses in the better
residential areas have not taken any billetees at all."
But the same investigator put some of the blame upon "the tyranny of servants" in the
big houses over elderly employers and their reluctance to put up with evacuees. The
situation had been aggravated by the fact that, as the war dragged on, gradually more
and more of the domestics had been called up into the forces, leaving large residences
severely under-staffed.80
Itwas often remarked that prominent citizens were not as responsive as could have been
hoped. A contributor to the journal Social Work maintained that a high standard of
living was not always associated with a high standard of charity, and the best foster
parents often already had large families, though some childless couples were glad to
78 The Spectator: 21.7.44, p.50; 4.8.44, p.105
79 "T EL": "The Second Evacuation", op. cit., p.120
80 Mass-Observation File 2189, p.16
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take evacuee children." This was borne out by two interviewees who were evacuated
to Sheffield in 1944. Although separated from their mothers on arrival, both found their
hosts generous in hospitality despite their cramped living conditions and spoke highly
of their foster parents. One ex-evacuee was billeted in a small terraced house and slept
in a camp-bed in her hostess's bedroom, while her brother shared a room with the adult
son of the house.82 The second was happily accommodated in the tiny, inner-city home
of a childless couple employed in the local steel-works and said repeatedly: "They were
such kind people. ,,83 On the other hand, her mother and younger siblings were less
happy with much more affiuent householders." Similarly, another interviewee, who
felt miserable and neglected in the home of well-to-do hosts, reported: "My brother and
I did not receive good care, and for both of us it was a year of great unhappiness. ,,85
Some landladies were condemned for preferring unofficial evacuees to those sent under
the government scheme: but in their defence it was pointed out that many who had been
able to charge private lodgers thirty shillings a week were now required to take in
children on full board for little more than a third of that sum, or else rent a room to a
mother and child for eight shillings per week." Sheffield did not escape condemnation
on this score: at the end of August The Sheffield Star reported that local landladies were
turning out their Sheffield tenants from rented rooms to make room for unofficial
evacuees who were able to pay more for their accommodation.Y
81 "T EL": "The Second Evacuation", op. cit., p.12l
82 Oral interview: Frances Pullen, 1l.7.97
83 Oral interview: Hazel Robbins, 29.9.97
84 Oral interview: Gwen McDermott, 24.10.97
8' Oral interview: Patricia Jones, 3.11.97
86 "T EL": "The Second Evacuation", op. cit., p.12l
87 The Sheffield Star: 30.8.44, p.3
336
Other householders were apparently unwilling to comply with billeting orders, too. In
Blackpool, for example, where local dignitaries had refused to take in evacuees in 1939
(see Chapter Four), summonses were issued against six people for the same offence
within a week of the beginning of the operation 'Rivulet'i'" Furthermore, the Town
Clerk reported on three cases under investigation to a meeting of the Emergency
Committee for Civil Defence in September. The relevant file shows that no action was
taken on two of these: a report was submitted on the third but no conclusion was
recorded." It is interesting to note that no mention of any of these cases has been found
in local newspapers.
Attempts were made to reassure reluctant householders that they would not face the
problems which had been encountered in 1939, but not all were convinced. Like
Worksop people in 1940, Chester citizens (who had received evacuees from Liverpool
in 1939) were unwilling to respond to the call to offer billets, despite officials'
assertions that they would find people coming from the south would be of a completely
different calibre from those they had before."
It was true that the official evacuation programme of 1944 encompassed a broader
cross-section of the population than had "Operation Pied Piper" with its high proportion
of inner-city residents. Mass-Observation reported that the proportion of slum-dwellers
seemed to have been lower in relation to the whole, and many hosts said they received a
better type of evacuee than expected. In Birmingham, formerly an evacuation zone but
88 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 15.7.44, p.l
89 Sheffield Archives File CA 157/7
90 The Chester Chronicle: 15.7.44, cited in J Croall: unpublished BA Dissertation, p.34
337
by this time a receiving area, a rest centre helper was quoted: "I was amazed, amazed,
to see rows and rows of bright clean intelligent children.,,91
Sheffield newspapers were keen to convey a public image of a city welcoming the
newcomers with open arms, but quoted cases of inhospitality on the part of people in
other reception areas. One report on Knutsford in Cheshire stated: "Half the people are
willing to help and the others are finding all kinds of excuses to refuse." Another, on
Hoole in the same county, described how two hundred evacuees had been left without
billets and quoted conflicting views of members of the Urban District Council. The
Clerk clearly held householders responsible as he observed: "It is amazing the amount
of illness which has developed in the district since the evacuees arrived." But a couple
of days later, the Council Chairman put the blame on evacuees:
"One [evacuated] mother had refused four billets - the first three
were either 'too posh', 'not posh enough' or 'too quiet'; she had
refused to look at the fourth, but had gone home instead.,,92
In 1944, as in 1939 and 1940, the familiar aversion of householders to adult evacuees
was evident. Mass-Observation reporters still found a reluctance among some private
householders to take in any evacuees, especially mothers and children. A billeting
officer in Nottingham (formerly an evacuation area), where 500 evacuees were
expected, reported that offers for only about 150 were received, and 98% of the
volunteer householders did not want mothers with children. In the event, only sixty
evacuees arrived." In Bradford an investigator remarked:
91 MaSS-Observation File 2189, pp.l, 2
92 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 11.7.44, p.2; 15.7.44, p.l; 17.7.44, p.l
93 MasS-Observation File 2189, p.12
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"I haven't met a single person who wouldn't have taken in an
unaccompanied child, or children, but the minute 'mother and
child' was mentioned most people said 'No women!"?"
In Sheffield an elderly woman wrote to her local newspaper to express her dismay at
being required to take an evacuee mother with two children, and stated her firm
intention to lock up her house and go away."
It was not all gloom, however: Graves held that, because inhabitants of many northern
and midland towns and cities had personal experience of bombing and evacuation
problems, they responded sympathetically to the new evacuees. % And although Mass-
Observation reports described several areas of failure in the 'flying bomb evacuation',
observers also pointed to examples of success. Despite the Cheshire householders'
reluctance cited above, other officials in the same county declared their satisfaction
with the efficiency and smoothness of organisation in dealing with nearly three
thousand evacuees." An interviewee, who was a veteran of previous programmes,
noted a much more welcoming attitude in hosts in 1944 than in earlier years, when he
had witnessed a marked reluctance to take in evacuees: this time he remembered that
several local people had come forward and were disappointed that so few had arrived."
In 1944, as in 1939, it was evacuee women who agam attracted the majority of
complaints: in the course of this investigation few criticisms of unaccompanied children
have been discovered. In Monmouth, where householders cited earlier unhappy
9~ss-Observation File 2189, p.21
95 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 14.8.44, p.3
96 Graves: op. cit., p.232
97Mass-Observation File 2189, p.6
98 Oral interview: George Green, 17.12.93
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experiences as reasons for their unwillingness to take in mothers and children, there
were mixed reports. Many empty houses were requisitioned for use as hostels to
accommodate mothers with large families, but officials soon received complaints that
some of the occupants were dirty and neglectful. Other families, however, were praised
for 'getting on with the job of settling in'. For their part, some of the evacuees were
dissatisfied with the accommodation provided, while others were full of praise for the
welcome received."
At first, very few criticisms of Sheffield's hosts or 'guests' were published in the local
press, but some surfaced in the 'Letters' columns in mid-August. One writer was
worried about rumours "so prevalent in London of the complete indifference and apathy
of Sheffielders to the evacuees". Another contributor demanded "Sheffield authorities
want the rumours scotched." Some complaints from householders mirrored those of
earlier programmes in other reception areas, particularly with regard to evacuees'
ingratitude or unspecified "peculiar habits".loo In contrast, several letters of thanks and
praise were published from grateful evacuees, one of whom signed herself "79 years old
and still going strong".'?' Only one complaint from an evacuee was found: a London
woman protested that evacuees in Sheffield were getting a raw deal. 102
Evidence gleaned from newspapers, archive files and interviews uncovered little overt
criticism of evacuees by Sheffield householders. Despite optimistic press reports of the
evacuees' warm reception it is clear, however, that not all Sheffield residents welcomed
99 Mass-Observation File 2151, pp.2-6
100 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 14.8.44, p.3; 23.8.44, p.3
101 ibid., 21.7.44, p.2; 29.7.44, p.3; The Sheffield Star: 10.8.44, p.2; 28.8.44, p.2
102 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 18.8.44, p.3
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them, and some were openly hostile. One interviewee remembered her family's
attitude of distaste towards them:
"We definitely looked down on them. I suppose we felt superior
to them really. And we knew they were low class and dirty from
the reports at the beginning of the war."I03
On the other hand, the family of another Sheffield interviewee reacted more positively:
her mother took in some children even though she had several children of her own. She
reported: "We accepted them: we felt sorry for them and so we did our best for them
and found them very satisfactory.t"?' Another, who was an ex-evacuee herself, also
had no problems in accepting a mother and child: perhaps because of her own
experiences, the two families settled down well together.i'"
The Director of Education for Sheffield gave clear instructions that all evacuee children
should be encouraged to mix freely and receive the same treatment as local children,
ensuring that no special provision would be necessary for the newcomers.l'" Response
was apparently positive, and no overt animosity such as that experienced by evacuees in
1939 and 1940 was reported in newspapers or interviews, although inevitably some did
feel discrimination at times. One ex-evacuee said:
"In the playground I longed to play, but that privilege belonged
to the local regulars, it seemed. I just stood a few yards away
and wistfully watched them. ,,107
103 Oral interview: Barbara Smith, 16.12.94
104 Oral interview: Dorothy Donnelly, 16.12.94
lOS Oral interview: Margaret Bennett, 16.3.95
106 Sheffield Archives File CA.15717; The Sheffield Star: 14.7.44, p.4
107 Oral interview: Frances Pullen, 11.7.97
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Some women and young adults settled in easily, while others reported that they felt
unwelcome. Within days of their arrival, it was reported that a number of evacuee
mothers had obtained work in Sheffield and had arranged for their householders to look
after their children.l'" Likewise, fifty adolescent evacuees were soon found work
t
locally by the Ministry of'Labour.l'" Most mothers, however, did not stay long enough
to look for jobs, and many experienced the problem that had dogged evacuee women
sharing homes with local families. Feeling in the way in their billets, they spent their
days in local parks and cafes or touring the local area by public transport. An ex-
evacuee mother recalled: "I collected the children each day and we went for circular
bus rides around the town and sometimes right out into the countryside. ,,110 Another
interviewee said: "All of us went to Graves Park together after school and at weekends.
The park was a favourite meeting place for displaced London mothers. "Ill
While many problems cited in earlier evacuation programmes were again encountered
in 1944, some were different. Grumbles about visitors, for instance, this time mainly
related to husbands of evacuated women and not to parents of unaccompanied
children.112 One reason for this may have been that the journeys involved were often
longer and more expensive, even with government-subsidised fares. The distance
between Sheffield and London, for example, may have deterred parental visits to
unaccompanied children billeted in the city.
108 The Sheffield Star: 17.7.44, p.S
109 ibid., 18.8.44, p.3
110 Oral interview: Gwen McDermott, 24.10.97
III Oral interview: Frances Pullen, 11.7.97
112 Mass-Observation File 2189, p.14
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Shortages of bed linen or other household articles which had become scarce as the war
stretched into its fifth year also caused stress. It was not long before private
householders were asking for help, for many of those who may have earlier been
bombed out of their own homes were now coping with evacuees and were in need of
crockery, cutlery, bedding and towels.'!' But, as The Sheffield Star reported:
"Although wear and tear of linen by evacuees is a sore point for
householders, no general provisions are being made to issue
extra coupons. ,,114
The city's Chief Billeting Officer offered bunk beds, palliases and blankets where
required, but admitted that neither bed linen nor pillows could be supplied. liS
Despite newspaper descriptions of Sheffield as a welcoming city, it was not long before
there were rumblings of discontent about unequal distribution of evacuees to reception
centres in the suburbs. In mid-August the warden of an inner-city rest centre asked:
"Can you tell us why five or six lots of evacuees have been sent
to the same district of Sheffield but none has yet been sent to
Fulwood or Ecclesall where the houses have a lot more spare
rooms?"!"
It has been difficult to substantiate this claim but it can be observed from Appendix 1
that there were far more rest centres in working-class areas - Heeley, Hillsborough,
Shiregreen and Crookes, for instance - than in the more affluent areas of, say, Endcliffe,
Dore or Totley. It may be held that there were comparatively few middle-class suburbs
in a city largely supported by its heavy industries: nevertheless, it can be seen that such
residential areas as Crosspool and Fulwood were not even listed.
113 The Spectator, No. 6056,21.7.44, p.50; The Sheffield Star: 18.8.44, p.2
114 The Sheffield Star: 17.7.44, p.5
m ibid., IS.7.44, p.5
116 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 16.8.44, p.5
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When the city's quota of evacuees was quadrupled in August there were murmurs that
Sheffield was being asked to bear an unfairly heavy burden of reception: one
correspondent to The Sheffield Star pointed out that Manchester had received less than
half the number of evacuees sent to Sheffield, and inferred that advantage was taken of
the city's willingness to co-operate in reception. The newspaper's editor replied that
the decision had been taken on hard facts: there were simply more billets to spare in
Sheffield than in Manchester, where accommodation was needed for servicemen and
other floating wartime communities.l+'
In 1939, as has been seen in Chapter Four, some evacuees were accused of causing
damage in the reception areas. No complaints from householders about damage by
evacuees to Sheffield in 1944 have been discovered during a trawl through local
newspapers or in interviews. However, a search of the city's Archives revealed that two
amounts were written off in respect of loss of household equipment issued to evacuees
who had returned to London. Given the large number of evacuees who had come to
Sheffield, the amounts were fairly small: £3.1s.lOd on 17 November 1944 and
£29.2s.0d on the following 16 February.lIs This appears to suggest that, on the whole,
evacuees did not cause a great deal of damage in the city.
It is apparent that there was far less dissatisfaction about the condition of evacuees in
1944 than in 1939. This was partly due to the help given to refugees by clothing depots
which had been set up by such organisations as the WVS. But the chief reason for
improvement was undoubtedly the development of welfare services throughout the war
117 The Sheffield Star: 22.8.44, p.l
118 Sheffield Archives File CA.IS7/7
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- not least the importance of regular medical inspection of all school children.'!" The
widespread problems of uncleanliness encountered in 1939 were thus largely avoided.
The matter of medical inspection before evacuation in this last programme is unclear.
Mass-Observation reporters were uncertain if these were always carried out, and much
seemed to depend upon the resources of local organising bodies at departure points. In
most cases it was found that procedures had improved: a nurse travelled with each train
and gave a cursory last-minute inspection on the train. The evacuees were inspected
again on arrival either at the station or rest centres, and any special cases sent to the sick
bay. In another part of Yorkshire, a Northallerton nurse demonstrated the improvement
by comparing the situation with that of 1940, when she had to examine four hundred
children in a country station waiting room. In 1944 she found that all the evacuees had
been examined before leaving home stations, with special conditions being listed on
cards.120
With regard to Sheffield, the Report of the School Medical Officer for 1944 recorded
that evacuees arriving in the city had been medically inspected before leaving their
home stations and information relating to defects noted and forwarded to the reception
areas. Nevertheless, they were examined again at rest centres "in a spirit of warm
sympathy and helpfulness". The report continued:
"It is a pleasure to record a different picture [... ] of the
excellent care of these children who were inspected after many
weeks of exceedingly trying conditions in the home area. It is
119 T' . 37rtmuss: op. cit., p. 9
120 Mass-Observation File 2189, p.IO
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fair proof of the high morale of the people living under
continuous strain. ,,121
The health of the evacuees gave little cause for criticism. At a meeting of the
Emergency Committee for Civil Defence on 21 July 1944 it was stated that, of the
2,073 official evacuees who had arrived in the city in the first nine days, only eighty-
two were suffering from infectious conditions - or 3.9% of the total. The situation was
hardly different by mid-August, by which time 6,085 official evacuees - 1,839 mothers
with 3,412 children and another 834 unaccompanied school children - had been
received. Of these, a total of 245 (or 4%) suffered infectious conditions, including one
family found to harbour body lice as well as head lice. The table below, taken from the
report of the Director of Education lodged in Sheffield Archives,122 shows the position:
Results of Medical Inspection of Evacuees to Sheffield during
Government Evacuation Programme 'Rivulet' 1944
Minor casualties dealt with at railway station 2
Nits and lice - heads cleansed 115
Scabies - dealt with by Ministry of Health Department 23
Enuresis 37
Minor ailments dressed 51
Asthma 3
Chickenpox 1
Whooping cough 1
Others (1 eye trouble, 2 gastric illness) 3
To Medical Rest Centres 4
Tuberculosis 3
Pneumonia 1
Paralysis 1
121 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of the School Medical Officer 1944, p.37
122 Figures taken from Sheffield Archives File CA.15717: Report 18.8.44
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Cleansing of all the affected evacuees was undertaken at the rest centres, where 148
minor, non-infectious ailments were also treated.!" The scabies cases were sent to the
City General Hospital along with two further unspecified cases, while those with
whooping cough and chickenpox were admitted to Lodge Moor Hospital. Three
evacuees were transferred to the medical rest centre at Broomhill in the suburbs 124 and
one adult with paralysis to Fir Vale House. At the railway stations treatment for "minor
cases of malaise" was undertaken. In some cases, special selection of billets was
required, for example to accommodate one child who was allergic to animals.!"
Under the 'flying bomb' evacuation programme it was planned that, as in earlier
programmes, teachers from the evacuation areas would accompany organised parties of
school children. But recruitment proved a stumbling block and by the end of July only
250 (or 3%) of the 8,000 teachers employed by the LCC had volunteered for work in
reception areas. With 1,500 teachers needed to assist with evacuees throughout
England and Wales, the National Union of Teachers warned that compulsory powers
would have to be used if volunteers were not forthcoming.l"
Teachers gave various reasons for their reluctance to move with their pupils. Some,
who had been evacuated previously, declared that their treatment and experiences in
reception areas earlier in the war had deterred them. Many complained that the housing
allowance was too small and the government refused to increase it. Others claimed that
123 The Health of the School Child: Report of Chief Medical Officer Ministry of Education /939-45,
pp.32,33
124 Taptonville Hostel, cited in The Sheffield Star: 11.7.44, p.4
m Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of the School Medical Officer 1944, p.3S
1261he Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 25.7.44, p.3
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if they did go to the reception areas, there was no guarantee that they would be re-
employed by the Lee.127 Teachers were also said to fear that their homes might be
requisitioned in their absence, and by October, the shortage of London teachers in
reception areas was still so bad that the Minister of Education, R A Butler, threatened to
direct them to these areas under Defence Regulation 58A.128
No teachers were among the first parties of evacuees who arrived in Sheffield, although
officials had clearly expected some to accompany the refugees and announced they
would be warmly received and billeted in hostels run by the Education Department.
Few, if any, had apparently arrived two weeks later, for the Director of Education
applied to the Lee for teachers to come and assist with the evacuees.!" The situation
had improved somewhat by the autumn, when the Sheffield Education Committee
Report showed that, after renewed requests, fifty-nine took up duty.I3O Even then,
research in school log books has revealed that, of the small number of evacuated
teachers traced, all arrived at least one week after the start of the autumn term, and all
except one had returned to the south by Christmas.Y'
It appears that those teachers who did evacuate were not immune from the muddles
which occurred in the reception of other groups of refugees. An article in The
Hallamshire Teacher showed that when a party of thirty teachers arrived in the city in
127 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 25.7.44, p.3
128 HoC Deb. 26.10.44 & 27.10.44, Vol. 404, Cols. 334,487-8
129 The Sheffield Star: 11.7.44, p.4; 14.7.44, p.4; 26.7.44, p.2.2
130 Sheffield Education Committee: Report 1944-1945, p.133
13l Log books: Crookes Endowed; Anns Road; Hillsborough; Owler Lane, Huntsmans Gardens; Burgoyne
Road Schools
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September, accommodation had to be arranged at only two hours' notice and an
orphanage for the daughters of teachers was quickly adapted as a temporary hostel. 132
When Sheffield was declared a reception area, one of the first concerns was that large
numbers of incoming children would present problems for education in a city where
there was already a shortage of teachers and overcrowded classrooms.i'" The Director
of Education, anxious to avoid the problems of shared schools and split shifts
experienced in some areas in 1939, instructed head teachers to take as many evacuees
into their schools as possible.':" In the event, only three trainloads had been received
by the end of the summer term and all the children were absorbed without much
difficulty into schools and local activities and organtsanons.!"
Throughout the vacation a further seven organised parties of refugees arrived in the city,
bringing the total of official evacuees to around 7,000. Fears were again expressed that
problems would arise as large numbers of children were expected to apply for school
places at the start of the new term. The position was further complicated because it was
not known how many children had arrived under private arrangements - some reports
referred to "thousands of unofficial evacuees", but this was later amended to "many
hundreds".':" The Director of Education repeated his intention to make no special
arrangements for the evacuees but to absorb them into existing schools, and continued
his negotiations with various southern authorities for teachers to come to the city.l37
I32 Hallamshire Teacher: No 21, Sept 1944, p.3
133 The Sheffield Star: 6.7.44, p.8
134 Sheffield Archives File CA.1S717: Report 2l.7.44; The Sheffield Star: 14.7.44, p.4
m The Sheffield Star: 26.7.44, p.2
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The last official party of evacuees arrived in the city on 25 August and more than 2,000
new evacuees had registered at local schools when term began four days later. Parents
were assured that no problems were envisaged.i" Nevertheless, some schools did
suffer from overcrowding: the very small Crookes Endowed School added thirty-six
London evacuees to a number already admitted the previous term.139 Woodseats
Infants' School was also very full: an interviewee recalled:
"The school was terribly overcrowded, with the sudden influx of
evacuees, and three or four children were squeezed into each
desk made for twO.,,140
The Report of the Director of Education for 1944 showed that over 3,000 children
evacuated from the south of England had been received into Sheffield elementary
schools in the period from July to September.!" This number exacerbated the problem
of overcrowding which had grown throughout the war years as some schools had closed
due to bomb damage and many others had lost members of staff to war service. With
all but a handful of its own evacuees returned, and the increase in pupil numbers due to
inward evacuation the position was serious. Titmuss stated that, whereas there had
been only two classes of more than fifty children in Sheffield in 1939, by autumn 1944
there were 406, and sixty of these contained more than sixty children each.!"
Once again, however, the drift homeward of evacuees, which had caused so much
concern to planners of earlier migrations, was soon evident. Many were found to be
138 The Sheffield Star: 30.8.44, p.5
139 Log book: Crookes Endowed Junior School
140 Oral interview: Frances Pullen, 1l.7.97
141 Sheffield Education Committee: Report /944145, p.133
142 Titmuss: op. cit., p.406
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returning home within a short time, and sometimes even within days of their arrival. 143
By the beginning of August, even while England continued to suffer devastating rocket
attacks and refugees were still fleeing northward out of the capital, large numbers were
making their way south again. The Prime Minister told the House of Commons that the
morale of Londoners could be judged by the fact that many evacuation trains had
returned as full as when they had left for the reception areas. But, he went on, the
government wished to discourage this needless risk and strongly advised leaving the
capital "in a timely, orderly, gradual manner'"!" The first part of the statement might
have been seen as condoning the conduct of the returnees, but it was interpreted by the
Sheffield local press as a further appeal to those in the danger zones to take advantage
of the government's evacuation scheme.145 However, the drift homeward continued as
other efforts were made to stem the flow. The Chairman of LCC toured the reception
areas in early September and warned: "Conditions are so uncertain that it would be
unwise for people to come home yet." He hoped they would stay until the government
was satisfied it was safe.146
It might be argued that returning evacuees were emboldened by a statement made by
Churchill's son-in-law: on 7 September 1944 Duncan Sandys, Chairman of the
'Crossbow' Committee charged with reporting on rocket attacks,147 told a press
conference that the Battle of Britain was over "except possibly for a few last shots".
The announcement proved somewhat premature, for the very next day brought the first
143 Titmuss: op. cit., p.429; O'Brien: op. cit., p.6SS
144 HoC Deb. 2.8.44, Vol. 402, Cols. 1476-78; O'Brien: op. cit., p.662
145 The Sheffield Star: 3.8.44, p.8
146 The Sheffield Star: S.9.44, p.4
147 W S Churchill: The Second World War, Volume VI: Triumph and Tragedy, p.38
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of the V2 missiles: in addition, VI flying bombs continued to plague Britain for seven
more months.!"
Despite the terror wrought by the new and more powerful weapons, by 10 September
the drift homeward appeared to have become a flood, with 37,000 pouring back from
the provinces into London stations in one day, causing chaos as they mixed with
holidaymakers leaving or arriving at the same time.149 The position became so serious
that railway officials ordered a temporary halt to the conveyance of luggage sent in
advance by returning evacuees at two of London's main stations, Paddington and King's
Cross. In vain the Minister of Health warned: "We strongly deprecate the continued
flow back to London.?""
Sheffield officials were slow to acknowledge the exodus from the city. On 22 August
The Sheffield Star stated: "Sheffield has not had the experience of other reception
authorities, of large numbers of evacuees returning to the south." lSI Three days later it
was admitted that some mothers were leaving the city with their children, but the matter
was played down, being described by a spokesman as "a dribble such as occurs in every
town". The Chief Billeting Officer was defensive:
"Those going back were the type who could not settle. I know
of one case of a woman who went back because she did not
want to be in 'a smoky hole like Sheffield' but at the seaside.
People going back would be hard to satisfy anywhere.,,152
148 B Holman: op. cit., p.60; A Calder: The People's War, p.562
149 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 11.9.44, p.1
ISO ibid., 16.9.44, p.4; 13.9.44, p.4
lSI The Sheffield Star: 22.8.44, p.4
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On 8 September, the day that the government announced the suspension of general
evacuation arrangements, it was finally admitted that evacuees were leaving Sheffield
in large numbers. It seemed that the local press were keen to absolve city hosts from
any responsibility for the return, for The Sheffield Star said of the southerners: "They
are sorry to go because they have been made so happy and comfortable." Neither were
the evacuees criticised: on the contrary, various reasons were given for their leaving. It
was argued that Londoners considered the capital safe because the government had
lifted blackout regulations and suspended the evacuation scheme. And in any case, not
all were going home - "some were more cautious and were staying on to be safe rather
than sorry," but there was no place like home, even though they all spoke of the
wonderful hospitality. The evacuees were even praised: it was said that Sheffield
people admired them. The Director of Education, in charge of the city's evacuation
programme, suggested that it was not official evacuees who had gone home, but those
who had made their own private arrangements to come to the City.IS3
On 14 September the Director of Education reported to the Emergency Committee that
the total of official evacuees in the city had reached 8,046 of which 1,569 were
unaccompanied children'j" but it is clear that, as in previous evacuation programmes,
there had been a continual movement of evacuees into and out of Sheffield throughout
the period in which operation 'Rivulet' functioned. Once again the ebb mainly
concerned mothers with their children, with the population of unaccompanied school
children remaining much more stable. An examination of the Billeting Register in mid-
mThe Sheffield Star: 8.9.44, p.4; 9.9.44, p.2; 11.9.44, p.8
154 Sheffield Archives File CA.1S717: Report of Director of Education 13.9.44:
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September showed that, whereas more than 1,000 adults with children had returned
home in the previous fortnight, the number of unaccompanied children had reduced by
only twenty-five. ISS
Preliminary discussions had begun at the end of 1943 for the return of most evacuees to
their homes, and by spring 1944 detailed plans were in hand. Rocket attacks
necessarily delayed plans for London and south-east England but by the following
September everything was ready for a gradual reversal of the original evacuation
scheme for the rest of the country, with the exception of Hull and some other east coast
towns.i" On 8 September 1944, the same day that the first V2 missile fell on London,
the government announced the suspension of organised evacuation.F' Although air
attacks continued until the followingMarch and heavy damage was inflicted by the new
weapon, renewed demand for evacuation did not occur and the official scheme was not
revived. However, the assisted scheme remained in place, with travel vouchers and
billeting certificates issued for those in danger zones who wished to make their own
arrangements to move to safer areas.ISS
The transfer of parties of school children, mothers, nursery children as well as the aged,
infirm and blind from the reception areas called for minutely detailed preparation and
co-operation between the various authorities involved, as had their removal from danger
m Sheffield Archives File CA. 157/7
IS6T' . 431rtmuss: op. ctt., p.
157 ibid., p.429
IS8 ibid.
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areas in 1939. Across the country many of the original school parties had disintegrated:
some pupils had reached leaving age and returned home independently; countless others
had joined the drift back months, or even years, earlier. Few teachers remained
evacuated, for the majority had been recalled - either to join the armed forces or, as
numbers in the reception areas dwindled, to return to their original schools to cope with
the increased numbers of pupils at home.159
In preparation for the first stage of the planned return, in September the Ministry of
Health ordered evacuating authorities to send lists of all evacuated children to the
reception areas to check that children were still present there. Notices were sent to
adult evacuees and to foster parents and guardians of unaccompanied school children,
detailing the procedure for the organised return home. Evacuees would be allowed to
remain in the reception areas under certain circumstances, including cases where homes
were bomb-damaged, or family circumstances were unsuitable. In addition, children
about to sit examinations or in employment in the reception area would be allowed to
stay with the consent of parents. Householders were warned that billeting allowances
would cease if parents had made private arrangements for children to stay with them.
Free travel vouchers would be issued to those evacuees able to return home within four
weeks of the date to be stipulated by the authorities.l'"
As has been seen in earlier chapters, only a small proportion of those eligible to be
evacuated had actually left Sheffield under the 'Pied Piper' and 'Trickle' schemes, and
very few indeed remained in the reception areas of Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire
1~9T' . 431itmuss: op. CIt., p.
160 Ministry ofHea1th circulars: 129/44 and 146/44, cited in G Wallis: MA Dissertation,pp.253-4
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in September 1944: the Director of Education gave the total number of unaccompanied
children still away as 200. Glossing over irrefutable evidence of the earlier refusal of
most citizens to leave the city, and the rapid return of the vast majority of those who
had agreed to evacuation, he stated that the main reason for the reduction in the original
number was that children had returned to the city as they reached school leaving age.
News of official arrangements for their return hardly made headlines in the local press
but was contained in a small column on the fourth page of The Sheffield Star:161 its
sister paper, The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent, carried no information at all.
Preliminary procedures for the return were outlined. Evacuees would receive a notice
from the local authority telling them about their return home and mothers with children
who wished to make their own arrangements would be eligible for free railway
vouchers: the government would bear the cost of transporting heavy luggage and
equipment. Those who wished their return to be organised for them would travel in
escorted parties with unaccompanied school children. Parents or other authorised
adults wishing to bring their children home privately would not receive travel vouchers.
Evacuees who failed to return home without good reason would have billeting and other
accommodation arrangements cancelled. The Minister of Health repeated the advice to
evacuees from London and southern England not to come back and instructed local
authorities not to assist evacuees to return to those areas which were not considered
safe.162
161 The Sheffield Star: 26.9.44, p.4
162 ibid
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In December 1944 ninety-five unaccompanied children were brought home to Sheffield
from the reception areas. In his annual report to Sheffield Education Committee, the
School Medical Officer stated: "A few children, owing to special circumstances, still
remain in the reception areas. ,,163 No details of organisation for the return has been
discovered: archive research proved fruitless and all interviewees who stayed in the
reception areas until the end of the evacuation scheme came home under private
arrangement. The event did not, apparently, merit any publicity, for no mention has
been found in local newspapers. The return of only three of the seventeen official
overseas evacuees from Sheffield has been traced: two came home in February 1945
and the third in December. Two of these events were covered by the press.l'"
As discussed above, archive records show that in 1944 Sheffield billeting officials had
faced the task of receiving nearly 7,000 official evacuees of all classes from the south of
England.l'" In addition, an unknown number of unofficial refugees had arrived in the
city - officials finally estimated the total number as more than ten thousand people.l'"
On 15 December the Emergency Committee approved the closure of information
centres and hostels in the city and reduced the number of rest centres. The Billeting
Department was also closed. In February it was deemed unnecessary to continue to
man the remaining rest centres, but the Emergency Committee for Civil Defence agreed
they should be kept ready "in case of alert". 167
163 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of the School Medical Officer 1944, p.37
164 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 5.2.45, p.3; The Sheffield Star: 26.2.45, p.5; Oral interview:
Geoffrey Stevens, 12.3.97
165 Sheffield Archives File CA15717
166 Sheffield Civic Record No 25-26, Aug/Sept 1949, p.3
167 Sheffield Archives File CA.1S717
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Planning for the return to London was particularly complicated, for special trains had to
be arranged to transport London mothers and children who had been scattered over a
thousand billeting areas.l'" The programme was the responsibility of the LCC, but
Graves asserted that it was the WVS who carried it through. Volunteers of that
organisation visited parents to see if they were able to accept their children back: when
details were ready, they visited again to warn when to expect them. The women also
acted as escorts on trains carrying the evacuees and delivered unaccompanied children
to points within walking distance of their homes. 169
Titmuss estimated that there were 1,040,200 evacuees of all classes in reception areas
across the country in September 1944 and it was expected that arrangements would
have to be made to transport 500,000 people in organised parties to complete the return
home. Once more, however, government planning was confounded, for large numbers
of people did not avail themselves of official facilities but went ahead independently
and made their own arrangements. When a census was taken in March 1945, two
months before the official end of evacuation, it was found that nearly 600,000 evacuees,
or 60% of the September figure, had already gone home in the intervening period,
leaving a total of 438,000 official evacuees (mostly Londoners) in various parts of
England and Wales: only 132,000 of these were unaccompanied school children [see
Table below]. 170 Government plans had to be scaled down accordingly and fresh
timetables drawn up.
168 T· . 431itmuss: op. cit., p.
169 Graves: op. cit., p.242
170 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.433-5, 562
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Total number of evacuees billeted in all rectGytion areas of
England and Wales 1939-194517
Unaccompanied Mothers and
Date children children Other classes Total
Sept 1939 765,000 426,500 107,000 1,298,500
Jan 1940 420,000 56,000 46,780 522,780
Aug 1940 421,000 57,000 41,000 519,000
Feb 1941 480,500 571,000 *287,200 1,338,700
Sept 1941 435,700 450,000 178,000 1,063,700
Mar 1942 332,000 279,000 127,000 738,000
Sept 1942 236,000 196,000 98,000 530,000
Mar 1943 181,000 148,000 77,000 406,000
Sept 1943 137,000 124,000 61,400 322,400
Mar 1944 124,000 132,000 63,400 319,400
Sept 1944 284,000 601,000 127,800 1,012,800
Mar 1945 132,000 243,000 63,000 438,000
Sept 1945 13,250 tn/a tn/a 13,250
*Mainly homeless people, including 66,200 such people billeted in evacuation areas.
tBy September 1945 all in these categories had left the reception areas or ceased to be evacuees.
Finally, on 2 May 1945, all the remaining evacuees were informed that they could leave
their reception areas. Due to the complexity of the planning, special evacuee trains did
not start running until June 1945, but the operation was completed by 12 July 1945, by
which time 54,317 evacuees had taken advantage of the organised scheme. 115 trains
had run from reception areas to London and the south of England but, as in 1939,
ordinary people refused to conform to the government's expectations. Most people
decided to act on their own initiative and take advantage of travel vouchers, while the
intricate plans of officials went unheeded and many of the trains were half-empty - this
time on the journey home.172
171 Figures taken from Titmuss: op. cit., p.562, Appendix 9
172 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.433-4
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On 3 May 1945 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent announced that transport would
be arranged for evacuees to leave the city the following month in organised and
escorted parties. A census would first be taken to determine numbers of those who
could return at once and also those unable to go back because they had no home or for
other reasons. There would be a special check on the home addresses of
unaccompanied children to ensure that there was no obstacle to their return.173
Mothers with children comprised the majority of the first party, when over three
hundred evacuees left Sheffield for London and the south of England on 6 June. The
event was covered by both local newspapers. It was stated that some mothers were
returning with babies who had been born while they were evacuated and others had
been baptised in city churches and chapels: all the evacuees spoke with gratitude of the
welcome they had received. They were seen off at the station by many host families
who lined the platform. Once again members of the WVS were in evidence, both in
distributing sweets and toys to the children and parcels to the mothers, and also acting
as escorts on the train.174
Unaccompanied school children were the last to be repatriated. Sheffield witnessed the
final phase of evacuation on 28 June 1945, when almost two hundred left the city in a
train which also carried children from neighbouring towns, including Rotherham. The
Sheffield Star reported the view of the WVS organiser, Mrs R C Maples: "This is
certainly far happier than their arrival - exhausted, frightened and lonely - last year."
173 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 3.5.45, p.3
174 ibid., 6.6.45, p.2; The Sheffield Star: 6.6.45, p.5
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The scene described in Chapter Three, when evacuees to coastal towns were re-located
inland in June 1940, was re-enacted as the School Medical Officer remarked:
"Affectionate leave-takings on the station were evidence of the
happy relationships which existed between the foster mothers
and the children."!"
The Sheffield Star reported: "nearly all the foster mothers had tears in their eyes."
Many children had settled in their billets and made friends at their schools, while some
of the youngest had little recollection of their homes.!" Once again, refreshments on
the special train were provided for the journey by members of the Sheffield WVS but
this time the party was accompanied by forty-four London teachers who had travelled to
Sheffield specially to act as escorts.!" By this time the crucial general election of 1945
was only a week away and was receiving widespread press coverage. Little public
attention was paid to this final stage of the government evacuation scheme as it affected
Sheffield, one of the major local newspapers failing even to give the subject a mention
In his annual report for the year, the School Medical Officer indicated that 319 children
were examined prior to their departure from the city and, in accordance with previous
practice, information relating to any defects found was forwarded to appropriate
authorities. The perennial problem of infestation arose even in these last days, for the
report went on: "The few children who were found to have infested heads were
cleansed before departure."!" It may be assumed that these children, who had been in
foster homes for some months, had become infected while in their billets.
m Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of the School Medical Officer 1945, p.41
176 The Sheffield Star: 28.6.45, p.4
177 ibid I1 1 ., p.
178 Sheffield Education Committee: Annual Report of the School Medical Officer 1945, p.41
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For families which had been divided for long periods - sometimes many years - there
may have been many difficulties to overcome when they were finally reunited. Not only
did parents and children have to learn to settle down with each other again, but often
husbands who had been away on war service had to re-establish their relationship with
wives who had grown used to new independence, perhaps having gone out to work in
their families' absence. Children who had left home little more than babies were
approaching teenage years at the end of the war: some had become used to living an
ordered existence in middle-class comfort and had to adjust to poorer circumstances in
crowded and noisy households.
There were also some problems, inevitably perhaps, for children who returned home
after years abroad. Despite having kept in close touch with her two children evacuated
under the Children's Overseas Reception Board (CORB), Vera Brittain remarked of her
son, who had been away for three years: "it will take time to get to know him again".179
A former CORB evacuee returning to Sheffield from Australia, also found adjustment
difficult. He said in interview:
"It was like entering a different world when I came back. At
one point I was homesick for Australia and did think of going
back. But my mother was upset, so I stayed on in England. ,,)80
Some children appear to have coped with the change without difficulty, however: for
instance, an interviewee who had been billeted in a mansion with five servants
179 A Bishop & Y A Bennett: Wartime Chronicle: Vera Brittain's Diary 1939-1945, p.233
180 Oral interview: Geoffrey Stevens, 12.3.97
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apparently found no problems when she returned to her 'two-up, two-down' terrace
home after five years away:
"I just settled in and carried on the same as before, even though
1had been used to a very different way of living. Mum and Dad
had progressed as well because they had visited me and seen
how things were done. They had more money and were
generally better Off."181
Another interviewee had also become used to a better life-style. She said of her return:
"I got on all right with my mother but 1missed the luxury sort of things.,,182Although
one ex-evacuee left his twin brother in the reception area when he returned home on
reaching school-leaving age, he settled down quickly:
"It was all so different and exciting, what with going to work
and all that. 1missed the billet very much but going to work and
earning money was a big thing.,,183
However, others encountered problems: at least one former Sheffield evacuee, after no
such trouble in her billet, began to wet her bed when she returned home.l" Another,
evacuated to a residential school for five years, felt the experience had affected his
entire life, for he stated that institutional care had inhibited his trust in people.l"
Despite having always felt "an outsider" in his reception area, an ex-evacuee who was
billeted in Hatfield for the entire period of the war did go back to his foster home.
"When we went home it was like being with strangers. We didn't know our parents at
181 Oral interview: Dorothy Knowles, 21.3.95
182 Oral interview: Patricia Gamble, 12.3.96
183 Oral interview: George Shelley, 12.8.96
184 Oral interview: Pamela Oennitf, 16.9.94
18S Oral Interview: Alfred Knowles, 20.10.92
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all." This interviewee later ran away from home and returned to Hatfield until he was
called up for National Service.l'"
Some foster parents found the parting very painful, too. As the evacuation scheme
ended and children had to return home, the foster parents of one city child were
desolate. Several times during the interview this householder repeated:
"My husband says 'Take her while I'm at work'. He was very
touchy: he didn't want to see her go. He thought the world of
her, and I did."
When the foster mother escorted the child back to Sheffield, she was not welcomed by
everyone, however, for a relative clearly felt that home was not the best place for this
particular evacuee: "He did shout about us bringing her back. [... ] He didn't want
[the child] to get into bad ways - you know. ,,187
Just over half the evacuees from Sheffield interviewed had kept in touch with their host
families for at least a short time after their return home, some having invited their foster
parents to their weddings many years later.188 Likewise, some evacuees into the city
kept in touch with their Sheffield hosts long afterwards.l'" But a former Sheffield
evacuee to Nottinghamshire, although happy in his billet, did not remain in touch with
his wealthy host afterwards, for he said: "It would have seemed like begging."I90
Evacuated children often found that their education was doubly disrupted - firstly when
they arrived in the reception areas, and again when they returned home. And this did
186 Oral interview: Terence Lenihan, 29.6.97
187 Oral interview: Gladys Smith, 12.5.95
188 Oral interviews: Geoffrey Stevens, 12.3.97; Pamela Grayson, 12.3.96; Joan Patterson, 18.8.92
189 Oral interviews: Frances Pullen, 11.7.97; Hazel Robbins, 29.9.97
190 Oral interview: Douglas Pearson, 2.7.95
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not just apply to inland evacuees but to those who went overseas. A former CORB
evacuee from Sheffield felt his chances of going to university were severely prejudiced
by his evacuation to Australia. Having attended a city grammar school before
evacuation, he was placed with pupils two years younger than himself when he reached
Perth in order to fit in with the national system of his host country.
"Then I had four years in a grammar school there and was 16
when I got home, ready to take School Certificate. But in
England I was told I would have to go back at least a year
because the Australian system was behind ours here. I didn't
want to repeat all that and decided to give up my education and
go to work."!"
After the official return of evacuees from the reception areas a Ministry of Health
inquiry at the end of July 1945 found 67,000 people still in billets who could not return
to their homes. The majority of these were mothers with children, while an estimated
10,000 were unaccompanied school children.i'" By March 1946, when the evacuation
scheme was finally wound up, the figure had fallen by almost a half to 38,000. Family
groups accounted for 29,000 and 4,000 were old or infirm evacuees. Most of these
remained because their own homes had either been bombed, given up in their absence,
or requisitioned during the war: they became the responsibility of the receiving local
authorities.!" There were only 5,200 unaccompanied children left in reception areas
covering the whole of England and Wales.194 Of these, 3,000 were living in private
billets and 1,000 in residential nurseries and special schools: the rest were in hostels.
Some had remained because their families were homeless or suffering other domestic
191 Oral interview: Geoffrey Stevens, 12.3.97
192 PRO.HLG/I02178 file 99043/16/166/38/1, cited in Titmuss: op. cit., p.437 n.l
193 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.434, 435, 437
194 PRO.HLG/I02178 file 99043/16/166/38/1, cited in Titmuss: op. cit., p.437
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difficulties. Others had lost one or both parents, either through death or divorce. Many
of the evacuees remaining in private billets became permanent members of their foster
families. By 5 July 1948 there were still approximately 1,500 evacuated children for
whom no permanent arrangements had been made: under the Children Act of that year
they became the responsibility of their various local authorities.l'"
Family life had undoubtedly undergone stresses and strains while fathers were away for
long periods, houses were bombed, or mothers were working outside the home~ so it
would not have been surprising to find many evacuated children unclaimed after the
war had ended. Yet, despite continual accusations throughout the war that parents were
taking advantage of evacuation to shirk their responsibilities and abandon their
children, an investigation by local authorities concerned about unaccompanied children
in July 1945 had found only twenty-nine children had actually been deserted.i'"
195 T' . 438itmuss: op. CIt., p.
196 ibid., p.437 0.3
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CONCLUSION
In the foregoing chapters attention has been drawn to the multitude of problems
encountered by those affected by various programmes of the government evacuation
scheme: those who were charged with the task of initial planning, the many officials
involved with the operation of the various programmes, and the individuals who took
part and were most intimately concerned - that is, the evacuees themselves and those
who took them in. The experience of the people of Sheffield, and in particular the
city's children, has been put in context with the national situation. An attempt has been
made to show reasons why difficulties arose and how they were addressed.
The government claimed success for Operation 'Pied Piper' in September 1939. The
movement of nearly 1,500,000 people in less than four days, to reception areas spread
across the length and breadth of Britain, had been achieved without a single reported
casualty. Nothing of such magnitude had been attempted in this country before. In
terms of logistics, the government and all the thousands of officials across the country
who had been employed in this monumental venture could rightly deem it a success.
But, though there may have been no physical casualties, it is clear that many other
problems were encountered.
It has been seen that evacuation was planned as a military necessity, to be carried out in .
anticipation of immediate and devastating air attack on London and other cities and
towns of industrial importance in the event of war. The organised movement of priority
groups of civilians from danger areas was regarded as essential in order to save lives,
preserve public morale and prevent universal panic - for it was feared that inhabitants of
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those areas would flee in terror in the face of aerial bombardment. The matter of
transporting evacuees to reception areas was studied and organised in intricate detail,
but was hampered by the perceived need to keep the subject out of the public domain.
The government faced a dilemma: on the one hand, it was essential to be prepared for
hostilities, especially when Germany began to build its military strength throughout the
1930s. On the other, it was politically important to avoid naming a potential enemy and
thus appear to be encouraging war, at a time when the British people were still coming
to terms with the great losses incurred by the First World War and were eager to
preserve peace. But the secrecy which surrounded the planning process impeded
efficiency: as Macnicol asserts, one consequence was that many fundamental issues
were not discussed, either between participating local authorities or with central
administration,I and this had far-reaching effects.
The failure to disclose proposed reception areas to those most directly concerned - the
people living in the danger areas - surely had a serious effect upon parents' willingness
to register their children for evacuation. It may also have accounted for the reluctance
of those who did register them to let their offspring actually go away when the time
came. The confusion surrounding the choice of receiving districts for Sheffield - when
first the Peak District, then Lancashire, Yorkshire and Lincolnshire were rumoured to
have been earmarked for the city before Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire were
finally chosen - was one example of prevarication, which has been documented in the
first chapter. When receiving districts were finally made known to local officials, the
I I Macnicol, "The effect of the evacuation of schoolchildren on official attitudes to State intervention" in
H L Smith (ed): War and Social Change: British Society in the Second World War, p.ll
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refusal of the Ministry of Health to guarantee that any particular party would arrive at a
specific destination caused considerable anxiety to evacuation leaders and teachers, and
may have deterred potential evacuees, although events showed the wisdom of that
decision when chaos resulted from speeding up the dispersal process, as has been seen.
There is no doubt that Treasury procrastination put the scheme in jeopardy in more
ways than one. Delay in granting permission for local authorities in reception areas to
purchase bedding, blankets and, above all, waterproof sheets for children under five
years old until the end of May 1939meant that supplies of these essential items had not
been received in many areas when the children arrived. Repercussions have been well
documented. Moreover, the failure to provide any mackintosh underlays at all for
children of school age turned out to be a crucial omission. The ban on spending, which
was not lifted until 25 August, gravely impeded the ability of evacuating and receiving
authorities to prepare adequately by adapting premises and providing both householders
and needy children with basic requirements. The covert allowance of £1 per two
hundred necessitous cases (less than l1,4d.per child) for clothing and boots, authorised
only days before the first exodus, was inadequate. The fact that the sum was not
increased for more than a year' threw an extra burden on householders which added to
stress and ill-feeling, and was only alleviated by voluntary assistance, mainly from
women's organisations.
Billeting allowances were another sticking point. The same amount was payable for
five-year-olds as for adolescents of seventeen and it was nine months before the
2 R M Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy, History of the Second World War, pp.118,375( n.2)
369
differential for children over fourteen was introduced. Despite a marked rise in the cost
of living there was no further change until March 1942, when some selective increases
were made, but it was May 1944 before allowances for all age groups rose by one
shilling a week.3 Such penny-pinching led to friction between hosts and parents.
Likewise, controversy over payments for school milk and the decision to charge
householders for evacuees' school meals made for increased tension in the reception
areas. It took two years for the situation to improve substantially, when the Exchequer
raised the grants for facilities for meals for all school children, yet it was 1944 before
free milk was available to all official unaccompanied evacuees."
The failure of the planners to foresee the importance of nurseries in reception areas for
evacuated pre-school children proved to be an error which had far-reaching
consequences, and it was compounded by the refusal of the Treasury to sanction
expenditure on such provision. Early appeals from the Ministry of Health and the
Board of Education went unheeded, and action was not taken until January 1940 to
allow the provision of day centres for young children to be set up, by which time 88%
of the evacuated mothers and accompanied children had returned home.' It was only in
later programmes that the importance of welfare services to the success of evacuation
was recognised.
The government decision to make the Ministry of Health responsible for the
organisation of evacuation was considered a mistake by many. Lowndes, for example.
3 Titmuss: op. cit., pp.161, 163,397
4 R Samways: We Think You Ought to Go, pp.40, 41
s Titmuss: op. cit., pp.169, 170
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contended that if the Board of Education had been in charge, its officials would have
been less likely to have accepted the Treasury embargo on spending or the telescoping
of timetables which caused such scattering of school parties and resulting chaos in the
reception areas. Moreover, the Board might have anticipated the need for nursery
provision earlier and certainly would have entrusted billeting to local education
authorities instead of housing departments which were inadequately staffed to deal with
children."
A major shortcoming of the government evacuation scheme was that, in comparison
with the meticulous attention given to dispersal from the danger areas, not enough
thought was given to what was to happen to the evacuees in the reception areas, in the
first programme at least. There had been problems enough in earmarking billets before
the operation began; but it seemed that few had foreseen the difficulties which were to
arise between hosts and their 'guests' when the evacuees arrived in their new homes.
For although it was a mass movement, after the transport stage was past the matter of
billeting was, as Margaret Cole maintained:
"a highly individual business [... ] it consisted in the placing, by
individuals, of individuals in individual families and groups,
over widely separated and widely differing localities."?
The billeting of mothers with their children upon private householders was, perhaps,
doomed to failure from the beginning. On the one hand, evacuated women had to take
their small children into the homes of strangers with entirely different life experiences,
cultures and standards, and to adapt to conditions which were sometimes completely
6 G A N Lowndes: The Silent Social Revolution, pp.205- 6
1R Padley & M Cole (eds): Evacuation Survey, p.3
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alien to them. On the other, hostesses were expected to accommodate and extend a
welcome to mothers and infants, some of whom did not respect their values,
possessions or way of life, who did not help in the home and who were miserable in
their new surroundings. It was no light undertaking, either, for foster parents to open
their homes to unaccompanied children, some of whom were badly-behaved and ill-
clothed for country life, with unfamiliar accents and mores, and to feed and care for
them for an unknown period of time. No preparation or help was given to either
evacuees or householders to help them to adjust to their new circumstances and it was,
perhaps, inevitable that many placements broke down within weeks, and sometimes
within days.
In 1939 the public conscience received a massive shock as revelations of the condition
of some evacuees gained much unwelcome publicity. Had adequate medical
supervision and inspection been made available before the children left their home
towns and cities, it is clear that much of the furore which followed their reception could
have been avoided. Evacuation exposed a gap in the school medical services, for the
absence of these facilities during the long summer holidays prior to the first operation
led to perhaps the greatest animosity against evacuees. Steps were taken in successive
programmes to head off problems of health and cleanliness by examining evacuees
before leaving the danger areas. However, there still remained some cases where
refugees arrived in need of cleansing - for example the 3.9% of evacuees from the south
who arrived in Sheffield in 1944, as mentioned in Chapter Seven.
No-one, it seemed, had anticipated that the problem of bed-wetting would be so
widespread and cause such consternation and condemnation from householders who
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were ill-equipped to deal with the problem due to the shortage of waterproof underlays.
In hindsight, this was a grave error, for it should have been evident that the trauma of
leaving home would have some repercussions. While for most affected children
enuresis proved to be a problem of short duration, caused by temporary insecurity, the
immediate reaction of many officials and householders was to blame parents for lack of
training and children for dirty habits. It was several months before the problem was
addressed and hostels set up to deal with severe cases, but future evacuation
programmes were comparatively free from criticism on this point. It is clear that, in the
absence of air raids and lack of war news, the attention of both the press and the public
was drawn towards horror stories about evacuees and, in Samways' words:
"Thus the widespread hospitality and welcome that flowed from
countless country homes gave place in the public mind to
startling tales of dirty Londoners and grudging country folk.,,8
Although it has not been the purpose of this thesis to assess the extent to which
differences in social class affected evacuation and evacuees, it would be unwise to
ignore the issue and the part which it played throughout various programmes. It is
evident that the often-held view that evacuation made a significant impact in breaking
down class divisions during the war must be challenged. Problems of class pervaded
almost every aspect of evacuation from the very beginning. For one thing, the architects
of the government scheme were mainly "military, male and middle-class"? yet were
charged with making plans on behalf of a civilian working class with whom they were
completely out of touch. Many of those who drew up the scheme sent their own
8 Samways: op. cit., p.14
9 Padley & Cole: op. cit., p.4
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offspring to boarding-schools at an early age: it did not occur to them that they were
asking too much of the populace to send their children away to unspecified destinations,
in the care of strangers, for an unknown period of time. They simply did not
comprehend the strength of family feeling among the urban working class.
In the reception areas problems of class conflict were apparent from the start, and
nowhere more so than in the matter of billeting. Particularly in Operation 'Pied Piper'
and the 'Trickle' programme, it has been demonstrated that many upper- and middle-
class owners of large houses managed to evade their responsibilities. They were tacitly
supported by billeting officers whose duty it was to ensure fairness but who often lived
locally and were loath to upset their neighbours. Reports on all programmes of
evacuation have shown that working-class householders in smaller houses and cottages.
often with large families themselves, were more likely to be left to bear the brunt of
billeting and take in the evacuees than their wealthier countrymen and women.
That is not to say. however, that all owners of large houses refused evacuees. or that all
working-class householders welcomed them into their homes. Class was not a deciding
factor in the success of all placements: some children were miserable in afiluent
surroundings while others were happy, and the same applied to evacuees in poorer
homes. Twin brothers from Sheffield. for instance. were equally content in very diverse
circumstances. one settling immediately with working-class hosts and remaining with
them even after leaving school. and the other finding affection in affluent, middle-class
surroundings.'? Furthermore. there were not just problems of class: religion and race
10 Oral interview: George Shelley, 12.8.96
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were always thorny issues - and it seemed that no-one was prepared, either, for the
social impact that the clash of cultures would expose, for the differences between urban
and rural working classes became an unexpectedly contentious issue.
Class hostility was somewhat less apparent by the time the 'Rivulet' programme was
operated. An important reason for this may be that, because rocket attacks were more
random than earlier air raids, evacuees were drawn from a wider cross-section of the
population, - from suburban areas as well as inner-city London and also from rural areas
of south and south-east England. Also, since reception areas had been re-defined, it was
easier to match hosts with evacuees from similar environments. In addition, some
urban householders had themselves earlier been victims of bombing and were therefore,
perhaps, more likely to receive their 'guests' more sympathetically. Nevertheless, as
Chapter Seven has demonstrated, complaints were received in Sheffield that most
billets were being sought in working-class areas, leaving the suburbs relatively
untouched.
It has been shown in earlier chapters that, in the planning of the government scheme,
the question of education was given scant attention until evacuation was imminent.
Clearly, dispersal and billeting had to take precedence in a war situation; but, as a
contributor to the journal Education maintained: "It would have been better if transport
minds and billeting minds had fitted with the minds of education officers."!' As it was,
the education of large numbers of children was badly disrupted when the first
programme was operated, with far-reaching effects.
11 Education: No. 1920,27.10.39, p.358
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It was in the evacuation areas that education was confused and disorganised for the
longest period. It had been assumed that the majority of children would leave the
danger areas and the schools were expected to close for the duration of hostilities. The
fact that compulsory education was not re-introduced until April 1940 undoubtedly
adversely affected the education of many thousands of children. In some danger zones
home tuition was established: Sheffield was at the forefront of a scheme in which non-
evacuated children were taught in groups in their own homes by peripatetic teachers.
Nevertheless, most children in evacuation areas had only part-time schooling, or none at
all, for several months because schools had been requisitioned or did not possess
adequate shelter protection.
In reception areas few arrangements could be made in advance because the arrival of
particular groups, or even of numbers and categories was not guaranteed. When the
children did arrive, the fragmentation of so many evacuated schools affected not only
the incomers and their teachers, but also interrupted schooling for resident children and
their staffs. In addition, overcrowding in small schools meant that shift arrangements
had to be made, curtailing the amount of education that both local and incoming
children received. Although the problem was greatest in the first programme, the
constantly moving population throughout the war complicated matters for teachers, who
had to cope with ever-changing numbers in both reception and evacuation areas.
The architects of the government evacuation scheme had expected that the majority of
"non-essential persons" would leave the vulnerable areas at the beginning of the war
and would stay away until peace returned. But their plans were confounded by the
British public, who either refused to evacuate their children in the first place, or brought
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them home early. The mass exodus of September 1939 was followed by the return of
large numbers of evacuees to the cities, but when bombing materialised further
evacuation programmes were initiated. The populations of evacuating and receiving
areas were in constant flux, with evacuees leaving their homes in times of perceived
danger, and returning within months, or even weeks. The ebb and flow of evacuation
may be demonstrated by the experience of one small reception area: Weston-super-
Mare, a small seaside resort, received a total of 10,336 official evacuees, coming and
going according to the fortunes of war, but only 130 spent four years or more in the
town." Moreover, neutral areas were also affected, not only by re-zoning or war
damage, but also by the unpredictable movement of private evacuees into and out of
those areas according to the perceived threat of air raids.
During the course of nearly six years of war 4,000,000 people were evacuated under
various official programmes, but this figure overstates the total number of individuals
because it includes some who evacuated several times. To the approximate number of
1,450,000 who moved under Operation 'Pied Piper' must be added the 300,000 who
were dispersed in the early summer of 1940 from Medway towns and coastal areas. A
further 1,250,000 were evacuated under the 'Trickle' scheme during periods of
intensive air attacks, and 1,000,000 under Operation 'Rivulet' in 1944. In addition
2,600 children travelled overseas with the Children's Overseas Reception Board.13 The
chart below, statistics for which were taken from Titmuss and based on local counts of
12 B Brown & J Loosley: Yesterday's Town: Weston-super-Mare, p.98
13 Lowndes: op. cit., p.207
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evacuees at six-monthly intervals, demonstrates the fluctuations In movements of
people to billets in reception areas throughout the war years.14
Movements of evacuees under official government schemes
during the Second World War
-+-All
classes
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The government evacuation scheme clearly succeeded in its objective of saving lives.
Lowndes showed that the total number of non-evacuated children under the age of
fourteen killed in air attacks on British cities during the war was 7,778.15 It has not
proved possible to compare the position of evacuated children over the whole of that
time but, according to Samways, up to the end of 1942 only twenty-seven London
evacuees were killed in air-raids in reception areas and a government estimate
suggested that during the same period 4,500 children's lives were saved for the entire
14 Titmuss: op. cit., p.356
15 Lowndes: op. cit., p.208
378
metropolitan evacuating area." In Sheffield, examination of the Civilian War Dead
Roll of Honour has disclosed that seventy-nine children under the age of fourteen were
killed in city air raids during the war.17 In contrast, the death of only one evacuated
Sheffield child has been discovered. (Interestingly, no trace of any report of this has
been found, except for a one-word entry: "Killed" in Gotham School Admissions
Register" and a small funeral notice in the Deaths column of The Sheffield Star.19)
Official fears of an unruly exodus, universal panic and a loss of morale among the
masses, which had been such a major preoccupation during the planning process,
proved unfounded. On the contrary, the reluctance of ordinary British people to leave
their homes in danger areas was made apparent not only in 1939 at the outbreak of war,
but also following successive air attacks from 1940 onwards. The only incident
discovered which might have been attributed to panic happened in March 1943 when
173 people died at the entry to a Bethnal Green underground shelter during an air raid.
Crosby asserts, though, that this was not due to a stampede, but resulted from a woman
tripping on a badly-lit, steep staircase, which caused the following crowd to collapse on
top of each other."
'Trekkers' who left danger zones each night, returning in the morning, were sometimes
accused of running away in fear. However, McLaine held that trekking was not a
panicky mass flight but rather an orderly procedure, although the Home Intelligence
16 Samways: op. cit., p.lS
17 The Civilian War Dead Roll of Honour: Sheffield, several entries
18John Malcolm Marsh: Gotham Council School Admissions Register, Nottingham Archives ref. SA.74/1/4
19 The Sheffield Star: 22.7.40, p.6
20 T L Crosby: The Impact of Civilian Evacuation in the Second World War, p.12S
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Department saw it as an alarming symptom of low morale." It is evident that some
Sheffield people also regarded the phenomenon as a sign of weakness: after the blitz in
December 1940 local newspapers carried several letters criticising trekkers for seeking
safety in flight and urging them to stay in the city and 'do their bit' in civil defence.f
Nevertheless, Churchill's comment, at the height of the rocket attacks in 1944, that
public morale could be judged by the immediate return of many evacuees from
reception areas23 gives support to the claim that ordinary people kept their heads and
remained steady in the face of prolonged attack, and were not frightened into disorderly
flight. Further, this was evidenced by their resistance to evacuation throughout the war.
It has been seen that evacuation was dogged by several problems, but perhaps the
greatest difficulty for administrators was the failure of the British public to react in the
way expected by the architects of the government scheme. To begin with, there was
their reluctance to register school children and mothers with young children for
evacuation. Of those who did sign up, far fewer than expected actually went away
under the official programme when the time came. Huge numbers of those who left had
returned within weeks to the cities, especially mothers and young children. When
further schemes were introduced as invasion threatened, or when bombing began, the
population of the cities and towns still showed little enthusiasm for evacuation.
It may be said that it was always going to be an impossible task to try to impose a
scheme of such a revolutionary nature - to persuade people to leave their homes and
21 McLaine: op. cit.; p.120
22 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 16.1.41 - 7.3.41
23 HoC Deb. 2.8.44, Vol. 402, Cols. 1476-78
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travel to unknown destinations for an indefinite period of time - upon a nation who
were not convinced of its necessity. Sheffield people, for instance, failed to heed the
warning of a local Member of Parliament that the city would be of considerable and
special attention at the hands of an enemy because of its important armaments
industry." An interviewee recounted a view popular at the time: «They'll never find
Sheffield among all these hills: we'll be safe here.,,25
It is clear that the architects of evacuation vastly over-estimated the number of eligible
individuals who would actually opt to leave their homes and take advantage of the
government scheme. In 1939, across the country 1,500,000 of the expected number of
evacuees elected to stay at home, or else made their own private arrangements and
moved to safer areas independently. Some local authorities in danger areas were much
less successful than others in persuading vulnerable people to leave: Sheffield's 15%
and Rotherham's 8% of eligible school children evacuated hardly bears comparison
with Salford's 76%. But the latter authority had carried out a dynamic campaign to
keep parents informed in a positive way and expected (and achieved) a good result."
Had the Salford policy been carried out in Sheffield, the city's poor showing might have
been improved, though this cannot be stated with certainty.
However, it is argued that there were other factors which helped to account for
Sheffield's failure. Whereas Rotherham's low numbers may be blamed on the fact that
the town was classified a neutral area until July 1939,27Sheffield's inner-city areas
24 HoC Deb 20.12.38, Vol. 342, Col. 2809: G Lathan, MP for Park, Sheffield
2S Oral interview: Sheila Clay, 15.3.98
26 Padley & Cole: op. cit., pp.42,48
27 The Sheffield Telegraph & Independent: 14.7.39, p.3
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were always classified a danger zone and its officials had plenty of time to prepare for
evacuation. Failure could be partly attributed to muddled administration at both
national and local level. The government impeded plans made on behalf of Sheffield
people by allocating officials' preferred reception area (the Peak District) to evacuees
from other industrial districts. Community leaders in some localities chosen to receive
city children made public their opposition to the project. Such prevarication was hardly
guaranteed to instil confidence in Sheffield parents.
Another important reason for the low turn-out of evacuees from Sheffield, it is
contended, was the apathy of many municipal leaders which persisted throughout the
first programme and has been documented in several chapters of the thesis. Not only
was there a lack of positive encouragement by city officials: at times local councillors
publicly voiced opinions which were quite negative and critical of parents who had
allowed their children to remain in the reception areas. This was hardly conducive to
success, and may well have led to the premature return home of some and, in addition,
may have inhibited parents from registering their children for future evacuation.
The local press, too, appeared ambivalent in the period before war began, and although
a policy of rather more encouragement was pursued in newspapers once bombing
started, it could be argued that it was too little and too late for the Sheffield public who
were reluctant to go away even after heavy bombardment. Locally, after the first
exodus from Sheffield, evacuation seemed almost forgotten until the city became a
reception area in 1944. Newspaper reports had dwindled after the first few months, to
the point where the return of the few remaining evacuees when the government scheme
finished scarcely merited a mention. Although press interest was briefly resurrected
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when evacuees poured into the city in July and August 1944, there was only cursory
coverage of their return at the end of the war.
Several reasons may be advanced for the premature drift back to the cities of evacuees
after the exodus of 1939, among them financial worries, the introduction of parental
contributions, dissatisfaction with billets, class hostility, religious and racial prejudice,
and the failure of the expected air-raids to materialise before the summer of 1940. All
these factors played some part in persuading evacuees to return home early and
threatened the first scheme with failure. They were also partly responsible for the
reluctance of many parents to take part in future schemes - even when the Blitzkrieg
began, for not only were rural householders 'once bitten, twice shy' about offering
homes for evacuees: urban dwellers were also loath to risk a repetition of earlier
unhappy experiences. Further, it is arguable that the public outcry at the condition and
conduct of evacuees, fuelled by newspaper reports, local rumour and hearsay, had an
adverse effect upon the success of any future evacuations.
Much was made of the failure of parents to respond to the new campaign launched in
the spring of 1940. The simple desire of families to stay together in adversity was an
important contributory factor. When the 'Trickle' programme was begun the problem
of resistance in reception areas was somewhat avoided by sending smaller parties over a
longer period of time. In 1944 Operation 'Rivulet' saw many evacuees being sent to
reception areas formerly designated danger zones, where householders may have been
less resistant to billeting because they had experienced air raids themselves. It has been
seen, however, that even then evacuees were not universally welcomed.
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There were, inevitably, omissions and mistakes in the operation of the government
scheme in the reception areas. It is clear that there was a lack of consultation with
those who were to be most affected, and not enough thought was given before the war
began to problems likely to arise in these districts: the government's prime concern,
after all, was for national security. At the beginning of the war it had not been
appreciated that provision of adequate medical and welfare services would be crucial to
the success of evacuation and there were hardly any social workers available where they
were most needed - in the reception areas." In 1939 at least, apart from teachers, the
vast majority of those involved at ground level in carrying out the plans which
bureaucrats had conceived were willing, but inexperienced, volunteers - from the
escorts in the evacuation zones to the billeting officers in receiving areas - and were
often not qualified to deal with many of the problems which arose, particularly those
concerned with the condition and behaviour of evacuees or facilities for pre-school
children.
Some lessons were learned from mistakes made in the first evacuation: in subsequent
programmes, for instance, transport plans were better adhered to, largely avoiding
muddles at reception points; this in tum led to less confusion on the education front.
Welfare services, hitherto overlooked, were put in place as the need was realised, or as
quickly as funding allowed. But other errors were repeated, as the continuance of
'cattle market' methods of selection for billeting in some places indicated. Complaints
28 C Burt, "The Billeting of Evacuated Children", British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. XI
(1941), p.87
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regarding financial shortages rumbled on throughout the war, with the Treasury
providing minimum assistance only when pressed, and often very late in the day.
The greatest impediment to the scheme's success, and one that had been grossly under-
estimated by authorities, however, was the inexorable pull of home ties. Moreover, the
failure of the scheme to appeal to those most at risk suggests that family unity was at its
strongest in the poorest sections of the population, although this would be hard to prove.
Before the war, neither parents nor children in the working classes had ever envisaged a
long period of separation from each other. If the anticipated air raids had begun when
war was declared, or if evacuation had taken place six months later, it is arguable that
public opinion would have been less concerned with the shortcomings of the evacuation
scheme and the condition of evacuees, and the drift back might have been less marked:
but this must remain a matter of conjecture.
It has not been the remit of this study to join the debate on the importance of evacuation
to the introduction of changes in social policy. Nevertheless, it is clear that evacuation
drew attention to the economic and social deprivation which existed in many inner-city
areas and which could no longer be ignored. Middle-class complacency was rocked by
the revelations, as Britain's social services were exposed as hopelessly inadequate.
With more trained social workers it is conceivable that there might have been less
trouble in the billets and less heart-ache on both sides. If nursery provision had been in
place in the reception areas, the drift back might have been lessened. It is true, as
Macnicol asserts, that some changes in social policy had already been put forward
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before the war." But it seems to this writer that evacuation highlighted the
shortcomings of existing welfare provision and demonstrated, for example, that reliance
upon untrained staff and voluntary organisations was insufficient. It served as a focus
for change and speeded up the provision of such facilities as hostels and psychological
support for disturbed children, trained social workers, welfare clinics and school meals
for all.
In all the planning and execution of the government evacuation scheme little attention
was paid to the psychological effect on unaccompanied children of being uprooted from
home and family and deposited among strangers for weeks, months, sometimes for
years. What was a skilful strategic exercise produced confusion and distress in human
and educational terms. Evacuation left in its wake many emotional problems: anecdotal
evidence and personal interviews with evacuees attest to this. Evacuation meant that
children were not only without their home background, parents and siblings, but they
also lost the familiar environment of their school, home town, amusements and often
their friends as well.
The successes went largely unrecorded, as did the feelings of the evacuees. The voices
of dissatisfied householders, on the other hand, were heard everywhere almost
immediately. As the Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Education reported, it
was "the unbilletable minority" of children who caused serious problems in the
reception areas and who gained much more notoriety than "the great majority of well
brought up and well behaved children who settled down with their foster parents".30
29 Macnicol: op. cit., p.22
30 The Health of the School Child: Report of Chief Medical Officer Ministry of Education 1939-45, p.31
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Some children adapted happily to country life and were loved and cosseted in their
billets. There were even some who were better cared for in their billets than in their
own homes, as one interviewee declared:
"We were showered with love and didn't want to go home at the
end of the war. Our foster mother was a better mother to us
than our own mother was.,,31
Other children, equally well looked after, were miserable and homesick. But what is
often overlooked is that, just as the evacuees had their rogue elements, so not all foster
parents were loving and caring: some children were brutally treated and abused and
others were treated with coldness, neglected and unloved.
The subject of evacuation has often been overlooked in accounts of the history of
Britain in the Second World War. But this study has attempted to show that it was an
event of profound significance in the lives of countless ordinary British people.
Evacuation preoccupied officials who made the plans as well as administrators, teachers
and volunteers who carried through the various programmes, and it affected country
householders who took in refugees. Above all, it concerned all the evacuees themselves
- particularly those who, leaving their parents at home, went unaccompanied into other
people's homes and were dependent upon the goodwill of strangers for weeks, months,
and sometimes for years of their childhood.
31 Oral interview: George Green, 17.12.93
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APPENDIX 1
Civil Defence Pamphlet produced by Sheffield Communist Party, July 1938
[original' kindIyrenf1JYN-E Moore; Sheffield}
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APPENDIX2
Items in the Planning of Evacuation·
I. Arrangements for road transport for expectant mothers, blind persons and physically handicapped
children.
2. The registration of expectant mothers at maternity and child welfare centres, the issue of permits for
different types of transport, and the maintenance of a 'live' register of mothers within one month of
confinement.
3. The enrolment and organisation of an adequate number of teachers and helpers to travel with the
school children.
4. Advising all parents of the luggage and clothing to be taken by children.
5. Arrangements for assembly points, entraining and detraining stations, including the organisation of
reception staff (with armlets).
6. The provision at railway stations and for the journey of water supplies and first aid and sanitary
facilities.
7. The production and distribution by the London County Council of a complete terminology of
evacuation issued to prevent misunderstanding.
8. The distribution by the London County Council of an evacuation pamphlet for mothers and children,
including a number printed in Greek for Cypriots in Soho.
9. Arrangements for a special registration day in London for the Jewish community.
10. Rehearsals by London schools in methods of crossing roads (demonstrations of 'wave' crossing).
11. Provision and distribution of emergency food rations (meat, milk, biscuits, chocolate and carrier bag)
for forty-eight hours through the Food (Defence) Plans Department, and the subsequent increase of
food supplies in reception districts.
12. Arrangements with the police to control entraining and detraining at main stations.
13. Preparation of billeting forms and notices, appointment warrants, identity labels, final warning notices,
telegrams, posters, wireless, press and cinema notices and arrangements for loud-speaker vans.
14. The organisation of petrol supplies for road transport at detraining stations.
15. Arrangements for the transfer and reception of the children and staff of day nurseries and nursery
schools.
16. Arrangements with the British Medical Association for the medical treatment of children.
17. Provision of accommodation for handicapped children including the staffing and equipping of premises.
18. Provision of adequate nursing and medical services in the reception areas, including hospital
accommodation, maternity homes and midwives and obstetricians for expectant mothers.
19. The purchase and distribution of camp beds, palliasses, blankets and rubber sheeting.
20. The appointment of billeting and reception officers and the organisation of their work.
2l. Arrangements with post offices for the payment of billeting allowances.
22. Preparations for the appointment of tribunals in reception areas to hear appeals from occupiers to vary
or cancel billeting notices.
23. Arrangements (including the opening of special offices) by the Unemployment Assistance Board to pay
allowances to evacuated adults in need of temporary assistance.
24. The preparation of railway vouchers for helpers returning to the evacuation areas.
25. The printing and distribution of postcards for the use of evacuees to announce their safe arrival and
address.
• R M Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy: History of the Second World War, pp.541,2
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APPENDIX3
Designated Evacuation Areas in Britain
September 1939*
1 London and outer metropolitan areas
2 Medway Group (Chatham, Gillingham and Rochester)
3 Southern Ports (Portsmouth, Southampton and Gosport)
4 Midlands (Birmingham, Smethwick, Coventry, Derby, Nottingham,
Walsall, West Bromwich and Oldbury)
5 Merseyside (Liverpool, Bootle, Wallasey, Birkenhead, Manchester, Salford,
Crosby, Stretford, Widnes, Litherland, Runcorn, etc.)
6 Yorkshire and Lincolnshire (Bradford, Leeds, Sheffield, Kingston-on-Hull,
Grimsby, Cleethorpes, Middlesbrough and Rotherham)
7 North-East Group (Newcastle, Gateshead, South Shields, Sunderland,
Tynemouth, West Hartlepool, Jarrow, Wallsend, Felling, Hebburn and
Whickham)
8 Scotland (Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee, Clydebank and the Rosyth area of
Dunfermline)
N.B. In England, only in a few cases outside London was the whole area scheduled as
evacuation. Most boroughs and urban districts included both evacuation and neutral
zones, and only those parts considered most vulnerable were zoned for evacuation.
In Sheffield, only the densely populated central, northern and eastern areas, with the
exception of housing estates therein, were designated evacuation zones.
• Titmuss: op. cit., p.33, n.2
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APPENDIX4
Government Leaflet delivered to householders in evacuation areas, July 1939
[original kindly lent by interviewee Mrs D Knowles]
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APPENDIX5
Timetable for Evacuation of Sheffield Schools 1 September 1939
[Details extracted from City of Sheffield: State of Emergency, 11.5.39, p.2]
TO NOTTINGHAMSHIRE
Sheffield School EntraininK Del!arture DetraininK
Station time Station
Hucklow Road Victoria 9.30 am Bingham
PitsmoorCE Victoria 9.30 am Bingham
Newhall Victoria 12.50 pm Bingham
Langsett Road Victoria 4.15 pm Bingham
Maltby Street Victoria 4.15 pm Bingham
Hammerton Darnall 8.45 am Kimberley
Woodbourn Darnall 10.50 am Kimberley
Darnall Road Darnall 1.30 pm Kimberley
Whitby Road Darnall 1.30 pm Kimberley
All Saints' Victoria 9.15 am Kimberley
NeepsendCE Victoria 10.0 am Kimberley
Wincobank Victoria 10.0 am Kimberley
Attercliffe CE Victoria 12 noon Kimberley
Carbrook CB Victoria 12 noon Kimberley
Cathedral Victoria 12 noon Kimberley
Pye Bank Victoria 8.30 am Newark
OwlerLane Victoria 10.40 am Newark
Coleridge Road Darnall 1.0pm Ruddington
Huntsman's Gardens Darnall 1.0pm Ruddington
DarnallCE Darnall 3.30pm Ruddington
Phillimore Road Darnall 3.30pm Ruddington
Crofts Victoria 4.0pm Ruddington
Tinsley Victoria 4.0pm Ruddington
Wadsley Bridge Victoria 4.0pm Ruddington
Tinsley CE Victoria 4.0pm Ruddington
Maud Maxfield Deaf All by bus nla Southwell
Morley Street Midland 2.35 pm Southwell
Springfield Midland 9.35 am Southwell
Upperthorpe Midland 11.15 am Southwell
St Jude's (Eldon Street) Midland 11.15 am Southwell
Philadelphia Midland 12.55 pm Southwell
Pomona Street Midland 12.55 pm Southwell
Park Midland 4.15 pm Southwell
Salmon Pastures Midland 4.15 pm Southwell
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TO LEICESTERSHIRE
Sheffield School Entraining Departure Detraining
Station time Station
Hillsborough Midland 10.10 am Kegworth
Bow Midland 1.30 pm Kegworth
Hillfoot Midland 1.30 pm Kegworth
Abbeydale Heeley 8.30 am Loughborough (LMS)
Sharrow Lane Heeley 11.0 am Loughborough(LMS)
Carfield Heeley 12.40 pm Loughborough (LMS)
Lowfield Heeley 2.20pm Loughborough (LMS)
St Barnabas CE (Alderson Road) Heeley 2.20pm Loughborough (LMS)
St Barnabas CE (Cecil Road) Heeley 2.20pm Loughborough (LMS)
St Stephen's Midland 9.20 am Loughborough(LMS)
St Wilfrid's RC Midland 9.20 am Loughborough (LMS)
St Silas' CE Midland 11.50 am Loughborough(LMS)
St Vincent's RC Midland 11.50 am Loughborough (LMS)
Sale Memorial Midland 11.50 am Loughborough(LMS)
Netherthorpe Midland 3.10 pm Loughborough (LMS)
St Joseph's RC Midland 3.10 pm Loughborough (LMS)
St Mary's (Hermitage Street) Midland 3.10pm Loughborough (LMS)
St Mary's (Walkley) Midland 3.10 pm Loughborough(LMS)
St Matthias' CE Midland 3.10pm Loughborough(LMS)
St Simon's CE Midland 3.10 pm Loughborough(LMS)
Brightside Victoria 2.15pm Loughborough (LNE)
Burngreave Victoria 2.15 pm Loughborough (LNE)
Attercliffe Victoria 3.45 pm Loughborough (LNE)
St Charles' RC Victoria 3.45pm Loughborough (LNE)
Broomhall Nursery Midland 8.45 am Melton Mowbray
Burgoyne Road Midland 8.45 am Melton Mowbray
Denby Street Nursery Midland 8.45 am Melton Mowbray
Duchess Road Midland 10.25 am Melton Mowbray
Woodside Midland 10.25 am Melton Mowbray
Wybourn Midland 12.05 pm Melton Mowbray
St Marie's RC Midland 1.45pm Melton Mowbray
Walkley Midland 1.45 pm Melton Mowbray
Hillsborough RC Midland 3.25 pm Melton Mowbray
St George's CE Midland 3.25 pm Melton Mowbray
St John's (School Street) Midland 3.25 pm Melton Mowbray
St John's (Cricket Road) Midland 3.25 pm Melton Mowbray
Carbrook Victoria 9.0am Quorn & Woodhouse
Ellesmere Road Victoria 11.40 am Quorn & Woodhouse
Firs Hill Victoria 12.30pm Quorn & Woodhouse
St Catherine's RC Victoria 12.30 pm Quorn & Woodhouse
Grimesthorpe Victoria 2.45 pm Quorn & Woodhouse
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APPENDIX6
Number and proportion of unaccompanied school children evacuated from certain
areas on the outbreak of war
[Details extracted from R M Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy: History of the Second World
War, pp.550,1]
Countt Boroulh No. of children No. evacuated % evacuated
Newcastle 39,800 28.300 71
Gateshead 14,900 10,598 71
South Shields 12,300 3,826 31
Tynemouth 4,600 1,481 32
Sunderland 25,100 8,289 33
West Hartlepool 8,000 2,881 36
Middlesborough 16,700 5,171 31
Leeds 57,400 18,935 33
Bradford 29,900 7,484 25
Bootle 10,500 7,123 68
Liverpool 99,500 60,795 61
Wallasey 3,500 2,662 76
Birkenhead 15,100 9,350 62
Manchester 96,000 66,300 69
Salford 23,800 18,043 76
Rotherham 4,100 332 8
Sheffield 35,600 5,338 15
Derby 12,700 3,438 27
Nottingham 21,600 4,763 22
Walsall 2,000 360 18
West Bromwich 6,900 1,786 26
Smethwick 9,300 2,219 24
Birmingham 101,000 25,241 25
Coventry 15,400 3,082 20
Portsmouth 39,900 11,970 30
Southampton 30,200 11,175 37
London Administrative County 490,000 241,000 49
*Only in a few instances outside London was the whole area under the local education authority
evacuated. Most county boroughs includedboth neutral and evacuation zones. The figures given refer to
the latter.
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APPENDIX 7
Evacuees received in wholly reception counties of England and Wales
September 1939
[Statistics extracted from R M Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy: History of the Second World
War, p.553]
Evacuees % received to
County received numbers expected
Bedfordshire 37,163 45
Berkshire 36,832 50
Buckinghamshire 31,345 47
Cambridgeshire 14,480 34
Cornwall 2,576 3
Cumberland 22,499 51
Dorsetshire 19,807 44
Isle of Ely 8,425 40
Herefordshire 6,697 38
Huntingdonshire 8,658 52
Lincolnshire (Holland) 8,682 33
Lincolnshire (Kesteven) 1,655 7
Northamptonshire 42,529 44
Oxfordshire 21,502 43
Soke of Peterborough 2,424 15
Rutland 2,712 49
Shropshire 20,604 45
Somerset 46,532 42
Suffolk East 38,842 59
Suffolk West 8,842 38
Sussex East 72,527 53
Sussex West 41,656 51
Westmorland 9,775 55
Isle of Wight 5,201 23
Wiltshire 25,659 45
Wales ex Glamorgan & Monmouthshire 56,987 32
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APPENDIX8
Destinations of Sheffield Schools evacuated to Leicestershire,
1 & 2 September 1939, demonstrating how schools were scattered
[Details extracted from Leicestershire Education Committee Attendance Record of
Evacuated School Parties 1939-1940, Leicester Record Office File DE.2144/269]
Sending School Receiving School
Attercliffe Council Rothley C of E Senior
Attercliffe Council Rothley C of E Infants
Atterc1iffe Council Swithland C of E
Attercliffe C of E South Charnwood
Bow Council Breedon C of E
Bow Council Old Dalby C of E
Brightside Council Barrow on Soar C of E
Brightside Council Barrow on Soar Council
Brightside Council Burton on the Wolds Council
Broomhall Nursery Melton Mowbray C ofE Infants
Burgoyne Rd Melton Mowbray Primary. Boys
Burgoyne Rd Melton Mowbray Primary.Girls
Burngreave South Charnwood
Carbrook Council Anstey Latimer St
Carbrook Council Anstey Main St
Carbrook Council Newtown Linford Council
Carbrook Council Rearsbv C ofE
Carbrook Council Thurcaston C of E
Carbrook Council Thunnaston Roundhill
Denby Street Nursery Melton Mowbray C ofE Infants
Duchess Road Council ABB Kettleby Council
Duchess Road Council Scalford C of E
Duchess Road Council Freeby C ofE
Duchess Road Council Stapleford & Saxby C of E
Duchess Road Council Frisby on the Wolds C ofE
Ellesmere Road Barkby Council
Ellesmere Road !Oueniborough C ofE
Ellesmere Road Svston Parochial Junior
Ellesmere Road Svston Parochial Infants
Firs Hill Council Mountsorrel St Peter's
Firs Hill Council Mountsorrel Baptist School Room
Grimesthorpe Council Baptist School Room Quorn
Grimesthorpe Council 1000m C ofE Infants
Grimesthorpe Council Ratcliffe on the Wreake
Hillfoot Council Castle Donington C of E
Hillfoot Council Castle Donington Modern
Hillsborough Council Castle Donington Modern
Hillsborough Council Kegworth
Hillsborough RC Melton Mowbray RC
Netherthorpe Council Shepshed Council Senior
Netherthorpe Council Shepshed Council Infants
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Senior boys from Melton Mowbray rural area Melton Mowbray Modem B<>y_s
Senior girls from Melton Mowbray rural area Melton Mowbray Modem Girls
St Catherine's RC Sileby C ofE
St Catherine's RC Cossington
St Catherine's RC Sile~ Council
St Charles's RC Si1e~C ofE
St George's C ofE Branston C of E
St George's C ofE Goad~ Marwood
St George's C ofE Waltham C ofE
St George's C ofE Croxton Kerrial Council
St John's Cricket Rd Croxton Kerrial Council
St John's Cricket Rd Eastwell C of E
St John's Cricket Rd Eaton Council
St John's Cricket Rd Barsby Council
St John's School St Rotherby
St Joseph's RC Shepshed RC Senior
St Joseph's RC Shepshed RC Infants
St Marie's Melton Mowbray RC
St Mary's Sh~shed Council Senior
StMary's Shepshed Council Infants
St Matthias Shepshed Council Senior
St Matthias Shepshed Council Infants
St Simon's C ofE Shepshed Council Senior
St Simon's C ofE Shepshed Council Infants
Walkley Council Great Dalby Council
Walkley Council Knossington C of E
Walkley Council Somerb_yCouncil
Walkley Council T~rd Council
Walkley Council Burrough C ofE
Walkley Council Sproxton
Walkley Council Saltby C ofE
Woodside Melton Mowbrl!Y_Prim"!!y:B<>y_s
Woodside Melton Mowbray Prir ......y.Girls
Wybourn Council Bottesford C of E
Wyboum Council Harby Council
Wybourn Council HoseC ofE
Wybourn Council Lon_gClawson C ofE
Wyboum Council Barkestone C of E
Wyboum Council Stathem Council
Wyboum Council Kni_Q_tonC of E
Unknown Melton Mowbray C ofE Infants
Unknown Wymondham C ofE
Unknown Hoby C of ElAsford~ Council
Unknown Redmile C of E
Schools evacuated to Leicestershire but unaccounted for: Abbeydale, Carfield,
Lowfield, Sharrow Lane, St Barnabas C of E, St Silas C of E, St Stephen's C of E,
St Vincent's RC, St Wilfrid's RC, Sale Memorial.
401
APPENDIX9
Sheffield Rest Centres for Reception of Evacuees from the South of England 1944*
Eastern District Darnall Public Hall
South East District Hollinsend Methodist Church
Intake Methodist Church
Prince of Wales Methodist Church
Ri<!geway Road Social Welfare Centre
Woodhouse Wesley Methodist Church
North East District Beck Rod Methodist Church
Ellesmere Road Methodist Church
Shiregreen Congregational Church
Sicey Avenue Social Welfare Centre
Western District Broompark Congregational Church
Broomspring Congregational Church
Crookes Wesley Hall
Hanover Methodist Church
St Timothy's Church, Slinn Street
South West District Ann's Road Methodist Church
Banner Cross Methodist Church
Bents Green Methodist Church
Carterknowle Road Methodist Church
Dore & Totley Union Church
Endcliffe Congregational Church
Endcliffe Park Methodist Church
Greystones Methodist Church
Holmhirst Road Methodist Church
Meersbrook Park Congregational Church
Meersbrook Park Methodist Church
Millhouses Methodist Church
Norton Lees Parish Hall
Oak Street Methodist Church
Plantation Road Methodist Church
Psalter Lane Methodist Church
St Chad's Parish Hall, Abbey Lane
St Peter's Mission Hall. Fitzroy Road
Totley Rise Methodist Church
North West District Birley Carr Methodist Church
Hillsborough Trinity Methodist Church
Hillsborough Wesley Methodist Church
St Mark's Methodist Church
Wadsley Bridge Methodist Church
* Information taken from Sheffield Archive File CA 50915: Lord Mayor's Secretary's
files 1938-46
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